Paul Collier
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is only one among many forces for change; but unlike many of the others, it is optional. If indigenous populations do not want it, they need not accept settlers.
Settler migration from rich countries to poor is thus a two-edged sword for the indigenous: settlers bring institutions that are desirable, but cultures that are unwelcome. Now consider, hypothetically, the same process but from poor countries to rich ones.
Imagine that poor settlers were to arrive in a rich society, intent on maintaining and spreading their culture. The social models they would bring with them would not be beneficial: poor countries are poor because their social models are dysfunctional. Prosperous societies would therefore have reason to be wary of such settlers.
Of course, poor countries do not send settlers to rich ones. Some modern migrants from poor countries to rich ones may wish they could behave like the former settlers, but they lack any semblance of the political power, based on superior violence, that settlers were able to wield. But perhaps the modern distinction between cultural assimilation and cultural separateness is somewhat analogous to that earlier distinction between emigrants and settlers. Emigrants leave their society of origin behind them and join a new one, making it easier for them to accept the need to assimilate. Settlers have no intention of assimilating: they expect to retain their values and culture in their society of arrival.
Two Meanings of Multiculturalism
Like everything about migration, the cultural narrative appropriate for migrants is highly politicized. At one end of the spectrum is assimilation: migrants intermarry with the indigenous population and adopt the ways of that population. I am the product of assimilative migration. So is Boris Johnson, the mayor of London, whose
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grandfather was a Turkish immigrant. At the other end of the spectrum is permanent cultural isolation of migrants in a hermetic community where schooling and language are separate and marriage outside the group is punished by expulsion. While such people can be citizens in the legal sense, they are only meaningfully part of society if it is seen as radically multicultural.
Multiculturalism began as a reaction to the narrative of assimilation. Perhaps the main impetus for it was a recognition that many migrants were not keen to assimilate: they preferred to congregate together in clusters that protected their culture of origin. Criticism of migrants for reluctance to assimilate might be seen as implying the superiority of the indigenous culture, which in turn might border on racism. But gradually multiculturalism was framed more positively by liberal elites as desirable in itself: such a society provided more variety and stimulus than a society with a single culture.
In this form multiculturalism embraces the permanent coexistence of distinct cultures in the same country. The nation is reconceived to be a geopolitical space in which separate cultural communities peaceably coexist with equal legal and social status. The indigenous community may or may not remain a majority, but it has no special status. An alternative meaning of multiculturalism, perhaps closer to the original idea, is that rather than migrants being assimilated into the indigenous population, there is a cultural fusion between migrants and the indigenous. Unlike assimilation, fusion does not imply that the indigenous culture is either superior or privileged to that of the migrant.
So we have four competing narratives for migrants. They could arrive as traditional immigrants, accepting and aspiring to assimilation with indigenous culture. They could arrive with the intention of cultural fusion, bringing something distinctive to the common table from which all eat. They could arrive as cultural separatists,
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intent on isolating themselves from indigenous society while participating in the economy: in effect being guest workers. Or they could arrive as settlers, intent on spreading their culture among the indigenous. How do these four narratives stack up, both ethically and practically?
Assimilation and Fusion
Despite having fallen out of fashion, assimilation has some major advantages, not just for the indigenous but for everyone. Ethically, it is consistent with the golden rule of treating others as you would wish to be treated. Most notably, immigrants from poor societies can only ethically demand one of the other narratives if they have themselves supported that narrative back in their country of origin.
Yet few poor societies have yet made a success of cultural separatism: this is indeed why Montalvo and Reynal-Querol find that cultural distinctness in poor countries increases the incidence of
intergroup violence. 30 The most extreme advocates of cultural separateness speak of assimilation as “cultural genocide,” but this is an inexcusable appropriation of a terminology whose emotive force should be reserved for the terrible situations when it is genuinely needed. The initial cultures of immigrants live on as dynamic processes in their countries of origin. There is no ethical reason that, as part of the deal in being admitted to a country, a migrant should not be expected to absorb the indigenous culture. In concrete terms, should migrants be expected to learn the local language?
Having a common language is manifestly highly convenient: without a common language it is hard to have a common politics. More than that, it matters for mutual regard: remember that study of Mexican immigrants to America which found that those who
learned to speak English were more willing to cooperate in public
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goods provision. So migrants who are unwilling to learn the local language are free riding on the public goods that a common language has helped to foster. Further, they are liable to be in breach of the golden rule: do they accept that immigrants to their own country of origin should not have to learn the local language either?
