The Campaigns of Napoleon

by David G Chandler

  21

  EXPEDITION TO SYRIA

  In the autumn of 1798 Bonaparte was not having exactly an easy time in Lower Egypt. For a period, he professed to disbelieve the news of Turkey’s declaration of war against France (September 9), but the reality of the event was soon brought home to him. His attempts to open diplomatic relations with the Oriental powers were particularly disappointing; Murad Bey sent back a message of defiance to Bonaparte’s tentative offers of peace; Djezzar Pasha, governor of Syria, rebuffed all approaches while the Sultan did not even deign to reply to Bonaparte’s overtures. The Bey of Tunis and the Pasha of Damascus similarly returned curt answers, and the feeling of complete isolation was reinforced in October when the Sultan issued a “firman” declaring a Holy War against the French. This was no empty form; on the 21st the population of Cairo, urged on by their religious leaders, unexpectedly revolted, and it took the French two days of stiff fighting, including a prolonged bombardment of the principal mosque, to restore control. The revolt cost the French the lives of 300 soldiers, including General Dupuy and Aide-de-Camp Sulkowski, both butchered by the mob, and Bonaparte exacted heavy retribution. Although he made a public show of clemency, at least 2,000 Arabs died in the fighting, and many prisoners, including six Sheikhs and 80 members of the rebel “Divan of Defense” were put to death in the citadel. To save bullets, the executioners were ordered to resort to the axe.

  Many additional problems were crowding in upon Bonaparte. The British naval blockade was almost completely effective; this meant that replacements and news from France failed to materialize, and homesickness became ever more prevalent among the troops. Attempts were made to alleviate this by opening a large club in Cairo, and many European-type shops appeared in the city, while Bonaparte optimistically talked of importing a theatrical company and 100 French prostitutes to further divert his men, but nothing could disguise the steady erosion of the army’s morale and size. Battle, suicide and above all disease, were taking a steady toll of irreplaceable manpower. By October 22, 15 per cent of the army was on the sick list, and in December an outbreak of the dreaded bubonic plague came to Cairo, Alexandria and Damietta. At its height, the plague was claiming 17 victims a day from the worst affected battalions, and before it receded some 2,000 men had died. Bonaparte deliberately disguised the nature of the illness and personally ensured that the military hospitals continued to function efficiently, but morale inevitably sagged even lower. To fill the growing gaps in the ranks, Bonaparte had already incorporated all naval personnel into the army, and now he ordered the registration of Mameluke slaves between the ages of eight and fourteen. He even planned a Negro legion, though this failed to materialize.

  A final complication was a rash of resignations tendered by senior officers; even Berthier asked for permission to return to his beautiful Visconti, but withdrew his application at the last moment. Kléber changed his mind, Menou was snubbed, Dumas* allowed to go; a few sick officers were given leave of absence, including the general’s brother, Louis Bonaparte. Several generals were openly critical of the conduct of affairs; Kléber in particular made no secret of his dissatisfaction at the opportunism of Bonaparte’s policies, and it was fortunate that for much of the time he was away in Alexandria.

  Beset by so many problems, there is little wonder that Bonaparte turned for relaxation to the charms of Madame Pauline Fourés, the vivacious Bellitote. Unfortunately, her husband was a stubborn character who, for all his lowly rank, dared to glower at her would-be lover in public, and it proved necessary to invent a fictitious mission to the Directory to get him out of the way. Even that stratagem failed; the unfortunate lieutenant of dragoons was captured by the Royal Navy at the very outset of his journey, and a courteous British naval captain insisted on returning him to the shores of Egypt. An interesting, if hysterical, scene followed in the General’s quarters near Cairo, but Bellitote made use of the easy laws of the Republic to secure a divorce from her husband, and Bonaparte’s sensual idyll continued.

  By the end of the year the most pressing problem of all was the rapidly deteriorating strategic situation, as Constantinople mobilized its vast armies, egged on by the dashing Royal Navy officer, Commodore Sir William Sidney Smith, His Brittanic Majesty’s plenipotentiary extraordinary to the Porte. As it became clear that it was beyond the powers of the French diplomats to secure a détente—Talleyrand had never even set out on his mission to the Sultan—Bonaparte was compelled to devise measures for the defense of Egypt. The form the Turkish onslaught would take soon became apparent. The Sultan was planning a massive converging attack on Egypt, one pincer being formed by the Army of Rhodes, transported by sea with the assistance of the Royal Navy, the other by the Army of Damascus, advancing on Egypt by way of Palestine and the Sinai Desert. While these moves were in preparation, the Pasha of Acre was to advance on the Egyptian frontier and occupy the attention of the French.

