After the completion of the new bridges on the 10th, the Army of the Reserve poured over the Po at San Cipriano, and by the evening of the 11th some 28,000 men were at Stradella despite the heavy rain. “I have a wretched cold,” wrote Bonaparte to Josephine. On the welcome arrival of Desaix from France the same day, Bonaparte reconstituted the army’s organization. His esteemed comrade of Egypt was given Boudet’s and Monnier’s divisions to form a fourth corps d’armée, destined to perform a vital role in the coming events, and Victor took over Gardanne’s division to bring his corps back to strength; Duhesme was put in command of a corps of odd units, some from Moncey, some from Chabran. At this juncture, the Army of the Reserve, including the numerous formations on detachment and in the rear areas, totaled 58,021, some 30,000 forming the field force.
Eager to strike the Austrians while they were still off balance and faced with the vital need to force battle before Melas could break contact and retire on Genoa, Bonaparte advanced to the banks of the River Scrivia on the 12th, at the same time recalling Lapoype’s division from Pavia. The 12th was also marked by the long-awaited arrival of most of the divisional artillery from Ivrea, bringing the army’s metal to a strength of 41 pieces. As there was still no news of any Austrian move to meet him, Bonaparte decided to provoke Melas still further and ordered the army to cross the Scrivia the following day. As the morning of the 13th wore on with torrents of rain and no news of the foe—“the light cavalry found no trace of the enemy”—Bonaparte became increasingly convinced that Melas was deliberately avoiding action. As early as June 12 he had significantly ordered Berthier to ensure that the reserve ammunition was sent to Sarravale on the road from Alessandria to Genoa, as if he expected to fight there in due course. Determined to block the only two “bolt holes” open to the Austrians, at about noon the First Consul ordered Desaix to move from reserve behind the Scrivia and march with Boudet’s division toward Rivalta and Novi in order to cut the main Genoa-Alessandria highway, and thereafter possibly link up with the advancing forces of Suchet. Monnier’s division was brought up into central reserve, but Lapoype’s command currently at Pontecurone was similarly put in a state of readiness for a march on Valenza to join Chabran’s troops and forestall any enemy effort to break out north of the Po where they might attempt to sever the French lines of communication by a thrust toward Milan.
Nevertheless, “the First Consul was very uneasy.” Since Montebello, he had received no reliable information of the enemy’s moves, thanks to General Ott’s superior cavalry forces, and the conviction that Melas was determined to avoid a battle steadily hardened into a mental fixation. As Victor and Gardanne advanced on the village of Marengo, they were opposed only by 4,000 men of the Austrian rear guard who were soon in full retreat for nearby Alessandria beyond the River Bormida. If Melas intended to make a stand, surely he would have done so on the Plain of Scrivia, especially as it was ideal cavalry country, and would afford the Austrians a good chance to employ the best arm of their forces. As Jomini wrote: “The plain of Marengo is almost the only one in Italy where masses of cavalry can charge at full speed.”34
As evening turned into night, a series of misleading reports appeared to confirm Bonaparte’s assessment that the Austrians dared not fight but were trying to escape. Gardanne reported, erroneously, that the retiring Austrians had all crossed the Bormida destroying the bridge behind them and that Alessandria was only lightly held. A staff officer, sent to confirm this and to reconnoiter the whole area, not only reported that this was so, but failed to notice that in fact Melas had built an additional pontoon bridge over the Bormida. Austrian prisoners reported that Melas had sent a force toward Acqui, intelligence that would seem to confirm that the foe was planning to make for Genoa, but other information, allegedly provided by a double agent who was, in fact, a spy in the pay of General Zach, mentioned cavalry movements toward the Po. In the light of this mass of information, some of it conflicting but all of it bogus, the First Consul felt that his detachment of Desaix from his main force, despite the close proximity of the enemy, had been a safe and well-advised measure. Nevertheless, Bonaparte remained uneasy, and spent the earlier part of the night riding among the men of Victor’s corps camped around Marengo, straining his eyes to the westward in an effort to pick out the enemy’s campfires. In the end, he retired to bed at the Villa of Torre-di-Garofoli instead of returning to his comfortable quarters at Voghera, prefering to stay closer to his men in the light of the uncertain situation.
