by Anil Jaggia
Rajinder, however, didn’t appear too keen on the idea. He was afraid something might go wrong, but Sharan and I decided to give it a shot anyway. It would have to be done in a convincing manner because it was becoming evident that the hijackers had had some sort of training in airline and aircraft procedures. We also advised Al-Minhad ATC about our plan, asking them to keep the emergency services on standby. The tower acknowledged our message.
Red Cap re-entered the cockpit and asked Captain Sharan to take off. I said I would have to go down and inspect the aircraft for its airworthiness. He agreed. The chief hijacker accompanied me down, holding a gun to my head with one hand and a grenade in the other. I descended from the aircraft from door 1L.
For an aircraft that had been subject to so much abuse, the A300 was not in as bad a shape as I had expected. This was bad news to my mind. It had been over two hours since our touchdown in Dubai and though unwilling, we were now in a position to fly wherever the hijackers wanted to take us next.
I set the refuelling panel in such a manner that, at the next station, only a Flight Engineer or Aircraft Maintenance Engineer could refuel the aircraft.
While on the ground, I had the impression that we were being filmed.
The food trucks were parked on the side of the runway, behind the buses that were to take the passengers. I exchanged glances with one of the ground personnel and observed army/security vehicles placed in such a manner to suggest that some action was going to take place.
The air seemed pregnant with expectation. Red Cap must have sensed the same furtive, loaded atmosphere for he pulled me aside immediately, leaving the inspection only half complete. I was ordered to go up immediately.
Red Cap demanded that Captain Sharan take off from Al-Minhad. Once again, he revealed his reckless nature when he asked the Captain to take off from where we were parked rather than taxi from the end of the runway.
While we were going through the standard take-off procedures, Red Cap was joined by Burger in the cockpit as at Amritsar. Red Cap stood directly behind Captain Sharan while Burger positioned himself between me and the panel near the seat from where I had hoped to trigger the fire warning. If I had attempted to do so, I would have had to ask Burger to move aside and he would have been able to see my every move. Our heroic plan remained stillborn!
At 6.30 a.m. Dubai time (4 a.m. 1ST), with emotions ranging between deep anxiety and unadulterated fear, we took off for Kabul. Who could blame us for being paranoid? Since the days of Ahmad Shah Abdali, Afghanistan has been a source of trouble for India. Afghanistan is a bastion of terrorism and the dreaded Taliban from where renegades like Osama bin Laden routinely mount their anti-India and anti-West operations. And we were now headed there.
The take-off was uneventful and smooth. The extra-long runway at Al-Minhad gave the Airbus ample room for a smooth climb. Captain Sharan and I exchanged glances as the window of opportunity closed around us once more.
From UAE we flew towards Karachi, Dera Ismail Khan, and finally into Afghan airspace. The atmosphere in the aircraft was now less heated than before. As we flew towards Kabul, I realised that we had not seen all the hijackers. Where were the others, and what were they doing?
* * *
New Delhi
In the early hours of Christmas morning, a bleary-eyed India woke to the news that after intense negotiations, UAE authorities had clinched a barter deal with the hijackers: some passengers and a body had been exchanged for fuel, water and food. At the CMG, hectic parleys were on amidst cups of coffee and tea, Home Minister L.K. Advani who was consulting with the Intelligence and NSG chiefs to explore the possibility of a commando operation, knew their last chance to mount such an operation was now virtually over.
The CMG reconvened to take stock of the situation. Everyone seemed apprehensive that their worst fears were coming true. India had been vocal in condemning the Taliban. It was not too long ago that the Ministry of External Affairs had circulated a note on global terrorism and narcotics trade, and the role played by the Taliban as a proponent of terrorism and an exporter of arms and drugs. And IC 814 was now heading for Afghanistan.
