The Campaigns of Napoleon

by David G Chandler

  P.M. on the 16th. He left behind him the corps of Mortier and Marmont (north and south of the Marne respectively) with orders to cover Paris under all eventualities, giving a little ground if need be; however, if Blücher set out to join Schwarzenberg, Marmont was instructed to rejoin Napoleon.

  Immediately after arriving at Guignes, Napoleon demanded a full briefing on the latest enemy positions and movements. It appeared that the Army of Bohemia was operating in three main columns—Wittgenstein by way of Nogent, Wrede from Bray, Württemburg and Bianchi through Montereau. Soon a welter of orders were leaving French headquarters. Every available man must be sent to the front from the Paris garrison. The capital’s defenses must be completed. General Maison must counterattack at once in Belgium and cause General Bülow (currently following Winzingerode towards the Aisne) to retrace his steps. The recalcitrant Augereau must attack at once from Lyons against Schwarzenberg’s communications. Eugène must continue to defy Murat and the Austrians indefinitely in North Italy.

  The next morning Napoleon flung his concentrated force—now numbering about 60,000 men—against the nearest Allied columns. Gérard and Grouchy virtually destroyed General Pahlen’s force of 4,300 cavalry at Mormant, and then drove General Wrede’s advance guard back through Nangis in disarray after a sharp encounter at Valjouan. Victor was supposed to join in these engagements, but in practice did next to nothing. Oudinot meantime headed for Provins and Nogent. Then the Emperor broadened his operations still further: Macdonald took over the pursuit of Wrede toward Bray, while Victor, Gérard and the Guard marched on Montereau (en route they were joined by the veteran cavalry leader Pajol, summoned from Melun). Napoleon’s aim at this time was to strain every nerve to reach and occupy Troyes ahead of the retiring Austrians.

  Unfortunately, one of his subordinates again let him down. Victor, after dragging his heels throughout the 17th, capped a dismal day by halting for the night at Villeneuve some miles to the northeast of Montereau instead of pressing on overnight as ordered. This dilatory conduct gave the Prince of Württemberg time to draw up his men in a strongly fortified position north of the Seine covering the town. Pajol’s cavalry pushed the Prince’s outposts back, but could not undertake any more forceful action until Victor condescended to appear on the scene at nine o’clock on the morning of the 18th.

  Napoleon was justifiably furious when he heard of Victor’s idleness. “Express my discontent to the Duke of Belluno,” he ordered Berthier, “for the lack of vigor shown in his attack on Villeneuve and for not obeying my orders which prescribed his reaching Montereau…. tell him that I require an explanation for his disobedience of my order, which is compromising the success of the campaign. Write him a truly dry letter.”21 A few hours later the Emperor decided to replace Victor, appointing Gérard to command in his place.

  The Battle of Montereau was a hard-fought affair. Gérard struggled all morning to gain firepower superiority over Württemberg’s batteries; by early afternoon this was achieved following the arrival of the Guard cannon. Shortly after 3:00

  P.M. the French successfully stormed the ridge forming the key to the Allied position, and Württemberg ordered a withdrawal. This became a rout when Napoleon personally led his guns forward to the captured ridge, while a brilliant cavalry charge led by the wounded Pajol burst over the bridges through Montereau and over the Yonne beyond before the Allies could explode the demolition charges. Pajol’s example proved infectious, and on the Emperor’s order Marshal Lefebvre led a charge by Napoleon’s headquarters staff and escort along the main road toward Bray, causing still more confusion in the Allied ranks. “Foam came out of the marshal’s mouth,” asserted Captain Coignet, another participant, “and his saber hardly rested.”22 As Napoleon surveyed the scene from the dominating ridge, some members of the Guard remonstrated with him for exposing himself so far forward. “Fear not,” he replied, “the bullet that will kill me has not yet been cast.”

