Bitter Harvest

by Ian Smith

  In my opinion there was a decent, honest way for South Africa that would preserve their Western civilisation. It was obvious that discrimination based on race, colour or creed was undesirable and unacceptable in any civilised community. But this did not mean that the safeguarding of rights, culture, tradition and decent standards should not be attempted, especially for minorities unable to defend themselves. They should introduce a strong federal system, which would encourage different groups to protect their identity, traditions and way of life, and secure this in a constitution immune from tampering and underhand influence. The large number of diverse nations and groupings in their country would support and protect such a system. Time was of the essence, because under their current system they were draining their economy, prejudicing expansion, depleting their white population, aggravating race relations not only with blacks but with their Coloured and Asian communities as well. This was having the effect of uniting everyone else in the country into a strong opposition against the white community, something which many of them would have liked to avoid. They simply wished to be treated with dignity, as human beings, and not regarded as second-class citizens. The important point was that they were not seeking power, and, in fact, would join with others in order to ensure that the communists did not succeed in their dream of securing a one-party dictatorship. It seemed to me that this would be the way to protect their civilisation, spike the guns of their opponents and once more open their doors to Western investment and immigration with all its professionalism, technology, skill and experience. Ensuring that people were content, with the opportunity to work for a better way of life, was the best solution to the problems of any country.

  For a while there was no talk on the aircraft. We were all deep in thought, no doubt contemplating the future and wondering what hope there was for us as part of this strange world where one could no longer rely on loyalty, friendship, promises, a code of conduct — those old-fashioned qualities that no longer seemed to be of value. I said to myself those words which I have never forgotten from the day they were spoken to me by John MacDonald, one of the finest and most respected men I ever knew, our senior English teacher at the school I attended in Gwelo: ‘The friends thou hast, and their adoption tried, grapple them to thy heart with hoops of steel.’ They were certainly few and far between those days!

  We had a safe return flight and I was back home in good time to join the rest of the family for Janet’s birthday dinner — a happy occasion which helped me to forget my problems for a while. Our two eldest children, Jean and Robert, married members of well-known local families, and fortunately these turned out to be happy and successful affairs. Alec, the youngest of our clan, was engaged to a Norwegian girl whom we had never met. Elisabeth arrived on a ‘familiarisation’ visit to have a look at us and allow us to have a look at her. She is a beautiful and charming girl, completely natural, and we have all fallen in love with her. Alec has made a fabulous choice, and in fact has shown great maturity over the whole affair, particularly gratifying because there is no more important decision in a man’s life.

  For the remainder of the month of November, we held executive council and ministers’ council meetings almost on a daily basis, and gradually, through continually hammering away, we progressed with the constitution. There were embarrassing moments when certain members, through self-interest, attempted to insert conditions which were outside the terms of our agreement, but responsible opinion prevailed in the final event; 30 November was a great day: the final agreement was ready and the four executive council members supported by their ministers’ council members stood together and presented their case to the media. There were to be eight electoral regions, in keeping with the boundaries of the existing eight provinces. Of paramount importance was the devolution of powers to provincial authorities for all those matters affecting the daily lives of the people, such as education, health, local government, communications and law and order at the provincial level. Most important of all, the first majority rule government would have cabinet ministers proportionally reflecting on a party basis the representation in the legislative assembly. Right from the beginning this had been my foremost aspiration for two principal reasons: first it would contribute towards better government by including the experience, professionalism and skills of our white community; and second, it would help to maintain white confidence and morale, thus reducing the exodus of our people. In other words, we would have a government of national unity to help bind our people together in order to ensure that we could overcome the immediate difficulties before us and bring terrorism to an end.

  The British and Americans had not given up on their pursuit of their settlement, however. Their envoys, Cledwyn Hughes and Steven Low, arrived on 5 December to see if we could make progress on the all-party conference. Hughes began by attempting to obtain our concurrence to the introduction of new conditions, obviously favourable to the Patriotic Front of Mugabe and Nkomo, that had not previously been discussed. Both Sithole and Muzorewa jumped on him, expressing dismay that he should attempt to introduce pre-conditions when he was aware this was contrary to what had previously been agreed. We had expected them to give us a venue and date for the conference. I quoted from the State Department’s minute of our last meeting in Washington of 20 October, which proved conclusively that their suggestion was a deviation from that agreement. Was this deliberate, or a mistake indicating that they had not taken the trouble to check the record? There was an embarrassing silence and, after fumbling for a while, Hughes queried the need for and desirability of our national government. Muzorewa simply asked why it was right for Britain to do this during the last world war, and wrong for us to do likewise under similar circumstances? That effectively shut up that one. The trouble was that they knew so little about our case, and we had the complete story. Every time they moved, they put their foot in it. In a short space of time the meeting collapsed, and they went off to think about it. Their problem was that they were trying to comply with further demands from the Patriotic Front, instead of pointing out that an agreement had been made and therefore they must comply with it. But that would mean standing up to the OAU and the communists — what a hope!

