The Campaigns of Napoleon

by David G Chandler

  Whenever he set about devising an operational plan, Napoleon invariably based his calculations on the conditions peculiar to the theater and the known dispositions of the enemy forces. By the end of April, his intelligence service had provided him with a fairly accurate picture of Russian military dispositions. He knew that six enemy army corps and three more of cavalry (comprising Barclay de Tolly’s First Russian Army of some 127,000 men) were spread in an extended cordon over a front of 250 miles from near Shavli in Courland to Slonim in southern Lithuania. He also learned that two more army corps and a sizable cavalry contingent (Bagration’s Second Army of 48,000 soldiers) were concentrating around Lutsk, 200 miles to the south of Slonim and on the further side of the Pripet Marshes. After weighing up the alternatives open to him, Napoleon selected Barclay’s army as his immediate objective and decided to mass the Grande Armée around Kovno after a rapid advance from the concentration areas along the Vistula, in preparation for a drive on Vilna. By means of a strategic penetration, Napoleon hoped he would split Barclay’s extended army into two parts, and at the same time cut the larger half’s communications with St. Petersburg.

  Napoleon considered three hypothetical Russian reactions to this drive on Vilna. They might fall back in haste from the Niemen river line and re-concentrate in new positions further east in the hope of covering the main roads to both Moscow and St. Petersburg. If they acted in this way, Napoleon would lose no time in enlarging his strategic penetration, dividing the enemy into two halves before proceeding to destroy each in turn. Secondly, the Russians might abandon Vilna and draw off to mass in force south of a line running from Grodno to Slonim; in that case the Grande Armée would sweep into the Russian rear, and pen them in a pocket formed by Slonim, the Pripet Marshes, the rivers Bug and Narew—a repetition, in fact, of the enveloping movement used to such good effect at Ulm in 1805. Thirdly, Napoleon conceived that the Russian right (Barclay) might slowly give ground before the Grande Armée whilst their left (Bagration) launched a counteroffensive from Lutsk toward Warsaw. Of these three possibilities, he inclined to consider the third the most probable in the light of the present positions of the Russian armies and the known proclivities of their commanders, but such an attack would in the end only serve to increase the peril of the Russians—providing the Emperor’s subordinates carried out their missions in a satisfactory manner.

  As the Emperor probably saw it, certain military priorities would have to be observed if his plans were to mature. First, he must move fast enough to occupy Vilna before the Russians could realize what he was about; secondly, he must lure as many enemy formations as possible to the south of Grodno into the proposed “killing ground.” He felt that these requisites could best be achieved with the aid of deception. Accordingly he intended to create all the appearances of a major onslaught toward Moscow by way of Volhynia, that is to say through the fertile areas lying to the south of the Pripet Marshes. The mounting of this diversion would be the duty of Schwarzenberg’s 30,000 Austrians and General Reynier’s VIIth Corps advancing from Lublin, with King Jerome making corresponding moves from the vicinity of Warsaw to heighten the impression. This, Napoleon hoped, would suffice to distract Russian attention southward while the main French army swept on to Vilna, set up a zone of security there to the north of the Niemen and Vilia river lines, and then prepared a devastating wheel to the right which would trap and destroy the Russian forces.

  To describe Napoleon’s basic plan in slightly more detail: He intended that Jerome and Schwarzenberg should tie down the Russian forces near Warsaw or along the River Bug, while the main French army under his personal command advanced to the River Niemen, crossed it near Kovno and then swept on toward Vilna, with the Viceroy of Italy’s army on his right to protect the exposed flank. As the main advance gathered momentum, that is to say, after Napoleon had completed some twelve days’ marches, Jerome was to begin a slow withdrawal up the River Narew to bring his men into contact with Prince Eugène and Davout’s 1st Corps, drawing the Russians after him. Once the various parts of the French force had met up, Napoleon would have achieved his “concentration of 400,000 men on a single point,” placing them all on the Russian right flank and rear. Trapped in the Grodno-Slonim pocket, the Russians would have no alternative but to fight or surrender. The plan appeared virtually infallible; even if the Russians pressed Jerome hard in the early days, he would still be able to seek sanctuary behind the fortifications of the Rivers Narew and Vistula, and the general effect would be the same; Bagration would be trapped as before, but with the Vistula to his front instead of the River Bug.

