Stalin's Nemesis
Page 5
Cultural and recreational activities centred around cinema screenings and performances by its orchestra and ad hoc choirs assembled in individual units for special occasions. Other entertainment such as recitals by Ukrainian artists was arranged by the Military Board,100 which together with the Ukrainian Central Committee and a special commission established by the Division, also helped the Ukrainian soldiers locate and contact their relatives within the refugee community.
To complement this initiative, SS-Brigadeführer Freitag allowed the wives of German and Ukrainian soldiers to visit their husbands and stay in special quarters in the camp for a maximum of a 14 day period. This privilege was well received and appreciated by those who were able to take advantage of it—although almost without exception these were the senior German officers.
The Galician Division was given the use of a rest home known as ‘Montana’ near Zakopane in the Tatry mountains, where its most deserving solders and those recuperating from wounds could convalesce. On the right: Waffen-Grenadier Ostap Sokolsky.
The German authorities still however made little effort to honour Wächter’s assurance that maintenance arrangements would continue for the families and relatives of the Ukrainian soldiers. This was despite the fact that the provision of monetary aid for the soldiers dependants was especially important in view of the fact that many had been forced to flee westwards as refugees.101
2
Slovak Rebellion and the Red Army
Kampfgruppe Wildner1
Reformation of the Galician Division had barely begun at Neuhammer when it was disrupted by an order to organise a Kampfgruppe for immediate use against the uprising which had broken out in Slovakia against the pro-German government of President Monsignor Jozef Tiso.2
The armed insurrection organised by the Slovak resistance movement began at 1900 hrs on 29 August 1944. Its strategic aim was to assist the rapid penetration of Soviet troops across the Carpathian Mountains and into the rear of the German armies in Romania and Hungary, which would have undermined the whole southern sector of the German-held eastern front. Implementation of the plan was the responsibility of the Defence Minister General Ferdinand Catlos backed by members of his cabinet and a large part of the Slovak Army under General Jan Golian. This had grown to a formidable strength of approximately 47,000 men due to the mobilisation carried out on 9 September. They were equipped with tanks, artillery, two improvised armoured trains and over 250 aircraft.3 The 1 Czechoslovak Army in Slovakia formed the backbone of the insurgent forces. It was reinforced and co-ordinated by 2,200 soldiers of the II. Czechoslovak Independent Airborne Brigade4 and 7,000 partisans which included a number of Soviet commanders and specialists.5 From 17 September the Soviets also supplied additional air support from the 1 Czechoslovak Air Fighter Regiment, together with 250 tons of arms and supplies.
With the ashes of the Warsaw rising still smouldering, the Germans needed to quell the insurrection in Slovakia as quickly as possible in order to restore the main communication and transportation lines to military traffic. By 2 September 1944, they had assembled an ad hoc force of emergency mobile Kampfgruppen from their forces in eastern Slovakia and northern Hungary. Their objective was to suppress the revolt which was already restricted by a combination of illprepardness, treachery and hesitation on the part of the Slovaks.
The man appointed to crush the rebellion was SS-Obergruppenführer Gottlob Berger,6 who confidently promised Himmler that ‘he would settle the matter [the rebellion] in four days’. Under his direction KGr. Schill,7 KGr. Schäfer8 and the Panzer-Division Tatra9 initially made good progress as they moved in towards the principal tactical centres of the rebellion. These were Banska Bystrica [Neusohl] which was the rebel head quarters, Brezno [Briesen] and Zvolen [Altsohl] situated in the mountainous Low Tatra region in central Slovakia. By the middle of September however, the advance had lost its momentum as the insurgents withdrew further into their mountain strongholds where the Germans could not exploit their superior training and weaponry.
On 14 September Berger was replaced as overall commander in Slovakia by SS-Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen-SS und Polizei Hermann Höfle.10 The offensive resumed but it was clear that the German authorities had underestimated not only the scale of the revolt but the resources needed to subjugate it. Hence, on 22 September the Galician Division’s command received urgent notification that it was to organise a Kampfgruppe with the strength of a reinforced battalion, to be sent to join the forces already in Slovakia. The order which was clearly issued at short notice, did not take into account the recent change in overall command in Slovakia as it still stipulated subordination of the Kampfgruppe to Berger and not Höfle.
