The Battle of Borodino (or of the Moskowa), September 7, 1812. Marshal Berthier returns the sword of a Russian general while General Caulaincourt (the Duke of Vicenza’s brother) storms the Great Redout.
The crossing began at 10:00 o’clock on the evening of the 23rd. First, General Morand contrived to pass three companies of light infantrymen over the Niemen in light boats, and behind this screen General Eblé’s engineers of the bridging trains settled down to work with a will. By dawn three pontoon bridges were complete, and the remainder of Morand’s division and the greater part of the reserve cavalry were soon on the eastern bank. During the 24th and 25th, the rest of the army poured across in their wake. The mighty tide of men, horses, guns and vehicles swept over the creaking planking onto the soil of Holy Russia. Apart from three shots fired by a Cossack patrol, there was no Russian attempt of any sort to interfere with the crossing, and everything remained excessively quiet. Kovno was occupied without opposition.
Napoleon began to feel a trifle uneasy. By rights his advanced units, Murat’s 1st and 2nd Reserve Cavalry Corps with their 60 guns, should have made contact with Barclay’s forward positions before this, but reports sent back by his questing horsemen revealed no certain indications of the enemy’s presence. At length the truth dawned. Barclay had already begun to retire on Vilna and Sventsiani preparatory to a general withdrawal to the strong Dvina line. A little later news arrived from the distant French right to the effect that Bagration’s army, far from launching an attack toward Brest-Litovsk or Warsaw, was in the process of moving north, clearly en route for an early junction with Barclay. This information reinforced Napoleon’s belief that the Russians had correctly deduced that his main line of attack would run through Kovno, and that consequently the elaborate security measures used to conceal his main move had been of little avail. The enemy was not, for once, playing straight into his hands.
This in itself was frustrating enough, but the situation was not yet beyond redemption. The fact that Barclay was retiring toward Drissa, that is to say northeast, meant that he was in fact putting more distance between his army and that of Bagration, and thus was delaying the concentration of the two Russian armies. There might still be time, therefore, for Napoleon and Eugène to interpose their armies between the two Russian wings and close the trap on Bagration—now definitely selected as the initial target—always providing that they could move forward rapidly enough to secure Vilna as a center of operations for the enveloping attack while Jerome’s army switched from the defensive to the offensive in order to exert strong frontal pressure on the Second Army of the West, preventing it from slipping away to the east beyond the grip of the Emperor.
In these vital conditions, however, lay the rub. In the first place Napoleon could not push ahead for Vilna and the crucial central position until his immediate flank and rear had been safeguarded by the arrival of Eugène’s army in Kovno to guard his lines of communication over the Niemen. Now, the Viceroy of Italy was already two days behind schedule (as the Emperor had known early on June 20) owing to his experiencing great difficulties with the unwieldy transport convoys, and this meant that Napoleon would have to check the rate of advance of Murat (who could have reached Vilna with relative ease by the 27th), and at the same time retain Davout near the Niemen until his stepson could catch up and take over security duties. Otherwise it was just conceivable that Bagration might find himself well placed for an attack upon the main army’s lines of communication. Furthermore, there were few indications from the right flank to suggest that Jerome was making an effective advance from the Warsaw area to intercept Bagration, although on the extreme right both Reynier and Schwarzenberg were conforming with the enemy’s northward march and moving toward the River Bug and Lublin respectively. Thus from the very outset of the campaign, lack of mobility and associated problems were threatening to ruin Napoleon’s brilliant strategic plan. Neither the Emperor nor his subordinates had any real previous experience of the detrimental effect that long, bulky convoys could exert on their rate of advance; they were, in fact, like frustrated sprinters with balls and chains fixed around their ankles.
