The Manhattan Project
Page 12
In the meantime I was searching for the best man to take charge of this work. I reviewed with everyone to whom I felt free to talk the qualifications its director should have, and asked for nominations. Today, Oppenheimer would be considered a natural choice because he proved to be successful. Having been in charge of this particular field under Compton, he knew everything that was then known about it. Yet all his work had been purely theoretical and had not taken him much beyond the point of being able to make an educated guess at the force an atomic fission bomb could exert. Nothing had been done on such down-to-earth problems as how to detonate the bomb, or how to design it so that it could be detonated. Adding to my cause for doubt, no one with whom I talked showed any great enthusiasm about Oppenheimer as a possible director of the project.
My own feeling was that he was well qualified to handle the theoretical aspects of the work, but how he would do on the practical experimentation, or how he would handle the administrative responsibilities, I had no idea. I knew, of course, that he was a man of tremendous intellectual capacity, that he had a brilliant background in theoretical physics, and that he was well respected in the academic world. I thought he could do the job. In all my inquiries, I was unable to find anyone else who was available who I felt would do as well.
Of the men within our organization I had no doubt that Ernest Lawrence could handle it. He was an outstanding experimental physicist, and this was a job for an experimental physicist. However, he could not be spared from his work on the electromagnetic process; in fact, without him we would have had to drop it, for it was far too difficult and complex for anyone else. I knew of no one then and know of no one now, besides Ernest Lawrence, who could unquestionably have carried that development through to a successful conclusion.
Compton had a thorough background in physics, and he had had considerable administrative experience. But he could not be spared from Chicago.
Urey was a chemist and, though an outstanding one, was not qualified technically to head up this particular job. Outside the project there may have been other suitable people, but they were all fully occupied on essential work, and none of those suggested appeared to be the equal of Oppenheimer.
Oppenheimer had two major disadvantages—he had had almost no administrative experience of any kind, and he was not a Nobel Prize winner. Because of the latter lack, he did not then have the prestige among his fellow scientists that I would have liked the project leader to possess. The heads of our three major laboratories—Lawrence at Berkeley, Urey at Columbia, Compton at Chicago—were all Nobel Prize winners, and Compton had several Nobel Prize winners working under him. There was a strong feeling among most of the scientific people with whom I discussed the matter that the head of Project Y should also be one.
I think that the general attitude toward these laureates has since changed. They no longer are looked up to quite so much as they were then, primarily because so many men have produced remarkable results recently without receiving prizes. However, because of the prevailing sentiment at the time, coupled with the feeling of a number of people that Oppenheimer would not succeed, there was considerable opposition to my naming him.
Nor was he unanimously favored when I first brought the question before the Military Policy Committee. After much discussion I asked each member to give me the name of a man who would be a better choice. In a few weeks it became apparent that we were not going to find a better man; so Oppenheimer was asked to undertake the task.
But there was still a snag. His background included much that was not to our liking by any means. The security organization, which was not yet under my complete control, was unwilling to clear him because of certain of his associations, particularly in the past. I was thoroughly familiar with everything that had been reported about Oppenheimer. As always in security matters of such importance, I had read all of the available original evidence; I did not depend upon the conclusions of the security officers.
Finally, because I felt that his potential value outweighed any security risk, and to remove the matter from further discussion, I personally wrote and signed the following instructions to the District Engineer on July 20, 1943:
In accordance with my verbal directions of July 15, it is desired that clearance be issued for the employment of Julius Robert Oppenheimer without delay, irrespective of the information which you have concerning Mr. Oppenheimer. He is absolutely essential to the project.
I have never felt that it was a mistake to have selected and cleared Oppenheimer for his wartime post. He accomplished his assigned mission and he did it well. We will never know whether anyone else could have done it better or even as well. I do not think so, and this opinion is almost universal among those who were familiar with the wartime operations at Los Alamos.
“Scientific Director for the special laboratory in New Mexico”
This letter from General Groves and James B. Conant, his science adviser, notified Oppenheimer of his official duties and responsibilities as Scientific Director of the laboratory at Los Alamos. It is worth noting that the transition to a military status never occurred.
Office for Emergency Management
Office of Scientific Research and Development
1530 P Street NW.
Washington, D.C.
Vannevar Bush
Director
February 25, 1943
Dr. J. R. Oppenheimer
University of California
Berkeley, California
Dear Dr. Oppenheimer:
We are addressing this letter to you as the Scientific Director of the special laboratory in New Mexico in order to confirm our many conversations on the matters of organization and responsibility. You are at liberty to show this letter to those with whom you are discussing the desirability of their joining the project with you; they of course realizing their responsibility as to secrecy, including the details of organization and personnel.
