Stalin's Nemesis
Page 7
The following day, Freitag and Major Heike drove to Zilina to discuss the details of the exchange of control with the commander of the Panzer-Division Tatra General Friedrich-Wilhelm von Loeper. At the meeting the area of operations within which the Division was to maintain security was defined as covering the area of Ruzomberok, Dolny Kubin, Cadca—Rakova (3 km WNW Cadca), Turzovka,—Kolarovice (15 km NW Zilina)—Povazska Bystrica—Svaty Jur (18 km SW Vrutky)—Sklabina/Podzamok 10 km SE Vrutky).58 As a ‘Führerbefehl’59 (Special Führer Order), it was to protect the main railway line from Zilina to the industrial town of Ruzomberok. This was of considerable strategic importance for moving troops and military supplies to the front and ferrying wounded to hospitals and damaged vehicles to repair shops in Germany on the return journey as well as transporting completed guns from the essential artillery works at Ruzomberok. Consequently it was busy day and night.
As the largest and most substantial unit, all other formations involved in anti-partisan operations within its operational area would be subordinated to the Division both operationally and for supply purposes.60 Their duties clarified, both men returned to Neuhammer where they were later joined by General Friedrich-Wilhelm von Loeper to oversee the transfer.
On 4 October WGR 30, which was to form its advance party, entrained at Neuhammer for Slovakia and after a twenty four hour journey arrived on 6 October and began to prepare the defences and make suitable arrangements to accommodate the whole of the Division.61 The remaining echelons followed WGR 30 by train on 15 October62 and by 17 October all combat and support units including the Training and Reserve Regiment63 had detrained in Slovakia. The Division at this time had almost reached its full authorised strength which was recorded as 14,285 (286 officers and 13,999 NCOs and men).64 Although this represented an overall deficit of around 400 men, significantly the shortfall in the number of officers and NCOs was as acute as ever with only 59 per cent of its authorised strength in post.65
Upon arrival, basic deployment (subject to changes) was as follows:
Divisional Staff, Supply troop, Communications unit, Administration section, Feldlazarett—in the city of Zilina
Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 29—to the north of Zilina; Regimental HQ in Kysucke Nove Mesto
Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 30—West of Zilina; Regimental HQ at Velka Bytca
Waffen-Grenadier-Regiment der SS 31—South east of Zilina; Regimental HQ at Turciansky Svaty Martin
Waffen-Fusilier Bataillion der SS 14—South west of Zilina; HQ at Rajec
Waffen-Artillerie-Regiment der SS 14 South of Zilina; HQ at Bytcica66 Lietavska Lucka.
Panzerjäger-Abteilung—HQ at Turciansky Svaty Martin
Waffen-Pioneer Bataillion—HQ in Vrutky67
SS-Feld-Ersatz-Bataillion 14- South east of Zilina, HQ at Krasnany68
Training and Reserve Regiment, temporarily in the Zilina area and then north east of the city, HQ at Cadca.69
Some units were billeted in the recently vacated modern and comfortable barracks of the former Slovakian Army such as the ‘Stefanik Barracks’ named in honour of the Slovak hero General Stefanik, while others were quartered in public buildings such as schools, cinemas, care homes or village halls. As a rule only those based in rural outlying areas were billeted in private dwellings.
The Division’s operational district was divided into defensive security zones (Sicherungsbereiche). To maximise its potential, its various sub units occupied dispersed centres within these zones, sometimes in company or platoon strength. Once on Slovakian soil, the Division took over the static point defences and the guarding of local munitions factories, mines, bridges and tunnels and other strategically important sites as well as the safeguarding of the main arterial transportation and communication routes. Its anti-aircraft detachment was guarding the railway station at St Martin.70 At the same time all sub-units were required to immediately conduct security operations and anti-partisan sweeps within their respective areas.71
Parade at Neuhammer held for the benefit the Divisional Commander of the Panzer Division ‘Tatra’ Friedrich-Wilhelm General von Loeper. Photo courtesy Richard Rygaard archive
The same occasion, bicycle units parade. Left to right: Freitag (white lapels) not known, commander of Neuhammer General Major Hans Runnebaum, Major Heike (dark collar). Photo courtesy Richard Rygaard archive
Senior staff officers after the parade. Left to right front row: General Friedrich-Wilhelm General von Loeper (black lapels), Freitag (white lapels), second right, back to camera: General Major Hans Runnebaum camp commander at Neuhammer. Photo courtesy Richard Rygaard archive
After the parade. Left to right: General Friedrich-Wilhelm General von Loeper (black lapels), Freitag, General Major Hans Runnebaum.