  By the end of the day the Allies had suffered some 6,000 casualties and lost 15 guns. French losses amounted to approximately 2,500. Württemberg was in full flight with the survivors of his corps for Bray, narrowly forestalling the arrival of Macdonald’s troops there early on the 18th. The same day Oudinot reached Nogent, but as at Bray the French troops found the bridges destroyed and the enemy safely away on the south bank of the Seine. The Emperor was disappointed with the scale of his success. “The foe has enjoyed a stroke of rare good fortune,” he complained; “the heavy frosts permitted him to move over the fields—otherwise at least half his guns and transport would have been taken.”23

  There was no disguising the fact, however, that in his turn Schwarzenberg had been very roughly handled. As early as the 17th the Austrian commander in chief had asked for an armistice, claiming that agreement had been reached at Châtillon between Caulaincourt and the Allied representatives. In fact the Congress had been suspended by the Allies between the 9th and 17th, so this was little more than a ruse to gain a breathing space. In any case Napoleon was no longer prepared to consider anything less than the “natural frontiers,” following his recent series of successes. In the opinion of General Fuller, at this point, “Pride ruins his splendid strategy.” Had Napoleon been prepared to accept a cessation of hostilities and the Frankfurt terms it is very probable that the Emperor of Austria would have accepted this, and either forced the hands of his fellow allies or at least left the alliance. In the event, however, feeling that the fortunes of war had definitely swung in his favor, the French Emperor remained adamant, and probably sacrificed his last chance to survive as ruler of France.

  In utter desperation, Schwarzenberg faced no alternative but to head for Troyes, summoning Blücher to join him at Méry-sur-Seine in the hope that together they might prove strong enough to turn and face Napoleon’s triumphant army.

  Napoleon was now determined to force his way through to Troyes; he had no way of telling whether the Allies would concentrate there and offer battle or whether they would fall right back to join their reserves, but in either eventuality a rapid advance was called for. Gérard was to march in one column from Sens; the main body would pass through Nogent and Oudinot debouch by way of Romilly, while Mortier fell back from Soissons to Château-Thierry to defend the northern flank and keep in close contact with Marmont at Sézanne. Nogent was designated the new centre des opérations. Napoleon hoped to be in Troyes by the 23rd.

  This plan was compromised from the outset by shortage of bridges. The fact that the Allies had successfully destroyed the Bray and Nogent bridges forced the Emperor to funnel his advance through Montereau, and the delay this imposed gave Schwarzenberg a clear two days’ start back toward Troyes. In consequence the Army of Bohemia was able to link up with Blücher’s forces at Méry on the 21st as planned. Napoleon was soon aware that his opportunity of complete success was on the point of eluding him, and on the 21st addressed a letter to his father-in-law indicating that he was, after all, prepared to accept the Frankfurt basis and a general pacification. Sent a few days earlier, this offer might have been conclusive, but resenting the abrupt rebuff of his latest peace offers the previous week the Emperor Francis had now hardened his heart and steeled his determination to continue the struggle. Thus Napoleon misjudged his opportunities badly. A letter was sent to the dilatory Augereau on the 21st urging him to attack Schwarzenberg from the south. “It is necessary to get out your boots,” wrote the Emperor, “and also the resolution you displayed in 1793.”24

  Faced by the advance of a French army now totaling perhaps 74,000 troops (admittedly mostly conscripts), the Allied high command was attempting to decide on its strategy. The Tsar and King of Prussia were adamant that a stand must be made—and even a major battle undertaken, but Schwarzenberg was equally determined that the retreat must continue. He believed that Napoleon was at the head of 180,000 men (!) and was unnecessarily concerned about Augereau’s ability to sever his communications. At a council of war held at Troyes on the 22nd, Schwarzenberg forced his unwillin
g colleagues to agree to a further withdrawal. By this time Napoleon was approaching at full speed, detaching Oudinot en route to face Blücher and Wittgenstein at Méry-sur-Seine; he was confidently expecting a major battle against Schwarzenberg near Troyes on the 23rd (70,000 French versus 100,000 Allies).

  Once again, however, Schwarzenberg’s inglorious but probably justifiable caution thwarted Napoleon of a decisive action. Ordering an infuriated Blücher to retrace his steps toward the Marne (where he was to assume command over the troops of Winzingerode and Bülow in addition to his own forces), Schwarzenberg set out for Vandeuvre heading for Bar-sur-Aube. On the 24th Napoleon entered Troyes unopposed to receive a great welcome from the citizens. The next morning the leading French troops reached Vandeuvre and Bar-sur-Seine, while the Austrians continued their disorderly retreat toward the Aube.