Not only is assimilation ethically well based, but its practical consequences are benign. Trust remains at a high level because migrants absorb the attitudes of the indigenous. Migrants and the indigenous learn to have the same mutual regard that already prevails within the indigenous community. Having common cultural behavior, the indigenous and immigrants come to recognize each other as the same people. This is gradually reinforced through intermarriage, which yields common descendants. The prospect of intermarriage is potentially important for the perception of identity. After a prolonged period without migration, such as most European countries experienced until the 1950s, the indigenous population can truly imagine itself as one people: most British people have been British since before Neolithic times. But migrants who expect to assimilate can participate in this same story. Not only will their offspring belong to a common people, but their offspring will themselves be directly descended from the same stock as the indigenous. An
immigrant from Sierra Leone to Britain is unlikely to be descended from King Alfred, but through intermarriage her grandchildren are likely to be. If she herself recognizes that link through the future to the past, it may help her to embrace a new identity.
Multiculturalism as fusion is also ethically well based. Unlike assimilation, it readily affords equal dignity to the migrant as she is and to the indigenous. There is no hierarchy of cultures but rather the excitement and creativity of cultural blending. Fusion places demands upon both migrants and the indigenous to be curious
about other cultures and to adapt to them. Given the numerical
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preponderance of the indigenous, there is some presumption that the new blended culture will be predominantly indigenous, and so migrants should be willing to accept larger cultural adaptation than the indigenous. However, such an expectation is merely a practical matter, not an ethical requirement. In Britain chicken tikka has become the most popular national dish, replacing the indigenous fish-and-chips. Chicken tikka is not literally the import of an immigrant culture; rather it is an innovation in Britain by an immigrant who rose to the challenge of fusing his own cultural expertise with an i
ndigenous demand for fast food. In practical terms, fusion has consequences similar to assimilation. The only difference is the potential risk that the social model will become blended in such a way that damagingly dilutes its functionality: remember that in economic terms, not all cultures are equal.
Separatism and Settlers
In Europe, until recently the dominant tendency among political elites has been to espouse multiculturalism interpreted as the right to persistent cultural separatism. This orthodoxy and its supporting policies responded to, and legitimized, a preference for cultural separatism on the part of major groups of immigrants. One objective manifestation of separatism is the spatial pattern of immigrant residence. In the absence of policies to the contrary, immigrants tend to cluster. This is unsurprising: established immigrants are the obvious source of information and assistance for new arrivals. In some countries, such as Canada, governments have actively sought to counter this by requiring immigrants to settle in particular locations. Britain briefly attempted such a policy, dispatching a few Somali immigrants to Glasgow. Within weeks one of them was murdered in a racist attack and the policy was understandably
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abandoned. But in the absence of policy to the contrary, immigrants to Britain have become steadily more concentrated over time in a few English cities, most especially London. The 2011 census revealed that the indigenous British had become a minority in their own capital. Even within cities there is considerable concentration.
According to an index of segregation, Bangladeshis in Bradford are the most spatially concentrated migrant population among thirty-six migrant clusters in Europe. In London migrants have clustered in the inner districts, while the indigenous have moved to the outer districts—the so-called doughnut pattern. Even within Inner London there is a further high degree of concentration. For example, the British census of 2011 revealed that over the past decade the fastest growing borough in the country has been Tower Hamlets, a borough of Inner London, the population of which grew by 26
percent. This growth was largely driven by immigrants from
Bangladesh: nearly half of all the Bangladeshis in London live in this one borough, and conversely, over half of the children in the borough are now Bangladeshi.
Separatism also shows up, albeit in a less measurable form, in cultural practices. This is far from universal across immigrant groups and may have more to do with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism than with the policies of host countries. For example, French second-generation Muslim immigrants are less willing than their
parents to let their children eat in school canteens. 31 British Bangladeshi women are increasingly adopting the full veil, whereas in Bangladesh itself the veil is not worn: in this case it is clear that immigrants are not hanging on to practices in their society of origin but are differentiating themselves from the indigenous population.
In Britain this cultural separatism has led to the suggestion—by none less than the archbishop of Canterbury—that Parliament may need to introduce a parallel legal system based on sharia law. This
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would be a precise instance of migrants bringing their institutions with them.
One step on from legal separatism is political separatism: spatial and cultural separatism combine to facilitate it. One manifestation is when the political organizations of countries of origin re-form in host countries. For example, the local government of Tower Hamlets is apparently beset by feuding between the two dominant political parties of Bangladesh: the Awami League and the Bangladesh National Party. While the continued functioning of these Bangladeshi political parties within British politics is kept low profile, a more overt instance is that in 2005 British Muslims created their own political party, Respect. It has so far won two parliamentary by-elections, one in Tower Hamlets, the other in Bradford, both constituencies with very high concentrations of Muslim immigrants.