  After lunch Hughes and Low came to see me at ‘Independence’ in an attempt to gain some concession that might help them to win the Patriotic Front across. I spoke to them about the crisis of confidence and the resultant loss of expertise, professionalism, experience, skills and capital through emigration. I explained that this had been triggered off by Britain’s failure to honour the 1976 Pretoria agreement. Why did they not comply with this, then the problem would be solved? They sat speechless for a while and then pleaded ignorance. If we showed weakness, I said, and gave more ground to the terrorists, this would only exacerbate the situation and further lower morale and increase despondency. There was one clear, obvious answer, which would provide an immediate solution: the British and Americans had to cease trying to appease the terrorists. They were a bit depressed when they departed, and Low (the American) said with a tinge of emotion in his voice that he had developed a great love for Rhodesia, and now this meant that he would never be coming back again. I urged him to cheer up; where there was life, there was hope!

  The next day, 6 December, brought another American visitor. Senator McGovern was on a visit to Rhodesia and came to meet me in the afternoon. I told him that I had heard from people, with whom he had held discussions, that he was accusing me of lacking integrity and good faith and that this was prejudicing our settlement. I told him I hoped he could substantiate his claims. He was a bit taken aback, but soon collected his thoughts and started by mentioning the distrust which existed between the members of our transitional government. I replied that I found that strange in view of the fact that only a week ago we had all stood together in public at a press conference and announced the finalisation of our new constitution and plans for our impending general election. Did that not debunk his story? He then turned to the State Department briefi
ng which he had received, and discovered that this was in conflict with his findings here. I was able to produce the agreement which we had made with them in Washington just over a month previously, and said we were patiently waiting for his government to comply with that. Then I reminded him of the agreement signed with Henry Kissinger in 1976. Could he explain, I asked, why his government had reneged on that? He quickly side-stepped that one, but was honest enough to admit that on the evidence before him he had been misled by the State Department, and graciously apologised for his false accusations against me. Then we talked at length, covering much ground, and his approach was totally constructive. In the end he gave an undertaking to add his weight to the call for a removal of sanctions, and the holding of an all-party conference without preconditions. It sounded hopeful, but I wondered if he was going to be any different from so many of the others who pledged support while they were here, but readily changed their minds when under pressure from other quarters!

  Apart from visitors I met our caucus, as Parliament was winding up for the Christmas recess and, especially in view of difficult times we were going through, it was important to keep them fully in the picture in order to eliminate any communication gap that might lead to misunderstanding. They had behaved most responsibly and, by taking time and having more than normal patience, I had succeeded in getting them to go along with a number of tough decisions. It was necessary to reaffirm constantly the deceit of our ‘friends’ in the free world, and the double standards with which we were confronted, and that this encompassed the South Africans as well. On the positive side, we had succeeded in producing an agreement and a new constitution with conditions calculated to preserve decent civilised standards. This would help to maintain the confidence of our white community and thus, we hoped, curb the flow of emigrants. As all of our enemies, in particular the communists and the terrorists, were becoming increasingly antagonistic to our plan, this must mean only one thing: we were moving in the right direction, and we had to keep up the pressure.

  The South Africans remained a problem. Their judicial enquiry into the ‘Information Scandal’ had hit the headlines, and the judicial commission did not seem to have pulled their punches. Unfortunately it seemed as if Vorster could be implicated. It appeared that there was still much below the surface which was yet to come out. The problem for us was that this tended to make them oversensitive, with their Foreign Affairs Ministry looking for means of diverting attention. Hawkins told us that he was inundated with questions about the need for statements from our government of national unity, stressing the safeguards for maintaining standards and preserving the confidence of our white community. Was it necessary for me to make public statements? Why should not the black members of executive council do this? Did we not realise this was provocative to the OAU?

  In response, we sent a message to Hawkins requesting him to point out to the people down there that our four executive council members rotated in the chair weekly and statements emanated on this basis. The exception was that, until the constitution was promulgated and became the law, I was still Prime Minister and had to make certain announcements if they were to have any meaning. Moreover, the majority of our government were black ministers and they were adamant about the need to stress those conditions which would maintain white confidence internally, and externally the confidence of the free world, with the goodwill and investment which this would attract. Hawkins replied that he had given them this message a hundred times, but because of their obsession with appeasing Kaunda and Nyerere and the OAU they turned a deaf ear to it. It seemed quite clear that our plans to preserve confidence through the promotion of decent standards of civilisation, ensuring freedom, justice, prosperity and economic stability were regarded as of no consequence. And into the bargain they continued to inform the South African public that they were not attempting to pressurise us.

  We had to keep trying to influence the outside world. A constructive interview with British TV on 14 December gave me an opportunity to put over a few truths. I told them that I did not believe Callaghan would face up to their much-vaunted all-party conference with no preconditions. We were waiting for the call, I said, but my gut-feeling was that they would back down because the OAU and their protégés were opposed. It would not be the first time that the UK and US administrations had resorted to deceit and sided with the communist terrorists behind our backs.

