The pace of events began to quicken. On the 23rd Davout was engaged in a sharp action against Bagration at Mohilev and succeeded in denying the Russians passage northward; that is to say, the French were still successfully interposing their troops between the two Russian armies. The 24th saw Napoleon at Biechenkovski, carrying out a personal reconnaissance of the further bank of the Dvina; the same day a handful of captured Russian stragglers confirmed that Barclay was in person at Vitebsk. The uncertainty was now over. During the next night the French set off for Vitebsk along the Dvina’s left bank, still intent on forcing a battle on an unreinforced Barclay. On the 25th and 26th Napoleon really believed that this had at last materialized; on both days Murat’s cavalry was engaged with Russian forces at Ostronovo, and the belief grew that the foe was indeed courting battle. Convinced that Barclay was now at his mercy, Napoleon withstood the temptation to attack at once with the forces to hand, and ordered his troops to wait for one day to allow reinforcements to close up.
This delay was the Emperor’s great mistake; it is true that Barclay had originally intended to face the French at Vitebsk, but when he learned that there was no longer any chance of Bagration moving up through Orsha (owing to Davout’s successful blocking action at Mohilev), he changed his mind, and decided to slip away toward a new rendezvous at Smolensk. By delaying his attack for the space of one day, Napoleon unwittingly gave Barclay the chance to get clear; consequently, when the French advanced in full panoply of battle on the morning of the 28th, they found Vitebsk in its turn evacuated by the elusive foe. And so Napoleon experienced his second disappointment of the campaign; twice the neck of the strategic net had been pulled tight, but on each occasion the prey had narrowly eluded capture.
There was now little chance of catching Barclay this side of Smolensk; there were too many good roads for his army to use. Similarly, there was little hope of preventing Bagration from making a successful rendezvous with his colleague. Napoleon’s strategy had come to naught, and he had failed to force a decisive engagement on a divided foe. He could hardly console himself with the knowledge that he had inflicted some 8,000 casualties on the foe and that the French had been left in possession of “the principal military position in Europe.” There was no disguising the fact that the Grande Armée had worn itself to a shadow in the process. The weather was excessively hot, and the number of sick had risen alarmingly; the loss of horses had been particularly severe. The route of the army was marked with putrefying corpses which undoubtedly served to raise the sickness rates. “Between Kovno and Jevee [Vidzeme] we found a good 3,000 horses lying by the roadside,” noted Captain Roeder, advancing in the wake of the leading formations, “overcome by fatigue or bad feeding, mostly from being overfed with green corn; and even more rotting human corpses, which at this season of the year make a hideous stench.”29 By the time Napoleon reached Vitebsk, perhaps 100,000 of his men were absent from their units through sickness or straggling.
Napoleon was faced with no alternative but to call a halt. His disordered and weary troops needed a period of rest and reorganization, and perhaps even the belated convoys would be able to make up lost time and reach the front to relieve some of the men’s most immediate wants. Therefore the impetus of the main French army came to a standstill for eight days while the men slept, ate and plundered and the major formations regrouped around Vitebsk, newly designated as the center of operations for the next push eastward. Meanwhile the cavalry were pushing on ahead through Souraje and Roudnya to keep a watch on the foe and shield the main army. During the period of relative quiescence, many stragglers and new drafts reached the front, bringing welcome new blood to the weary corps. Convoys also began to arrive. At this time Napoleon saw fit to entrust the VIIIth Corps (formerly Jerome’s command) to Marshal Victor.
There was little opportunity for rest, however, for the outlying French formations. Away on the southern flank, General Reynier soon found himself hardpressed near Brest by Tormassov’s Third Army of the West, newly operating from Volhynia, and in due course it behoved Napoleon to move Schwarzenberg’s Austrians up in support of the VIIth Corps to contain this new menace. At much the same time, Davout was ordered to move his present command toward Orsha so as to close up with the main body. Meanwhile, on the northern flank, there was even more activity. Oudinot’s IInd Corps engaged in a long drawn out struggle with Wittgenstein’s isolated 28,000 Russians in the vicinity of Polotsk and Disna from late July to August 16; the fortunes of war swung to and fro as first one side and then the other advanced to contact and subsequently retreated.