Respect is an overtly Muslim and Asian party, appealing to voters on the grounds of their identity. It is also highly oppositional to the mainstream political parties. In Britain voters can register their vote either in person or by post. In Bradford the Respect Party gained three-quarters of the postal votes. Postal voting, somewhat like an unarmed police force, is a useful appurtenance of civilized society, but one that depends upon unspoken conventions. Postal voting has the potential to breach the principle of the secrecy of the ballot.
In family structures in which the head of the family has considerable authority over other members, voting forms filled in at home may be subject to undue influence. Of course, this criticism applies to those indigenous households that are hierarchical; however, this is currently a clear cultural difference between many immigrant households and the indigenous norm.
The local government of Tower Hamlets is currently seeking to upgrade its political status from a borough to a city, which would give it considerably greater powers. Given the spatial concentration
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of immigrants, a continued trend toward political separatism would presumably produce cities ruled by immigrant-dominant political parties. This would approximate to the transfer of institutions, at the city level, from poor societies to rich. Somewhat ironically, precisely the opposite proposal is being made by the eminent economist of the growth process, Paul Romer. He shares the analysis that institutions are fundamental to the difference between poverty and prosperity, but adds a simple-sounding solution: charter cities. 32
A charter city would be created on territory that the government of a poor country would cede on a long-term lease to be governed under the laws of some developed country. Bangladesh might cede a patch of land to be ruled under the jurisdiction of Singapore, or for that matter of Britain. With the rule of law so secured, Romer predicts that both investors and people would flood in. An irony of Romer-in-reverse—the transfer of institutions from the societies of origin to the host societies—is that, if Romer is correct, what migrants are escaping from, though they may not realize it, is the dysfunctional institutions that as settlers they appear to want to bring with them.
Despite the momentary successes of the Respect Party in Britain, most immigrants do not separate themselves from the indigenous political organizations. Nevertheless, their political affiliations are often highly distinctive. At the 2010 British national election the indigenous electorate voted in favor of the Conservatives by a little more than four to three versus the incumbent Labour Party. In contrast, ethnic minorities voted by nearly one to five in favor of the Labour Party. 33 The voting pattern of immigrants is also distinctive across Europe. In America it is much less distinctive but still proved decisive in the 2012 election. Mitt Romney’s somewhat menacing policy of “voluntary repatriation” unsurprisingly alienated many Hispanic voters.
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A reasonable criterion for the political integration of immigrants is that their allegiance should broadly mirror that of the indigenous population. Not only is this an indicator of integration, but it is also the least threatening to an established democratic process. Democracy depends upon an alternation of power between parties, so that the overall vote should be roughly equally distributed between the major parties. If, at the other extreme, immigrants all support one particular party and become a substantial voting bloc, the only way in which the balance of power between political parties can be preserved is if the indigenous population votes disproportionately against the party that attracts immigrant support. This has two undesirable consequences.
One is that the inevitably aggressive and abusive rhetoric of political contest is likely to contaminate the issue of immigration: one party, being dependent upon the immigrant vote, will become perceived as pro-immigrant, while the other party, attracting overwhelmingly indigenous votes, will be seen as anti-immigrant. The other is that the alternation of power between parties involves periods in which immigrants are effectively
unrepresented in government, and periods in which the party that has won a majority of the indigenous vote loses power because of the distinctive political affiliation of immigrants. Such situations are not hypothetical: in the elections for mayor of London precisely this pattern of allegiance has emerged: the strategies of the political parties reflect the doughnut-shaped distribution of the immigrant and indigenous
populations. The distinctive distribution of the immigrant vote is not an inevitable feature of migration, nor is it anybody’s “fault,”
but it is evidently undesirable. Because highly skewed immigrant political support has such undesirable consequences, there is a strong case that political parties should not differentiate themselves on immigration policies. This is one of the policy areas in which a
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common approach based upon a shared, evidence-based analysis is preferable. A common approach does not, of course, imply that the mainstream parties should ignore the issue.
Absorption and Attitudes of the Indigenous Population
toward Migrants
Migrants from low-income countries are seldom made welcome in high-income host societies. They have to contend with racism and job discrimination, behaviors that demean their hosts and that can be countered by government policies. Here my focus is on the rate of absorption—the rate at which migrants merge into the indigenous population—and it is evident that such attitudes are liable to be an impediment. Social exclusion encourages separate identity.
Beyond the obvious point that xenophobia on the part of the
indigenous is scarcely conducive to absorption, what has social science to contribute? One potentially important recent research result is that a more general attitude of the indigenous population mat-
ters, namely the level of trust. 34 The higher the level of trust is on
the part of the indigenous population, not just regarding migrants but each other, the easier it is for migrants to integrate. This is scarcely surprising: immigrants are better able to form attachments to their new society—Putnam’s “bridging capital”—if the indigenous population is trusting.