Unknown to Bonaparte, General Melas had, in fact, decided to stake everything on a battle to be fought on the morrow. The Austrian commander in chief dreaded nothing more than the junction of the Army of the Reserve, Bonaparte and Berthier, with the Army of Italy, Massena and Suchet, which he believed to be approaching fast from the west. Melas hoped to avert this danger by defeating the Reserve on the 14th and thus reopen his communications with Mantua and Austria; only in the event of a repulse would he consider a retreat to Genoa. All night preparations were hurried forward, and although Victor’s sentries reported a continuous commotion in Alessandria, the French took only elementary precautionary measures.
On the morning of Sunday, June 14, 1800, the weather was fine and clear in marked contrast to the unusually wet weather of the preceding days. By six o’clock Melas’ army was on the move over the Bormida bridges into the narrow bridgehead held all night by General O’Reilly, and the French “awakened to a reveille of gunfire”35 as the first batteries went into action. The Austrians, almost 31,000 strong supported by 100 cannon, slowly began to deploy in the restricted space into three columns. O’Reilly led the way with 3,000 men, and at once drove back Gardanne’s outposts from Peterbona before wheeling to the south of the main road to form the Austrian right wing. Melas in person accompanied the second column with his chief of staff, Zach, and the 18,000 soldiers of Generals Haddick, Kain and Elsnitz, to form the center of the array which was to launch the main attack against the village of Marengo. The third column, 7,500 strong, commanded by General Ott, snaked away to the left toward Castel Ceriolo, where Melas erroneously believed that a large French force was stationed. Fortunately for the French, the Austrian deployment was seriously hindered by the narrowness of their bridgehead on the right bank of the Bormida, and only at nine o’clock did the attack gather any momentum. Moreover, Melas suddenly withdrew 2,340 cavalry troopers from Elsnitz’s division and sent them off toward Cantalupo on a wild goose chase occasioned by a false report that General Suchet was advancing on Acqui in the Austrian rear. Thus it was not only General Bonaparte who detached large formations in the face of the enemy on this fateful day.
Nevertheless, General Melas’ unexpectedly aggressive move took the French command completely by surprise. For several hours, in consequence, the whole brunt of the battle was borne by Gardanne and Chambarlhac of Victor’s Corps, supported by only five guns.* These divisions were drawn up behind the deep Fontanove stream in front of Marengo, and it is greatly to their credit that not a yard of ground was relinquished before noon. Meanwhile, the First Consul, still at Torre-di-Garofoli, obstinately stuck to his belief that these aggressive events were nothing more than a cover designed to shield Melas’ withdrawal toward Genoa or, alternatively, toward the Po. About nine o’clock he confirmed the order for Lapoype’s division to march north for Valenza, thus weakening the Reserve by a further 3,500 men, and sent off an aide to Desaix with instructions for Boudet’s division to press on from Rivalta for Pozzolo Formigioso.
But within an hour of sending these orders, Bonaparte came to realize the true gravity of the situation. By ten o’clock Lannes, Murat and their troops had moved up in support of Victor, raising the French strength committed to battle to 15,000 men, but they were still outnumbered two to one by the enemy. Watrin’s division took post to the right of Marengo but was soon under heavy frontal attack by Melas, while Ott’s corps threatened to fall on the exposed right flank. Bonaparte arrived on the scene at eleven, and at once realized the n
ecessity of reinforcing the right; if Ott was allowed to take undisputed control of Castel Ceriolo he would be in a position to outflank the entire French battleline and his cavalry might be able to press on for Salé toward the Po, thus threatening the French communications. By this time aides-de-camp were spurring furiously after Lapoype and Desaix with orders of urgent recall; Bonaparte’s message to the latter allegedly ran: “I had thought to attack Melas. He has attacked me first. For God’s sake come up if you still can.”36 Fortunately Desaix, held up by a swollen river, was not beyond recall and received his message at one
P.M., but Lapoype was reached only at six in the evening and proved unable to intervene, even in the last stages of the battle.