  Thus Napoleon conceived a crushing strategical envelopment of the enemy of the type used to such good effect in 1805 against the hapless General Mack. By refusing his right (Schwarzenberg) and using Jerome as a moving pivot for the decisive movement of his operational left (leaving Macdonald’s Xth Corps on the extreme flank to tie down that part of Barclay’s army still remaining in the vicinity of Tilsit), the Emperor confidently anticipated that twenty days would see his army completely victorious. “The enemy will lose many days’ marches,” wrote Napoleon to Berthier on June 11, “by undertaking useless operations which in the last analysis can only bring them to the Vistula, while the left of our army, having crossed the Niemen, will arrive on their flank and rear before they can retrace their steps.”13 The previous day he had summarized the whole plan in a dispatch to Eugène: “The march of my army will be a movement which I shall execute with my left wing while continually refusing my right wing.”14 It would be erroneous to suggest, however, that Napoleon’s plan was unalterably conceived from the very outset. There are many variations of interpretation of what he intended to do after reaching Vilna; some commentators believe that his first intention was to destroy the Russian right and press on for St. Petersburg, and at one time such a course of action was undoubtedly considered. However, in the end, he appears to have preferred the destruction of the center and left of the Russian line as his primary strategic objective.

  This plan is both ingenious and inspiring, proving that Napoleon’s planning capabilities were still undimmed; he was able to visualize the entire operation, involving half a million men, from the phase of initial concentration to that of final execution, as a single whole. However, his schemes contained two serious flaws, destined to ruin a whole succession of brilliant concepts as the campaign unfolded. The problems of time and distance were to prove too great for the capacity of a single mortal, even when that man was Napoleon. As we have seen in earlier campaign studies, Napoleon’s whole idea of warfare was based on personal supervision of all parts of his army. This had been hard enough to achieve with armies of 200,000 men in the comparatively restricted confines of Italy, North Germany or the Danube; but now, faced with the vast and empty expanses of Poland and Russia, and with the need to manipulate more than half a million men in concerted action, Napoleon’s energy and drive were to prove lamentably inadequate. Consequently, he was to prove physically incapable of supervising every stage of his plan’s implementation, and outlying subordinates, accustomed to serving with the Emperor close behind them, were to reveal themselves incapable of effective semi-independent action. Yet Napoleon fully appreciated the vital importance of closely synchronized action by all parts of his forces. Writing to Jerome from Thorn on June 5, he stated that “In this profession, and in such an extended theater of action, success may only be gained by a well-conceived plan, in which all the component parts are in full harmony.”15 The plan was well enough conceived; it was to be harmony in its execution that was lacking.

  In the meantime, what plans were the Tsar and his advisors striving to bring to fruition? From the outset, defensive considerations seem to have been to the fore; there is little evidence to suggest an aggressive intent, although a drive toward Warsaw might have been undertaken had conditions been generally more favorable and the Russian plans more advanced when the blow fell. During March and April 1812, the Tsar called in his scattered formations and
massed them in two main armies near his western frontiers. As more troops became available from the quiescent Persian and Turkish fronts, he set about the creation of a third Army of the West. Thus, by June, the Russians had at their immediate disposal three field armies, amounting to some 218,000 men. The largest force—Barclay de Tolly’s First Army of the West—numbered 127,000 troops including 19,000 cavalry, divided into six army corps, three cavalry corps and a Cossack division, supplied with 584 cannon. At the outset, as we have seen, this army was spread in a wide arc from the Baltic coast to the upper reaches of the Niemen. The right (Baltic) flank of this army was commanded by General Wittgenstein (1st Corps, headquarters at Rossieny). The center was formed by the IInd, IIIrd and IVth Corps, drawn up in a long cordon line based on Kovno, supported by Platov’s Cossack screen; the left flank consisted of General Doctorov’s VIth Corps and the IIIrd Cavalry Corps, concentrated near Lida. Barclay’s headquarters was situated at Vilna; his second line and reserve forces comprised the 1st Cavalry Corps near Vilkomirz, the IInd at Smorgoni, and the Grand Duke Constantine’s Vth Army Corps at Sventsiani. The Second Army of the West consisted of two army corps, the VIIth and VIIIth, and the IVth Cavalry Corps, supported by a further 4,000 Cossacks, totaling some 48,000 men* (including 7,000 regular cavalry) under the command of General Bagration. Originally this army was stationed around Lutsk to the south of the Pripet Marshes, but by early June Bagration was on his way northward to join Barclay, and had reached the general area of Volkovisk. Finally, General Tormassov (formerly Bagration’s second in command) was in the process of forming the Third Army of the West in Volhynia, but this force (which eventually numbered 43,000) was still widely dispersed and unprepared in May.