While the Emperor was cursing his hapless transport battalions, Murat was riding hell for leather toward Vilna at the head of 22,000 horsemen. Oudinot, after occupying Kovno and repairing the bridge there, was crossing to the right bank of the River Vilia en route for Keidany, where he hoped to intercept Wittgenstein’s two divisions, who appeared to have been left exposed by the sudden retreat of the remainder of Barclay’s army. Oudinot was, in due course, supported by Macdonald advancing from Tilsit on his left, and by Ney’s IIIrd Corps on his right. On the 25th, however, it proved necessary for Napoleon to damp the ardor of his cavalry on the central sector. “There can be no question of your actually marching into Vilna,” the Emperor wrote to Murat. “Rather it is vital that our left flank should be perfectly secured.”21 At 3:30 the next morning he advised Davout that “up to now the King of Naples has been pressing on rather too fast,” and warned him that there was a possibility of an enemy attack against parts of the 1st Corps from the direction of Vilkomir, away to the northeast.22 For the rest, the Emperor advised Oudinot to move forward with caution in his search for Wittgenstein; the Imperial staff desired accurate information of Barclay’s total strength and present whereabouts rather than an inconclusive action on the left flank.
The Russian Campaign of 1812
Next morning, the French staff enjoyed an apparent stroke of luck. Some Russian dispatches were intercepted revealing that the Tsar and the First Army were, in fact, still at Vilna, and that the town had been designated as the meeting point with Bagration’s converging forces. As Eugene was at last crossing the Niemen at Piloni, Napoleon felt free to form his own army into battle order and press on for Vilna without further delay. By dawn on the 28th everything was ready for action, and Murat led the army toward the city. However, Napoleon’s hopes of a decisive battle were soon dashed; the Russians merely engaged the approaching French with their artillery before evacuating the town, burning their accumulated stores and the bridge behind them. And so Vilna, in its turn, fell into French hands without a struggle. Thus Napoleon had achieved a limited penetration of the Russian position, but his success was not complete; his men were growing increasingly hungry, for the supply convoys were already being left hopelessly in the rear, and consequently looting, foraging and general indiscipline were becoming endemic.
Nevertheless, no time could be wasted if the converging corps of Bagration’s army were to be trapped before making good their escape, for part of the Second Army of the West was already reported as far east as Ochmiana. Napoleon accordingly adjusted his plan. The task of pursuing Barclay toward Sventisiani was to be entrusted to Murat and five cavalry divisions, assisted by a new temporary corps (consisting of Friant’s and Gudin’s divisions) commanded by Count Lobau. This force would have Oudinot on its left and Ney to the rear. Davout, with Morand’s 1st Infantry Division and some cavalry, was to prepare to head for Mikhalichki, securing the bridges over the Vilia so as to cut Bagration’s line of retreat. For the present, the Emperor would remain at Vilna with Desaix’s and Claparède’s divisions, using the town as his center of operations where the various field parks and convoys could foregather. Meanwhile, away on the right, Jerome was also to hasten for Ochmiana with all dispatch, applying remorseless frontal pressure. Thus Napoleon decided to split his army into a number of parts, sending Murat off in one direction after Barclay and using what was left of Davout’s corps to hunt down Bagration in conjunction with Jerome. This questionable dispersal of force was largely due to the scanty and inaccurate intelligence reaching the Emperor. He was in effect being forced to wait upon events, hoping perhaps that his deliberate weakening of his forces at Vilna might tempt Barclay to retrace his steps and accept battle after all. However, as Napoleon now hoped to tackle Bagration first, he instructed Murat, Oudinot and Ney not to press Barclay too hard for the present.
The pace of
the French advance was by now clearly slackening, as a combination of pouring rain, delayed convoys, and scarce intelligence reduced the forward movement to a crawl. Clearly, the Campaign of Russia would not be over in the first twenty days—as originally estimated.
Early on the morning of July 1, Napoleon at last received reliable tidings that Bagration was heading toward Vilna through Grodno, presumably on his way toward Sventsiani. Couriers were soon spurring from headquarters with expanded orders for Davout. He was to assume command of a force organized into three columns for an immediate southward march designed to intercept the Russians. The right column, led by Grouchy and consisting of Dessaix’s infantry and two more brigades, was to grapple with the enemy rear guard once contact had been made. The second, under Davout’s personal control, would fall on Bagration’s center, the Prince of Eckmühl being allotted the assistance of Compans and Pajol, a division of cuirassiers and the Lancers of the Guard. The left-hand column, under General Nansouty, was to consist of four brigades of cavalry and Morand’s infantry and would move to outflank the Russian advance guard.23 At the same time, Jerome was to hasten towards Ochmiana from Grodno with both horse and foot to hem in Bagration from the other flank. Marshal Mortier would form the general reserve. The arrangements seemed comprehensive.
