Commandos and Rangers of World War II
Page 37
Without artillery the Commando targets were limited in World War II, although a shortage of landing craft was an even greater handicap. However, the smaller operations needing no major fire support and few craft were successfully continued through 1942 to 1944 in the search for military intelligence, the Twenty-first Army Group having curbed the habits of raiding for raiding’s sake. The co-ordination of the intelligence-seeking COPP and other small party raids had been informal, but was closer than may appear in official records, because each group had a representative on the commitee responsible for canoe designs. Through this and similar contacts most of the small raiding groups had kept in touch, but in 1944 they were formally put under the command of HMS Rodent a stone-frigate (base camp) at Liss in Hampshire. Raiding became more effective when it was coordinated with the operations of main forces, along the lines envisaged by Major Hollaud when he was with the General Staff’s research section in 1938. In south-east Asia the Small Operations Group provided this co-ordination with the main campaigns, although one official history of the SOG units’ actions stresses the difficulties in finding suitable targets for these raiders.
The records clearly show the difficulties, not only in south-east Asia, that senior staffs found in making use of the quick silver nature of Special Forces with their ability to take on unusual tasks. Yet commanders with the flair to see these commando-style actions as nothing out of the ordinary for men selected and trained to perform them, did emerge—more often through the political imagination of Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt than through military channels. Such political influences were not always popular but were effective in forging links with established command circules. Lower down the scale the involvement of Special Forces with agents, guerrillas and other clandestine forces has been cited as a reason for avoiding their future recruitment, whether for action in uniform or out of it.
The history of Special Forces briefly outlined in Appendix 7, read in conjunction with a knowledge of the techniques described earlier, shows the serious approach of these commandos and rangers to their military roles as being far more efficient than some popular legends suggest. By the late 1940s amphibious warfare had become highly sophisticated, with such complex units as the 34th Amphibian Support Regiment RM equipped with flame-thrower and rocket amphibians (LVT(F)s, LVT(R)s. Yet the effectiveness of small-scale raiding remained essentially based on the canoe or inflatable, the mere threat of raids providing a means of forcing an enemy to overextend his defences as the German armies did in Norway—where the coastal army might have been better used in fighting the Russians on dared to leave the west coast undefended. The Japanese might have concentrated their defences instead of being stretched over more islands than their resources could defend, as the raiders created the impression of moves first towards this island group and then towards that.
The achievement of sabotage raids must be set in the context of the overall war effort, when the loss of a bomber represented between £50,000 and £75,000 of effort, a submarine represented over £350,000, and a large armour-piercing bomb took £100 of work and materials. An estimate of the conventional forces needed to attack Bordeaux in the winter of 1942 was put at two divisions, yet the RMBPD canoes successfully damaged 6 ships, although all but one of the five canoe teams were killed or captured. Their canoes and explosives probably each represented less than £100 of time and materials, while training a canoeist cost less than training their counterparts in aircraft crews. Such equations of effective effort are something of a guessing game, but there is no doubt of the necessity for COPP navigators to guide in landing craft, for there was no way the average standard of achievement in these flotillas might be brought to an adequate pitch for the job in hand, within the politically acceptable period of time for mounting a second front in Europe. But there is no formula by which to measure the undoubted success of commando and ranger exploits in raising their fellow countrymen’s morale.
As individuals—proud, confident, and among them many with strong religious convictions—these Special Forces walked tall, with a quiet consideration among the majority for lesser mortals. A few were brash and boastful but in the author’s experience these were men who had not been in battle or carried out a raid. A handful did not match up to the strain of continuous commando action, or as raiders failed to react quickly enough in confused situations, and were relieved of their commands. But the great majority achieved deeds of daring beyond their own expectations. Inevitably amoung such a group of individualists and unconventional military thinkers, there was some jockeying for position in the reorganisations from time to time, but non of the pettiness of position-seeking was ever apparent on the field of action.
After the war the Commando and Ranger traditions were carried on. In October 1950 a newly raised Royal Marine. Commando fought alongside the US 1 Division in Korea, losing half their strength the Commando was awarded a Presidential Unit Citation. In Vietnam the American Special Force, wearers of the green beret, was expanded from a primary role of infiltrators to raise guerrillas, their designated role in Europe in the 1950s, to a counter insurgency unit ‘what it was never intended to be and what it had not trained for’.[*] Now, however, the old ranger qualities are being taught at the 75th Infantry (Ranger) School in Fort Benning Georgia. A ranger tradition which in the words of the veteran ranger Peter Deep ‘reflect the American Indian’s way of life … the Rangers made more versatile in their use of new methods, when through their knowledge of military history they created new tactics … their leaders did the scouting as well as the planning … and in combat the rangers sought to be amoung the first to challenge the enemy’s strongholds’.
