Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  […] One day in mid December 1944, a very sad and unexpected event occurred in our company. The whole company gathered in a building. Before it stood a large military truck and beside it a few military police (Feldgendarmerie). We called them ‘tin smiths’ because on the chest they wore on a chain and a tin sign in a half moon shape. We did not like them as sometimes they interfered with us. Our platoon commander Waffen-Untersturmführer Ivan Havryliv ordered us to put our rifles in the corner. One of the feldgendarmes read out the names of six soldiers and Waffen-Rottenführer Tsyplakov from our unit and ordered them to step out of the line. The feldgendarmes took away their belts and bayonets, told them that they were under arrest and ordered them into the lorry outside and took them to Zilina. We were very confused and afraid because we didn’t know why they had been arrested. Then we noticed our NCO from eastern Ukraine was missing. We guessed that he had been transferred to another unit.

  On the second day, Tsyplakov returned and began to cry like a child. He told us that these soldiers had a few drinks together with this eastern Ukrainian NCO in a bar and discussed how they could get to the UPA from Slovakia, but the NCO from eastern Ukraine reported it to the Germans. Tsyplakov had been arrested by mistake. A few months later the boys saw the eastern Ukrainian NCO during an anti-partisan action and killed him under the pretext that partisans had shot him.

  At a morning roll call our platoon commander selected 30 soldiers from the company, including me. He gave us blank bullets which we put in our bread bags. We marched beyond the village to an empty pasture where we practised firing a salvo on command. On the third day we received some spades and a saw. Near the town of Zilina almost 1 km from the main road there was a large pasture and at the side a young fir forest. On the edge of the forest our German commander instructed us to dig six graves. Other soldiers were told to cut wood from the forests for 6 posts and to dig them in front of the graves. We did this work with inexpressibly deep grief because we knew we would perform the execution of our comrades in arms. If we had refused, we would have been court martialled. In war there was cruel German discipline. We covered the graves with branches in order to hide them from outsiders. After lunch we again practised shooting a salvo and did it very well.

  Perhaps on the fifth day, in the morning we attended a roll call at which the thirty of us were issued with five live bullets each.172 SS-Oberscharführer Mitzinger ordered us to check our rifles, then the whole company with our 30 at the front of the column marched in the direction of Zilina to the place of execution of our friends. As we marched we were very subdued. In our heads there was thunder and in our souls terrible and indescribable grief.

  When we arrived, there were another three companies of our battalion which were forced to witness the execution. Many military police also arrived. We saw in the distance on a small hillock two machine guns aimed at us. Gendarmes stood beside them, maybe in case we wouldn’t carry out the orders. Soon a lorry came with our arrested friends. They were in a very poor shape. One of them asked, ‘What’s up boys?’ We were very sad. The gendarmes led them to the posts, tied them to these posts and placed white blindfolds on their eyes. My friend Yarema from Berezahany who was much older than us shouted ‘shoot straight boys so that we don’t suffer’. Then all thirty of us lined up ten metres from our friends. Among us, after every fifth person stood an MP. When everyone was ready the military judge stepped out and read the accusation against them citing the paragraph of the law and the verdict—death by firing squad. Our chaplain approached them and gave each one the last rites. From thirty rifles sounded one thunder. From the chests of the tied soldiers burst blood. Their bodies slumped down. Then there was the command, ‘Turn left, march!’ What happened to our shot comrades I didn’t see and I did not want to see. We left that place. There are no words to describe our feeling.

  We got to the village of Brodno and our German commander Mitzinger let us go to the local bar. There we had a shot or two of Slivovitz (Slovakian brandy) which slightly calmed us down.173

  In mid November the Division absorbed a group of Ukrainians who arrived in Slovakia having been temporarily seconded to the 5.SS-Panzer Division ‘Wiking’. These were part of a group of’ around one thousand174 Ukrainians from the Galician Division’s Training and Reserve Regiment,175 which had been assembled on 8 July at Heidelager prior to being seconded to the 5.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Wiking’ for training.176 Their basic infantry training began in Heidelager but was eventually completed on or about 5 September at another Waffen-SS training establishment at Strasece near Prague in Bohemia.177 From here, they boarded a train for Modlin (north of Warsaw) in Poland, where in mid September 1944 the one thousand grenadiers were divided up between ‘Wikings’’ two infantry regiments—Westland and Germania and its artillery regiment.178