Group of soldiers from the Galician Division’s Reserve Regiment.
Check point near a school gate in Cadca, Slovakia, where the Division’s Reserve Regiment was based. The sign reads ‘County foster home and recreation centre of county care for youth in Cadca’.
Chadtsi, Slovakia. Sitting from the left: Pylypyk, V. Lototskyi V., N.N. Lubytskyi, Z. Dolynka. Standing: O. Oleksiychuk and S. Maksymyuk.
Clerks in the Reserve Regiment, Chadtsi, Slovakia.
The extremely poor overall condition of the Division (which like the 708 Volks-Gren.Div and 271.Volks-Gren.Div’s was not yet fully armed)72 meant that it was barely equal to these tasks. Virtually every company was under strength in terms of officers and NCOs and was comprised mostly of fresh recruits with little or no basic training. The necessary numbers of officers and NCOs needed for administrative and training purposes were simply not available and often these duties had to be devolved to the most intelligent enlisted men or the most experienced.
The frequent transfer of personnel from company to company at short notice was another contributory factor which impacted negatively on effectiveness as did the provision of weapons and equipment which at this point was nothing short of woeful. To cite as a typical example, during its first week of deployment in Slovakia, the company commander of 1./I./WGR 30 Waffen-Untersturmführer Roman Herasymowych recorded that it had only two thirds of its required weapons, (three machine guns, three sub machine guns, two pistols and eighty rifles). He noted that there were also severe shortages of ammunition and equipment and that within his company footwear was in a deplorable condition as was clothing—there were only 20 helmets and 60 belts for 120 soldiers, who also lacked a great many other important accessories.73
A lesser burden was also caused by the recent influx of the newly promoted Ukrainian officers as company and platoon commanders. Fresh from the training schools, these men lacked both administrative and more importantly practical front experience,74 which compelled battalion commanders to hold regular instruction talks with them about the contemporary situation and to discuss current tactical problems.
In a private letter to his father, SS-Brigadeführer Wächter noted the transfer of the Division to Slovakia and expressed his concern for its low morale and for its future prospects under the continued leader ship of Freitag. It read:
[…] The 14 Galizische Schützendivision is quartered in Sillien [Zilina] for the time being. Here it should be refreshed and prepared for later action. Belief and the effectiveness (Durchschlagskraft) of this formation is low. After meeting with the Divisional commander in Stary Sambir, I am personally very sceptical. I never thought much of the warfare (Kriegskunst) and leadership talents of this man. […]75
In spite of these considerable afflictions, continuing efforts by all units to clear the local terrain had according to the official situation report on events in Slovakia produced ‘good results’.
Unidentified group from the Galician Division during anti-partisan operations Slovakia. Photo courtesy Filip Zierfuss archive.
Officer with another unidentified group at their billets in Slovakia. Photo courtesy Filip Zierfuss archive.
Immediate anti partisan sweeps commenced by all the Galician Divisio
n’s elements including this unidentified unit. Private photos taken during active duty were officially forbidden.
Group from 10./III./WGR during anti-partisan action in Slovakia.
The daily entries read as follows:
12/10/44.
