Bitter Harvest

by Ian Smith

  The date for the conference was fixed for Monday 25 August. We flew up to the Falls the day before, in order to check on the arrangements and ensure that our people were giving maximum assistance and co-operation to the South Africans. We were met by a horde of press men and TV cameras. The whole place was buzzing, and it was obvious that the novel concept of a conference in a railway carriage on the middle of the Falls Bridge had caught the world’s imagination. The South Africans would be happy, I knew.

  We went straight down to Devil’s Cataract and had a brisk walk around that corner of the Falls and, as always, it was magnificent and exhilarating. Then we went on to the bridge to have a look at the conference set-up. The saloon was exactly in the middle, bisected by the boundary line, impressive with its stinkwood furniture, but once the delegates were seated at the table there would be no space for people to move from one end to the other. There were buffet saloons attached to both ends, loaded with every conceivable kind of drink. This worried me, knowing how different people react differently to alcohol. The presence of so much of it was hardly going to be conducive to the atmosphere we were trying to create for a serious and contentious meeting which was going to be charged with emotion. The last thing the participants required was additional stimulation!

  After lunch we exchanged ideas and discussed tactics. Our position was straightforward, as had been accepted at the Pretoria meeting, where Mark Chona, Kaunda’s representative, had made the agreement with Vorster. The plan was simple: bring the two opposing sides together, the Rhodesian government and the black nationalist leaders, to reach an agreement that each side would appoint representatives to meet in Salisbury in order to negotiate a new constitution. We had made two requests: first, there should be no pre-conditions and, second, the negotiations should take place in Rhodesia. It was, after all, a meeting of Rhodesians discussing a constitution for Rhodesia. Vorster sent me a personal message to assure me that our requests were accepted unreservedly, and Chona had brought with him a message from Kaunda confirming that the question of one man, one vote was not for consideration. It all looked good in theory, but we wondered if the deeds would match the words. On the one side we had Vorster coaching the Rhodesian team, and on the other Kaunda (and Nyerere) coaching the black nationalists. The Rhodesians would play according to the rules of the game, but what about the black nationalists? Their record was far from consistent.

  We received confirmation that Vorster was flying up from Pretoria the next morning, Monday 25 August. He and Kaunda would personally give their blessing to the conference and then leave it to the two delegations to get on with the substance. My passing comment, before our meeting broke up, was that it would have been much easier, and more certain of success, if we had simply received a message after the Vorster–Chona meeting in Pretoria, informing us that the plan had been finalised and a date given (which could have been agreed) for the negotiating team to meet in Salisbury. That would have avoided all the ballyhoo and the expense, and time consumed in laying on this jamboree. I was quickly reminded by one of my colleagues, however, that I had missed the main point: South Africa’s involvement and the credit which they would derive from it, and thus the need for maximum publicity.

  We went down to the Falls once again for a late-afternoon viewing, with the setting sun as a background, and the rainbow in the spray was more spectacular than at our morning visit. One of the attractions of Victoria Falls is that its character can change, not only by the day, but often by the hour. We had a good dinner, a stroll in the fresh air and got off to bed early so that we would be up bright and fresh with the dawn.

  Vorster, accompanied by Hilgard Muller, duly arrived in good time and was brought to our hotel, where accommodation had been laid on for the day. We were staying at the new Elephant Hills Hotel, a magnificent place overlooking the Zambezi a short distance above the Falls. We could see the spray billowing up on our right and immediately below was the beautiful golf course designed by Gary Player. As we looked down over the scene, Vorster commented: ‘I wish we had the time to stay over an extra day, I would enjoy a round on this course. ’There were kudu and impala grazing the green grass, and warthog running around with their tails sticking straight up into the air.

  We went inside and talked about the meeting, and Vorster reassured me that the plan was on course. Only yesterday Kaunda had reiterated that our nationalist leaders had received a firm message from both him and Nyerere that there could be no backing down from the agreement. Vorster had warned Kaunda that he did not have time to waste on any wild goose chase, so he was satisfied that my fears were unfounded. I was pleased to hear this and simply repeated that it was in conflict with our information, but that we would soon know the truth. The Rhodesian team were ready, I said, and he could rest assured that we would honour the agreement. He graciously expressed his appreciation to me, conceding that he was well aware of our reservations, and thus that we were reluctant participants. He believed the result today would prove that our fears were unfounded. He said he would be meeting Kaunda on the northern side of the bridge, and together they would put in an appearance at the opening ceremony to make it clear that what we were about to do had their support and blessing. Thereafter they would retire to an adjoining coach on the Rhodesian side to hold their own meeting while we were in session. The meeting between Vorster and Kaunda, their first ever, was an important breakthrough for Vorster’s détente. Relations between the two countries had been cool for some time, as Kaunda had accused Vorster of misleading him on an issue they had been working on, so this would be an additional bonus from the bridge meeting.