  To serve the spiritual needs and improve the morale of the Ukrainian soldiers, the Military Board recommended a Ukrainian chaplain pfarrer Waffen-Obersturmführer Julian Habrusewych also be assigned to the ‘Wiking’ Division.179 The arrangements were made but a series of delays prevented the chaplain from arriving in Modlin until the surviving Ukrainian contingent had already rejoined their parent formation.180

  As members of the ‘Wiking’ Division which at that time was engaged in the third defensive battle for Warsaw, the Ukrainian soldiers were split up no more than five per unit,181 and sent to frontline defensive positions. These were to the north west of the city, close to the confluence of the Vistula and Buh Rivers. Here, dressed in German uniform and distinguishable only by the Ukrainian insignia worn on their collar patches and arm shields,182 the Ukrainians most of whom spoke little or no German,183 were thrown into heavy fighting. For one month they battled against attacks by powerful Soviet assault forces whose targets were the Vistula crossings and the town of Modlin. Despite their significant numerical weakness, the Soviet attacks were successfully repulsed and the front held. In the process the defenders sustained extremely heavy losses.184 By 30 October when the survivors were withdrawn from the front line, only approximately eight hundred men were left from the original contingent.185 The rest were dead, wounded and had been hospitalised or missing.186

  After numerous requests from the Military Board and the submission of petitions to the ‘Wiking’ Division command by the Ukrainian soldiers,187 Himmler finally ordered their detachment and transfer back to the Galician Division. On the occasion of their formal departure on 3 November 1944, in recognition of their contribution, the ‘Wiking’ Division commander SS-Standartenführer Karl Ulrich issued a special order in which he praised their efforts in helping to hold although heavily outnumbered by the enemy and thanking them for their ‘proven commitment to the battle against Bolshevism’.188 The survivors returned to Zilina on 17 November 1944, and were integrated into the various sub-units. Their combat experience proved to be a major asset and according to their instructors they went on to become some of the Division’s best soldiers.189

  The Reich Yields

  In late 1944, while the reformation process continued in Slovakia, the Ukrainians came one step closer to realising their ultimate goal of using the Division as the basis for a Ukrainian National Army. Now that no part of Ukrainian territory remained in German hands, in desperation some elements within the Nazi state attempted to mobilise the support of the hitherto subjugated eastern peoples en masse in the defence of the rapidly collapsing Reich.190 In order to achieve this, the long overdue decisive political concessions, which underpinned any continued cooperation were finally granted.

  The long time champions of the creation of an ‘anti-Bolshevik front’ from the eastern peoples included men like General Reinhard Gehlen, head of Foreign Armies East (Fremde Heere Ost), Field Marshal Günter von Kluge and General Ernst Köstring. Along with a growing number of notable personalities, they advocated the formation of a Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (Komitet Osvobozhdeniia Narodov Rossii) [KONR] which was to be under the leadership of the anti-Bolshevik Russian Genera
l Andrei Andreyevich Vlasov.191 It was to have its own Russian Army of Liberation known as the Russkaya Osvoboditelnaya Armiya [ROA] that would fight as Germany’s ally against the Soviets. To appeal to the Russians in the Red Army, political concessions were to be granted in the event of a German victory, foremost amongst which was the promise of the formation of a Russian state over which the Russians would continue to exercise political control.192 According to the ‘federalist’ concept to which Vlasov and his German sponsors193 adhered, the ROA would encompass all the other former Soviet nationalities which would be subordinated to Vlasov’s overall command, thus unifying the forces struggling against Bolshevism.

  Other proponents of co-operation such as Alfred Rosenberg194 and Dr Fritz Arlt as chief of the Freiwilligen Leitstelle Ost in Amtsgruppe D opposed the ‘federalist’ concept, supporting instead the idea of national separatism and autonomy for the non Russian nations of the USSR. They envisaged the formation under German auspices of several distinct National Committees as representatives of the larger ethnic minorities with Vlasov Primus Inter Pares.195

  In either case, the Germans were fully cognisant of the fact that it was imperative to secure the support of the Ukrainians since as the largest and most important of the minority populations of the Soviet Union, their cooperation was critical if they were to succeed in this endeavour.