  The invasion of Syria, 1799; El Arish, Acre and Mount Tabor

  It was extremely unlikely that Bonaparte would remain passively waiting for these blows to fall. Typically he began to plan a decisive counteroffensive on the sound principle that “attack is the best defense,” and from November onward these matters commanded a great deal of his attention. He determined to leave 10,000 of his French troops, assisted by the local militia, to control Egypt, and march with the remainder across the desert into Palestine to forestall Djezzar Pasha, seize Acre, defeat the Damascus army, and then double back to Egypt in time to meet the Rhodes armament. He hoped that in due course the French would occupy Palestine permanently, for its possession would prove a good buffer against future threats from the north and east, deny the Royal Navy the free use of the Syrian ports of call, and provide a source of new recruits from the Jewish and Christian minorities. It is unlikely that the possibility of an advance on India was ever included in these calculations, despite the fact that Bonaparte wrote to Tippoo Sahib about this time promising direct assistance. But there is little doubt that Bonaparte hoped a rapid advance on Syria would persuade the Sultan to reverse his present policy, while even the appearance of a threat to the land route to India could be expected to cause the British Government grave concern and thus distract attention from Egypt. A quick success might even persuade the Directory to send reinforcements.

  The attitude of the French Government toward the Army of Egypt had undergone a radical change since August. France was facing the prospect of an onslaught by the forces of the Second Coalition the following spring, and all the Directory’s attention was taken up by attempts to bring the depleted armies up to strength. Consequently there were no men or ships to spare for Egypt, and on November 4 Talleyrand wrote to Bonaparte that he was on his own, giving him the choice of staying in Egypt, marching on Constantinople, or trying to reach India. This superbly unhelpful document reached headquarters only on March 25, but it revealed beyond doubt that the Directory no longer considered the Orient to be a vital theater of war.

  Long before this missive reached him, Bonaparte had assumed the offensive. He considered that the campaign would fall into two stages: a rapid march through the Sinai Desert against minimal opposition, followed by a steady advance up the coast of Palestine against stiffening resistance culminating in a hard struggle for Acre. As usual, speed was to be the main ingredient of success, and to prepare the way for the onslaught, General Legrange was ordered, on December 23, to reconnoiter the Sinai coastlands and establish a forward base at Katia. Thirteen thousand troops were put under marching orders, including 9,932 infantry in four under-strength divisions commanded by Kléber, Bon, Reynier and Lannes,* 800 cavalry under Murat, and 1,755 sappers and artillerymen besides the 400 Guides and the 80 men of the recently formed, but already redoubtable Dromedary Corps. Each division was provided with its own mule train and ambulance detachment, and every man was supposed to be issued with a leather water bottle. To speed the rate of advance the heavy siege guns were loaded onto two flotillas of naval craft at Alexandria for transport
to Acre by sea. In a few weeks all was ready.

  On February 6, 1799, General Reynier left Katia with the advance guard, closely followed by Kléber’s division. Bonaparte estimated that his men could cross the 120 miles of desert by February 14, but in this calculation he was sadly in error. Owing to an incomplete reconnaissance, the French had no idea of the strength of the Turkish garrison at El Arish, and to his consternation, Reynier found himself confronted on the 8th by a solid masonry fort, defended by 600 Mamelukes and 1,700 Albanian infantry. “We were astounded,” wrote an officer named Doguereau, “by the defenses of El Arish. Nobody expected to find any obstacle before Gaza, where we knew a fort was in existence. We were greatly surprised to find such a well-built fort … which held us up for several days.”18 Indeed, Bonaparte’s orders to Reynier dated January 31 included the passage: “having reached El Arish, General Reynier will immediately start to construct a fort …” and for this purpose Chief Engineer Cafarelli attached a strong detachment of sappers to the advance guard.

  The unexpected need to besiege El Arish forms the first crisis of the campaign and the delay was to cost Bonaparte dear. Reynier’s men stormed the village and camp on the 9th at considerable cost, but all their efforts proved unavailing against the fort. Nor did the arrival of Kléber’s divisional artillery on the 14th make an appreciable difference, although his infantry proved invaluable in assisting Reynier to drive back a Turkish attempt at relief on the following day. On the 17th a furious General Bonaparte galloped into the French lines, deeply concerned at the havoc this unforeseen obstacle was causing to his timetable. He at once ordered up several 12-pounder guns from the heavy field park, but still the defenders held out, and it was only when General Dommartin, the artillery specialist, massed all the available mortars against the fort that the 900 survivors of the garrison surrendered on terms on February 19. El Arish cost Bonaparte eleven invaluable days, a delay which compromised the success of the entire campaign.