  There was a unanimous decision that we would all take a break over Christmas and the New Year, so we flew down to the farm in the usual DC3 with the children, grandchildren and the dogs. It was a beautiful time to go, because there had been good rains, the country was looking lush green, the cattle were sleek and the mealies growing apace. The children enjoyed themselves driving tractors, riding horses and milking cows.

  Regrettably, our security forces had to be more on guard than normal because the terrorists took advantage of such times to ply their evil trade, hoping that they could catch people off guard, especially women and children. A few such reports came in, including one on a farm about twenty miles from us, where a wife was brutally murdered and mutilated while her husband was away dealing with his cattle. On my return to Salisbury, I was shown dreadful photographs of approximately 200 cows lying dead in a kraal where they had been collected for veterinary inoculations the following morning. They had been mowed down by terrorist machine-guns during the night. The photographs showed baby calves trying to drink milk from their dead mothers lying on the ground. People who can perpetrate this kind of crime are more animal than human.

  In my New Year broadcast to the nation I gave an assessment of the position in which Rhodesians found themselves. One particular issue I dwelt on was the constant drain of skilled manpower through emigration. I said:

  The main effect of the emigration of skilled personnel, which accelerated in 1978, will be felt in 1979 and become more severe unless the trend is stopped. This will be the main difference between 1978 and 1979. A growing shortage of skilled personnel will reduce rather than create employment. It will have an adverse effect on productivity. The basic fabric of the economy is, however, intact and it will respond quickly to any improvement in conditions.

  One afternoon I had a meeting with Albert Mells (MP for Gatooma) and his constituency committee, who were threatening to walk out on him because of their disenchantment with our proposed new constitution. We talked for a few hours and, after I gave them proof of the pressure we were being subjected to by the South African government, they conceded that we had no option. Included in his delegation were a few people of Afrikaner descent, and they were especially shaken by the information which I had given them, and apologised with emotion for the inconvenience to which I had been put, one of them with tears in his eyes. They could not credit that the South African government had behaved in such a manner, and in particular that they were deceiving public opinion by their oft-repeated statements that in no way were they attempting to pressurise us.

  A note in my diary:

  The Abdim’s Storks have been back with us for a few weeks (from their annual summer migration to Europe) and we have been worried that our old friend with the broken and buckled leg had not shown up — he has been here regularly for the past four years. Well he’s back on the lawn in front of the house, and Janet and I went out and talked to him this morning, and as I rode my cycle around this evening he was very much in control of the situation and quite unconcerned. We are thrilled.

  The brutal murder of rural people continued even though our security forces hammered ZANLA and ZIPRA both internally and externally. The South African pressure continued. For example, on 20 January 1979 I had a visit from David Smith and David Young, Minister and Secretary of Finance respectively, to brief me on their visit with Ernest Bulle, his Co-Minister of Finance, to South Africa the previous month, and to have a general discussion on the economic picture. They were scathing in their condemnation of Pik Botha’s insulting behaviour: ‘After twenty years’ experience at this kind of meeti
ng, that was in a class of its own for rank bad manners and emotional acting.’ Botha had also behaved so abominably that Bulle commented that his display was worse than he would have expected from an uncivilised savage.

  Botha openly stated that the ‘golden days of assistance from South Africa for Rhodesia were over’. There was a ganging-up among certain ministers to oust Horwood (Minister of Finance), as he was well known for his sympathetic attitude towards Rhodesia. If such a move should materialise, it would be a sad day for South Africa because at the IMF and World Bank and other international financial institutions Horwood was held in high regard. There was a volatile situation in South Africa, with many segments of government overreacting because of the ‘Information Scandal’, and this was not conducive to responsible and mature decisions, and their Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in the lead providing ‘prima donnas’ for the scene. It was clearly a worrying time for our Minister of Finance, and obviously if Pik Botha and his ‘comrades’ had their way, our problems could only grow. They were going through yet another appeasement epidemic. It was based on the philosophy that you can have an easier and better life today if you side-step those issues requiring greater effort and maybe even sacrifice, in order to ensure a better future for your children. Let me say from my experience in politics that it is much easier to sell to voters a commodity which will make them comfortable as opposed to one which will require effort. There are two ingredients necessary to stimulate people to make a stand. First, a cause which motivates them: freedom to live according to their traditions, culture, religion, coupled with a determination to make a stand in order to protect these. Second, good leadership in order to mobilise and motivate. Many worthwhile and feasible causes have been lost through indifferent leadership. The gangsters, the extremists, never lack leadership or dedication. It is the decent, moderate person who, because of his reasonableness, is prepared to tolerate another point of view, who usually finds himself edged into the background in the rough and tumble and unscrupulousness of modern day politics. One of our most vital — indeed desperately urgent — tasks in life is to arouse moderate people when freedom and justice is under attack.