At length a bewildered Brunswick issued new instructions. In order “to defeat them by an oblique and rapid movement against the general direction they will be following,”10 he directed that the army should mass to the west of the Saale and then threaten Napoleon’s flank. Two forces of cavalry supported by light artillery were to be pushed south to Neustadt and Hildburghausen to threaten the French communications, with the Duke of Weimar’s division in support at Meiningen. The remainder of Brunswick’s own field army was to advance slowly on Erfurt (to be reached by the 9th), and then to Blankenhain. Hohenlohe was ordered to concentrate at Hochdorf on the 9th, and then to take up a position around Rudolstadt on the left bank of the Saale. Only a small detachment of Tauenzien’s reconnaissance force was to be left near Hof. Rüchel was to send detachments toward Fulda so as to increase the threat to the French rear areas, while his main force moved up from Eisenach to make contact with Brunswick’s forces between Gotha and Erfurt. The reserve, under Eugen of Württemberg (13,000), was ordered up to Halle from Magdeburg, ready to rejoin Brunswick at either Leipzig or Naumburg if need arose.
In general terms this was a sound enough plan, although it clearly admitted that the French were in possession of the full initiative. Moreover it was excessively detailed in the number of detachments it authorized, and was sufficiently vague to allow Hohenlohe to interpret its underlying intention as he, and not Brunswick, thought best. Elated that the commander in chief’s plan of a general advance on Würzburg had been dropped, Hohenlohe and Massenbach concluded that their own plan for a general concentration on the right bank of the Saale was implicitly approved, and forthwith advanced Tauenheim’s Saxon divisions towards Auma and Schleiz and a further force to Saalfeld under the command of Prince Louis Ferdinand without seeking Brunswick’s prior permission. These troops were consequently placed directly in the path of the approaching Grande Armée.
While his Prussian adversaries were vacillating from one course of action to another, Napoleon was steadily completing his own preparations. Prussia had gained a month’s start in the mobilization race before the French had any clear intimation of what was afoot, but even in September the Emperor acted with commendable caution. The early Prussian moves seemed so inexplicable that he suspected a deeper significance. Perhaps a new coalition had been secretly formed; perhaps England was preparing a descent on the French coast and was using Prussia as a bait to distract the attention of the main French forces; perhaps Austria was planning to enter into a new struggle with France once the corps had become deeply involved in Central Germany. The Tsar’s unexpected repudiation of the proposed treaty with France, news of which was received in Paris on September 3, served to strengthen the Emperor’s suspicions of a new international conspiracy. In consequence Napoleon bided his time, waiting for his adversaries to reveal at least part of their hands, and contented himself with taking precautionary measures. On September 5 decrees were announced calling up 50,000 conscripts of the class of 1806 and recalling 30,000 reservists to the colors, and the same day an order was sent to Berthier, the acting general in chief in Germany, instructing him “to send engineer officers to make full reconnaissances of the roads from Bamberg to Berlin, taking all necessary risks”11; further, he was to be ready to assemble the IVth, VIth and VIIth Corps at the former place within eight days of receiving definite orders. On the 9th, Napoleon informed the marshal that in the event of war the line of operations would probably run from Strasbourg to Mannheim, Mainz and Würzburg, utilizing the Rivers Rhine and Main.12
Prussian actions, particularly the indications that her main forces were concentrating to the west of the mighty River Elbe, “the Rhine of Prussia,” continued to surprise the Emperor. It was so clearly in Frederick William’s interests to oppose Napoleon with distance and time that such a forward and exposed concentration could be explained only in terms of a wider military conspiracy or sheer lunacy. “Prussian movements continue to be most extraordinary,” he confided to Berthier on the 10th; “They need to be taught a lesson. My horses leave [Paris] tomorrow and the Guard will follow in a few days’ time…. If the news continues to indicate that the Prussians have lost their heads, I shall travel directly to Würzburg or Bamberg.”13 The doubt as to his destination reveals that Napoleon was still by no means certain which direction to follow. If the foe was to march on the upper Main, the former would be the better concentration point; if the Prussians continued to hesitate, then through Bamberg lay the best road toward Dresden, Leipzig and Berlin and the means of compelling the foe to fall back and accept a battle in defense of his capital. For several more days Napoleon hesitated to indicate his army’s center of assembly, but on September 15, the decision was finally taken in favor of Bamberg.
