The Campaigns of Napoleon

by David G Chandler

  Thus Kutusov was preyed upon by theoretical as well as practical doubts concerning the Russian strategy, and his consequent caution and hesitation in implementing the final stages of Alexander’s plan were destined to play an important part in determining the outcome of operations on the Berezina. In his heart of hearts he would prefer to see Napoleon’s retreat continue all the way to Poland, a prey to the full horrors of the Russian winter, which would reduce French power as effectively as a major battle and would avoid the spilling of any large quantity of Russian blood. Kutusov had in any case no means of knowing accurately how many men Napoleon could still put into the field, the crowds of French and allied stragglers serving to confuse the assessments of his probing Cossack patrols. Consequently, he decided that discretion was the better part of valor, and bided his time until it was in effect too late to trap the French at the river line.

  73

  THE BEREZINA

  On November 23, Napoleon enjoyed a further stroke of good fortune which helped solve the problem of discovering a way over the Berezina. A certain Brigadier-General Corbineau, originally commanding the force of light cavalry belonging to the IInd Corps but more recently attached for operational purposes to Wrede’s command, guarding the approaches to Vilna, received orders to leave Gloubokoie and rejoin his parent unit. On his way eastward he narrowly avoided running into various parts of the Russian forces, but eventually found himself on the western banks of the Berezina. He soon discovered that the enemy were holding the Borisov bridges, but his men managed to round up a peasant who eventually showed the way to a ford opposite Studienka, some eight miles north of Borisov, where the water was only three and a half feet deep. Corbineau immediately crossed, and by the 24th had reported his interesting discovery to Marshal Oudinot, who lost no time in informing the Emperor.

  Napoleon, currently camping with headquarters near Loshnitza, was not slow in realizing the significance of the news. Up to the present he had been considering two possible courses of action. On leaving Orsha, he had first of all thought of forcing the line of the Berezina at Borisov and then pushing on toward Minsk in order to join with Schwarzenberg’s forces for a final effort. This plan, however, had been made impossible by Tshitshagov’s capture and subsequent destruction of the Borisov bridges. Moreover, all efforts to find an alternative crossing place further down the Berezina toward Bobruisk had proved unavailing. Secondly, for a time the Emperor considered the possibility of breaking away to the north, heading for Wrede’s positions and thence marching on Vilna, brushing off Wittgenstein on the way. But here again, the absence of good roads, the exhausted state of his men and the muddy nature of the countryside during the current thaw would have made such a move extremely hazardous and probably fatal if the least delay was experienced. Consequently, he far preferred the third possibility now presented by Corbineau’s timely discovery, and at once began to consider a plan for a crossing at Studienka, so much closer to both the army’s present front and distant Vilna. It was nevertheless a desperate and dangerous decision.

  There was no pretending that this would be an easy operation. In the first place, the army was almost completely deprived of bridging equipment thanks to the conflagration at Orsha, and secondly, Admiral Tshitshagov’s forces were presently positioned all along the river line from Brilli to Saba-chevitshi. The northernmost Russian contingents would have to be lured away from the Studienka area if the bridging attempt was to have any chance of success. Nevertheless, it was a military problem after Napoleon’s own heart, and he flung himself into the preparations with a vigor reminiscent of his greatest days. The detailed plan that evolved was as follows.

  First of all, a series of diversions were to be mounted at several points along the river, most particularly opposite Stachov, at Borisov and at Ucholodi further to the south; it was hoped that these would serve to distract the admiral’s attention from Studienka. Next, a small force of cavalry and light infantry, commanded by Corbineau, were to cross the ford on horseback or rafts and set up a covering position on the west bank opposite Studienka. At the same time, Generals Chasseloup and Eblé of the Engineers were to gather all available timber, pulling down the houses of Studienka if need be. As soon as it was dark, Eblé was to construct three bridges with all possible speed. Meanwhile, the corps of Marshals Victor and Davout would be charged with the duty of holding off Wittgenstein from Kostritsa and Kutusov’s advance guard from Bobr respectively, winning time for the remaining formations and equipment of the army, not to mention the horde of noncombatants, to make their way through Borisov to the vicinity of Studienka and the bridges.