The British army’s Commandos established their glorious reputation in only five years during World War II. Their mystique was enhanced by others but undoubtedly was a feature of their success, as it is with any military unit carrying through a succession of difficult operations. But the Commandos’ success was built on more than the shadows of reputation, their example of courage, personal initiative and flair for daring operations can be seen in a succession of military feats of arms few units can equal. They will inspire others for generations to come in seeking the lasting peace for which the commandos and rangers fought.
APPENDICES
1 Abbreviations
AB
Able seaman
AO
Administrative Officer
AOP
Air Observation Post
APD
Auxiliary Personnel Destroyer
BC
Battery Commander
BCP
Boom Clearance Party
Bde
Brigade
Bn
Battalion
CCO
Chief of Combined Operations
Cdo
Commando
CO
Combined Operations or Commanding Officer
COPP
Combined Operations Assault Pilotage Party
COSU
Combined Operations Scout Unit
CSM
Company Sergeant Major
DCO
Director of Combined Operations
EO
Executive Officer
FOB
Forward Officer Bombardment
FOO
Forward Officer Observation/Forward Observation Officer
GS(R)
General Staff research section
HE
High explosive
HQ
Headquarters
IO
Intelligence Officer
ISTDC
Inter-service Training and Development Centre
LAD
Light Aid Detachment
LCA
Landing Craft, Assault
LCI(L)
Landing Craft, Infantry (Large)
LCI(S)
Landing Craft, Infantry (Small)
LCM
Landing Craft, Mechanised
> LCN
Landing Craft, Navigation
LCOCU
Landing Craft Obstruction Clearance Unit
LCP(L)
Landing Craft, Personnel (Large)
LCP(R)
Landing Craft, Personnel (Ramped)
LCT
Landing Craft, Tank
LCVP
Landing Craft, Vehicle Personnel
LCR
Landing Craft, Rubber
LMG
Light Machine Gun
LO
Liaison Officer
LRDG
Long Range Desert Group
LSI(H)
Landing Ship, Infantry (Hand-Hoisting)
LSI(L)
Landing Ship, Infantry (Large)
LSI(M)
Landing Ship, Infantry (Medium)
LSI(S)
Landing Ship, Infantry (Small)
LVT
Landing Vehicle, Tracked
LVT(A)
Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armoured)
LVT(F)
Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Flame Thrower)
LVT(R)
Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Rocket)
MGB
Motor Gun Boat
MI R
Military Intelligence Research
ML
Motor Launch
MNBDO
Mobile Naval Base Defence Organisation
MO 9
Section of the War Office, military operations
MTB
Motor Torpedo Boat
OP
Observation Post
ORs
Other Ranks (enlisted men)
OSS
Office of Strategic Services
Pfc
Private first class
PO
Petty Officer
Plt
Platoon
QM
Quartermaster
RA
Royal Artillery
RAMC
Royal Army Medical Corps
RCT
Regimental Combat Team
RE
Royal Engineers
Recce
Reconnaissance
Recon
Reconnaissance
REME
Royal Electrical and Medical Engineers
RM
Royal Marine
RMBPD
Royal Marine Boom Patrol Detachment
RSM
Regimental Sergeant Major
SAS
Special Air Service
SBS
Special Boat Section
SEAC
South East Asia Command
SEU
Special Engineering Unit
SGB
Steam Gun Boat
SIS
Secret Intelligence Service
SO
Signals Officer
SOE
Special Operations Executive
SOG
Small Operations Group
Sp
Self-propelled
SRU
Sea Reconnaissance Unit
SS
Special Service
SSRF
Small Scale Raiding Force
ST
Signal Troop
Tp
Troop
Trp
Troop
TLO
Tank Liaison Officer
TSM
Troop Sergeant Major
USMC
United States Marine Corps
2 Organisation
Special Service Brigade—1940
Responsible to Director of Combined Operations (DCO).
Five battalions each of two Commandos with a battalion headquarters.
British Independent Company Norway 1940
(290 all ranks)
Twenty officers and 270 other ranks in platoons with Sections, weapons mainly rifles and some brens. Carried 100,000 rounds small arms ammunition, £4000 in Norwegian and British money, and rations for five days (chiefly pemmican dried meat).
British Army Commando Troop-1940
(50 all ranks)
HQ-Captain, Troop Sergeant Major and 2(?) runners; with two Sections of 23 men each commanded by Lieutenant or Sergeant. Sections probably divided into rifle and bren sub-Sections as Corporal’s commands. Specialist medics, signallers, etc. attached as required.