There were several rounds of brainstorming about the likely course of action. Only three countries had recognised the Taliban regime—Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE—and these were countries where India had little or no influence. For the CMG, the challenge lay in establishing a medium of communication with the hijackers. From the news filtering in from various ATCs in the region, it was now becoming clear that the final destination was Kandahar where the aircraft was expected to land at 8.30 a.m. Afghanistan time.
In South Block, diplomatic activity was in full swing. Foreign Secretary Lalit Mansingh contacted the High Commissioner in Islamabad G. Parthasarthy and asked him to try and estabhsh some contact with the Taliban and their mission in Islamabad. He could take whatever help was required from the Pakistanis for the purpose.
At 7, Race Course Road, Vajpayee, Jaswant Singh, Pramod Mahajan and Brajesh Mishra were in touch with the CMG. But for a body with such a grandiose title, not much news was filtering in. It was the footage from foreign TV channels that was the only link between the CMG and the hijacked plane. Intelligence agencies were told to furnish details of people who could prove helpful in establishing contact with the Taliban. Finding itself alone, the CMG had no clear direction in sight.
At 10.30 a.m. IST, there was another mysterious call. This time, it was made to the ATC in New Delhi, adding considerably to the confusion. A male voice called in to say that the hijackers were from an organisation called the Islamic Salvation Front. The Work Shift Officer on duty immediately informed the officials at the Central Committee control room. The Minister of State for Civil Aviation, Chamanlal Gupta, was in the room when the message came in. This was passed on to the CMG. Even before the government could digest this information, Gupta went on air and announced that the Islamic Salvation Front could be behind the hijacking. In the confusion that followed, even Intelligence agencies were taken aback at this sudden development. A furious CMG complained to the Prime Minister about the manner in which the minister had made the announcement to the media without checking its veracity.
Intelligence agencies were asked to dig out any information on the organisation, but they drew a blank. No one in Intelligence circles had even heard of the Islamic Salvation Front, they told the CMG. Gupta had stirred a hornet’s nest and soon the pressure began to mount on the government. For the relatives waiting for any official word on the hijacked aircraft, Gupta’s statement seemed to carry almost the first authoritative intimation, and they demanded more information. And with nothing else forthcoming, there was considerable resentment and anger. The government was already under strain; the media now began to mount pressure on it to release more information on the latest development. But no one had any answers . . . The crisis was deepening.
The government’s crisis management received a lot of flak. There was absolutely no coordination within the government. Chamanlal Gupta had earlier announced the cancellation of all Indian Airlines flights to and from Kathmandu. His boss, Sharad Yadav, heard of this through the media and was understandably furious. Now Gupta had again put his foot in his mouth by announcing the role of an unheard of Islamic Salvation Front behind the hijacking. Prime Minister Vajpayee could hardly believe his ears. He told Gupta to refrain from making any comments to the press and issued instructions that only Jaswant Singh was to speak on behalf of the government. All CMG members were instructed not to speak to the media. It was apparent that the government was frustrated over its own impotence.
Earlier in the morning at the CMG control room, NSG’s Head of Operations, Major General Hoshiar Singh gave a presentation on the viability of mounting a commando operation and the risks involved. At this point, Sharad Yadav, who had just come back from the airport, chipped in and suggested that the safety of the passengers’ lives was to be given the highest priority He explained that at the airport, he had been mob
bed by relatives worried about the passengers on board the aircraft. The political brass needed to be careful about how it dealt with the situation, he insisted.
Sharad Yadav also wanted to go to Dubai personally to receive the released hostages since this would send the right signals to the people that the government was doing all that it could. He would receive the first batch of hostages who were to be released and thank the UAE authorities on behalf of the Indian government for their cooperation and help. However, there was one hitch. The minister, who had never been abroad, did not have a passport.
The Chief Passport Officer was called at home and asked to ensure a passport for the minister. At 7.30 in the morning on Saturday, the passport office was especially opened and Yadav’s passport prepared. The Dubai trip was on for the minister.