  So ended the second phase of the Campaign of 1814. For sheer activity, the period January 26 to February 25 has few rivals in the long annals of the Napoleonic wars. After a shaky opening, Napoleon demonstrated all his old talents at both the strategical and tactical levels, and ended by outmaneuvering and outfighting two superior opponents. The Allies had displayed all their old weaknesses; muddled leadership and poorly coordinated planning lay at the root of their reverses. Their worst error had been to permit a gap to develop between the Armies of Bohemia and Silesia; this was due to the contrasting interaction of Schwarzenberg’s overcaution and Blücher’s rashness. After being forcibly concentrated by Napoleon’s attack at Brienne, they permitted their armies to drift apart in the weeks that followed and thus afforded Napoleon his chance to exploit their separation. It might be thought that their experiences at Montmirail, Vauchamps and Montereau would have taught the Allied high command the need for united action, but instead Schwarzenberg deliberately reseparated the Allied armies on the 22nd in the hope of diverting French pressure from his own forces. As will be seen, his action had this desired effect—but once again Napoleon was given the opportunity to smite his foes hip and thigh in detail.

  At the level of Grand Strategy, however, Napoleon was committing grave mistakes. However brilliant his military movements, he was living on borrowed time, and the ultimate result was predictable. He had neither the resources in men nor the assured support of populace and government which were necessary for the attainment of victory. But this he refused to believe, as his faithful servant Caulaincourt repeatedly lamented: “For us, all was changed,” wrote the realistic if pessimistic foreign minister. “We had nothing left but courage. Power and force were in the enemy’s camp, with numbers and fortune…. but the Emperor doubtless blinded himself to his perils as well as to his resources. He gauged the energy of others by his own; he treated counsels of prudence as weakness…. Dangers crowded upon him, encompassed him, oppressed him from every side; but he thought to escape from them, and even to hide them from others, by misrepresenting them to himself. Though his genius might allow him to triumph at one point, it could not prevent his lieutenants from being involved at others, inasmuch as resources were everywhere inadequate. Everyone said so, at headquarters as in Paris. Discouragement, the word ran, was universal, not on account of the daily risks one took, but because the future promised no end to them.”25

  Disillusion, growing war-weariness and sheer exhaustion on the part of his subordinates, both military and civil, would inevitably bring Napoleon low. His genius and his foes’ mistakes might earn him a little more time, but after the Emperor of Austria’s rejection on February 27 of Napoleon’s peace offer, the writing was on the wall.

  86

  CHECK IN THE NORTH—LAON

  The third period of the Campaign of 1814 took place between February 23 and March 20. The military events need to be seen against a background of Allied diplomatic activity, and it will be convenient to summarize the main developments at this point. On February 25, the Allied leaders held a discordant council of war at Bar-sur-Aube. The Tsar, Emperor of Austria, King of Prussia and Lord Castlereagh (sent from England by a British Government anxious lest the Alliance should be falling asunder) were present. All agreed that a force of 35,000 men should be sent south to reinforce General Bubna without delay in an attempt to neutralize the threat supposedly posed by Marshal Augereau, but there was considerable division of opinion when Schwarzenberg proposed a continued retreat by the main army to Langres. In the end he had his way, but the Allied monarchs insisted that a new advance was to be undertaken at once if Napoleon turned north. It was also confirmed that Blücher should operate independently for the time being, assimilating the forces of Bülow and Winzingerode (despite Bernadotte’s outraged protests) into his command.

  These decisions formed the basis for an even more important conference held at Chaumont, commencing on March 1. The Allied leaders met again to clarify and settle their basic policy. The outcome was the Treaty of Chaumont (signed on March 9 but dated the 1st) whereby the Allies pledged themselves to continue the war for twenty years if need be, and undertook to conclude only a single peace with France. In other words there were to be no unilateral settlements with Napoleon. Great Britain pledged considerable monetary sums to the signatories, disbursing a total of £5 million sterling. The signatories then went on to make Napoleon their last offer: an immediate cease-fire on all sectors and a peace based upon the frontiers of 1791. He was required to notify his acceptance by the 11th. Despite the pleas of his advisors, Napoleon scornfully rejected these terms; he considered himself a conqueror still. It was to be a case of “the natural frontiers” or nothing. The last chance of a negotiated “compromise” settlement thus slipped away; with it went any lingering hope of Napoleon being able to persuade Austria to leave the alliance. The very basis of his diplomatic strategy thus disappeared.