  The Emperor was insistent that the bridges should be used day and night without cease. As soon as the first was completed, Oudinot’s corps was to pass over the river to form a protective flank against Tshitshagov in the vicinity of Stachov, quickly followed by Ney, who would take post on the left of the IInd Corps. The Guard and headquarters would then cross the bridges and form up as a reserve near the hamlet of Brilli; hard on their heels would come Eugène’s IVth Corps, heading for the northern flank toward Sembin in readiness to repulse any attempted intervention by Wittgenstein from that direction. Next, Davout would file through the intervals between Victor’s divisions. Finally, Victor, abandoning Borisov, would withdraw his rear guard into a narrow bridgehead about Studienka preparatory for the final evacuation. Last of all, General Eblé would fire the bridges and the whole army would make its way through Sembin towards Vilna and safety.

  This was a comprehensive and well-considered plan, but much depended on the enemy reacting as anticipated. There was, however, one glaring omission in the Emperor’s orders. No specific provision was made for the evacuation of the thousands of hapless stragglers and noncombatants clinging round the skirts of the army; it was assumed that they would cross with as much of the remaining transport as possible in the intervals between the fighting corps. In the event, however, lack of detailed planning was to doom many thousands to unnecessary death and agony.

  Clearly speed was a primary consideration and no time was wasted in starting the preparations. A comparatively light frost on the night of the 24th-25th conveniently served to harden the muddy banks of the Berezina, a factor that would assist the work of the sappers, and General Eblé set about marshaling his limited resources for his vital task. Fortunately he had managed to save “two field forges, two wagons of charcoal, six covered wagons of utensils and nails”24 from the funeral pyre of his pontoon train at Orsha, and this foresight made his present task just feasible, although he eventually found that the army possessed sufficient resources to build only two of the proposed three bridges. As dusk gathered, his men set about pulling down the houses of Studienka, and began to construct the first trestles.

  Before the real bridging operation could safely commence, however, the enemy’s attention had to be distracted to some other sector. The various demonstrations were accordingly put in hand during the 25th. By far the most effective was that carried out near Uchlodi. Here a party of Oudinot’s cuirassiers, supported by infantry, a few guns and a vast crowd of refugees, descended onto the river bank and succeeded in making so much noise that they created the impression of frantic bridging preparations. Admiral Tshitshagov fell for the bait with a vengeance. In any case, he had already received a misleading dispatch from Kutusov warning him that Napoleon would very probably try to cross the Berezina near Bobruisk, and Oudinot’s activities served to confirm the impression that the main French effort would indeed be south of Borisov. Accordingly, heedless of the protests of many of his officers, the admiral ordered his army to draw off toward Sabashevitshi, abandoning the positions opposite Studienka and Borisov.

  French staff officers, anxiously scanning the further bank from the vicinity of Studienka, could hardly believe their eyes when they saw the Russians break camp and march off southward without so much as a glance over their shoulders. General Rapp rushed into Napoleon’s presence with the good news. “I have outwitted the Admiral!” t
he Emperor exulted. “He thinks I am at the point where I ordered the false attack—he is heading for Borisov!”25

  The Crossing of the Beresina, 1812, as depicted by an unknown eyewitness of the scene. Note the type of vehicle employed by the French Army in the foreground.