From noon to one o’clock a pause ensued as the Austrians regrouped their legions for a further all-out attack. Victor’s corps was running dangerously short of ammunition around Marengo, and it seemed unlikely that the weary troops would be able to hold the line of the Fontanove much longer. Nevertheless, Bonaparte decided to commit his remaining reserves on the opposite flank against General Ott who had by this time almost annihilated Watrin’s division. The 900 men of the Consular Guard were ordered up to Watrin’s support, and the last reserve, Monnier’s division, was instructed to move against Castel Ceriolo and dispute its possession with the Austrians. The Guard advanced in a square formation in the face of ferocious enemy fire which decimated the ranks, but their intervention temporarily eased the pressure on Watrin and gave Monnier time to deploy his men on the extreme right. The French attack on Castel Ceriolo at 2:00
P.M. coincided with the long-anticipated loss of Marengo village on the southern flank, but the wisdom of Bonaparte’s decision to strengthen his right was borne out by the fact that the whole Austrian offensive was delayed while Ott turned to deal with Monnier’s division. Thus a little more time had been won, although every available French soldier was now fully engaged, and all fifteen pieces of divisional artillery were committed to the battle. Austrian pressure increased relentlessly on the Marengo side, and by three
P.M. the French army, 23,000 strong, went reeling back toward San Guiliano, and there was no chance of Desaix’s troops intervening before five o’clock.
The Battle of Marengo, June 14, 1800: the morning phase
Defeat seemed to be staring the Reserve in the face, or so it appeared to General Melas. Extremely fatigued and slightly wounded, the Austrian commander in chief decided to hand over command of the pursuit of the apparently shattered French forces to his chief of staff, General Zach, convinced that technically his men were already victorious. A welcome pause ensued while the Austrian center was formed into column of route. Bonaparte had traded space for time, and, as he knew, help was drawing closer.
Shortly before three in the afternoon a mud-spattered General Desaix galloped up to the French commander and announced that Boudet’s division with its eight guns was close behind him. Some authorities assert that Desaix was already “marching for the sound of the guns” when Bonaparte’s order of recall reached him; in any case there is no doubt that his intervention came in the very nick of time. “Well, what do you think of it?” asked Bonaparte. Pulling out his watch, Desaix replied, according to Bourienne: “This battle is completely lost, but it is only two o’clock”—in fact three—“there is time to win another.”37 Heartened by this timely reinforcement, fresh resolution filled the hearts of the weary troops. Bonaparte rode among the men and called out, “Soldiers, you have retreated far enough; you know that it is my habit to bivouac on the field of battle.” “Chins up!” shouted back a sergeant of the Consular Guard.
The Battle of Marengo, June 14, 1800, by General Lejeune. General Desaix is struck from his horse (left background) as he leads his men forward to rout General Zach and his Austrian column. In the left foreground, the First Consul rides forward with his staff. Berthier is shown in the right central foreground, and the painter has included himself (mounted right, wearing brassard) leading up Austrian captives.
Within an hour the reinforcements were beginning to arrive behind Victor’s shattered corps and a new plan of battle was soon fashioned, calling for the closest cooperation between all three arms. Marmont massed the five remaining divisional cannon, Boudet’s eight, with five more from the reserve into one battery, and opened a heavy fire on the Austrians for twenty minutes, damaging many enemy guns, and tearing great gaps in the flank of Zach’s ponderously advancing column. Then Desaix led forward his men, formed into an oblique order of brigades; a moment’s hesitation was experienced when, emerging from the smoke, these troops found themselves confronted by a crack battalion of Austrian grenadiers, but Marmont was at hand with four light guns which he rapidly unlimbered to pour four salvoes of canister into the white coats at point-blank range. Forward again swept Boudet’s men, eager to get to grips. At that precise moment an ammunition wagon exploded, and a moment of consternation paralyzed the Austrian ranks in their turn. Seizing a fleeting opportunity, the younger Kellermann wheeled his 400 horsemen for a bold, spontaneous charge into the stunned left flank of Zach’s 6,000-strong column. It was the moment of truth which converted near-defeat into crushing victory. “A minute earlier, or three minutes later, and the thing could not have succeeded, but the timing was perfect, and North Italy was recovered in that moment for the French Republic.”38
In a short time, General Zach and several thousand of his grenadiers found themselves prisoners instead of victors, and all Austrian resistance on the right collapsed into a headlong flight through Marengo for the River Bormida and the safety of the walls of Alessandria beyond. With a great shout, the whole French line swept forward; Kellermann re-formed half his triumphant men to rout the Austrian cavalry and General Ott conceded that the day was lost, withdrawing his men of the Austrian left in good order. Shortly after nine in the evening, after twelve hours of fighting, the firing died away. The French victory was complete, but Desaix lay dead, shot in the chest, at the moment of triumph which he had done so much to make possible, near the hamlet of Vigna Santa. “His death deprived the army of an excellent general, and France of its most virtuous citizen” was Thiers’ epitaph on the fallen hero. Bonaparte never forgot his debt to his deeply-mourned comrade. “I am plunged into the deepest grief for the man whom I loved and esteemed the most,”39 he wrote next day to his fellow-Consuls.