From the outset, however, the plan went astray. Instead of moving to Vilna as ordered, Eugène spent the entire day of the 2nd halted at Piloni, under the impression that a large Russian force—a figment of General Roguet’s imagination—was about to fall on the left flank of the Army of Italy. This inaction earned the Viceroy a stiff reprimand and a curt summons to transfer his army toward Vilna without delay. Early on the 3rd, the advance guard of the VIth Corps obligingly made its appearance at Vilna, and Napoleon felt safe enough to order Davout to proceed with the envisaged operation. The next morning, after the rest of Eugène’s dilatory command had arrived, Napoleon released Claparède’s division from reserve duty at Vilna and sent it off to reinforce Davout, bringing his total strength to 50,000 men. In addition, Eugène currently had 30,000 under command on the northern side of the trap and Jerome was moving up (though ever so slowly,) with 55,000 from the west. All being well, therefore, Bagration would still be traqué de tous côtés, surrounded by French forces coming from every side.24 One hundred and ten thousand French troops were converging on a paltry 45,000 Russians; Bagration could hardly hope to escape.
Optimistic forecasts of this type, however, proved decidedly premature. Not only did Bagration slip out of the net, he also showed up the clumsiness of the French and their allies. Fifth July found a letter from Jerome on Napoleon’s desk, written from Grodno on the 3rd, reporting that his cavalry probes had found no trace of the Russians at Ochmiana apart from two weak detachments of infantry, and that Bagration seemed to be moving off toward Slonim and Minsk with his seven divisions. In other words, Jerome had hardly advanced a yard, had consequently failed to pin down the enemy (his vital task if the trap was to be sprung properly) and had also taken 48 leisurely hours to inform Napoleon of his findings. Once again the Emperor gave vent to his wrath. “Tell him,” he instructed Berthier, “that it would be impossible to maneuver in worse fashion … that I am severely displeased that he failed to place all the light troops at Poniatowski’s disposal for the purpose of harassing Bagration; tell him,” Napoleon concluded scathingly, “that he has robbed me of the fruit of my maneuvers and of the best opportunity ever presented in war—all on account of his singular failure to appreciate the first notions about warfare.”25 So great was Jerome’s fury when he received this tirade that after a further tiff with Davout a week later he decided to throw up his command and return to Westphalia. He left the front in high dudgeon on July 14, and his formations were temporarily taken over by Marshal Davout.
Putting aside this growing family contretemps and hoping that Bagration’s retreat might still be interrupted before he reached safety, the Emperor hounded his subordinates forward in headlong pursuit. The Russians could hardly reach Minsk before the 11th, and consequently Davout might yet be able to forestall them there and engage on fairly good terms. If all went well, Bagration might yet find himself flung into the Pripet Marshes near Pinsk. Accordingly, Napoleon again ordered Murat, who was chafing at the delays imposed on the northern sector, to bide his time for a further period; he was not to move beyond Vidzeme toward Dünaburg, and on no account was he to engage in a major battle in Napoleon’s absence.
On July 8, Davout limped with his footsore columns through the gates of Minsk, only to ascertain that Bagration had doubled back on his tracks several days earlier, and set off for Bobruisk the moment he had learned of the 1st Corps’ march to intercept him. That is to say, the Russians had early realized their peril, made up their minds to avoid action, and were consequently following a more southerly escape route than the French had anticipated. Once he reached Nesvizh Bagration awarded his weary men (they had been on the march incessantly for nine days) seventy-two hours’ rest. If all had gone according to plan, of course, Jerome should have been at Nesvizh by the 7th—with Davout moving up from Minsk on the further side to arrive there three days later—but the King of Westphalia was nowhere near his intended station. Consequently, Napoleon was forced to admit that his first full-scale maneuver against Bagration, intended to destroy the left wing of the Russian army at one blow, had ended in complete failure. Scarcity of local resources, over-reliance on crawling convoys (repeatedly held up on the poor earthen roads which a single rainstorm often made impassable), and growing exhaustion among his men (exposed to great variations in day and night temperature and often desperately short of food) had been the factors that robbed Napoleon of what had originally promised to be an almost certain triumph. At least, those were the reasons he put forward to explain the failure. In reality, the more significant causes lay deeper—in the failure, especially Jerome’s, of incompetent subordinates to implement their orders, and in a definite lack of physical energy on Napoleon’s own part. In previous campaigns we have always found him riding to the point of crisis to direct his divisions in person; on this occasion, however, he passed his time at Vilna, ineffectually trying to influence affairs by remote control. This was also a portent of still worse things to come.
