Bitter Harvest

by Ian Smith

  The British government, as is their custom, were busy handing out honours to the most efficient and dedicated politicians, and the bravest soldiers associated with this nefarious operation. Pride of place, of course, went to Carrington, who was the brains and driving force, indeed instigator, from the very outset. He played his role magnificently, in keeping with those well-known traditions associated with Foreign Office diplomacy. During my years in the world of politics I have come into contact with my fair share of devious characters, but I regard Carrington as the most two-faced of them all.

  I had a meeting with Mugabe on Tuesday afternoon, 17 June. On the question of community schools he apologised that he had not yet managed to see his Minister of Education. On the question of the provocative stance of the broadcasting media, he had spoken to the minister concerned and was therefore surprised to hear that the matter had not been rectified. I stressed the case forcibly, warning that irreparable damage was being done, and that even if it were to be corrected, although the wounds might heal, scars would remain. There was ample evidence to indicate that this was an aggravating factor in the escalation of emigration. More and more people were claiming that this was deliberate government policy in order to reduce the white population. At the same time news broadcasts were strongly critical of, indeed provocative in their attacks against, the USA, while supporting and praising the stance of Cuba. Their programmes were blatantly biased in support of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, in opposition to the free world stance, which was promoting a Soviet withdrawal. All of this made a mockery of our claim to be neutral and was damaging our standing among the leading countries of western Europe and North America, which were our main supporters and principal providers of finance. One was compelled to question whether this was a deliberate attempt to sabotage our country. He said that one of his problems was insufficient time to monitor the news broadcasts, but that he was concerned at my report, and would look into the matter. I found it difficult to believe that the leader of any country did not keep abreast of what the media were saying. Moreover, I had heard from some of my old contacts that he had retained the system of a briefing from the Minister of Information each morning — all a bit perplexing.

  I hoped he was not resorting to the tactic of feigning ignorance, and passing the buck to his various ministers when in fact they were following his instructions. Recently I had experienced a growing uneasy feeling that he was gradually reverting to his true colours as a dedicated communist. Since winning the election, he had been a model of reason and fairness, accepting the principle of free enterprise, and implementing the philosophy of reconciliation as laid down in the Lancaster House agreement. Of course, failure to comply would have resulted in serious penal consequences — an assurance constantly reiterated to us in London. Accordingly, it was imperative for the new government to adhere to the agreement, at least for as long as they believed necessary to secure themselves firmly in the saddle.

  The obvious question: had the time arrived to end their pretence of being on the side of the free world, as opposed to communism — to reveal themselves in their true colours? There were two vital ingredients necessary to provide an affirmative answer. First, was their track record adequate to present a favourable façade to the Western world? Second, was there an adequate infiltration of their ‘comrades’ into the security forces to ensure that any incipient, covert undercurrent of opposition to the government would be revealed, and thus nipped in the bud?

  In my opinion they had not adequately prepared the ground; when embarking on this kind of exercise it was elementary tactics to be over-prepared, rather than under-prepared. My assessment proved correct. They did take more time, and resorted to a policy of gradualism and finesse.

  23

  Life under Mugabe

  Life continued in the same vein. I continued to do what I could for the country. On the afternoon of 19 June 1980 I had a meeting with Tiny Rowland. My erstwhile opponent greeted me warmly, saying how happy he was to be back on Rhodesian soil. He related how he had hardly touched ground over the past week — Mexico, Washington, Morocco, a meeting with Jonas Savimbi who was, he said, one of the greatest leaders in the world at that time. Rowland believed that the fate of southern Africa would be profoundly influenced by what happened in Angola. I was pleased to hear his optimism. To me there were two vital factors: a victory for Reagan in the US presidential election at the end of the year, which would be our best hope of getting the Cubans out of Angola; and second, the determination of the South Africans. On this latter point he assured me that P.W. Botha was strong and in total support of Savimbi, and his new security chief, van der Westhuizen, was first-class and working closely with Kaunda. They were a different kettle of fish from Vorster and van den Berg who, among many other strange decisions, were responsible for the débâcle of withdrawing the South African troops from Angola in December 1975 when they were within one day of total victory. Where, I asked, does Kaunda stand? Rowland replied that he supported Savimbi, but obviously with discretion. Nyerere was the principal obstructionist, as usual. This reminded me of how he had derailed the agreement which Kaunda and Garba (the Nigerian) had made with me to bring Nkomo into the Rhodesian government in 1977. Rowland said that a Mexican friend of his who had strong business contacts with Castro’s brother, Raul, claimed the Cubans had become disenchanted and were looking for a way out of Angola. I asked if they would not be replaced by East Germans. No, Rowland replied, because in a short time they would find their way into South Africa as defectors. Rowland said that he had made it clear to the South Africans that they must hold on to their present course, as the alternative was another Vietnam, with the resultant disaster. Finally, I briefed him on my talks with Mugabe about him on 3 June, as they were meeting the next day.