  Even before the meeting at Bar-sur-Aube confirmed Schwarzenberg’s provisional decisions of the 22nd, fire-eater Blücher was resuming the offensive. Infuriated that the Austrian supreme commander had summoned him south to join in a major battle and then changed his mind, the Prussian leader vented his spleen on the nearest French formations. Recrossing the Aube at Anglure on February 24 after an unsuccessful foray against Mery-sur-Seine, Blücher moved his 53,000 men northward to confront Marmont’s corps near Sézanne. Faced by odds of almost nine to one, Marmont prudently retired to a strong position north of the town.

  Apart from the knowledge that Blücher was moving northward, Napoleon had little idea what the Army of Silesia was attempting to achieve. Blücher might be taking a circuitous route to rejoin Schwarzenberg, or alternatively heading for Chalons to meet reinforcements; thirdly it was just conceivable that he was renewing the advance on Paris. The Emperor’s first reactions were accordingly cautious. On the 25th he directed Ney’s Young Guard corps to march on Arcis, while Victor (partially restored to favor and now commanding the second Young Guard corps) was sent to Méry-sur-Seine. “As soon as I see what Blücher wants to do,” Napoleon wrote to Joseph, “I shall try to fall on his rear and isolate him.”26

  Slowly the truth dawned at French headquarters: Blücher was heading for Paris again after all. On the 27th, Marmont reported that the enemy had reached La-Ferté-Gaucher the previous evening, but that Mortier was in contact and they were together falling back on Meaux. Napoleon lost no time in taking countermeasures. He at once sent Ney and Victor through Arcis towards Sommesous, and set out from Troyes in person at the head of part of the Guard to join them. His plan was to place 30,000 élite French troops across Blücher’s communications while Marmont and Mortier pinned him frontally. “It seems evident that when Blücher finds that he controls no bridges over the Aube, and when he sees a corps between him and Vitry, he will abandon all his operations in favor of an attempt to reach Châlons—that is, if he ever intended to try anything else.”27 As this quotation shows, Napoleon still tended to doubt that Blücher was being so rash as to reopen his drive on Paris. It seemed improbable that he would deliberately court disaster again so soon.

  Before leaving Troyes he bestowed
temporary command of the rest of the French forces on Macdonald. Aided by the troops of Oudinot, Gérard, Kellermann and Milhaud (in all totaling some 40,000 men), he was to keep a close watch on Schwarzenberg’s movements. The Army of Bohemia was to be persuaded that Napoleon was still personally facing them. Front-line units were to shout “Vive l’Empereur” within hearing of Austrian sentries as if greeting an Imperial visit. “I hope I will have time to complete my operations [against Blücher] before the foe [Schwarzenberg] notices it and advances,” Napoleon confided to the minister of war.

  While Blücher employed his men in a series of vain attempts to trap and destroy Marmont and Mortier near Meaux, Napoleon was rapidly approaching from the rear. However, on March I the Prussian general received vague tidings that French troops had been seen in Sézanne, and as a precaution ordered all his troops to the north bank of the Marne. It was well that he did so, for late the same day Cossack patrols reported with certainty that Napoleon had passed in person through La-Ferté-Gaucher. As a result of this timely warning, all that the Emperor found south of the Marne were a few abandoned Prussian convoys and a line of burned bridges. Blücher had eluded him. As he impatiently marked time on the south bank of the Marne, Napoleon vented his wrath on the minister of war, whose failure to produce bridging equipment was causing this infuriating delay. “Monsieur le Duc de Feltre, thanks to the keenness and activity of the Marines of the Guard, the bridge at La Ferté will be finished within the hour. However, if I had possessed a bridging train at Méry, the army of Schwarzenberg would have been destroyed; had I possessed one this morning, the army of Blücher would now be no more.”28 Nevertheless, he still hoped to be able to settle with Blücher by the 3rd of the month; once this was done he intended to sweep east to Metz and Verdun and add to his strength the valuable garrisons besieged there before moving southward to sever Schwarzenberg’s main communications with Germany.