The Austrians had lost 15 colors, 40 guns and some 8,000 captives, besides 6,000 dead; nor were the French losses light—approximately one quarter of the Army of the Reserve lay dead or wounded. The victors were too exhausted to pursue their beaten rivals, but further operations fortunately proved unnecessary. That same night a shaken General Melas decided to ask for an armistice, and within 24 hours, the Convention of Alessandria was signed. The Austrians undertook to withdraw all their forces to the east of the Ticino and surrender their remaining fortresses in Piedmont, Lombardy and the Milanese, and further agreed to refrain from all operations pending a reply to Bonaparte’s offer of peace newly sent to Vienna. This was not the complete triumph that the First Consul had envisaged the previous December; nevertheless it would suffice for the present.
The Battle of Marengo, June 14, 1800: the afternoon phase
On June 17, Bonaparte left the army and set off for Paris by way of Milan. On June 23, a decree ended the separate existence of the Army of the Reserve, merging it into the Army of Italy under the command of Massena. The Reserve had existed for slightly over 100 days and had seen active campaigning for just over one month, but its work was gloriously done. An Order of the Day was issued on the 24th congratulating the men on their success: “The day of Marengo will remain famous throughout History,” declared the First Consul. He was right; it was his first victory as head of state, and many authorities regard the Marengo Campaign as the beginning of his period of full greatness, both civil and military.
About 15 miles to the inch.
See Appendix for the complete French Order of Battle on June 14, 1800
See p. 349 a
nd “afternoon” battle plan.
28
PEACE RESTORED
Bonaparte’s conduct of the Campaign of 1800 has inspired a great deal of comment, both favorable and critical. There is nothing but praise for the strategical conception that underlay the employment of the Army of the Reserve; the cunning use of the Swiss salient to outflank the Austrian forces and threaten their lines of communication, whether in Germany or Italy, was a brilliant stratagem, clearly illustrating Bonaparte’s mastery. As he said to Jomini in 1806: “The secret of war lies in the secret of the lines of communication…. Strategy does not consist of making half-hearted dashes at the enemy’s rear areas; it consists in really mastering his communications, and then proceeding to give battle.” This system underlay most of his campaigns.
However, for all its brilliance, the campaign did not end the war at one blow as originally intended. Melas was not annihilated at Marengo, but allowed, by the terms of the Convention, to “march away to fight another day.” It required a further joint effort by Moreau, Brune and Macdonald to achieve Bonaparte’s overall object. This disappointment was far more the responsibility of the First Consul’s subordinates, Moreau and Massena, than of le petit caporal; Moreau’s original refusal to cooperate in a decisive offensive on the German front compelled Bonaparte to refashion his plans in favor of the coup de foudre in Italy. The fact that he was able to do this so successfully is no mean tribute to his flexibility of mind and undaunted determination; Bonaparte was undoubtedly the past master of the alternative plan. If the victory won in Italy was less conclusive than had been hoped, it must be remembered that Bonaparte was forced to undertake operations with only 54,000 effectives in place of the 85,000 or more which the original plan envisaged; Moncey’s 11,000—when they eventually made their appearance—were hardly adequate replacements for Lecourbe’s 25,000 veterans, and Massena’s surrender of Genoa and subsequent withdrawal to Nice temporarily deprived the First Consul of the assistance of a further sizeable force in the crisis of the campaign. Moreau and Massena bear still more responsibility for the course of events; the former’s repeated delays in opening the Rhine offensive postponed the date on which the Reserve could move over the Alps, and the latter’s misfortune in allowing the Army of Liguria to be split in half before being driven into Genoa faced Bonaparte with an unanticipated crisis which left him no option but to enter into the campaign with his army yet incomplete.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 39