On his first trip abroad, Yadav was keen to make the most of the opportunity. He invited some media persons to accompany him, only to tell them at the airport that the UAE authorities had refused permission for the media. Relatives keen to go and receive their loved ones were rudely told that they would not be allowed on the flight. And even as they waited anxiously for their family members to be brought back, Yadav’s departure was delayed because the minister was unwilling to leave without his gutka which he had forgotten to carry on his person!
Despite the hiccups, the flight finally left for Dubai carrying a visibly excited Yadav.
* * *
On board IC 814
We had entered Afghan airspace when Kabul ATC radioed us to say that the airport was closed for our aircraft, and we should proceed to Kandahar. Kabul airport had been bombed thoroughly and its cratered runway was unlikely to take our large aircraft. This was conveyed to Red Cap who went into a huddle with Burger. The hijackers, however, appeared apprehensive about Kandahar. Burger’s comment was a telling one: “In Kandahar there is a problem. Kabul is better.”
Red Cap did not make any comment and okayed the change in destination.
Kandahar International Airport has still to be modernised. Its communication system consists of just one VHF (Very High Frequency) radio and one ADF (Auto Direction Finder) beacon to which we were tuned in. It had neither VOR (Very High Frequency Omni Range) nor the regulation Instrument Landing System. The runway, however, was another matter—long and smooth, it was obviously a gift from the years of Russian occupation.
But as we rolled down the runway, we observed a Pajero-type jeep full of Taliban militiamen racing alongside the aircraft. As the Airbus came to a halt, the jeep also stopped and one of the Taliban men waved at Red Cap who waved back. We requested Kandahar Tower for further instructions and were told that they would like to speak to a Pushto-speaking person.
At this, the hijackers asked the three of us to switch off the engines and go back into the cabin, leaving them alone in the cockpit. Captain Sharan, Rajinder and I moved to the rear after switching on the Auxiliary Power Unit (APU). We could hear the murmurs of a discussion taking place, and after about ten minutes, we were asked to return to the cockpit. Kandahar ATC then asked us to tail a Follow-Me jeep to the parking area.
The aircraft was parked on a taxi track parallel to the runway. There were some air force fighter aircraft and some discarded planes in that area, and we could see some Taliban militiamen moving about, apparently aimlessly. Once again, the hijackers asked us to move into the cabin. However, half an hour later they asked us to return to the cockpit—ATC now wanted us to move the aircraft further up. Captain Sharan taxied the Airbus another 500 metres. We were not to know then that the aircraft would stay there for the next seven and a half days.
Having got the Airbus where they wanted, orders were issued to us to once again move back into the cabin—this time to the economy section where we were asked to sit with the passengers in the ninth and tenth rows. Red Cap took over the cockpit and now began to use it as his private office. The executive class section of the aircraft was totally empty and only had piles of baggage removed from the overhead bins in the economy section.
For the first time now, we could study our oppressors. Other than Red Cap, there was Burger: slim, 6’ tall and fluent in English. There was Doctor: wearing spectacles, not very tall, 5’8” or so. Shankar: 6’2”, healthy, well-built and very fierce, he did not talk much. Self-assured, he would always respond as a disciplined orderly does to his Commanding Officer in the army. Finally, Bhola: very agile, 5’7” or so, with a Kashmiri accent, he was rude to the passengers and seemed ambitious as if determined to rise in the ranks.
8.30 a;m. What a start to Christmas morning. Outside the aircraft was the desolation of a barren landscape. Teasing thoughts of the lush Indian plains crossed my mind. Here, we might as well have been on the moon!
All through the flight, the passengers had been either blindfolded or forced to keep their heads down. The window shutters were kept lowered. Conversation was not permitted in the absence of which they could not know where the aircraft had landed. Anyone going to the toilet had to ask for permission.
Before we had left the cockpit, Red Cap had asked Sharan to show him how to operate the radio equipment to be able to speak to the ATC Kandahar.