Secret Command Matter Berlin Wilmersdorf 22.9.44
Teleprinter message
‘On the special order of the Reichsführer SS, the 14 Waffen Gren Div der SS (galiz. Nr.1) is to temporarily provide an infantry battalion reinforced with 1 l (light calibre cannons) infantry artillery platoon and 1 m (medium calibre cannons) anti-tank platoon for deployment against the partisans in Slovakia, to be sent at the earliest opportunity to Pressburg [Bratislava].
On arrival in Pressburg, the reinforced battalion is to be subordinated to SS Obergruppenführer und General der Waffen SS Berger.’11
Signed Blume
SS-Obersturmbannführer
The Division’s staff issued the proper instructions and immediately commenced preparations to implement the order which originated from the SS-FHA. Obersturmführer Rudolf Michel was assigned to oversee the units formation.12 To minimise disruption to its reformation plan, the III./WGR 29 was chosen as the basis for the improvised unit. This battalion had not deployed at Brody consequently its personnel were still fresh. It was composed partly of soldiers from the disbanded Galizischen SS Freiwilligen Regiment 5 which had earlier been active in the Cholm, Lublin and Hrubeshiv regions.
To ensure the battle group was as effective as possible, the soldiers of the III./WGR 29 were to be supplemented with some of the best and most experienced Ukrainian officers and NCOs including many Brody veterans from WGR’s 30 and 31. Essential specialists were to be drawn mainly from the Division’s various sub-units. As could be expected the motives for those who volunteered were mixed. Some responded to an announcement by the commander of WGR 29 SS-Standartenführer Dern, that Ukrainian families and refugees in Slovakia who had been granted asylum, had been seized by the Communists and were in danger.13 In contrast others like Theo Andruszko had more practical concerns:
As our food in Neuhammer was hopeless—mostly cabbage soup and turnips and beer was like water (you could drink 8 litres and not feel a bit intoxicated), I and many comrades who had just returned from Lauenburg volunteered in different capacities. I became ‘Entfernungs Offizier’, (distance measuring officer) for heavy weaponry such as mortars.14
Waffen-Sturmmann Mychailo Kormylo from the 10 company related his recollection of the formation of the unit:
[…] A week later the battalion commander SS-Hauptsturmführer Klocker (I. WGR 30) arrived at our company as we were forming and called for those who had been at Brody. He ordered Brody veterans to take one step forward. 40 men did. Klocker walked slowly along the length of us and then back, pointing a finger at those he wished to take a further step forward—he called me, Kormylo, then M. Baitala, B. Tarnawsky, H. Lischynsky and six others whom he recognised from Brody where he had been the battalion commander of I./WGR 30. The rest of the soldiers were instructed to return to barracks while we were taken to the officers’ mess. We were told to sit on benches and within minutes two officers arrived—they lifted their hands ‘Heil Hitler!’ We replied the same, sat down and waited. Klocker then introduced us to the two officers—first SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl Wildner and then Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Volodymyr Tatarsky. Klocker then continued saying that ‘we are forming a new fighting battalion because in Slovakia almost half of their army had risen against the Germans and we were going to sort them out. Because you are expe
rienced soldiers from Brody we will take ten of you to help create a new company, the type you experienced at Brody.’
Following this Klocker took us to the weapon store and asked each of us to choose the weapons we were familiar with and had used at the front. He informed us that we would be using them in Slovakia. I approached a rack of weapons, cleaned and oiled and immediately noticed an MG 42. I inspected its condition, brand new from the factory and as an addition I took two reserve barrels. Then I spotted the Lafette, also brand new. Further I chose attachments like the optical measurer, a good pair of binoculars, machine pistol, map case, diary, luminous compass, gas mask and camouflage clothing. I already had a pistole 38 which I had carried with me from Brody. We took the lot, cartridge belt, entrenching tool, bayonet and so on.[…]
Immediately after this Klocker instructed us to be on parade at 1500 hrs where the whole battalion was to gather. Here we had to choose from the men we had been instructing. [He said] ‘You will choose them and you will be held responsible for them’. From tomorrow you will take them for final training and test them in using heavy weapons. If they do not meet up to your expectations—change them!’.