Note:
Ten 50-man Troops made a Commando at this time. (Over the years the identification of Troops was by number No.1 Troop, No.2 Troop etc, or by letters A Troop, B Troop, etc.)
Special Service Brigade-spring 1943
RM Commando Troop-Normandy 1944
(60 all ranks)
Troop HQ: Commander-Captain; 1 or 2 Lieutenants; Troop Sergeant Major; orderly. Colt pistol carried by commander, all others in HQ carried rifles, the officers and TSM also carried Very pistols.
The Assault, Support and No.2 Sub-Sections, 27 all ranks, made a Section with two Sections to a Troop:
Assault Sub-Section (11) including Bren Group: Leader-Sergeant with tommy gun + 5 magazines 2 grenades, notebook and maps. Rifle Group-Corporal with tommy gyun + 5 magazines 2 grenades, toggle rope and shovel; Nos 1,2 and 3 riflemen each with rifle + 50 rounds, miner’s pick, 2 bren magazines, 2 grenades and toggle rope; Nos.4 and 5 riflemen as for No. 1 but shovels replaced picks.
Bren Group
Corporal with rifle + 50 rounds, 4 bren magazines, pick and entrenching tool; No.1-bren + 4 bren magazines, pick and entrenching tool; No. 2-rifle + 50 rounds, spare parts wallet, 4 bren magazines; No.3-rifle + 50
Special Service Group-March 1944
Notes:
*L.A.D. Light Aid Detachment from REME.
**48 (RM) Cdo formed March 1944, replace 10 (Inter-Allied) Cdo in 4 SS Bde in April 1944. Medical teams attached to Brigades for particular operations.
Army Commando-Mediterranean, August 1943
(461 all ranks)
Transport—35 bicycles; one 4-seater car; 18 5-cwt (Jeep-type) trucks—12 for heavy weapons; 8 15-cwt trucks; 3 3-ton trucks; one 15-cwt water carrier.
rounds, 4 bren magazines and shovel.
Support Sub-Section (5):
Corporal as for Rifle Group but carried binoculars and compass not wire cutters; Mortar L/Corporal-rifle + 50 rounds; 3 2-in mortar bombs HE and 9 of smoke in/with 2 utility pouches; No.1 mortarman-2-in mortar, 3 bombs HE, 3 smoke, Colt pistol and 3 magazines; No.2 mortarman-rifle + 50 rounds, 6 bombs HE and 6 smoke. Sniper-rifle with telescopic sights + 50 rounds and 2 bren magazines.
No.2 Sub-Section (11):
As for Assault Sub-Section but carried 40 lbs (18kg) explosives divided equally among men.
Bombs for Heavy Weapons Troop-3-inch (75mm) mortars were carried: 2 by each Lieutenant, 2 by HQ Orderlies; 2 by snipers; 4 by Sgt Asslt Sub-Sec; 18 by rifle Groups (except No.2 Sub-Section carrying explosives); 5 by No.3 of bren Group. Sixty bombs per Troop.
Commando Depot—Achnacarry 1944
(later Commando Basic Training Centre)
See text p. 240. Came under Commando Group, but CO also responsible to Combined Ops HQ, North Highland District of Scottish Command, Royal Marine Adjutant General and Admiralty for various aspects of training and discipline Colonel Vaughan, the Commandant, knew how to make the most of this variety of masters he skilfully played along to the Depot’s advantage.
1st Ranger Battalion—June 1942
(488 all ranks)
Small HQ (Lieut-Colonel’s command) with 6 companies (A to F) one with 81mm mortars as Heavy Weapons Coy. Each company about 80 strong in 2 30-man rifle platoons with a support HQ section. Each platoon had two 12-man Sections and a 5-man mortar Section with 60mm(?) mortars. The assault Sections were divided into 2 sub-Sections or Squads.
Note:
No establishment lists were available for a Ranger Battalion but an established strength of 538 all ranks was agreed about 1943 although in the field the strength was flexible.
4th
Ranger Battalion—June 1943
(419 all ranks)
Small HQ (Major’s command) with Executive captain and lieutenants as Adjutant, S-4, S-2, assistant S-3, communications officer, and medical officer. Each of the 6 companies commanded by a lieut or 2nd-lieut with two other junior officers in the coy. A company usually had 2 platoons each with about 30 riflemen and a support Section.
Divisional ‘Rangers’—1944/5
These special patrol squads were initiated by some divisional commanders but were not authorised to use the title nor the insignia of Rangers.