Park Chung Hee Era
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Regime opponents seeking democratization came forward as well. On
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August 18, 1971, progressive professors at Seoul National University publicly criticized the police surveillance of student activists. University students followed with their own protest. The agenda quickly grew to include the abolition of military drills on university campuses and the ousting of
“pro-Park” professors from the universities. On October 4, Korea University students began a sit-in to demand the punishment of corrupt politicians. Included in the list of politicians the students wanted purged were DRP finance chairman Kim Chin-man, KCIA director Yi Hu-rak, and CGC commander Yun P’il-yong. After the CGC’s repeated intervention in politics to weed out chaeya activists and terrorize opposition politicians, its commander had become the symbol of the politicization of the South Korea military.
Challenged by the mounting calls for democratization, but also sensing an opportunity for counterattack amid the public’s sense of crisis, Park chose to move swiftly and decisively against the student protestors at Korea University, ordering Yun P’il-yong to send the CGC military police onto the campus at dawn on October 5 to break up the sit-in, arrest student leaders, and close down classes. The defense minister threatened to conscript any university students who refused to participate in campus military drills, only to see demonstrations spread from Korea University to other campuses. Clergy from many Christian denominations joined in the rallies to denounce social injustice and political corruption. Park was not intimidated by the coalescing of opposition forces. On the contrary, he escalated the conflict, putting Seoul and its surrounding areas under a garrison decree on October 15 and sending soldiers onto ten university campuses to arrest the leaders of the student movements. In the end, more than four thousand students were arrested and forcefully drafted into the military.
As Park was challenged by society and as he sought to use this challenge as an opportunity for instituting lifelong rule, then, the political role of the South Korean military increased dramatically. Consequently, for the parliamentary election held on May 25, 1971, Park nominated forty-one retired generals as DRP candidates, giving the military the single largest share, 46.6 percent, of the total number of nominees.44 Although Park had regularly appointed military officers on active duty and in the reserves to important posts in the ruling political party, state bureaucracy, and state-owned companies, the number of former military officers he recruited into politics in 1971 was extraordinary.45 Distrusting the incumbent DRP legislators, who split into rival factions to vie for power in anticipation of Park’s expected retirement after his third term (1971–1975), Park’s loyal military officers, once elected, were entrusted with checking Kim Chong-
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p’il, whose supporters had opposed the extension of presidential terms to three in 1969, and Kim Sông-gon and his Gang of Four, whose loyalty could not be taken for granted in the event of the weakening of Kim Chong-p’il’s mainstream faction.46 The issue for Park in 1971 was not whether, but when and how, he would mobilize his praetorian guards to neutralize both Kim Chong-p’il and Kim Sông-gon in his bid for the extension of his rule. On December 6, 1971, Park declared a state of national emergency. The decree identified national security as the highest priority of the state and “disallowed” any social unrest threatening security. To overcome military security threats, South Koreans were called upon to restrain from “any irresponsible discussion” of security issues, to build up a “new belief system,” and to endure temporary restrictions on civil rights.47 The cabinet followed on December 7 with the preparation of a Military Establishment Protection Act, a Military Secret Protection Act, and an Amendment to the Requisition Act. These three bills laid the foundation for legally mobilizing the military for political purposes. A day earlier, Park had publicly presented his view of South Korea’s changing security situation and its limited means to counter the external threat. “As it is impossible to defend against the [North Korean] invader’s swords with the slogans of freedom and peace,” Park declared, “[South Korea] should go forward with a firm determination to restrain a part of its freedom [for national security].”48