  The Crossing of the Berezina, November 25-29, 1812

  The lure had worked; the bait had been snapped up by the gullible Russians, and at once the French troops set to work. Corbineau’s assault force splashed or paddled its way through the bitterly cold water, and very soon his 400 men had driven off the last lingering Cossack patrols that represented Tshitshagov’s rear guard. A powerful battery of 44 guns was drawn up along the left bank to cover the bridging site, and a brief cannonade proved sufficient to silence the single pair of Russian cannon left in the vicinity. Then it was the turn of Eblé and his 400 sappers. All the night of the 25th-26th, they toiled with their trestles and planking, striving to bridge the hundred-yard gap separating the two banks of the Berezina. Numerous difficulties were encountered but perseverance and ingenuity overcame them all in turn. For hours at a time the engineers had to toil up to their necks in the icy waters, placing the 23 sets of trestles in position, but step by step the work went forward. Dawn on the 26th found Napoleon inspecting progress, and in the end he spent the greater part of the day encouraging the engineers. At one in the afternoon the first bridge was complete, and without delay the 11,000 men of Marshal Oudinot and General Dombrowski set out for the further side, accompanied by Dumerc’s cuirassier division and a couple of light guns. The work on the second larger bridge was redoubled, and shortly after three o’clock it, too, was ready for traffic. Immediately, the artillery of Oudinot and the Guard were sent over to the further side.

  General Eblé and his small body of engineers had accomplished their daunting task after twenty hours of ceaseless work, but even now they could not rest. Both bridges were inevitably flimsy structures owing to the dearth of proper materials, and the sappers had to be divided into teams to make repairs as the need arose. Before daybreak on the 27th, three temporary breaks occurred, but the devoted sappers tackled each in turn. No praise is too high for the performance of the French engineers on this occasion; their devotion to duty and selfless heroism (only forty of them were to survive the campaign and General Eblé himself would lie dead within a few weeks) were important factors in the salvation of the wreck of the Grande Armée. More than any other man, General Eblé was the true hero of the Berezina.

  Fortune continued to smile upon the Emperor’s endeavors. Oudinot’s command was soon in a strong position near Stachov, only six miles from Borisov, and there were still few signs to indicate that the admiral had recognized his mistake. Oudinot’s cavalry also succeeded in seizing several wooden bridges on the causeway leading to Zembin, beyond which lay the vital highway running from Minsk to Vilna. Had these crossings been destroyed or strongly garrisoned, Napoleon would have experienced great difficulty in moving away from the Berezina. Meanwhile, on the left bank of the river, General Wittgenstein proved extremely tardy in following up Victor’s phased withdrawal, and when at last he did bestir his troops they obligingly headed for Borisov and not for Studienka. For reasons we have already touched upon, Kutusov’s main body was still many miles distant, most of it no nearer than Kopiss on the Dnieper, and even the advance guard was at a considerable distance from Bobr.

  It is difficult to arrive at exact figures for Napoleon’s combat strength at this juncture, but some approximations can be suggested. When the Grande Armée left Orsha, its strength appears to have been in the neighborhood of 25,000 combatants, no guns and 40,000 stragglers. Since then, Napoleon had been joined by Oudinot’s and Victor’s relatively fresh and numerous troops, resulting in a considerable increase in his battle power, and by November 27 there were probably 49,000 men still under arms. They were disposed as follows: the Guard—8,500; the Ist Corps—3,000; the IInd Corps—11,000; the IIIrd Corps—3,000 (after reinforcement); the IVth Corps—2,000; the Vth Corps and VIIIth Corps—joint total of 1,500; the IXth Corps—13,500; headquarters—2,500; mounted cavalry—5,500. The artillery is generally placed at between 250 and 300 guns, and there was certainly a large quantity of baggage still remaining with the army as the destruction of wagons at Orsha had been poorly enforced. Additionally, of course, there were also at least 40,000 stragglers. On the same date, the Russians probably controlled some 75,000 regular troops and Cossacks within striking distance of the Berezina. Kutusov was still too far away to make his presence felt.

