by Anil Jaggia
“You only promise but do not act,” Yadav was told.
The minister was getting restless and wanted to leave with the passengers when one of his aides had a brainwave. It was suggested that Swamiji could be of help at this juncture. Yadav was a bit reluctant because Swamiji was none other than godman Chandraswami who had been arrested two years ago by the Indian police for a variety of crimes. But looking at the exigency at hand and the political repercussions of returning without Katyal’s body, he agreed reluctantly. He called Chandraswami in Delhi and the minister stressed that it was important that the UAE authorities let him bring the body back with him.
Chandraswami agreed instandy to help and called the Crown Prince of Dubai, rumoured to be among his followers. Within a matter of 15 minutes, Chandraswami was speaking again to Yadav to tell him that formalities had been waived, and he was free to bring back Katyal’s body on the same flight as the released passengers. The legal formalities would be fulfilled later by the Indian mission.
Now another problem arose. The UAE authorities told Yadav that the released Indian passengers did not have passports (since this is not a mandatory requirement for Indian visitors to Nepal). Sharad Yadav gave the authorities his government’s undertaking to let the released passengers leave without their passports.
Even under the strain of such arduous negotiations and parleys, Indian officials could not resist their greed! Some enterprising officials gave in to their urge to go on a fling at Dubai airports duty free stores!
* * *
Indira Gandhi International Airport
At New Delhi’s Indira Gandhi International Airport, relatives had been waiting anxiously to receive those released at Dubai. However, some of them had mixed emotions. V.K. Tyagi, for instance, was in a dilemma. “To me, it is torturous to imagine that my four-year-old nephew and my brother are still on the plane, while his wife and one of their sons have been released. I don’t know whether to feel happy or sad,” said Tyagi. Like all others, he prayed for the ordeal to end soon.
The plane carrying the traumatised passengers touched down at New Delhi at 10.30 p.m. However, it was too early to celebrate the homecoming. Several of those waiting to receive their relatives broke down on not finding them among those released. The brutally stabbed body of Rupin Katyal, the 25-year-old honeymooner, was carried in a wooden casket. According to the FIR report in Delhi, his body bore “one stab wound on the abdomen, four stab wounds on the chest, two stab wounds on the neck, six stab wounds on the face and one abrasion on the nose”. His young widow was still on board the aircraft. Earlier, his father had been hospitalised due to shock and was in the Intensive Care Unit.
Sharad Yadav did not miss the opportunity of the photo session with the released passengers. He was particular about being photographed with the injured Satnam Singh who was stabbed by the hijackers along with Katyal, but was fortunate enough to be still alive. Yadav even gave an impromptu speech, but the relatives of the passengers were seething with anger and refused to pick up the bouquets arranged by the government.
The passengers were whisked away in government cars with a police escort for debriefing by Intelligence officials. During the debriefing, many of them broke down and cried. Finally, the Indian authorities were able to piece together the sequence of how the five hijackers, each masked and speaking in Hindi, had commandeered the aircraft, brandishing revolvers, grenades and knives.
* * *
On board IC 814
At about 4.00 p.m. Red Cap told me that an Afghan engineer was trying to refuel the plane but wasn’t making much progress. He wanted me to help him. I Went down, escorted by Burger, and saw the engineer struggling with the fuel pipes. Obviously, he wasn’t having a great time of it. The engineer asked me what was wrong with the aircraft. I said that it was not airworthy and required maintenance. The Afghan engineer said, “You tell me what’s wrong, I’ll see what needs to be done. Why don’t you allow these guys (the hijackers) to take off? What’s your problem?”
I said that the required maintenance was not possible in Kandahar. The Afghan said he was an engineer and could fix any flaws. Annoyed, I said: “You can’t even refuel the aircraft, what maintenance can you do?” I then told him that the fuel wasn’t entering the tanks of the Airbus due to some valve damage. The Taliban engineer kept trying to refuel the aircraft but without any success. I could see a huge flow of fuel down the' parking area. He accused me of pulling out the circuit breakers or shutting the dumping valve. Burger, who was listening to this exchange, threatened to shoot me for acting smart. It was now about 5.00 p.m.