  We motored down separately, parked on the Rhodesian side of the bridge, and walked across. After examining the conference layout, Vorster continued and met up with Kaunda on the Zambian side, and they returned together. We talked for a few minutes before they moved on to their coach on the Rhodesian side. We moved in to the conference area, and gradually the others from the Zambian side drifted in. There were six on our side, and about forty on theirs, packed in like sardines. Vorster and Kaunda then entered; fortunately at our end, where there was room to move, but only just. It would have been impossible to move from one end to the other without walking along the top of the table. First Vorster, and then Kaunda spoke, briefly and tactfully, wishing us success and God’s speed in our mission to bring peace to Rhodesia, and then departed to their saloon to await the result, which, according to the plan, should have come soon.

  Muzorewa was sitting in the chair at the opposite end of the table to me. At least that was in keeping with the plan, as there had been some speculation that he would have been replaced by Nkomo or Sithole. I asked if he wished to open proceedings, or if he would like me to do so. He chose to speak first and immediately got into his stride, out of keeping with his usual retiring, even timid character. It was obvious that he had been primed by the aggressive members around him and had been forced to change his stance in order to retain his position as leader. He stated that during the days preceding the conference they had given very deep thought to the proposals which he was about to submit to us. They believed it was important to be direct and honest, so that there was no doubt in our minds as to what they believed necessary if we were to reach agreement. First, and most important, one man, one vote was a basic necessity. In addition they demanded an amnesty for all terrorists, including those who had been convicted of murder by our High Court, and the right of everyone to return to Rhodesia immediately to conduct political campaigns.

  This was a blatant breach of the agreement on which the conference had been arranged. I replied with the utmost calm and dignity that I had been assured on a number of occasions by Mr Vorster that both President Kaunda and President Nyerere had confirmed to him that the Rhodesian black nationalist leaders in Zambia had accepted that this conference was being held purely and simply to bring together the Rhodesian government and the nationalist leaders in order, first, to agree to hold a meeting to resolve their differences, and s
econd, to determine a venue in Rhodesia. Specifically we were assured that no pre-conditions were to be discussed and, in particular, the question of one man, one vote was not at issue. Moreover, I said, all this had been confirmed to me only this morning by both Vorster and Kaunda. Accordingly, we were taken aback by this new and unexpected confrontation. Clearly, from what I have said before, it was not unexpected by the Rhodesian team — we had given ample warning that from our experience we doubted that they would comply. In keeping with their Marxist-Leninist training an agreement was something which enabled them to win a tactical advantage, to gain ground and thereafter to be rejected.

  My reply provoked a flood of rhetoric. The speakers evaded my question and returned to their parrot-cry of being a suppressed people who had been denied freedom in their own country. All they were seeking, they said, was to return home and live normal, peaceful lives. I allowed them free rein, and when they eventually appeared to have run out of steam, I simply reminded them that there was nothing preventing them all from returning home at any time and leading normal, peaceful lives. They were in their current position of their own volition, and the whole purpose of our meeting was to clear the decks and facilitate the process. I refrained from reminding them of how they had rejected all the opportunities offered to them by the various agreements made with British governments. These had promised them preferential franchise facilities and extra money to improve educational studies, to develop their farming areas, and generally to promote improved facilities for our black people. I was tempted to remind them that our constitution offered all Rhodesians equal rights, equal access to the vote whatever their race, colour or creed, in fact, preferential facilities for our black people. But sadly, at the instigation of their nationalist leaders, accompanied by the usual intimidation, they had rejected these offers, renounced the method of constitutional evolution, and in its place resorted to unconstitutional means and terrorism in order to overthrow the legal government of our country.

  My brief contribution enabled them to get their second wind, and they came back more vehemently than before, covering all the same ground again, and then adding that it was pointless, indeed, presumptuous of anyone else to believe that they could negotiate on their behalf. They were not prepared to delegate that authority to anybody. This was no surprise to me, as it was exactly in keeping with the message which I had given to Vorster and his associates on more than one occasion. Vorster, however, assured me that, on this occasion, it would be different because Kaunda and Nyerere were not only their black nationalists mentors, but also controlled their lifelines, and were in a position to throttle them if they dared attempt to bite the hand which was feeding them. Vorster reminded me that the exercise he was urging me to participate in was not the brainchild of the South Africans working in isolation, but that Kaunda and Nyerere had made it abundantly clear that they were determined to bring the Rhodesian problem to finality, as it was clear to them that the terrorists were failing in their mission, and Zambia and Tanzania were carrying the can — they had had enough.