  At first, attempts were made to establish closer co-operation with the Ukrainian nationalists via the Ukrainska Holovna Vyzvolna Rada (Ukrainian Supreme Liberation Council) which formed the political superstructure of the OUN-UPA.196 In doing so, the Germans hoped to exploit the significant anti-Soviet potential of the UPA which after the German withdrawal was directing its activities principally against the occupying Soviets,197 thereby allowing them to maintain a small second front behind Soviet lines. The German overtures met with limited success amongst local UPA leaders which resulted in occasional airdrops of arms and equipment being made,198 but the UPA executive leadership declined to enter into any formal agreement of co-operation.

  As a further inducement to gain Ukrainian support the Germans released several prominent Ukrainian nationalist political leaders and their followers from various concentration camps. Taras Borovets’ (aka Bul’ba) was freed in August 1944199 after which the leader of the OUN-B, Stephan Bandera and his deputy Jaroslav Stetsko (OUN-B) were released on 27 September 1944, from Sachsenhausen where they had been imprisoned since 1941. Finally came the OUN-M leader Andrii Melnyk who was granted his freedom on 17 October 1944.200

  The Germans represented by Berger (SS-FHA), Dr Arlt (Freiwilligen Leitstelle Ost im RSHA) and SS-Obersturmbannführer Ludwig Wolff (Einzel-Leitstelle Ukraine) among others, then initiated a series of discussions. These took place with the various representatives of the organised Ukrainian political and community centres, including Bandera, Melnyk, Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, Taras Bulba-Borovets, Prof. Volodymyr Kubijovych and Kost Pankivsky with a view to forming a Ukrainian Committee for incorporation into the KONR. In the negotiations which followed they discovered that although there were differences of opinion among the Ukrainian leaders, they were united both in their desire for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian state as well as in their total opposition to any Russian directed enterprise.201

  In this respect the Ukrainians had the unqualified support of other National Committees in particular those of the Georgians (Kediya), Belorussians (Astrausky) and Don Cossacks (Krasnov) which were equally hostile to the KONR project and the Russian claim to political hegemony.202

  Despite the failure of these negotiations, as a token gesture a ‘Pro Vlasovitie’ Ukrainian was found outside of the recognised political centres named Dr Fedir Bohatyrchuk who was appointed to head a rival Ukrainian committee under Vlasov. Realising that it was imperative to gain the endorsement of the OUN which would have nothing to do with this ‘Russianised’ Committee, the Germans were obliged to continue their discussions.

  As the Germans could not establish an understanding with either the Bandera or Melnyk factions of the OUN, and concerned that none of the remaining leaders possessed sufficient stature or support to make him acceptable as the head of the Ukrainian Committee,203 they made contact with Andrij Levitsky president of the UNR.204 As a ‘government in exile’ the UNR was a non-partisan body which had no direct contact with the underground Ukrainian organisations. In late November Levitsky nominated a pragmatic career soldier who was politically remote, General Pavlo Feofanovich Shandruk205 as leader of the UNC,206 who was found to be acceptable to all nationalistic factions.207 After further talks with Levitsky and other Ukrainian representatives he was persuaded to accept the nomination.

  Shandruk was summoned to Berlin for a meeting with Dr Arlt and the head of his Ukrainian section SS-Obersturmbannführer Wolff for discussions which concerned the proposed organisation, composition and functions of the committee and its relationship with Vlasov’s KONR.208 During this conference it quickly became apparent to Dr Arlt that Shandruk too demanded what amounted to no less than formal German recognition of a Ukrainian sovereign state. To ensure that the Ukrainians would be regarded as German allies and not merely as mercenaries,209 he set out certain conditions. These were; that Germany renounce all territorial claims in Ukraine; the formation of a Ukrainian provisional government be permitted; native command for the Galician Division and the transfer of all soldiers of Ukrainian origin who were dispersed throughout all formations of the Wehrmacht to purely Ukrainian units; the organisation of a national army which under Ukrainian command would march under the Ukrainian national banner, wear traditional Ukrainian uniforms, swear allegiance to Ukraine and serve only Ukrainian interests; the liberation of remaining Ukrainian political prisoners from German concentration camps; and guarantied civil rights (freedom of assembly, organisation and press etc).