  Nobody could accuse the French of inactivity during the weeks that followed, in spite of the increasing shortage of rations. On the 23rd, the army passed into Syria, and in the next twenty-four days fought its way over a further 140 miles to Acre. Gaza fell without resistance on the 25th, and the first day of March found the army at El Ramie where they were welcomed by the Christian population. Two days later Bonaparte was outside Jaffa, and three days of careful preparations resulted in a successful assault, led by Lannes, on March 7. There followed one of the grimmest and least excusable incidents in Bonaparte’s career. Three thousand Turks in the citadel of Jaffa accepted the word of a subordinate French officer that they would be granted quarter, but Bonaparte ordered the execution of every man and of a further 1,400 prisoners. He later attempted to explain this foul butchery in terms of military necessity—he had no food for so many useless mouths, could not spare them an escort, had found paroled Turks from El Arish serving in the garrison—but none of these explanations survive examination. There is little doubt that his real motive was to impress Djezzar Pasha, whose own nickname was “The Butcher,” with an example of French ruthlessness, but by any standards the massacre was a horrible business.

  As if in divine retribution for the incident, the army was instantly afflicted by a severe outbreak of plague. Bonaparte was forced to tarry at Jaffa for a whole week preparing his final drive on Acre, and every day the sick lists grew. To rally his army’s shaken morale in the face of the scourge, Bonaparte made the superb but rash visit to the Pestiferies on the 11th, accompanied by his terrified staff, and even insisted on helping to carry out a corpse from the ward. It was a sublime act, one that contrasts strongly with his decision to shoot the prisoners, and it achieved its purpose in rallying the army’s confidence. But when the troops marched for Haifa on the 14th, they left behind 300 plague cases and a guard of 150 men; of these unfortunates, only 36 survived the terrible visitation.

  Fate had another blow in store for General Bonaparte; on March 15, Commodore Sir William Sidney Smith appeared off Acre with H.M.S. Tigre and H.M.S. Theseus in the very nick of time to prevent Djezzar Pasha from evacuating the town. Sailing with the squadron was a certain Colonel Phélippeaux, a French émigré engineer officer, one-time classmate of Bonaparte at the Paris Military Academy. Smith lost no time in sending this expert ashore supported by the marine detachments and every spare man from the Tigre, and in the days that followed the fortifications of Acre were placed in a good state of defense. The full implications of the eleven-day delay at El Arish now became manifest. Had Bonaparte arrived at Acre on any day prior to the 15th, the place would have been his for the taking; arriving, however, as he did on the 18th, he found his hopes of a quick success dashed to the ground. As if this was not in itself enough, Bonaparte had the additional misfortune to lose the flotilla carrying half his siege guns—captured by the Royal Navy off Mount Carmel on the 18th—and within a few days of opening the siege of Acre the French found themselves disconcertingly under fire from their own pieces. Thus four days represented all the difference between success and failure. From the outset of the campaign in Syria, Bonaparte had anticipated a hard struggle for Acre. “The key of Palestine” (as Djezzar termed it) stood on a naturally strong position; the greater part of the town was situated on a peninsula, two thirds of its 1,000-yard perimeter facing the sea, while on the landward side massive walls formed an angle protected by an imposing tower of stone. Although Phélippeaux did much to strengthen them, particularly with fieldworks, before he died from sunstroke, the walls of Acre were more imposing in appearance than in actual strength, and had the French possessed heavy guns from the beginning of the siege a practicable breach would soon have been effected. Under the particular circumstances, however, for the first six weeks the French had to employ their field artillery in this vital role, and the results were far from satisfactory. The 5,000 men of the garrison, on the other hand, were well provided with artillery of all calibers, no less than 250 pieces being mounted on the fortifications, and Commodore Smith lost no time in establishing a further battery on the lighthouse mole to enfilade the defenses’ eastern approaches, besides arming a considerable flotilla of gunboats for the purpose of harassing the French flank.