  Many authorities state that the basic idea underlying the Tsar’s strategic plans throughout the 1812 campaign appears to have been the concept of trading space for time. How far this was deliberate or, alternatively, enforced policy is, however, a subject of some contention. In the opinion of some Russian contemporary experts the line of the Niemen was indefensible, and the general plan originally envisaged by Barclay and Bagration (after uniting their armies) was to make a gradual withdrawal before the Grande Armée until they reached the rivers Dvina, Berezina and Dnieper, which between them formed a formidable defense line running from the Baltic at Riga to the Black Sea. This was where Alexander probably contemplated making his first real stand, and on the advice of General Phull considerable fortifications were put under construction at the main crossing points. The defenses of Riga (on the Baltic) and Kiev (on the Dnieper) were strengthened, and new fortifications were put in hand at Dünaburg and Drissa on the Dvina, and at Borisov and Bobruisk on the Berezina. It can be surmised with some confidence that Alexander may have hoped to draw Napoleon ever further eastward and then hold him along these strong river lines while new Russian armies were mobilized to their rear in preparation for a mighty counter-offensive.

  In the event, however, these calculations were to go astray; when the campaign opened, the armies of Generals Barclay and Bagration were still dangerously separated, and the fortification work at Dünaburg and Borisov barely begun. The great fortified camp at Drissa, Phull’s pet project, was indeed completed, but was to prove completely untenable for strategic reasons. Nevertheless, in the long run the Tsar’s basic strategy of using the vastness of Russia to engulf the French army was to prove effective enough. “If the Emperor Napoleon is determined on war,” confided the Tsar to Narbonne in May, “and if Fortune does not smile on our just cause, he will have to go to the ends of the earth to find peace.”16 This was to prove another illuminating prophecy.

  As the early months of 1812 wore on, both sides hastened their final preparations. Napoleon mobilized his armies on February 8, explaining away the massing of his troops in North Germany as purely local measures designed to enforce the Continental System and close down the thriving illicit trade with England. By May 15, the great bulk of his forces were concentrated in the Danzig-Warsaw area lining the banks of the Vistula, and on the 26th orders for the advance toward the Niemen were issued by Imperial Headquarters. Screened by Murat’s cavalry and with Macdonald’s and Schwarzen-berg’s corps respectively guarding the northern and southern flanks, the Grande Armée moved forward, its three main components advancing in echelon. In the optimistic hope of cloaking this act of aggression under a veneer of legality, it was given out that these moves into Poland were being made solely at the invitation of certain Polish national groups.