Pi. Kp reinforced with assistance from the 14 Waffen Gren.Div. SS, works on the restoration of the road bridge by Kralovany.76
14/10/44
14 Waffen Gren.Div. SS carried out sweeps with several jagdkommandos (assault groups) in the entire area with good success.77
15/10/44
In its allocated area of Rosenberg [Ruzomberok] the 14 Waffen Gren.Div. SS, through active and continuous clearing activities has forced strong partisan groups to retreat in the direction of the Protecktorat border (i.e. occupied Czech territory).78
16.10.44
14 Waffen Gren.Div. SS also today sent several jagdkommandos79
17.10.44
14 Waffen- Gren.Div. SS undertook ongoing strong operations against the partisans in its area of operations. Prisoners and booty have been captured.80
18.10.44
14 Waffen Gren.Div. SS undertook clearing operations with goods results.81
Within a two week period, a significant number of prisoners and booty had been taken and the surviving strong groups of partisans had been driven out of its whole sector and into the remote mountains and forests.82
At the same time, once the presence of the ‘14 Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (galiz. Nr.1)’, became known, the Soviet partisan leader Colonel K. Popov immediately sought to unsettle the Ukrainians. To induce them to defect, he used a variety of propaganda methods, concentrating his efforts in the area of Zilina, consequently in the same two week period fifty desertions were recorded.83
The Operations of Kampfgruppe Wildner and Kampfgruppe Wittenmeyer in the Final Assault
During the first half of October as SS-Obergruppenführer Höfle continued to assemble his forces for a final concentrated strike against the insurgents, the Galician Division was ordered to form a second Kampfgruppe to take part in the action.84 This ad hoc unit with limited offensive capability, was formed on 15 October from WGR 30 which had been the first to arrive in Slovakia and placed under the command of SS-Hauptsturmführer Friedrich Wittenmeyer. It consisted of the III./WGR.30 reinforced with 13./WGR 31, a section of artillery, pioneers, anti-tank grenadiers, communications unit and a supply unit.85 Once mobilised and supplied it was to proceed to the north east edge of the insurgent pocket, free the main railway line and road from Ruzomberok to the east from partisan control and advance towards Brezno.
Both KGr. Wildner and KGr. Wittenmeyer took part in the final offensive which commenced on morning of 18 October 1944, when German forces closed in from all sides along eleven routes towards the centre of the rising. Despite brave efforts and temporary delays in localities where the terrain prevented the Germans from deploying their heavy artillery and armour, the well armed insurgents, could not withstand the intensity of the assault and organised resistance soon collapsed.
From its assembly area of Poprad and Spisska Nova Ves, (about 36 kms east of Ruzomberok), KGr. Wittenmeyer deployed with support from the 3 company of the 1 Field Bataillon of the Hlinka Guard (approximately 30 men) and a unit of ex-Luftwaffe personnel (of approximately company strength).86 It set out with the primary objective of opening and safeguarding the main road and rail lines east of Ruzomberok. On the very first day it became obvious that because of the wet and muddy ground, this operation would be difficult especially for the light artillery guns which quickly became bogged down and stuck in the mud and could only be freed by using oxen from a nearby village. To overcome this problem Wittenmeyer requested and received the following day Panzerspähwagen so that the artillery guns could be moved and were then able to provide the necessary support for the infantry units.87 Thus equipped, within a short time the battlegroup was able achieve its objective and drove the partisans in the proximity into the impenetrable High Tatras Mountains. Thereafter, it joined the attack on the insurgent pocket in a secondary role, advancing from the north east towards Brezno/Banska Bystrica.