Despite his reinforcement by St. Cyr’s VIth Corps on the 16th, Oudinot found himself back at Polotsk by the 18th. That day saw the stiff battle of First Polotsk during which General Gouvion St. Cyr earned his marshal’s baton by his masterly handling of the 35,000 French and allied troops, following the wounding of Marshal Oudinot the previous evening. It was not a very notable victory, considering the French preponderance of numbers, but it freed Napoleon from anxiety for his left flank and reinforced his determination to advance beyond Vitebsk. Meanwhile, on the extreme northern flank of the French armament, Marshal Macdonald had left his Prussian contingents besieging General Essen in Riga while the remainder of the Xth Corps moved up to Dvina to occupy Dünaburg.
These peripheral operations show the rapid extension of the French front. On the eve of operations in June 1812, the various army groups had occupied a start line of a little over 250 miles (Königsberg to Lublin). In little more than six weeks, the front-line forces had become extended into a huge arrowhead running from Riga to Vitebsk and thence towards Bobruisk and the Pripet Marshes. Even excluding Schwarzenberg and Reynier, operating around Lutsk far to the southwest of the rest of the army, the main French front extended for well over 500 miles. Thus Napoleon’s resources were becoming decidedly strung out, and the strategic consumption of manpower was already serious. By the time he reached Smolensk in mid-August, the effective fighting strength of his central army group had been reduced to 156,000. In the month that followed this figure was to shrink still further, amounting to only 95,000 men by the time Moscow was occupied; and all the time the French lines of communication were inevitably becoming more and more extended, placing an ever heavier load on the shoulders of the overworked supply battalions and calling for numerous garrison detachments for the protection of the staging points and extending flanks. Whether or not the Russian policy of denying battle and drawing Napoleon ever further into the midst of Russia was the result of deliberate planning or dictated by the course of events, it undoubtedly weakened the Grande Armée to a mere shadow of its original battle power.
In addition to wasting an ever-increasing proportion of French manpower, the elusive Russian tactics also contributed to the mental as well as physical exhaustion of Napoleon’s forces. Tip and run raids by small bands of Cossacks were continuous and exercised a baleful influence far in excess of the military danger they represented. The French army became increasingly subject to fits of the jitters. Captain Roeder noted one typical example in his diary. The Hessian troops were mustering for parade before the Emperor’s quarters at Vitebsk on August 17, when “everything was suddenly thrown into ridiculous uproar because a few Cossacks had been sighted, who were said to have carried off a forager. The entire garrison sprang to arms, and when they had ridden out it was discovered that we were really surrounded by only a few dozen Cossacks who were dodging about hither and thither. In this way they will be able to bring the whole garrison to hospital in about fourteen days without losing a single man.”30 The Cossacks enjoyed a very high opinion of their martial qualities. Shortly before Borodino a prisoner informed Napoleon that “If Alexander’s Russian soldiers were like the Cossacks, you and your Frenchmen would not be in Russia. If Napoleon had Cossacks in his army he would have been Emperor of China long ago. It is the Cossacks who do all the fighting; it is always their turn.”31 However, the individual Cossack was not so imposing an adversary when met in single comba
t, and man for man the French light cavalryman was probably superior. But in a harassing elusive role, the men of the Don valley had no equal.
Returning to the situation at the beginning of August, the fourth day of the month found the armies of Barclay and Bagration at last united, to the tune of some 125,000 men, in the vicinity of Smolensk. There was also the prospect of considerable Russian reinforcements making their appearance in the near future. Napoleon presently disposed of some 185,000 men under immediate control, mainly gathered into a large triangle formed by the towns of Biechenkowski, Surazh and Orsha. The component parts of this force were disposed as follows. The Vth and VIIIth Corps were to the south near the banks of the Dnieper; the northern side of the area held the VIth, the Guard (at Vitebsk with Imperial Headquarters) and the IVth; between these two groups were the men of the scattered 1st Corps, the IIIrd and the greater part of Murat’s cavalry. Some considerable way up the Dnieper were situated a single infantry division and Latour-Maubourg’s cavalry.