  The main crossing continued during the morning and afternoon of the 27th. At one in the afternoon, Napoleon transferred headquarters to the west bank, followed by the Guard, which took up a position near Brilli. The crossing proceeded smoothly enough until 4:00

  P.M. when the artillery bridge broke down, three trestles collapsing. The orderly column at once turned into a hysterical mob, and there was a wild rush for the single operational bridge, resulting in many hundreds of deaths. Captain Roeder, very sick and weak, was narrowly saved from sharing this fate through the devotion of his sergeant major, who spotted him wavering in the press and proceeded to clear a way for him through the struggling mass of humanity by brute force. By evening, order had been restored and both bridges were back in service, but the approaches were inextricably blocked with piles of corpses and the wreckage of abandoned vehicles. General Eblé’s engineers had literally to hew a passage through this frightful obstacle to permit the passage of the IVth and Ist Corps during the evening. Once these troops were across, peace settled over the bridges. In vain General Eblé tried to persuade the nearest stragglers to take the opportunity of the lull to cross in safety. But hysteria had given way to complete apathy, and the noncombatants clustered thickly along the river bank, wretchedly huddled over such fires as they could kindle. Consequently the Emperor’s order that the bridges were to be in service day and night was ignored, and the vast crowd of suffering noncombatants let slip their golden opportunity of relative safety. Perhaps if the Emperor had shown more personal concern over the crossing, placing himself nearby to supervise the bridges, something might have been done. But his flash of energy had died away and from the 27th onward, he took little active part or even interest in the proceeding operation. A cruel frost gripped the entire army during the night, increasing the misery of everybody; toward dawn this was replaced by thick snow.

  On balance, however, the 27th had been a successful day. The greater part of the army was safely over the Berezina leaving only the IXth Corps on the further bank, and all attempts by the enemy to interfere in the operation had been successfully beaten off. Late on the 26th, Tshitshagov had at last realized his error and began to retrace his steps towards Borisov, and next morning he was able to attack Oudinot in force. All day a bitter struggle raged along the south flank, but Oudinot succeeded in stabilizing his line at the hamlet of Janivki after giving up considerable areas of ground. On the opposite bank of the river Wittgenstein managed to drive Victor back to a perimeter extending from Viesseldove to the outskirts of Borisov, but the cohesion of the IX Corps remained unimpaired and Napoleon was sufficiently satisfied to order the withdrawal of the Baden brigade of General Dandels’ division during the afternoon. There was still little sign of Kutusov, although since the 26th he had been lashing his troops forward at a rate of 21 miles a day, apparently after a belated change of heart, and his advance guard eventually reached Bobr. However, none of his troops were destined to take part in any stage of the battle of the Berezina. All things considered, Napoleon felt he had reason for self-congratulation about the day’s outcome. “Voilà comment on passe un pont sous la barbe de I’enemi”* he boasted to his attendants.

  Dawn on the 28th, the final full day of the operation, found a great deal of activity taking place on both sides of the river. On the eastern bank, the refugees flocked down to the bridges and renewed their clamor for passage. Then Wittgenstein launched a heavy attack against Victor’s rear guard shortly
after eight o’clock, moving in from three sides. Soon the IXth Corps found itself in a difficult position. Victor had drawn his men along the ridge behind Studienka, one flank being on the river bank and the center behind a small brook, but his left flank was “in the air” and inviting envelopment. This was partly caused by an unanticipated shortage of troops, for one whole division was missing. This was the command of General Partonneaux, last seen the previous evening near Borisov, when he had received orders to abandon the town during the early hours of the 28th and fall back on Studienka. This movement had accordingly been commenced at three in the morning, but unfortunately the general selected the wrong road at an unmarked junction and marched his men straight into the midst of Wittgenstein’s army. Gradually the truth dawned, and Partonneaux halted his column and rode ahead with his staff to reconnoiter their true position, straight into the arms of a Russian cavalry force who promptly took them all captive. His bereaved division held its ground all night, ignorant of the fate of their general, but shortly after daybreak they found themselves surrounded on every side and with no option but to surrender. Thus 4,000 well-disciplined infantry, 500 accompanying cavalry and four guns fell unnecessarily into Russian hands, and only 160 men succeeded in finding their way back to Victor’s lines. When Napoleon heard the news he was both furious and aggrieved. This unexpected disaster, the worst incident of the whole three-day operation from the French military standpoint, ruined his satisfaction in his overall achievement.