A change had come over Red Cap. Now that his demand had been met and he was in the country of his choice, he no longer seemed to want to terrorise us. His speech and mannerisms too had become polite.
With the exception of the flight crew member we had picked up in Delhi, all other crew members had been on duty for over 24 hours. We were experiencing fatigue due to the strenuous conditions while flying in difficult and unknown terrain, threatened by guns and grenades. Even though we had landed, the terror was not past us.
Time ticked by slowly. We had no idea what was happening. Around midday, Red Cap summoned me to the cockpit and asked me to prepare the aircraft for departure and get it refuelled. I protested that it was not going to be possible without a proper maintenance check of the aircraft. Red Cap insisted that he wanted to get out as soon as possible.
I asked him where we were going. He replied that they would either go to Kabul or some other destination—what he required was five hours of flying endurance in the air.
What puzzled me was that the hijackers had been in contact with ATC Kandahar for approximately three hours. What actually transpired and why they wanted to leave Kandahar remains a question mark!
I guessed that the hijackers weren’t very happy with their experience at Kandahar. Were things not going as they had expected? It struck me forcefully that the hijackers were fanatics who would have no qualms about blowing up the aircraft should they not be satisfied. My worst suspicions seemed to be confirmed when Red Cap asked me to retrieve two pieces of registered baggage from the luggage hold. He said the suitcases were vital to their plans. When I asked about their contents, the hijackers said they contained essential equipment.
I told him that this was not possible. He insisted, saying that the baggage contained some special equipment and medicines. I reiterated the impossibility since we did not have the necessary baggage handlers and equipment to open the hold.
I also told Red Cap that take-off was impossible since the aircraft could not be refuelled as the fuelling system had broken down. I said that at Al-Minhad, the mechanics had used a high pressure fueller and the aircraft’s fuelling system had been damaged. Besides, without a maintenance check, the aircraft was not airworthy. The Airbus had taken off at Lahore and Al-Minhad airfields with much more than the maximum take-off weight of the aircraft. Structural damage to the aircraft could not be ruled out either. In addition, I told him, there was an oil leakage problem in engine number two, its vibration level was high, the oil level of the APU system was low and we were using retreaded tyres on which not more than ten landings can be made, and which now needed to be changed.
* * *
Dubai
Sharad Yadav’s special aircraft reached Dubai close to noon. When Yadav met the released passengers, some of them broke down as they narrated their experiences on
board the hijacked aircraft. Most of them were worried about the hostages still on board. He was told of the beatings and abuse the passengers had taken and their trauma at having to sit with the faces covered or bent down over their knees. Yadav assured them that the government would do everything possible to bring an early end to the crisis.
Yadav also met the senior UAE government officials and thanked them for their assistance. He handed the Crown Prince of UAE a letter from Prime Minister Vajpayee, thanking him for his help and expressing his gratitude for letting the hijacked aircraft land at Dubai.
A press conference was organised hastily for the minister at the end of which he wanted to announce a payment of Rs. 5 lakh for the next of kin of the deceased. The Indian Ambassador, K.C. Singh advised him against making such a statement when emotions were still fragile.
Expectedly, not everything ran as smoothly. Yadav wanted to carry the slain passenger Rupin Katyal’s body back with him. UAE officials informed him that under their country’s law, since the body was taken off the aircraft in UAE, they would have to first perform a post-mortem and then prepare the legal documents before it could be returned to India. This was a difficult situation for the Indian team. All requests from the minister and the Indian Ambassador were turned down. Yadav contacted New Delhi and tried to get the Prime Minister on the phone, but he was not available. He called Jaswant Singh who asked him to try and persuade the officials in UAE himself, since a similar reply to him by the UAE officials could prove embarrassing. Yadav was told that another reason behind the UAE’s hardline approach was that they were annoyed at former Civil Aviation Minister C.M. Ibrahim’s failing to keep his promise in granting additional flights to the UAE carrier Emirates.