To strengthen his position further, Park called on the Speaker of the National Assembly on December 23 to speed up the enactment of a Special Law for National Security.49 Passed on December 27, it enabled Park effectively to preempt any challenge to his rule, after the special law made clear that it was the president’s duty to defend the state and that the office of the president wielded the powers to regulate the economy and order national mobilization for the purpose of defending state interests. Moreover, the special law stipulated that in the name of national security, the president could restrict the freedom of political association and demonstration, freedom of speech and the press, and workers’ rights to collective action.50
To come up with a convincing security rationale for a regime change, however, Park thought he had to go beyond the traditional cold war rationale of containment, given the dramatically altered international security context of Sino-U.S. détente. Rather than justifying his turn to authoritarian rule only as a measure to prepare for confrontation with the North, Park combined the cold war rhetoric of military competition with the promise of reconciliation befitting the new era of détente. Park argued that by launching the yushin regime, the South strengthened not only its mili-
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tary deterrence but also its negotiating position vis-à-vis the North for coexistence. From the position of strength arising from internal political unity, Park argued, South Korea would negotiate favorable terms for unification. This newly added rationale of unification made it more difficult for not only the opposition NDP but also chaeya dissidents to oppose the promulgation of the yushin constitution in 1972. To undermine the opposition even more, Park appeared to be backing his words with concrete actions, sending KCIA director Yi Hu-rak to P’yôngyang on a secret mission on May 2, 1972, to negotiate a mini-détente on the Korean Peninsula. After Yi’s return, Park ordered him to draw up a “P’ungnyôn saôp” (Good Harvest Project), the blueprint for launching the yushin regime.51
Thereafter events moved rapidly. The two Koreas issued a Joint North-South Communiqué of July 4, 1972, to begin a dialogue for reconciliation based on the three principles of independence, peace, and national unity.
At the same time, the Ministry of National Defense issued a statement cautioning against any euphoria and called for a strengthening of military deterrence. On National Armed Forces Day, October 1, Park himself came out to stress the importance of national security in the coming era of détente. On October 17, he declared martial law and deployed military troops in and around Seoul. The Army Security Command was ordered to investigate and arrest NDP legislators suspected of illegally raising political funds for Kim Dae-jung during his unsuccessful 1971 presidential bid.
The ASC also searched for the opposition leader’s sympathizers within the military and began cracking down on Kim Young-sam and his newly emerging faction within the NDP. The ASC, with its mission of counterintelligence and countersubversion within the military, now began to conduct regular investigations of civilian politicians.52 The transition to authoritarian rule was completed when the State Council voted to submit the yushin constitution to a national referendum, which was duly held on November 22, 1972. Article 53 of the new constitution gave Park the power to take “emergency measures” for the maintenance of “national security” and “public peace and order.”
Breakdown of Checks and Balances, 1973
While moving toward authoritarian rule on the basis of the armed forces’
unswerving support in 1971–1972, Park also shook up the ruling coalition in order to clear away obstacles and nurture his bases of support. The objective was to adjust the control mechanism to the radical alteration in the parameters of power brought by the yushin. In the short run, t
he shake-up aided the launching of the yushin regime, but in the long run it damaged
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his regime’s internal mechanism to correct extreme abuses of power and rectify the worst forms of policy distortions by seriously undermining the multilayered system of checks and balances Park had established within the 1961 coup generation and between the senior and Hanahoe officers.
Ironically, it was the fall of Kim Chong-p’il from the position of crown prince that jeopardized the internal mechanism of checks and balances, because his fall reduced his rivals and foes’ utility as instruments of checks and balances. Between 1971 and 1973, the ruling DRP saw Park lash out against Kim Sông-gon and his colleagues (Gang of Four), once they took over the mainstream role and used their newly found power to join the opposition NDP in a vote of no confidence against minister of home affairs O
Ch’i-sông despite Park’s explicit instruction not to weaken the cabinet.
The military similarly saw CGC commander Yun P’il-yong stand trial under the charge of subversion on April 28, 1973. Park also dismissed Yi Hu-rak from his new post of KCIA director on December 3 of that year.
The purge of Yun P’il-yong shocked society, given his close ties to Park.