  I was able to discuss Rowland with Mugabe at a meeting with him on the morning of 9 July. As usual it was a cordial meeting. He said that he had had a fruitful meeting with Rowland, who had devoted too much time to apologising for the past. Mugabe felt this was unnecessary, because he had made it clear on a number of occasions that the past was finished and we were now looking forward. He wanted news of future investment and development. Why was it going to take so long to get the Beira pipeline working again? Rowland had explained that the damage was more serious than they had first thought, and he suggested that the local fuel companies, which had made their profits during sanctions, should make a contribution. Mugabe asked me if there was anything I could do to assist in that direction. That was not an easy one for me to accept, as these companies had been loyal Rhodesian supporters and assisted in breaking the fuel embargo. On the other hand, I had my obligation to support the new philosophy of reconciliation and assist in the building of our new country, and so I promised to do what I could.

  I then went on to the main point of my visit, the continuing deterioration of white morale, with resultant emigration and loss of skills and professionalism. The main causes were the breakdown of law and order, the increase in crime in the rural and urban areas and the threatening and aggressive attitude of certain of his ministers towards the white community. He expressed surprise and said he would make investigations. I told him that I had met a few white Zambians down here, at the instigation of their government, trying to entice a few hundred of our commercial farmers to Zambia in order to solve their food crisis. They would be offered leased land free, soft loans and labour at less than half the cost in our country. It would be criminal if Zimbabwe was to land itself in the same boat because of our government’s provocative actions. He nodded in agreement.

  I then turned to the growing friction between ZANU (Mugabe and the Shonas) and ZAPU (Nkomo and the Matabeles) with its resulting destabilising effect, not only internally, but also to the prejudicing of external investment. In reply, Mugabe hoped the friction could be brought to an end so that we could get on together and build our country, but he was doubtful whether Nkomo wanted to end it. But, of course, the problem went far deeper. The Matabe
le were a minority tribe, or nation as they called themselves, living in the west of the country. There was a clear policy of encroachment into both central and local government, placing Shona comrades in positions of authority, at the expense of Matabeles. Obviously there was resentment and the Matabeles were beginning to give vent to their views. This was the beginning of Mugabe’s plan to neutralise any opposition, in order to pave the way for the creation of his one-party state.

  I asked next if there had been any progress on the question of community schools. He replied that he was still awaiting a report from the Minister of Education. This worried me, as members of our caucus education committee had been assured by the Minister of Education that he supported the concept because it was obvious that it would assist in maintaining standards of education and also relieve the financial burden on government. This was another example — and a number had been brought to our attention — of Mugabe making a decision on a controversial problem, and thereafter feigning ignorance and passing the buck to one of his ministers.

  On 13 July I had a discussion with some of my ex-cabinet ministers, during which the question of South Africa’s ability to squeeze us economically was brought up. We recalled how often Vorster had pressurised us by means of slowing down transport deliveries whenever we questioned his détente philosophy. We also recalled that when we first started importing fuel through Lourenço Marques, the South Africans forced us to pay their excise duty, which is never paid on goods in transit. We believed that Pik Botha would renew this pressure, while saying South Africa did not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. However, we noted, our government constantly went out of their way to provoke South Africa, even to the extent of leading the pack in the attacks against the South African government. The fact that this would probably invite reciprocal action detrimental to their country seemed to be of no concern to them. They arrogantly believed that the rest of the world had to line up on their side, whether they liked it or not.

  Tiny Rowland dropped in on 26 July to inform me of his successful and cordial meeting with Mugabe. Rowland’s fertile mind was planning to get Beira — Rhodesia’s port — organised, and the obvious way, he had told Mugabe, to create the wealth for its development was to give Lonrho a concession to mine the coal fields at Tete. Mugabe was impressed and undertook to pass the message on to Samora Machel.

  On 14 August I had a long discussion with Mugabe. Once again I questioned the reason for the continuing hurling of abuse at South Africa by certain of his ministers. I noted that Kaunda and Machel had intelligently accepted the need to live in peace with South Africa, not because they agreed with its political philosophy, but because of the benefits which would thereby accrue to their countries. Mugabe readily agreed, and said he would urge his ministers to show restraint. I asked if he was kept informed of the actions of his ministers; Dr Herbert Ushewokunze, his Minister of Health, for instance, had arrived at Harare Hospital at 3 a.m. drunk and, much to the embarrassment of the staff, carried out an inspection, discrediting himself and his government in the eyes of influential blacks. Mugabe confessed that this was not the first time he had heard this kind of story about Ushewokunze. But why, I wondered, was he prepared to condone such vulgar arrogance from a member of his team? I warned of falling support for his party from a cross-section of people in many parts of the country.

  Once again I had to remind Mugabe of the ongoing campaign of recrimination against our white community, which received great prominence on the broadcasting media, with many people believing that this was part of a campaign to drive whites out of the country. Somewhat naïvely, he said he could not understand why people did not accept his word and ignore wild statements. In reply, I informed him that the wild statements received publicity every day, while his word was never heard by the general public.