The caption on this Kriegsberichter picture reads ‘Ukrainian civilian population freed by Ukrainians of the Waffen-SS. Over snow-covered roads the Ukrainian-SS volunteers bring their liberated compatriots security from the clutches of the Soviets’.
We ten assembled before the battalion arrived, watched it march towards us, then it stood to attention. Klocker then began to announce that we were Brody veterans and that we were to choose the men that would be accompanying us. Klocker then instructed those who had been training on heavy machine guns to take two steps forward. Sixteen stepped out and Klocker told me to pick seven men. Baitala and the others did the same.
On the second day we went for live firing. I took 3,000 rounds in order to give six of my men live practice. The seventh man was trained to carry our ammunition by horse some 200 metres behind us. As I had done at Brody so would I do in Slovakia. At the firing range all six of my men performed very well. However, Yevhen Petrytsky and Mychailo Sentsik, both sons of priests, had threatened that in real battle they would fire over the heads of the enemy.[…]15
In any event the unit was ultimately oversubscribed with Ukrainian volunteers. In some cases they replaced several German officers and NCOs who had volunteered but opted out when they discovered the destination.16
The Kampfgruppe had a battle strength of approximately twelve hundred men.17 It consisted of three light infantry companies (9, 10, 11) and one heavy infantry company (12) each of which had approximately two hundred men, together with the following support units:
Kampfgruppenstab
III./WGR 29
1 battery light artillery
2 anti-tank platoons
2 pioneer platoons
a signals unit
a Jagdzug
a supply unit18
Also attached to the unit were chaplain Waffen-Untersturmführer Rev Bohdan Levytsky and two medical doctors one of whom was Dr Kowalsky, with ten men acting as orderlies.19
Prudently, command of the Kampfgruppe was given to a Slovak Volksdeutsche, 47 year old, SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl Wildner.20 A very experienced careerist soldier, he had formerly served as an officer in the Austro-Hungarian Army and in the Slovak Army with the rank of major. Having joined the Division less than four weeks previously,21 this was to be his first combat assignment with it and he was an ideal choice. Bespectacled and moustachioed, he was a stocky, broad-shouldered man of mid height, who walked with a slight limp and always carried a walking cane, leaving his messenger to carry his weapon. Wildner enjoyed an excellent relationship with the Ukrainians who benefited from his idiosyncratic approach which quickly endeared him to them, for example he frequently addressed them in his native Slovak rather than the German language. Unlike most of his German counterparts, he was far more accommodating towards the Ukrainians under his command22 who affectionately referred to him as ‘Papa’. Within his Kampfgruppe the various company and unit commands (where known) were divided between German and Ukrainian officers.23
Kampfgruppenstab : Kdr SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl Wildner
Adj: SS-Obersturmführer Adolf Bruderhofer
III./WGR 29
9 company SS-Untersturmführer Lilinger (after he was wounded SS-Oberscharführer Mitzinger (later Waffen-Untersturmführer Zeniuk)
10 Company, Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Tatarsky,
11 Company Waffen-Obersturmführer Kosak,
12 Company SS-Obersturmführer Schneller.
1 battery light artillery Waffen-Untersturmführer Korczak
2 anti-tank platoons
2 platoons pioneers
a signals unit
a Jagdzug platoon24
a supply unit
Chaplain Waffen-Obersturmführer Rev Bohdan Levytsky
two medical doctors one of whom was Dr Kowalsky.
Reflecting the numerous shortages that the Galician Division was suffering from, supplies of weapons and ammunition were limited and the standard of some of the equipment and condition of the horses allocated to the Kampfgruppe was generally poor.25 The exception was the heavy company which had some of the latest automatic infantry weapons. For mobility it had at its disposal only five motor vehicles (two VW light passenger cars and three motorcycles) and cart-horses for the transportation of the light artillery guns and the supply and ammunition wagons.