  The leading defenders of Acre form a colorful pair. The septuagenarian Djezzar Pasha was widely famed for his quick temper and ferocity, and had attained his present exalted position by the ruthless elimination of political opponents. A Bosnian whose real name was Ahmed, he had started his career as the slave of Ali Bey in Egypt, but had rapidly carved his way to preferment, richly earning his nickname of “The Butcher” in the process. Sidney Smith had also enjoyed an extremely variegated career. Born in 1764, he joined the Royal Navy at the age of twelve, served afloat during the War of American Independence, and thereafter traveled widely in France and Morocco before joining the navy of the King of Sweden for the war against Russia. His services earned him a knighthood from King Gustavus III, but in 1790 he moved on to Constantinople for a stay of three years during which he made some invaluable contacts. In 1795 he was recalled to Britain by an Admiralty that considered his length of absence, a mere eight years, somewhat excessive, and in 1794 he saw some exciting service at Toulon with the British occupation forces. From 1796 to 1798 he languished in a French prison, condemned for piracy, but he was daringly rescued from durance vile by Phélippeaux and smuggled out of the country. From that time on Sidney Smith was inseparable from his deliverer, and both served with the Mediterranean Fleet of Admiral Nelson until Smith was given the virtually independent command of a blockading squadron with the rank of commodore. Between them, Djezzar and Smith made a formidable combination, as General Bonaparte was to find to his cost.

  Deprived of heavy artillery, Bonaparte had no alternative but to resort to the time-consuming and elaborate methods of siege warfare, which involved slow sapping forward toward the objective by means of approach trenches and parallels. Inaction never suited our Corsican, in this case made overconfident by his quick seizure of J
affa, and on March 28 he ordered a premature assault on the defenses; however, his storming columns found their ladders too short and were flung back with heavy losses. During this assault, Djezzar Pasha was at hand to rally his followers, sitting in state near the scene of action distributing largesse for every infidel head laid before him. Four days later the sappers exploded a large mine beneath the “Damned Tower,” as the French called it, but the solid masonry was barely cracked, and the following assault fared no better than its predecessor, while Bonaparte himself was saved from probable death by the devotion of his Guides who protected him with their bodies from an exploding shell.

  Already, however, Bonaparte’s attention was being drawn eastward toward the Jordan where his intelligence service reported that the Army of Damascus was on the move with a further force of 7,000 Turks gathering in Galilee. Reacting to this information, Bonaparte sent Junot with some cavalry to reconnoiter Lake Tiberias, and on April 8 this detachment beat off a far superior force near Nazareth. Alarmed by the apparent strength of the enemy in the region, Bonaparte next ordered Kléber to march with 1,500 men to Junot’s assistance, and on the 11th this force, in its turn, routed 6,000 Turks near Canaan. Continuing his precautionary moves, the French commander in chief sent Murat with two battalions to seize the important crossing of the Jordan to the North of Lake Tiberias, and he too gained a notable success and much booty on the 15th when he surprised a Turkish encampment.

  So far everything was going remarkably well, but on the 16th Kléber and his 2,000 men ran into real trouble when they found the Pasha of Damascus with possibly 25,000 cavalry and 10,000 foot near Mount Tabor. Retreat was out of the question, so making the best of the situation Kléber attempted to surprise the enemy encampment before daylight the following morning, blithely accepting odds of seventeen to one. The surprise failed, and a desperate struggle developed around the small French squares, lasting almost the whole day. Toward four in the afternoon ammunition was running desperately low when Bonaparte dramatically appeared on the scene from the north. Learning of his subordinate’s danger, the general had led up Bon’s division together with a handful of guns, marching overnight from Acre, 25 miles away. The new force moved rapidly to the rear of the Turkish host. Two cannon shots discharged at the right psychological moment, followed by a few well directed volleys from Bonaparte’s squares, were sufficient to scatter the Turkish horde to the four winds, and to the accompaniment of derisive laughter from the French, the Army of Damascus disappeared towards the mountains and the Jordan. When the roll was called it transpired that Kléber had lost only 2 men killed and 60 wounded in a 10-hour action against 25,000 horsemen. These French casualty figures seem hardly credible, but the outcome was barely less amazing. Seldom has the superiority of disciplined infantry formed in square over disorganized mass cavalry attacks been more convincingly demonstrated. Bonaparte had reason to congratulate himself and his men over the outcome of the battle of Mount Tabor; one of the Sultan’s “pincers” had been eliminated with comparatively little effort, and it appeared a happy augury for the rest of the campaign.