I. The laboratory will be concerned with the development and final manufacture of an instrument of war, which we may designate as Projectile S-1-T. To this end, the laboratory will be concerned with:
A. Certain experimental studies in science, engineering and ordnance; and
B. At a later date large-scale experiments involving difficult ordnance procedures and the handling of highly dangerous material.
The work of the laboratory will be divided into two periods in time: one, corresponding to the work mentioned in section A; the other, that mentioned in section B. During the first period, the laboratory will be on a strictly civilian basis, the personnel, procurement and other arrangements being carried on under a contract arranged between the War Department and the University of California. The conditions of this contract will be essentially similar to that of the usual OSRD contract. In such matters as draft deferment, the policy of the War Department and OSRD in regard to the personnel working under this contract will be practically identical. When the second division of the work is entered upon (mentioned in B), which will not be earlier than January 1, 1944, the scientific and engineering staff will be composed of commissioned officers. This is necessary because of the dangerous nature of the work and the need for special conditions of security. It is expected that many of those employed as civilians during the first period (A) will be offered commissions and become members of the commissioned staff during the second period (B), but there is no obligation on the part of anyone employed during period A to accept a commission at the end of that time.
II. The laboratory is part of a larger project which has been placed in a special category and assigned the highest priority by the President of the United States. By his order, the Secretary of War and certain other high officials have arranged that the control of this project shall be in the hands of a Military Policy Committee, composed of Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of OSRD, as Chairman, Major General W. D. Styer, Chief of Staff, SOS, Rear Admiral W. R. Purnell, Assistant Chief of Staff to Admiral King; Dr. James B. Conant serves as Dr. Bush’s deput
y and alternate on this Committee, but attends all meetings and enters into all discussions. Brigadier General L. R. Groves of the Corps of Engineers has been given over-all executive responsibility for this project, working under the direction of the Military Policy Committee. He works in close cooperation with Dr. Conant, who is Chairman of the group of scientists who were in charge of the earlier phases of some aspects of the investigation.
III. Responsibilities of the Scientific Director.
1. He will be responsible for:
A. The conduct of the scientific work so that the desired goals as outlined by the Military Policy Committee are achieved at the earliest possible dates.
B. The maintenance of secrecy by the civilian personnel under his control as well as their families.
2. He will of course be guided in his determination of policies and courses of action by the advice of his scientific staff.
3. He will keep Dr. James B. Conant and General Groves informed to such an extent as is necessary for them to carry on the work which falls in their respective spheres. Dr. Conant will be available at any time for consultation on general scientific problems as well as to assist in the determination of definite scientific policies and research programs. Through Dr. Conant complete access to the scientific world is guaranteed.
IV. Responsibilities of the Commanding Officer.
The Commanding Officer will report directly to General Groves.
He will be responsible for:
1. The work and conduct of all military personnel.
2. The maintenance of suitable living conditions for civilian personnel.
A. The prevention of trespassing on the site.
B. The performance of duty by such guards as may be established within the reservation for the purpose of maintaining the secrecy precautions deemed necessary by the Scientific Director.
V. Cooperation.
The closest cooperation is of course necessary between the Commanding Officer and the Scientific Director if each is to perform his function to the maximum benefit of the work. Such a cooperative attitude now exists on the part of Dr. Conant and General Groves and has so existed since General Groves first entered the project.
Very sincerely yours,
[James B. Conant]
[Leslie R. Groves]
THE MANHATTAN PROJECT ON THE MOVE
A paragon of efficiency, Groves used the train as his mobile office and his roomette became the temporary headquarters of the Manhattan Project. To cram more work into a day, an aide would accompany him partway while he dictated letters, gave instructions, and kept on top of his busy schedule. After an hour or two the assistant would get off, take another train back to the office, send off the letters, file the reports, and schedule his future appointments.
Sometimes an aide might travel to meet him as he was returning. If he had been in Los Alamos an aide might meet the General’s train in Chicago, and return with him the rest of the way to Washington, briefing him on developments while he was gone, bringing him reports, mail, and news from the office. By the time the train pulled into Union Station, many hours of work had been accomplished. When he could, Groves used Sundays to travel or traveled overnight, arriving at his destination in the morning fresh and ready for action.
—ROBERT S. NORRIS
“When you looked at Captain Groves, a little alarm bell rang ‘Caution’”
William Whipple, a member of the Army Corps of Engineers, recalls his impressions of General Leslie R. Groves, with whom he worked before Groves was selected as head of the Manhattan Engineer District.
From Racing for the Bomb
BY ROBERT S. NORRIS
Another young engineer at the time had an opportunity to observe Groves and later made some telling comments about his character. William Whipple had several relatives who had gone to West Point. He graduated third in the class of 1930, and, after studying as a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford, served with the corps. While at the Omaha district office he had contact with Groves, whom he remembered as “large, tough, and very intelligent”; although “only a captain, no one took this man lightly. I was careful not to have any trouble whatsoever with him. When you looked at Captain Groves, a little alarm bell rang ‘Caution’ in your brain.” He did not resort “to the usual ploys and swaggering to magnify his own importance. He gave the impression of a man of great latent power, who was biding his time. He was not rude; but neither did he go out of his way to be friendly. He was obviously highly intelligent. His subsequent career did not astonish me.”