The first of three echelons entrained for Slovakia at Neuhammer on the 22 September26 whilst a second and third followed within twenty four hours. On arrival, Kampfgruppe Wildner was to move to its staging point on the south western perimeter of the insurgent held territory where it was to move into position immediately adjacent to KGr. Schill (to whose command it was subordinated) and join the attack. A former member of the 12 (heavy) company Waffen-Grenadier Theo Andruszko recalled an incident which occurred as his unit arrived:
Our echelon arrived from Neuhammer some time at the end of September 1944 at a small railway station on the Czech/Slovak border. We disembarked with all our equipment. This moment stays in my memory because of something that happened there. One of the Czech railway workers recognised that we were talking in the Ukrainian language and remarked to one of the soldiers that we are about to get a good hiding from the Russians. He was reported and the German transport commandant promptly made an example of him—he was taken away and shot somewhere out of sight.27
Shortly after detraining at the station at Oslany on 28 September the point units of the Kampfgruppe were marching to their assembly positions when they came under fire from Soviet aircraft. Leading the column was 9 company and as it was crossing the brow of a hill, enemy aircraft suddenly appeared and came in for a low level attack spraying the area with their machine guns and wounding the company commander who became the first casualty for the campaign.28 Thereafter as a precautionary measure, detraining took place between stations in the same area.29 Waffen-Unterscharführer Roman Drazniowsky noted in his diary:
10 company disembarked on the afternoon of 29 September shortly after passing Zemianske Kostolany. The company commander Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Tatarsky received orders to proceed in battle order towards Oslany, with the destination of Pila, a small mountain village approximately 25 kms away. We reached Pila at midnight and the second platoon was ordered to secure the village and the surrounding area. […]30
In the vicinity of Pila, Wildner organised his force. On the morning of 30 September the company commanders informed the platoon leaders of the plans for the next few days, namely reconnaissance and preparation for an attack on the town of Nova Bana situated approximately 10–12 km’s to the south. Amongst the group was platoon commander Waffen-Sturmmann Mychailo Kormylo:
[…] We stayed in Pila three days while our reconnaissance groups went to seek out the enemy partisans. On the third day we saw them, one kilometre in front of us. I ordered my group to a position 700 metres from t
hem and prepared a 3000 round, setting the gun to zig-zag mode. I told Petrytsky to cover me and wait until I signalled him to let them have first 50 rounds, a second burst of 100 and a third of 150. This he did but they seemed to want to engage us. However I saw through my binoculars that they were poorly armed. They engaged in fire but we replied from a number of positions and soon they began to flee. Then we fired mortars at them. They and their Russian partisan allies began to retreat into a forest with our mortars setting the edge of the forest ablaze. I left my men on the hill and headed for further instructions. I entered the HQ where Wildner and Tatarsky were situated. Wildner wanted us to give chase as much as possible so that the Slovaks could not rest or re-group. In a matter of an hour we were ready to move after them […].31
A reconnaissance group had established that the town of Nova Bana could be reached from the west via mountain trails and in the early morning hours of 2 October the unit started its approach. The rocky terrain made access difficult to negotiate and was especially unsuitable for the horse-driven wooden ammunition carts, which began to break on the rough trails within hours and had to be abandoned, after their cargoes had been loaded onto the horses. In spite of this, the first Ukrainians soldiers reached the town by late afternoon and by the evening it had been captured from the partisans who had been taken completely by surprise, so much so that they did not have time to eat their meals which were still on the tables.32 On the following day, only one unit of the Kampfgruppe saw action, as recorded by its commander Waffen-Unterscharführer Roman Drazniowsky who wrote:
Group from 10/III./WGR during Wildner campaign. Second from right: Waffen-Sturmmann Mychailo Kormylo.
Well-armed squad from 10./III.WGR 29 during operations in Slovakia. Second from left: Waffen-Sturmmann Mychailo Kormylo.