  I told him that my contacts in the security forces had expressed their concern at the constant political pressure for the premature promotion of military personnel who lacked training and were unqualified for the posts they were assuming. Once again I reminded him that true professional soldiers were his greatest protection, especially on a continent notorious for coups. He appeared genuinely grateful for my concern.

  We then returned to the problem of lack of finality on the community school problem and, without hesitation, he said there was to be no change and advised me to consult the Minister of Education, Dzingai Mutumbuka.

  Finally, I informed him of my impending visit to Britain and the United States, and of my intention to put over a positive report of the new government settling in and dealing with the many difficult problems which confronted them.

  I pursued the community schools issue. The following week, before departing on my overseas trip, accompanied by my party’s education committee, I duly had the meeting with Mutumbuka, who said he was pleased to meet me because he was also born in Selukwe. I was impressed with his straightforward approach and he assured me, as he had previously done to my education committee, that he supported the community school concept and was preparing a statement to that effect.

  I travelled overseas to Britain and the United States and, on 8 November 1980, reported to Mugabe on a successful mission. In both countries, I told him, I had contact with top members of government and had assured them that in Zimbabwe things were going better than we had expected. I had stressed how important it was for the free world to lend their support in order to ensure that this strategically rich area did not succumb to communist subversion. I was encouraged by their positive response and, although the Conservatives and Republicans had not previously been his friends and supporters, I felt that Mugabe was now in a position where he could utilise their tremendous economic influence to the advantage of Zimbabwe. He readily agreed.

  I expressed my disappointment that, in spite of promises from the Minister of Education, there had been no announcement on the question of community schools. Mugabe undertook to give the matter his attention.

  Thereafter I had a number of meetings during the latter half of November and first half of December, mainly with Matabeles, but by Christmas Eve there was growing concern over the provocative attitude of ZANU(PF) politicians and ZANLA military personnel who seemed to be spoiling for a fight with Nkomo’s party and forces. The tragedy was that Tongagara had been assassinated — he was the one man who commanded the respect of all the fighters. Some of Mugabe’s ministers were now openly conceding this point.

  Nothing much happened over the following few weeks, however, as people went home for the Christmas break. Then by 22 January 1981, Mugabe had carried out a cabinet reshuffle and demoted Nkomo, which on the surface seemed incomprehensible in view of the pressures and friction with the Matabeles. But the reason soon became obvious: Mugabe had simultaneously detained about a dozen of the ZAPU (Matabele) hierarchy. As the authority for detention rested with Nkomo’s ministry, he had to be removed. It appeared as if Mugabe now believed he was strong enough to confront the Matabele — one more step, admittedly a big and important one, in his march towards a one-party state.

  Some of my colleagues believed Mugabe could be heading for trouble, as the ZANLA (Mugabe) and ZIPRA (Nkomo) forces were evenly matched in numbers, with ZIPRA better trained and better disciplined. But — and it was a very big but — my colleagues were overlooking the important, well-thought-out strategic changes recently instituted. Lookout Masuku, the ZIPRA commander, and Dumiso Dabengwa, the head of the ZIPRA executive, had been detained. Dabengwa was the ZIPRA counterpart to Tongagara in ZANLA, who was assassinated by his own people. This meant that Nhongo, the ZANLA commander, was now overall army commander. Moreover, all the previous Rhodesian units, armoured cars, artillery and the crack regiments, were still under the control of white professionals, and they would comply with the commands given to them. It was absolutely clear to me that this meant there could now be no organised and effective opposition. If there were people scheming about this, they had left it too late. Nevertheless, I think Mugabe should ha
ve taken more time to arrive at an amicable solution, because these strong-arm tactics would provoke Matabele resentment.

  I had a meeting with Mugabe in Parliament on the afternoon of 12 February to discuss the Matabeleland scene, and my concern at the manner in which Nkomo had been provoked — his Bulawayo house searched, his top men detained, his demotion in cabinet, all things which had humiliated the Matabele and widened the rifts. Mugabe replied nonchalantly that he had discussed the issue fully with Nkomo, explaining that the action was necessary because of Nkomo’s health. When I asked if Nkomo had agreed to the change, Mugabe replied in the negative. The reasons he gave lacked conviction because of the simultaneous detention of Nkomo’s top men and the search of the premises. Once again I warned that the Matabele were suspicious of his government’s intentions to create a one-party state that would eliminate the Matabele nation. He replied that their suspicions were unwarranted. I pointed out that their fears were real, and his actions were fanning the flames of their resentment but I detected indifference on his part.

  Once again I had to refer to the continuing attacks on and hurling of abuse at our white people, and worrying reports that this trend was developing among our schoolchildren — not surprising when one noted the lead given by certain cabinet ministers, and the constant propagation of the policy through the media. Finally, I said I regretted to have to remind him that we had not yet received a decision on community schools. He replied he thought it would not be long now.