On September 18, Napoleon learned more details of the Prussian move into Saxony and the forcible incorporation of two of her divisions into Hohenlohe’s army. This action he regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war upon France; the time for waiting was clearly past. All the preparations for a long campaign, should that prove necessary, were now largely completed, and nothing should stand in his way. It would seem that the Emperor was finally reassured about the unlikelihood of Austrian intervention by September 19, for on that date the pace of French preparations against Prussia noticeably quickened. The entire army was placed on a fully mobilized footing, and the Imperial Guard was sent rattling down the pavé roads toward Mainz in requisitioned post chaises and special wagons. In just over a week it covered 550 kilometers. The Guard infantry did not ride the whole way, however; velité of the Guard, Anciaume, related in a letter home; “We march through some villages on foot and then get back into the wagons at the far end.”14 The march to Mainz was completed on the 27th.
The Campaign of 1806 against Prussia
Over the 18th and 19th, Napoleon dictated no less than 102 orders and letters to his perspiring secretarial staff, including the famous “General Dispositions for the Assembly of the Grand Army,” the lengthy document which forms the basis for the entire campaign. In this, three crucial dates were given for the mobilization of the integral parts of the Grande Armée. By October 2, Augereau’s VIIth Corps was to have reached Frankfurt from its cantonment areas outside the city; Bernadotte’s 1st Corps was to be ready to march at Nuremburg, and Ney’s VIth Corps was to have gathered at Ansbach from its cantonments on the Rivers Iller and Upper Danube. The following day (October 3) Davout’s IIIrd Corps was to have moved from Nördlingen to Bamberg, there to join army headquarters (from Munich); Lefebvre’s Vth Corps, from the lower Main, was to be at Königshofen, while the artillery and baggage trains were to have reached Würzburg. By the 4th, Soult’s IVth Corps was to have arrived at Amberg after a considerable march from the area of the River Inn.15 Dispatched on September 20, this missive reached Munich four days later. After taking further steps to safeguard the security of France—which will be discussed below—Napoleon himself was on the road for Mainz late on the night of the 24th, accompanied by Josephine and Foreign Minister Talleyrand.
By this date, the outline of his intended plan was fairly clear in the Emperor’s mind, although the detail was yet uncertain. He had come to the conclusion that the overriding aim of the campaign should be to find and destroy the main Prussian army before Russian aid could reach the theater. A drive on Berlin would be the surest way of inducing the Prussians to fight, but since the river lines of both the Rhine and the Main were French-controlled, three avenues of approach were open to the French. Each had to be carefully considered from the standpoints of terrain and weather, the present position of the French troops, the last-known location of the enemy and his capabilities, and, of course, the problems of time and distance.
In the first instance, an army concentrated around Wesel on the Rhine would be in a good position for a direct advance toward Berlin. Apart from a series of potentially difficult river crossings en route, no serious natural obstacles would be encountered. Other considerations, however, ruled out this course of action. The pre
sent position of the Grande Armée in Central Germany was far removed from Wesel, and to redeploy it on the Middle Rhine would inevitably have consumed a considerable period of time, delaying the opening of offensive operations. This would afford Prussia a further breathing space, might well allow Russian forces to materialize from the east and, in view of the already advanced season of the year, could lead to the inconveniences of a winter campaign. Moreover, such a move would leave Austria completely unwatched, while the Prussian forces, should they be defeated on the North German Plain, would be in a position to retire along their natural line of retreat toward Berlin, their depots and the advancing Russian forces. Consequently a “direct approach” from Wesel had little to recommend it.