Red Cap held a meeting in the cockpit. He told me that they had to leave Afghanistan at all costs. “You have to tell me how we can get out of here. Let’s get back to Delhi or Amritsar. You can get all the parts there. At least we will be in our own country. Why do we have to stay here among these godforsaken people?” I was surprised at his pretence of being an Indian.
I suspected it was to trick us into refuelling the plane that Red Cap was adopting such a stance. Instead of Delhi, I feared the aircraft and its hostages would be taken to Kabul, or perhaps Chechnya, Somalia, Sudan, Algeria or Libya.
“How serious is the damage to the aircraft?” he wanted to know.
“Very serious,” I replied. “You don’t want to fly in an aircraft whose wings will drop off after take-off, do you?”
Red Cap asked me to return to the economy section. I was thoroughly shaken. I reported to Sharan and Rajinder that there was a probability they would try and take off and were bent upon retrieving their bags from the luggage hold.
The aircraft sat on the tarmac like a large bird carved out of rock. It had flown almost 14 hours in the last 24 hours. I fretted that the aircraft and its engines needed a thorough maintenance check. We needed engine oil that was not available in either Kandahar or Kabul. Hydraulic fluid also needed to be pumped in.
In the evening, we were finally served some food. It consisted of boiled rice and rajma, and was without either salt or any other spice. It was difficult to believe that the fratricidal war in the country had reduced it to such penury that their food didn’t even have salt in it.
We made the most of our bland Christmas dinner.
At night, the hijackers asked for six pencil batteries. My heart skipped a beat. Were they to be used as remote controllers for a detonator?
* * *
New Delhi
In New Delhi, the Prime Minister had still not convened a Cabinet meeting. Only a core group comprising Jaswant Singh and Brajesh Mishra had been closeted with the PM since the morning, seeking a breakthrough in the great Indian diplomatic dilemma. They were faced with the unenviable task of dealing with a regime they had denounced not so long ago, and any wrong step would mean that India would be playing into the hands of the terrorists and their mentors. It was a difficult choice for the government, but the pressure on it was mounting.
With no word from the Indians, the Taliban government was unsure about what it should do next. Besides, it didn’t know the kind of posture to adopt towards India considering that Saudi billionaire and terrorism financier Osama bin Laden had announced jehad or holy war upon India. That too, from Kandahar and with the blessings of Taliban supreme leader, Mullah Omar. This was the main source of worry at 7, Race Course Road. What if bin Laden was behind the hijacking? The consequences would be nothing short of disaster. Intelligence officials reported back to the CMG that the Muslim clergy based in Deoband in Uttar Pradesh, possibly using contacts with the Taliban, might be able to influence the regime in Afghanistan. The CMG asked the Home Ministry to send it a list of the clergymen who were thought to wield influence with the Taliban. However, establishing communication with them took time as most CMG members remained clueless about the Deobandis or any other sections of the Muslim clergy, for that matter, who had contact with the Taliban.
Pressure was mounting on the government from another unexpected source—its allies. As political allies started questioning th
e government on the steps it was taking, anxious relatives approached the politicians of their respective states to intervene and find out what was happening to their relatives held captive on IC 814.
Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu called up the Prime Minister. Naidu explained that he was under pressure from some of his constituents whose relatives were on board. In fact, the co-pilot of the aircraft was from Hyderabad. Naidu had already asked two of his ministers to keep him posted on the hijack. Most other allies wanted the PM to start a dialogue with the hijackers. Vajpayee told them that the CMG was still examining the consequences of the aircrafts detainment in Kandahar. He explained that Indian diplomats had already approached a number of countries and been promised help, but any more information could only be gleaned from Jaswant Singh. Naidu spoke to Jaswant Singh and stressed that the government needed to find an early solution to the end of the crisis. CMG members were also concerned at the fate of First Secretary Shashi Bhushan Singh posted at the Indian Embassy in Kathmandu who was on board the flight. The official, as coincidence would have it, worked with RAW and was related to both NSG chief Nikhil Kumar and Secretary in the PMO, N.K. Singh.