  Dr Arlt, who was not in a position to make any binding promises, told Shandruk that he would give his full support to obtaining consent to those conditions however he advised Shandruk not to make them a sine qua non, but rather ‘get in on a developing situation’.210 Arlt knew that Himmler’s own recently declared position was that the new Vlasov committee should enjoy an overall authority,211 and on this basis he was obliged to insist that the Ukrainian National Committee be subordinated to Vlasov’s KONR. In response, Shandruk who was equally adamant, emphatically refused to recognise even the symbolic supremacy of the KONR headed by Vlasov. He stated that no Ukrainian would support him, because such recognition would be considered treason.212

  In due course Dr Arlt referred the matter to Berger who had been appointed as Himmler’s plenipotentiary in all Russian affairs213 but Berger remained insistent upon this condition.214 In an attempt to resolve this contentious issue a meeting was arranged between Shandruk and Vlasov215 during which after much heated discussion Vlasov proffered an acceptable compromise. Shandruk would retain a Ukrainian Committee which would be formally installed as representatives solely of Galicia and would command a Ukrainian (Galician) Army. At the same time another Division of east Ukrainians who wished to place themselves under Vlasov’s banners would be formed under the KONR.216 Himmler sanctioned the idea in principal at his second meeting with Vlasov in February 1945, but this time it was Hitler who vetoed the plan.217

  Thus the formal legalised recognition of the émigré Ukrainian Committee which would have transformed it into a government in exile was withheld for several more weeks. Progress finally came when the former Governor of Galicia Dr Wächter, was appointed as the intermediary between Vlasov and Shandruk and persuaded his superiors to acquiesce to Shandruk’s demand for a Ukrainian Committee independent of the KONR,218 since by this time the Germans had nothing to lose and everything to gain.

  In the interim, while official German recognition of Shandruk’s Ukrainian National Committee was still being withheld, as a by-product of Arlt’s efforts, the SS authorities relented with regard to the question of Ukrainian national identity within the Galician Division.219 In November 194
4, as a conciliatory gesture to Ukrainian wishes, for the first time these allowed it to convey a perceptible Ukrainian national character.

  As Divisional commander, Freitag was summoned to Berlin to keep him informed of all developments and he returned to the Division on 20 November 1944, bringing with him the news about the official change in German policy towards Ukraine and the promise that the Germans no longer intended to occupy Ukraine. He went on to explain that in the future the Division was to assist in the establishment of a Ukrainian state, that the officers corps would be ‘Ukrainianised’ and that its name would be changed forthwith. 220

  In practical terms this was translated in a number of minor initiatives for example the Divisional orchestra was granted permission to play the Ukrainian national anthem alongside the two German anthems.221 Approval was also granted to fly the Ukrainian flag in the national colours of blue and gold along side the German flag.222 In addition to this increasing usage of the Ukrainian national symbol—the Trident—was tolerated especially on Ukrainian celebratory and ceremonial occasions even though it officially remained prohibited.223 A new oath was authorised with a modified text which read:

  I swear before God this holy oath, that in the battle against Bolshevism, and for the liberation of my Ukrainian people and Ukrainian homeland, I will give absolute obedience to the Commander in Chief of the German armed forces and all fighters of the young European nations against Bolshevism, Adolf Hitler, and as a brave soldier I will always be prepared to lay down my life for this oath.224

  Perhaps more significantly from a political point of view, finally it was formally recognised by the Germans as being a ‘Ukrainian’ as opposed to a ‘Galician’ formation and was renamed accordingly. By order of the Reichsführer dated 12 November 1944, the suffix (galizische Nr.1),225 was replaced by (ukrainische Nr.1) in the Division’s title thus it was redesignated ‘‘14 Waffen-Grenadier-Division der SS (ukrainische Nr.1)’.226 This was a measure which the Ukrainians themselves and the Division’s German sponsors most notably Dr Wächter, had repeatedly petitioned for. Although its commander SS-Brigadeführer Freitag was already referring to the Division by its new name by 15 November 1944,227 the change in nomenclature was not immediately adopted universally, even within the Division itself.228