  For me it was time for a break, to get outside for some fresh air and away from the buzzing noise of the air conditioner. It was even more important to confront Vorster and Kaunda with the impasse in which we were landed. My suggestion of an adjournment was welcomed from the opposite side, and there was a rapid evacuation from the saloon. We were informed that Vorster and Kaunda had departed from the bridge some time earlier, and gone their separate ways. So we returned to our hotel to meet up with Vorster, while our counterparts from the Zambian side of the conference table lost no time in occupying their refreshment saloon with all its inviting contents, both solid and liquid. Not a very promising outlook for the afternoon session. As it turned out, however, I need not have worried. During lunch we related what had transpired to Vorster and Hilgard Muller. Clearly, they were shocked. Muller was obviously deep in thought, trying to fathom out a scheme, and eventually he produced one. After lunch, he said, I was to accompany him across the river to Livingstone, where together we would meet Kaunda and sort out the problem. But one could immediately see the fallacy in his plan: Kaunda conniving with Ian Smith in order to outwit the black Rhodesian politicians and force them back into line. The idea was still-born. Vorster was quick to agree with me, and decided that he was returning to Pretoria. As they were discussing whether Muller should stay to meet Kaunda and Mark Chona, we decided to take our leave of them and prepare for our return to Salisbury. I resisted the temptation to emphasise that once again our assessment had been proved correct. We knew from experience that any such comment was best left unsaid.

  We sent a message to the captain of our aircraft to plan for our impending departure, and went to the airport via the bridge to see if, perhaps, there was any chance of a resumption. Apart from the train crew and the security personnel, the place was deserted. We were informed that within about an hour our ‘friends’ had drained their saloon dry of its contents, and had weaved their way across the bridge to their cars on the north bank. I was pleased to hear from the steward in our saloon that not a single bottle had been opened. ‘Not like over there,’ he said, looking contemptuously to the northern side. They must have rejoiced with a gigantic celebration, because both saloons were stocked to the ceiling with every imaginable liquor from Drambuie, Scotch whisky, KWV brandy and the rest — enough to satisfy any normal requirements for a long while. It had been cleaned out in a few hours! And sadly, in return, the South Africans had been told to mind their own business.

  There was a clear difference in attitude between the black and white sides. Although Kaunda and Nyerere had given a commitment on behalf of the black leaders to negotiate without preconditions, when the black leaders rejected that commitment, they concurred. My sources confirmed that both Kaunda and Nyerere were openly saying that it was not for them to tell black Rhodesians how to solve their problems, as this would be tantamount to interfering in their internal affairs — branded as an unpardonable crime worldwide. By contrast, the South Africans were attempting to solve the problem in the best interests of South Africa. Whenever we put forward our thoughts or ideas, we received a clear message — ‘or else’! It is difficult to point a critical finger at the black people about loyalty to their cause and their people. However, the history of white communities is littered with cases of deceit, treachery and betrayal. One can but hope that our case will be an object lesson for future South Africans. When the crunch comes the blacks will stand together, but with the white people, dog starts eating dog.

  Jack Gaylard arrived at the bridge from the hotel to say that a message had come from Livingstone indicating that there was no hope of carrying on with the meeting that afternoon. From the description which we had received of the condition of a number of their delegates, I doubted whether any of them would have been fit to make a meaningful contribution even the following day. We went on our way.

  We had a pleasant flight home, and over a cup of tea philosophised over the day’s events. Our hopes for developments in the cracks which had begun to appear in the ranks of the terrorists would have suffered a setback, for a strong message would now go out assuring them of the success of the conference, and the need for continuing a strong and united effort for the final victory that was now within sight. In contrast to the general incompetence which permeates communism in practice, their propaganda machine is highly efficient, and we would have to be prepared for this. It was a sad setback, as we had been receiving growing evidence that large numbers of terrorists had come to the conclusion that their methods could never succeed, and that the only sensible way was negotiation. After all, the Rhodesian government had on many occasions shown their willingness to meet and talk and the ‘men in the bush’ now believed that their leaders would accept this offer. Now more time would be wasted before anything further could be done because it would take time for the rank and file in the bush to realise that the Falls Bridge meeting had produced no results. We accepted that we would have to pick up the
threads, as we had done before, but Rhodesians were acclimatised to this, and would not be found wanting.

  15

  The Kissinger Agreement

  of 1976

  After the collapse of the Falls Bridge conference Muzorewa decided to travel, visiting Britain and the USA, in an attempt to drum up support. Sithole concentrated on building up his power base in Lusaka, Mugabe did likewise in Mozambique, and Nkomo decided to come back and try his hand in Salisbury. So much for the agreement which Vorster sold to us, with the support of Kaunda and Nyerere, on the basis that they had united the four leaders.

  The Falls Bridge débâcle, followed by the disastrous incursion into Angola in November–December 1975, in no way dampened the spirits of the South Africans. Having failed in their efforts to use the British and, following that, Kaunda and Nyerere, as a lever to solve the Rhodesian problem, they now saw an opening to use America. Hitherto the Americans had shown little interest in southern Africa, but they were now beginning to awaken to the insidious encroachment of Soviet imperialism down the continent. They did tend to blow hot and cold, understandably so, because their main concern was their confrontation with the USSR, and that involved them principally in Europe, and thereafter the Middle East and Central America. So we were subjected to a continuing subtle pressure, never applied directly to me, but around the corner via our mission in South Africa or through our Foreign Affairs Ministry’s contacts with the South African delegation in Salisbury, always indicating that they were not attempting to interfere in our affairs, but if they could be of assistance …