In the second place the French might concentrate in the vicinity of Mainz at the junction of the Rhine and the Main, and thence advance on Berlin through Frankfurt, Fulda and Erfurt. Although this area was closer to the cantonments of the Grande Armée, the geographical problems of the designated route were daunting. The Fulda Gap would provide comparatively easy going for part of the advance, but the greater part of the journey would be made through decidedly mountainous regions, culminating in the vast and badly-roaded Thüringerwald before the more open plains around Erfurt were encountered. Once again the Prussians would naturally be driven back to the east toward their supplies and reinforcements.
Taking these considerations into account, the third possible course of action therefore promised the best results. After a rapid concentration in the nearby Bamberg-Bayreuth area, the French forces could advance north to penetrate through the easier stretches of the Franconian Forest toward Leipzig or Dresden and then on to Berlin. The terrain would not be particularly favorable. The Franconian Forest was dense and hilly enough, offered only three good roads to the north and no lateral communications whatsoever; there were also numerous water obstacles to encounter, culminating in the mighty Elbe, although several valleys would run conveniently parallel to his line of march. However, the compensations decisively outweighed the objections. The concentration area was by far the most convenient of the three, given the present dispositions of the army. Fortified alternative bases of operations could be set up at Mainz, Würzburg, Mannheim and Bamberg along the main lines of communication, and an alternate series could be set up running south to Ulm and thence westward along the Upper Danube to the Black Forest and Strasbourg—largely obviating the potential perils of a Prussian offensive against the Main in rear of the French advance. In addition to these strategical advantages, the French would remain close enough to Austrian territory to be able to overawe Vienna. Finally, and most important of all, this line of advance could use any one of three rivers—the Saale, Elster or Mulde—as a strategic barrier, and the protection thus afforded would make possible a decisive manoeuvre sur les derrières of the Prussian forces. A rapid move from Bayreuth toward Berlin would at one stroke threaten the Prussian lines of communication, outflank their field forces, place the French in a commanding central position between Frederick William and the Russians and emperil the Prussian bases and capital. If the dazed Prussians held their ground, the story of Ulm might well be repeated, but such threatening circumstances should be more than sufficient to force Brunswick and his lieutenants into precipitate retreat, affording Napoleon the opportunity of dealing with the foe piecemeal at any one of half a dozen river lines. The Prussian army was well known to be extremely sensitive about its communications, and no other course of action promised so shattering an effect to its morale or offered as good a chance of a crushing Napoleonic victory. Napoleon fully expected that the decisive battle would take place on the Elbe, for he could not conceive that his adversaries would be so stupid as to expose themselves to the west of the river. However, on September 29 intelligence reports revealed that the mass of the enemy’s forces was still gathered in the Erfurt area, and it appeared that Brunswick was complying with Napoleon’s most sanguine hopes. The area between Dresden and Leipzig was clearly the strategical key to the situation; no time was to be lost in seizing this excellent central position, dividing the heirs of Frederick from the underlings of the Tsar.