  The army’s strategic concentration and the subsequent advance to contact went forward smoothly enough, no opposition being encountered, but the wear and tear on the troops, who were called upon to perform long marches day after day, was already considerable. “We have been on the march for two whole months with hardly a day’s break,” grumbled Jean-Hubert Pirotte of the 1st Battalion of the Artillery Train, writing home from Marienwerder, “and a couple of days ago we reached this place. I can tell you that we went through Stettin on Easter Day. We have also been through Berlin, Nienburg, Lüneburg and Hamburg, and we have passed Thorn in Poland. Now we are in Old Prussia, near the Russian frontier, and we daily look forward to fighting the Russians…. Our job is to transport guns. We have brought some pieces that need eight and even ten horses to draw them all the way from Minden.”17 Most of the troops moving through East Prussia experienced distinct difficulty in finding supplies. Captain Roeder, of the Hessian Lifeguards, noted in his diary the inhospitality of the local people: “I am heartily sick of leaving myself to the hospitality of the Prussians,” he wrote. “Since my people left Rostock they have had no meat, and when they are quartered for the night all they get is sodden potatoes, far worse than those we give our cattle.”18 As will be recalled, Napoleon had issued stringent orders that none of the army’s supplies were to be expended until after the crossing of the Niemen, and his troops suffered great hardships in consequence. Not unnaturally, tempers turned sour, and Davout, normally a strict disciplinarian, did nothing to stop the men of the 1st Corps sacking the town of Gumbinnen as they passed through. The old pattern of Napoleonic warfare was being repeated; starving troops, burning towns (even on technically friendly soil), massacred civilians, looting, rape and pillage. Nevertheless, by May 30, the entire army was at its appointed stations, ready to invade Russian soil.

  While his men grumbled and trudged their way eastward to the concentration areas, Napoleon was making his final political and diplomatic-arrangements. On May 9, the Imperial entourage left St. Cloud and headed for the frontier. A week later Napoleon reached Dresden, where he found waiting for him a glittering assemblage of kings and princes: the Emperor of Austria, the princes of most of the states of the Confederation, and even the King of Prussia attended to heed his behests and speed him on his way. The Emperor was all courtesy and moderation; in his eagerness to secure the willing cooperation of his somewhat dubious allies, he spoke much of his desire for a peaceful settlement with the Tsar, and even sent off M. Narbonne with a last appeal to Alexander at Vilna. In fact, of course, the die was already cast, and these negotiations were really intended to serve as propaganda, representing Napoleon as the justly aggrieved party.

  Two weeks of meetings and junketings ensued, but Napoleon soon reverted to more warlike pursuits; leaving Dresden on May 29, he conducted a lightning tour of the army’s principal bases at Thorn, Danzig and Königsberg. According to Caulaincourt, his first words to General Rapp, Governor of Danzig, were very much to the point. “What are your merchants doing with all their money? War is about to start. Now I will look after that myself.”19 Heavy indemnities were levied the next day. At last, on June 17, the Emperor reached Grand General Headquarters at Insterburg, and all was almost ready. He accompanied Berthier and the staff in the direction of Kovno, through Gumbinnen, Stallupöhnen and Vilkovischi, following the forest road, passing the marching columns of 1st Corps. Excitement now had the men in its grip. “The troops … were superb, and received the Emperor with genuine enthusiasm
…. All this mass of youth was full of ardor and good health.”20 Few were destined ever to see their homes again.

  The average régiment now comprised five front-line battalions of 800 men apiece. These 4,000 infantrymen, supported by a battery of ten cannon, constituted a brigadier general’s command.

  For a detailed breakdown of the Grande Armée’s organization, see Appendix.

  Some authorities place the strengths of the Russian Second and Third Armies of the West as high as 65,000 and 80,000 respectively. It is doubtful they were as strong as this in June 1812.

  69

  THE INVASION OF RUSSIA

  On June 22, 1812, the leading Polish cavalry patrols cautiously trotted their mounts onto the western banks of the Niemen and carefully scrutinized the further side for any sign of the enemy. They were shortly joined by the Emperor in person, come to reconnoiter the place selected for the crossing. The same night, Napoleon borrowed a Polish hussar’s cloak and forage cap, and, accompanied only by General Haxo of the Engineers, carried out a thorough examination of both river banks. Further investigations took up most of the next day, while the reserve cavalry and the corps of Davout and Oudinot, followed by the Guard, moved inconspicuously forward into the forests of Vilkovischi—taking every precaution to disguise their presence so close to the Niemen. On the further bank an occasional patrol of Cossacks could be observed, but that was all. It appeared that the door into Russia had been left obligingly ajar. However, those prone to superstition learned with foreboding that the Emperor had been thrown from his horse late in the afternoon in a cornfield when a hare got up under its hooves. Although Napoleon suffered no harm, the incident appeared to many an ill omen.