Napoleon was soon busily engaged planning his next move, the celebrated, though abortive Maneuver of Smolensk, designed yet again to place the Grande Armée in the rear of the Russian forces, cutting off their links with Moscow and thus forcing a battle. However, the final plan was still unsettled when sudden tidings from the Second Cavalry Corps seemed to change the entire situation. General Sébastiani, commanding some 3,000 cavalrymen, reported that he had been engaged in a sharp engagement with Platov’s Cossacks on August 8 near the town of Inkovo, receiving rather the worst of the encounter. This intelligence seemed to reveal that the Russians were at last marching out toward the French, apparently seeking battle. Nothing could have been more to the Emperor’s liking. Barclay and Bagration were, indeed, intending to launch an attack against Napoleon’s left wing. Both the Tsar and Russian public opinion were vociferously demanding a counterattack, tired of the continuous retreats which had, to date, taken up all the time of the Russian armies.
The moment appeared propitious for a counteroffensive; Napoleon’s impetus had largely died away, his formations were scattered around Vitebsk, and a resolute Russian advance would enable two more Russian formations, the Armies of Finland and Moldavia, both newly liberated from their previous frontier commitments by recent agreements with Sweden and Turkey, to mass in the interior preparatory to entering the campaign against the French. Accordingly, after holding a council of war on the 6th, Barclay ordered 100,000 infantry, 18,000 regular cavalry and 650 guns to move westward from Smolensk, hoping to forestall any French concentration and catch the enemy scattered and unprepared.
From the first, however, this operation was dogged with difficulties. Barclay and Bagration were already on the worst of personal terms, and consequently their armies failed to cooperate to the best advantage. When Platov reported his limited success at Inkovo, the Russian war minister’s nerve paradoxically began to fail him, and fearing massive French retaliation he swung his line of advance to the northwest and virtually abandoned the forward movement. For six days his offensive hung in abeyance, and when on the 13th he again ordered an advance, its extent was very limited, and before the day was out, the Russian army was again halted a short way to the east of Rudnia. By this time Bagration was simply not cooperating with his colleague, the bulk of the Second Army remaining in the vicinity of Smolensk. Thus the last spark of the Russian offensive was allowed to die away.
Napoleon’s first reaction on receipt of news of Inkovo had been to suspend preparations for the drive on Smolensk and order the army to concentrate around the nucleus of the IIIrd Corps near Lyosno in readiness to meet the Russian attack. However, by the 10th it appeared that this desirable event was not, after all, forthcoming; Barclay had halted in his tracks. Consequently, Napoleon canceled the concentration at Lyosno and reverted to his preparations for the Maneuver of Smolensk.
Almost all commentators agree that this operational plan constitutes one of Napoleon’s masterpieces. He intended to create a formidable bataillon carré of almost 200,000 men and launch it across the Dnieper on a 15-mile front in two large columns through Rosasna and Orsha with the greatest possible secrecy, intending to turn the Russian left while his opponents amused themselves cautiously probing toward Vitebsk on the opposite bank of the river. The Rosasna column, under the Emperor’s personal command, was to consist of Murat’s cavalry, the IIIrd Corps d’Armée, the Imperial Guard, and the Viceroy of Italy’s contingents. Further south, Marshal Davout was to cross with the 1st, Vth and VIIIth Corps, forming the second column, while Latour-Maubourg’s Corps of Reserve Cavalry launched a diversionary attack still further down the Dnieper. Once safely over the river, the main attack would advance eastward along the left bank, aiming to sever the roads linking Smolensk with Moscow, force Barclay to fight, and then drive the remnants of the Russian forces away to the north. This was a maneuver of strategic envelopment worthy of the one that preceded the great triumph of Jena-Auerstadt in 1806, and if it had fully succeeded the fruits of victory would have been no less impressive.