The president had lavished him with patronage in spite of his failure to join his classmates of the eighth KMA graduating class in the 1961 coup.53
Yun P’il-yong had risen from the rank of major in 1961 to that of major general by 1970. In those nine years of rapid promotion, he commanded the most powerful military units, from the Counter Intelligence Corps (1963–1968) to the Capital Garrison Command (1970–1973). In return for Park’s political patronage, Yun P’il-yong diligently waged a “dirty war” on Park’s behalf, suppressing political protests and cracking down on opposition politicians. By the early 1970s, Yun was singled out among military officers in uniform as a villain on the scale of Kim Hyông-uk and Yi Hu-rak in South Korean politics by political activists and dissidents. Yet Park came down hard on Yun P’il-yong, jailing him under the charge of subversion.
Yun had forgotten that he was only a caretaker of the Hanahoe, not its leader. His downfall began when PSS chief Pak Chong-gyu reported to Park on a discussion Yun had had with KCIA director Yi Hu-rak on the issue of succession. Park had reason to interpret Pak Chong-gyu’s report with a grain of salt. As a political rival of Yi Hu-rak, Pak Chong-gyu had every reason to cast aspersions against Yun P’il-yong, who increasingly sided with Yi Hu-rak in palace politics. Yi Hu-rak was then at the zenith of his career, having orchestrated Park’s victory in the 1971 presidential election against Kim Dae-jung. Yi Hu-rak had also triumphantly prepared the July 4 Joint Communiqué with Kim Il Sung, which opened the way for Park’s promulgation of the yushin constitution in 1972. Alarmed by Yi Hu-rak’s stunning political successes, Pak Chong-gyu was looking for a
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way to undercut his rival’s political standing. When Sin Pôm-sik, the president of a state-run newspaper, informed Pak Chong-gyu of Yun P’il-yong’s talk with Yi Hu-rak on the subject of succession while playing golf in October 1972, the PSS chief promptly informed Park of their “disloyalty.”54
Park was furious. He saw Yun P’il-yong as more threatening than Yi Hu-rak, because in his role as a caretaker of the Hanahoe on behalf of Park, Yun had managed to become its de facto leader. The Hanahoe was becoming a faction, with its top echelon ready for promotion to the rank of brigadier general and its rank-and-file members poised to monopolize mid-level positions in the military security forces. Park lost no time in ordering ASC commander Kang Ch’ang-sông to investigate Yun P’il-yong.
Park’s choice of Kang as the investigator on March 6, 1973, sealed Yun’s fate. The two had been recognized by their superiors and classmates as having the makings of a future army chief of staff early in their military careers.55 This was not the first time that they had confronted each other. In December 1967 Yun P’il-yong, then commander of the CIC, investigated Kang Ch’ang-sông for corruption. Kang Ch’ang-sông was the planning and management director at the KCIA and was rescued only by the last-minute intervention of Yi Chong-ch’an, Kim Kwang-uk, and Yi Tong-nam of northern and central regional origins. Kang Ch’ang-sông himself was a native of Kyônggi Province in the central region. It was during this time that Kang Ch’ang-sông came to learn about the Hanahoe. When Park appointed him as the ASC commander in August 1972, he set his mind on rooting out the Hanahoe and recruited non-Hanahoe officers into the ASC
to investigate Hanahoe activities even before Park ordered him to crack down on Yun P’il-yong.
After forty days of investigation, Kang Ch’ang-sông’s ASC charged Yun P’il-yong and his followers with plotting a military coup d’état. At the same time, the ASC accused them of having been involved in serious corruption that had endangered the morale of the armed forces.56 On April 28, 1973, eleven officers, including Major General Yun P’il-yong, brigadier generals Son Yông-gil (chief of staff of the CGC) and Kim Sông-bae (director of promotion and personnel at army headquarters), and colonels Kwôn Ik-hyôn (Seventy-Sixth Regiment commander of the Twenty-Sixth Infantry Division), Chi Sông-han (chief of the Army Criminal Investigation Department), and Sin Chae-gi (chief of promotion and personnel, army headquarters), were sentenced to from two to fifteen years of imprisonment for crimes of embezzlement, bribery, abuse of authority, and desertion. Another thirty-one military officers were given dishonorable discharges.57 Among the eleven “accomplices” sentenced to imprisonment, all
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but Kim Sông-bae and Chi Sông-han were Hanahoe members. These nine officers, moreover, all came from the Kyôngsang region, the home of both Park Chung Hee and Yun P’il-yong. Worse for the Hanahoe, among the imprisoned were Son Yông-gil and Kwôn Ik-hyôn of the eleventh KMA graduating class, who had founded and led the group with Chun Doo-hwan. Chun escaped the purge because he was the one who reported Yun P’il-yong’s conversation with Yi Hu-rak to PSS chief Pak Chong-gyu. Having escaped the purge, Chun tried to limit the damage by lobbying for clemency on behalf of other Hanahoe members. Park heeded his advice because he, too, could not afford to weed out the Hanahoe officers of the Kyôngsang region altogether.