Between the 19–23 October elements were involved in fighting in the area of Vernar and Kralova Lehota. Having broken through the enemy positions and occupied Kralova Lehota, on 24 October the battle group was reported to be ‘fighting slowly on [the village of] Maluzina’ 21 kms north of Brezno, which was captured the next day, freeing the railway line for rail traffic (after track repairs) in the process.88 The next report on its progress dated 27 October read: ‘KGr Wittenmeyer took Nisch [Nizna Boca] 10 km south of Krl.Lehota. Main road Rosenberg—Poprad is free of enemy. The Ukrainian volunteers of the Freiwilligen 14.Waffen-Gren.Div.SS deployed here fought exceptionally.’ [Author’s emphasis].89 On 28 October the unit was reported to have ‘cleared villages situated just south and north of the road Rosenberg—Poprad of the stronger partisan groups and secured many munitions dumps, provision and valuable light and heavy weapons’.90 Persevering through deep snow in very difficult terrain, it continued its activities in the vicinity, provided security for the recaptured area and pursued the remaining part of the insurgent army into the High and Low Tatras until 15 November when it was withdrawn and returned to its parent formation. During this period the Kampfgruppe also encountered and assisted refugees fleeing to the west towards Pressburg (Bratislava), whose number included a Russian émigré artist whom Wittenmeyer kept as a mistress.91
Although it played a limited part in the final offensive, during its operations Kampfgruppe Wittenmeyer uncovered a significant amount of weapons and other war matériel,92 which along with its performance earned its commander promotion to the rank of SS-Sturmbannführer on 9 November.93
Simultaneously, with Babina occupied the way was clear for the remaining German forces which included Kampfgruppe Schill strengthened with a company of 6 Sturmgeschütze (assault guns), to advance on Banska Bystrica, the headquarters of the rebellion. Kampfgruppe Wildner joined the assault in the south western sector and on 26 October received the order to start moving towards Zvolen.
Waffen-Unterscharführer Roman Drazniowsky’s 2 platoon 10 company was assigned the task of proceeding on the east side of the valley along trails at the top of the mountains, to prevent an attack on the units occupying the valley, a route he later described as ‘very difficult and exhausting’.94
The Slovak soldiers, in the absence of reserves to facilitate relief, often showed little inclination to fight, abandoning their heavily fortified defensive emplacements and leaving a trail of discarded weapons and equipment, as well as supply and ammunition dumps, as they withdrew towards Banska Bystrica. Behind them they mined the roads and blew up all the bridges on the River Hron. Waffen-Grenadier Theo Andruszko recalled: ‘On the way we found signs of fresh fighting. There were a couple of destroyed German tanks that had struck mines. Parts of human bodies were still there and sappers were busy checking the road for more mines’.95
Waffen-Sturmmann Mychailo Kormylo:
We progressed through the village of Sasa towards Dobra Niva where our six panzers had forced the enemy in the direction of Zvolen. On the road to Zvolen the Slovaks had abandoned a huge amount of ammunition leaving whole wagons standing with their horses, heavy weaponry of all kinds and grenades and rifles etc. It seemed that they had no wish to fight us. By leaving their dead on the roads we knew that they had no resistance left.
We arrived at Zvolen and saw how our tanks had destroyed the edge of the town. We walked through the town, weapons at the ready while a good number of the inhabitants ventured out to see who we were and what kind of people had put the Slovak Army to flight. I spoke to one woman who warned us that although the army had fled, a number of them had now dressed as civilians and might even be in the town.96
By this time, tired and demoralised, whole Slovak formations surrendered—frequently to the Ukrainians in preference to the Germans. Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun: ‘Slovak soldiers preferred to
capitulate to us because we had unofficial orders to give them official passes to return home while Germans usually sent them to labour camps in Germany’.97
As the commander of the Kampfgruppe, Wildner who was himself a Slovak national, proved to be adept at persuading many of his fellow countrymen to surrender. Waffen-Unterscharführer Jurij Ferencevych from 11 company experienced this at first hand:
Wildner was always with the infantry, marching with the soldiers in the mountains. Many times when they encountered Slovak ‘rebels’ they would start shouting, asking the Slovaks to surrender. I do not remember how many times it happened but in some instances Wildner was talking and an officer who knew him would respond and the whole company would come over to us.98
When unaccompanied by German officers, Wildner saw to it that groups of regular Slovak soldiers (especially the older men) had their weapons (mainly rifles) confiscated before being released.99