The attempt to establish diplomatic contact through the UAE and Saudi Arabia had not yielded much gain. As far as Pakistan was concerned, India did not trust it sufficiently, and sentiment seemed to support the popular perception of Pakistan having masterminded the hijack. A strong view prevailed that New Delhi needed to tread carefully if it was not to give any legitimacy to the Musharraf regime. And even though Prime Minister Vajpayee came close to breaking the silence to speak to General Musharraf to seek his help, the fear of granting legitimacy to his regime held him back. Despite Musharraf wielding considerable influence with the Taliban, both Brajesh Mishra and Jaswant Singh did not favour a tete-a-tete with him, at least then. There was no choice but to let Singh do the talking with the Pakistanis from New Delhi, while Parthasarthy continued the same efforts in Islamabad.
* * *
4
December 26, 1999
OPENING A CHANNEL
TO THE TALIBAN
Later, some passengers seated near the aisles were to report having seen, from the corner of their eyes, a man with a long beard who looked like a typical Taliban official . . . Had the aircraft been visited by some senior person who controlled the hijackers? If so, who was he? Visibly, from the sudden tension in the hijacker, he certainly was someone they dreaded. Passengers would later speculate whether this, in fact, had been Osama bin Laden himself!
On board IC 814
On the morning of December 26, Red Cap called me to enquire whether I had slept well through the night He said he had no personal enmity with me and I should bear him no ill will. His differences were with the government, and he was trying to sort them out in a manner he deemed fit. I said that hijacking an aircraft and terrorising innocent people wasn’t the best way to settle scores.
Red Cap said the Indian government was creating havoc in Kashmir with its army, paramilitary forces, and so on. He talked about atrocities in Kashmir. “Dekhiye, aap logon ko jahaz mein 36 ghante se jayada ho gayain hain. Kisi ne aapke bare mein maloomaat hi nahin kari. (You people have been in the plane for more than 36 hours. Nobody has made any enquiries about you.)”
This point was also repeatedly emphasised by the hijacker to the passengers.
Red Cap went on to tell me sharply that he was not happy with my advice and information about the aircraft. I had told him that the APU would run for only two to three hours but it had been in operation for over 24 hours. The Taliban engineer felt that the aircraft was in a fine condition—he felt I was deliberately not allowing it to be refuelled. Red Cap asked me to be truthful and cooperative.
Out of the blue, he asked: “Where’s your sky phone?”
I said I did not have a phone.
“Then your pilot or co-pilot must have one,” he said.
I said that neither of them had a satellite or sky phone.
“Then how does your government know of everything that’s happening inside the aircraft?” he shot back.
I was stumped. What was this fellow’s fertile mind hinting at?
Red Cap explained that Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh had given a description of the hijackers on TV And the minister had said that he knew about the state of the passengers on board. “If we can bring this aircraft from Kathmandu all the way to Kandahar, we have the ability to know what you, Sharan or the co-pilot have been up to.”
I asked: “Where did you hear this?”
Red Cap replied, “Last night, we heard it all on the BBC.”
I told him what he was alleging was untrue. However, I was relieved that the penlite cells we had given them the previous night were only being used for listening to the radio.
The hijacker asked: “How does the Indian government know the colour of our clothes, how many of us there are, and so on?”
“Arre, bhaiya,” I said, “what about the passengers whom you released at Dubai? They are in India now, and the Indian government has got all this information from them.”
The hijacker was mollified, but he continued to grill me.
“Your Punjab Police Chief K.P.S. Gill appeared on TV and stated that the pilots had acted smardy by putting down the aircraft at Amritsar and had given sufficient time to the government to launch commando action. But the officials had messed up things. So did you, Sharan and Rajinder land in Amritsar to get us killed?”