The exit of Yun P’il-yong ushered in a new era of military factionalism.
Gone were the days of the “big game,” where the prize was becoming Park’s heir. Also gone were big players with big ambitions striving to develop an independent power base of their own, first in military security institutions and then in the DRP. The three core military praetorian guards in charge of the KCIA at one time or another during the 1961–1973 period all fell from grace by the first year of the yushin regime. Kim Chong-p’il became the prime minister on June 4, 1971, but he was no longer the embodiment of young South Korea he had once been. The three political defeats he suffered in 1963, 1965, and 1969 broke his spirit and dismantled his faction. The two other KCIA directors of the 1961–1973 period had much harder falls from Park’s political grace. Fearing revenge by those whom he had harassed, abused, and terrorized, Kim Hyông-uk chose to go into exile in the United States on April 15, 1973. Yi Hu-rak retired to the countryside after his dismissal for having been implicated in the Yun P’il-yong incident and the kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung in Tokyo, until he won a seat in the National Assembly as an independent in the 1978 elections and was brought back into the DRP in 1979.
Even Pak Chong-gyu, whose rough style won him few friends, ended his twelve-year service as the PSS chief on August 21, 1974, when First Lady Yuk Yông-su died in an assassination attempt directed at Park. Like Kim Chong-p’il’s rivals whose careers ended with the dismantlement of Kim Chong-p’il’s mainstream faction, ASC commander Kang Ch’ang-sông too was forced to retire from active duty in January 1976 after serving as the Third District commander (1973–1975). He played a major role in cracking down on the Hanahoe officers of Kyôngsang regional origin. But as thing
s turned out, the purge of his rival, Yun P’il-yong, had damaged Kang Ch’ang-sông’s political utility to Park, who stuck to his divide-and-conquer approach to power. Kang’s experience was a reminder that a thing
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is cherished only if it is useful. And with the demise of these praetorian guards, the intricate system of checks and balances also was dismantled.
Guardian of the Yushin , 1972–1979
Once the yushin was promulgated, the military was bound to increase its political role. The military’s intervention in politics became an on-going affair after April 3, 1974, when, for the first time since the promulgation of the yushin constitution, students of Seoul National University, Sungkyunk-wan University, and Ewha Womans University coordinated large-scale demonstrations against it, culminating in the organization of the National Democratic Young Students’ Union and its Declaration of the People, the Nation, and Democracy. The yushin regime countered with the time-tested strategy of political repression, issuing Emergency Decree no. 4 to order the KCIA, ASC, and CGC’s military police to launch wholesale arrests of student activists. Four student leaders, including Yi Ch’ôl, were put on the wanted list and twenty-two others accused of participating in the People’s Revolutionary Party were tried by an emergency court-martial. Included among the accused were Yun Po-sôn, the former president of the Second Republic (1960–1961); Kim Tong-gil, a history professor at Yonsei University; and Kim Chi-ha, a renowned dissident poet. The court-martial found them guilty of violating Emergency Decree no. 1. Dissidents numbering about 180 were also imprisoned for violating Emergency Decree no. 4. Eight who were accused of being core members of the People’s Revolutionary Party were sentenced to death and hurriedly executed on April 9, 1975.