In support of these operations, Napoleon also devised a carefully considered system of communications. He ordered that the town of Vitebsk was to be fortified and provided with a garrison of 3,000 men32 to protect his northern flank and to serve as his center of operations in the early stages. Once the secret was out of the bag and the Russians became aware of his broad intentions, the lines of communication were to be rechanneled through Orsha, running back to Vilna by way of Borisov and Minsk.33
The preliminary movements began on August 11, and by the 13th the army was massed in its appointed forming-up areas, ready to cross the Dnieper. The Grande Armée’s change of front had so far gone undetected, thanks to the excellent work of the cavalry screen and the concealment offered by the densely wooded nature of the terrain. On the night of the I3th-I4th, General Eblé completed the throwing of four pontoon bridges over the Dnieper near Rosasna and the crossing could begin. By dawn, no less than 175,000 troops were safely over the obstacle. The advance toward Smolensk was immediately ordered, and the corps marched off at a fast pace behind the protective screen provided by Grouchy’s, Nansouty’s and Montbrun’s cavalry. The weather was dry, the roads were good, and by three in the afternoon, the leading elements had reached the town of Krasnoe, some 30 miles west of Smolensk, and there encountered the first sign of Russian opposition.
When he had devised his march toward Vitebsk, Barclay had very wisely ordered General Neveroski to take his division of 8,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry onto the southern bank of the Dnieper to guard the approaches to Smolensk and observe any French moves. A tough engagement ensued. Murat flung his massed squadrons against the puny Russian force time and again, but failed to break its cohesion. The King of Naples lost his head, and instead of allowing the IIIrd Corps to move up through his cavalry to engage the Russian infantry, now formed in one huge square, he deliberately blocked their passage, heedless of Ney’s pleas, and launched no less than 40 piecemeal cavalry charges against the enemy. They all proved to no avail; had the French been in a position to deploy some artillery, the Russian square would have been blasted into smithereens, but all their guns were held up in the narrow Krasnoe defile. As a result, Neveroski was able to execute a model withdrawal toward Smolensk.
But for Neveroski’s staunch resistance, the French cavalry might well have reached Smolensk by the evening of the 14th. Under the circumstances, however, Napoleon decided, somewhat unwisely as it proved, to check his forward movement for twenty-four hours in order to regroup his forces. It is difficult to understand this decision, as it robbed the maneuver of much of its vital surprise element and afforded the Russians with time to react, for by the early hours of the 15th both Bagration and Barclay had learned from Neveroski of the French offensive and had forthwith ordered their troops to retrace their steps to Smolensk. The latter wasted no time in ordering General Raevski’s VIIth Corps to occupy the city’s defenses, and by dawn on the 15th, these troops were entering the city from the
west to strengthen the garrison (commanded by Count Bennigsen); they were soon joined by Neveroski’s diminished but gallant division. Thus Napoleon missed his chance of taking Smolensk by surprise. Fifteenth August was also the Emperor’s forty-third birthday and part of the day was spent somewhat unnecessarily reviewing the army.
The great city of Smolensk lies astride the River Dnieper. On the northern bank stood the small New Town, or St. Petersburg suburb, joined by a bridge to the old city on the southern side. In 1812, the old quarter was surrounded by a massive medieval town wall some four miles long, strengthened with thirty-two towers. Beyond this lay a deep ditch, and a more recent covered way and glacis, but most of these fortifications were in a state of poor repair. Of particular concern to the garrison was the fact that the main battlements were not suitable for the mounting of cannon, although the towers were capable of holding small batteries. Beyond these positions, at the southeast corner, there stood a dilapidated earthen fort known as the Royal Citadel. Considerable suburbs lay beyond and among the outer defenses. From both the north and south, low ranges of hills looked down on the city.
Including cavalry, Raevski now disposed of about 20,000 troops and 72 guns, and he knew that both Bagration and Barclay were hurrying their columns to his aid. Realizing that his duty was to contest every inch of ground so as to gain time, Raevski deployed most of his men beyond the suburbs, placing 23 battalions to the west and south of the Old City, two more and the cavalry to watch the remainder of the perimeter, and retaining the remaining four as a reserve within the city. Eighteen guns were massed in the Royal Citadel, the remainder of the artillery being distributed among the tower platforms. In these positions the Russians resolutely awaited the arrival of the French.
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