It was a tricky question. If I said the wrong thing, who knew what harm Red Cap was capable of perpetuating. I pointed out that Gill must have been giving his own analysis of the situation. “He is assuming things. Besides, he is not privy to any information. He’s retired, you see.”
I further clarified that we had landed at Amritsar since Lahore had refused permission to enter Pakistani airspace.
At this point Red Cap called Burger and told me to repeat what I had said. (I got a hint that a rift had occurred between Red Cap and Burger over the decision to land at Amritsar.)
Next, Captain Sharan was summoned to the cockpit and interrogated similarly. Fortunately, his replies matched mine. For the moment, the hijackers seemed satisfied.
Total silence from the Indian government began to perturb the hijackers. At about 11.00 a.m. Captain Sharan and I were called to the cockpit. The hijackers informed ATC that they would be sending them two gifts: two foreigners were brought to the executive class cabin and the hijackers threatened to kill them. Though a UN team was already at Kandahar, Red Cap was not willing to talk to them. We managed to persuade him to let us talk to the UN team to start a dialogue. He agreed. Captain Sharan informed the UN team that there were foreigners of 10 different nationalities on board (deliberately leaving out mention of an American passport holder), and their respective governments should initiate negotiations with the hijackers to save their lives. The hijackers agreed to the three hours’ time requested by the UN team to revert to the cockpit with their action-plan. I also advised the UN team about the defects in the aircraft.
As we were leaving the cockpit, Red Cap asked me to leave my wristwatch behind and start the stopwatch on it. He was obviously taking the three-hour deadline extremely seriously. I told him I would start the aircraft stopwatch, which was a two-digit stopwatch. When it reached 99 minutes, it would return to zero; they should then wait for it to reach 99 again. Instantly, he tapped my shoulder and pointed out that this would mean 18 minutes over and above three hours. If we wanted extra time, we should have bargained for four hours. I realised that we could not short-change our captors!
* * *
New Delhi
The CMG team was nearing the end of its patience. It was now debating the necessity of active involvement, that is, opening a direct channel of negotiations with the Taliban. Something had to be done, and it had to be done fast. So far, the US had done little except interact with the governments of Pakistan and UAE. The CMG had been in constant touch with the UN and t
he Red Cross to establish a channel of communication with the Taliban and the hijackers. Though there were nationals of 11 countries aboard the aircraft, and they were starting diplomatic efforts, there were clear limitations since not one of these countries recognised the Taliban. For the CMG, for a long time, the communication did not extend to anything beyond Kandahar ATC, though given India’s position with the Taliban, even that was more than they expected from the rogue administration. It troubled them that even the Kandahar air traffic controllers gave precedence to the media over the Indian officials. The misery for New Delhi was unending.
Nobody could guess the role the brigand regime was going to play. Rather than provide open support to the hijackers, the Taliban was choosing to play its cards close to its chest.
Even more unnervingly: no demands had been made from the hijackers yet. What game were they playing?
* * *
New York
Among the members of the ruling coteries in Kabul is Abdul Hakim Mujahid, the suave Taliban Permanent Representative Designate at the UN, and he was to play a vital role in the entire episode at Kandahar. The hijacking of the Indian Airlines aircraft had catapulted him to the status of Most Wanted person in New York. Though not officially recognised by the UN, Mujahid knew that this was the chance for the blacklisted Taliban to redeem itself. Seeing New Delhi’s desperation, Strobe Talbott instructed his men at the UN to get in touch with Mujahid. The Americans impressed upon Mujahid that the Taliban should grab the opportunity to get recognition as a civilian state and to erase its reputation of being a haven for terrorists.
Soon, the Indians, led by the Indian Permanent Representative to the UN, Kamalesh Sharma, came calling on Mujahid who promised to try and establish contact with Mullah Omar, the Taliban chief and other leaders in Kandahar, and to ensure that the hostages were not harmed.
* * *
New Delhi