Writing to his brother Louis, King of Holland, on September 30, Napoleon revealed the full extent of his calculations. “My intention is to concentrate all my forces on the extreme right, leaving the entire area between the Rhine and Bamberg unoccupied so as to permit the concentration of 200,000 men on the same battlefield. Should the enemy push forces between Mainz and Bamberg, it will not worry me for my line of communications is based on Forcheim, a small fortress, and thence on Würzburg…. The exact nature of the events that may occur is incalculable, for the enemy, who believes that my left is on the Rhine and my right in Bohemia, and thinks that my line of operations runs parallel to my battlefront, may see great advantage in turning my left, and in that case I shall throw him into the Rhine.” In a second note the Emperor continued: “The observations in my first note are all of a precautionary nature. My first marches menace the heart of the Prussian monarchy and the deployment of my forces will be so imposing and rapid that it is probable that the whole army of Westphalia will retire to Magdeburg, and combine by forced marches for the defense of their capital.”16
The same document restressed the important role Napoleon was entrusting to his brother during the early days of the campaign. Two weeks earlier he had sent Louis a memorandum outlining his intended role: “Hasten to mobilize your troops. Reunite all available forces so as to deceive them [the Prussians] and protect your frontiers while I leap into the center of Prussia with my army, marching directly on Berlin. Keep all this secret.”17 Four days later (September 19) another letter enlarged upon the part Holland was to play. “As my intention is not to attack from your side, I desire you to open your campaign on 1st October by threatening the enemy. The ramparts of Wesel and the Rhine will serve you for a refuge in any unforeseen eventuality.”18
To secure the right flank of the forces in Holland and protect his rear depots on the Rhine, Napoleon instructed Marshal Mortier on the 20th to form the VIIIth Corps at Mainz. These measures were taken to achieve three desirable objects. Firstly, Napoleon hoped that Louis’ mobile columns, probing towards Münster and Frankfurt, would serve to draw Prussian attention to the north and west while the final French preparations around Bamberg were completed. Secondly, the Emperor was concerned to obviate any danger of a large Prussian force invading French soil. Whatever happened, he felt that Louis and Mortier between them should be strong enough to hold the line of the Rhine, even if the Grande Armée was defeated and forced to retire toward the Danube. In the third place, if the Prussians entered the empty area between Bamberg and Mainz, Louis and Mortier would form the anvil against which Napoleon could hammer the enemy from the rear. In the event of a victory in Central Germany, the French on the Rhine were to advance and occupy Kassel. Thus the requirements of security, diversion and exploitation were all carefully balanced. “I only count on your forces to serve as a means of diversion to amuse the enemy up to October 12,” Napoleon continued in his notes of the 30th, “… the date on which my plans will be unmasked.” The last part of this document revealed the full importance Napoleon placed on Louis’ role: “The least check to you will cause me anxiety; my measures may thereby be disconcerted, and such an event might leave the whole of the north of my kingdom without a head. On the other hand, whatever may happen to me, as long as I know that you are behind the Rhine, I will be able to act with greater freedom.”19
Two other possible eventualities needed guarding against. As we have already related, by September Napoleon was reasonably confident that the menace posed by Austria was mostly illusory, and he was prepared to accept the Schönbrunn’s assurances of noninvolvement at their face value; nevertheless, he took pains to ensure that Eugène Beauharnais’ Army of Italy was reinforced and placed on a war footing. The possibilities of an English descent on the French coast or toward Hanover were also considered, but the Emperor felt confident that the
local garrisons (General Brune’s 16,000 men), strengthened by the National Guard and gendarmerie, would be able to delay the exploitation of any such landing until Louis could take measures from Holland while Kellermann brought up the 8,000-strong central reserve from Paris, together with 2,000 cavalry from the Departments, to the coast.
Taken in conjunction, these plans and arrangements bear out one of Napoleon’s most important maxims: “The whole art of war consists in a well-reasoned and extremely circumspect defensive, followed by rapid and audacious attack.”20
The time for taking the offensive was clearly close at hand. On October 2, Napoleon reached Würzburg and took over personal command of the Grande Armée from Berthier, who was, as always, very relieved to be rid of the responsibility. There had still been no formal declaration of war, but this was not to be long delayed; in fact, the challenge was already on its way to Imperial Headquarters. The very day that Napoleon left Paris, the Prussian Government issued its long-anticipated ultimatum. Frederick William demanded the immediate withdrawal of all French troops over the Rhine, a guarantee that France would not stand in the way of the formation of a North German Confederation under the aegis of Prussia, the immediate return of Wesel and the summoning of a conference to settle other outstanding issues. An affirmative reply was required to reach Berlin by October 8 at the latest. This final clause was probably a calculated insult; the ultimatum was only delivered in Paris on October 2 and would have required the sending of a reply within 24 hours to meet the deadline. In fact, the document forwarded by the French Foreign Ministry only reached Napoleon at Bamberg on the 7th. His reply was typical. France’s practical response would be the invasion of Prussian territory at dawn the next day; by an ironic chance his written reply only reached Frederick William’s hands on the 14th—in the middle of the decisive battle of Jena-Auerstadt.
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 58