It is hardly feasible to trace in detail the happenings of the succeeding weeks of July 1812, but it is necessary to be acquainted with their outline. After the failure of his attempt to trap Bagration, Napoleon switched his attention to the hitherto relatively neglected northern sector of the front, leaving Davout to follow the Second Army of the West toward Borisov and Orsha with orders to hinder any attempt by the Russian forces to link up. By this time, Barclay de Tolly had retired the greater part of his First Army to the line of the River Dvina, and there taken up positions within the strong fortifications of Drissa and Dünaburg. Napoleon was aware of the strength of these positions, and made up his mind to force the enemy either to evacuate them or to come out and fight in the open. “As the Emperor does not wish to attack the enemy in either of his entrenched camps at Dünaburg and Drissa, he will turn their positions, render them completely useless and then attack them on the march.”26 So was born what is known as “the Maneuver on Vitebsk.”
In this second attempt to win the Russian war, the Emperor intended to use Murat (supported by Oudinot and Ney) as the holding force in front of the Drissa position, while the rest of the central army group crossed the Dvina further south and then moved north to threaten Barclay’s lines of communication with St. Petersburg. Barclay would be left with the choice of either an immediate retreat toward the Russian administrative capital or an advance to fight Murat. This plan was, of course, a variant on the old manoeuvre sur les derrières, designed to dislodge an enemy from a strong position by threatening his rear and then force him to move to a flank in increasing confusion.
While the Emperor remained at Vilna, Eugène’s forces and the Guard were sent forward on a six-day march to Gloubokoie to bring them up in line with Mur
at’s forces around Vidzeme, ready for the general advance against the Dvina line. However, on July 16, Murat reported signs of enemy movements in his direction which might indicate a Russian resolve to sally forth from their positions and attack. Napoleon at once set off for Sventsiani en route for Murat’s position at Ikazni, recalling the Guard and the VIth Corps together with the guns and sappers from the vicinity of Gloubokoie. “If the enemy attack develops,” he wrote to Bessières, “my intention is to move against him from all sides…. If, on my arrival at Sventsiani tomorrow, I discover it has been a false alarm, I will resume the move towards Gloubokoie.”27 And so it proved. The Russian attack did not materialize, and the 18th found Napoleon at Gloubokie. He now anticipated that Barclay would move toward Polotsk, that is to say toward Bagration, last reported to be moving toward Orsha. It came as no surprise, therefore, when Murat reported on the 19th that the enemy had abandoned the position of Drissa without firing a shot in its defense. Napoleon believed that Barclay would now make his way down the Orsha road to hasten the junction with his colleague, and accordingly all units were ordered to concentrate at Kamen, ready to fight the long-sought battle.
Once again, however, the Emperor’s intuition proved wrong. True, the Russians were straining every nerve to reunite their forces, but their designated place of meeting was Vitebsk, and not Polotsk as had hitherto been assumed by Napoleon. By the 21st he had recognized his error, whereupon he ordered his troops to move from Kamen to Biechenkovski, which they were to reach by the 24th. But nothing appeared certain. “Will the foe come to Biechenkovski or move straight to Vitebsk?” he asked himself in a letter to Eugene. “It is impossible to tell. It would appear that our move toward Orsha and Mohilev—together with Bagration’s efforts—have induced him to make this movement to his left.”28
The Campaigns of Napoleon Page 95