U.S. Department of Energy
General Leslie R. Groves oversaw all aspects of the Manhattan Project.
Decisive, Confident, and Cool
From an interview in the October 1945 issue of Collier’s magazine, General Groves emerges as an extraordinarily decisive person who did not harbor self-doubts.
From “The Man Who Made Manhattan”
BY ROBERT DEVORE
In the days when he was building Army camps, Groves insisted upon quick decisions. It was a standing rule that all questions on the sites had to be answered in twenty-four hours or an explanation given. In Manhattan, Groves cut the time for decisions down to one hour or less—even for the most complicated ones. He can remember only one occasion when it took longer to reach a decision. That was when they had to put up at Hanford Engineer Works “things” (someday the world may know the secret of those “things”) that they couldn’t be sure would be needed. They only knew that they either were building essential parts of the plant, or, said Groves, “monuments to a bad guess.”
You can’t explain General Groves by the little things that keep up the morale of many men. He never lost faith in his ability to succeed. He and his friends will tell you that quite simply and without pretension. His friends would ask him how he bore his responsibilities. He would grin and reply, “If I can’t do the job, no one man can.”
“My emotional graph is a straight line,” Groves told me. “I never worried. This job would never have been done if I had. I never had any doubts. Not having any doubts, I could not feel very surprised or elated by our success.”
“If I can’t do the job, no one man can.”
—GENERAL LESLIE R. GROVES
A BUREAUCRATIC WARRIOR OF THE FIRST RANK
If General Groves walked into your office and wanted something it was virtually impossible to say no, as War Production Board Director Donald Nelson quickly learned. Before taking over the Manhattan Project, Groves spent the previous two years grappling with the priority system. Resources such as steel, copper, and dozens of other scarce items were allocated to projects according to their rating, with AAA the highest. The competition for resources was fierce and success or failure often depended on what rating your project received.
On September 19, 1942, Groves marched into Donald Nelson’s office at the War Production Board with a letter to himself in hand, lacking only Nelson’s signature. The letter said that Director Nelson agreed to provide the Manhattan District a rating of AAA, or any lesser rating that Groves might determine. Nelson knew nothing about the Manhattan Project, had never laid eyes on Groves, and initially refused to sign.
At this point Groves applied a hammerlock on Nelson and told him he would recommend to Secretary of War Stimson that the Project be abandoned on the grounds that the Director of the War Production Board refused to carry out the wishes of President Roosevelt. At this point Nelson demanded to sign and there were no further problems concerning priorities for the Manhattan Project for the remainder of the war.
—ROBERT S. NORRIS
“The biggest S.O.B.”
Colonel Kenneth D. Nichols was District Engineer of the Manhattan Engineer District beginning in August 1943. From his office at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, he oversaw the construction and operation of all MED facilities. Nichols worked directly for Groves and had this review of his boss.
From The Road to Trinity
BY COLONEL KENNETH D. NICHOLS
First, General Grov
es is the biggest S.O.B. I have ever worked for. He is most demanding. He is most critical. He is always a driver, never a praiser. He is abrasive and sarcastic. He disregards all normal organizational channels. He is extremely intelligent. He has the guts to make timely, difficult decisions. He is the most egotistical man I know. He knows he is right and so sticks by his decision. He abounds with energy and expects everyone to work as hard, or even harder, than he does… if I had to do my part of the atomic bomb project over again and had the privilege of picking my boss, I would pick General Groves.
“Not right—do it again.”
Colonel John Lansdale Jr. was a special assisant to General Groves in charge of all security and intelligence matters. He shared his impressions of Groves in his memoirs.
From “Military Service”
BY COLONEL JOHN LANSDALE JR.
It is true that General Groves, like many of us, had a very adequate appreciation of his own abilities. The problem was he had no hesitation in letting others know of his own high opinion of himself and his abilities. This is the origin of the feeling that he was arrogant and the reason why many people disliked him. However, I know of no one who worked closely with him who did not have the highest regard for his intellectual abilities and his ability to get things done. He had an uncanny intuition for the right answer. I can remember more than one occasion when he returned something I wrote for him to sign with the notation: “Not right—do it again.” On one particularly frustrating case I asked him what he wanted to say. His answer was “If I knew I would have written it. I just know this is not right.” The adverse comment comes primarily from those who did not know him well or who had little contact with him. The only side of the General that they saw was what they regarded as his arrogant disclosure of his own high abilities.