Stalin's Nemesis

by Michael James Melnyk

  Borgmann: ‘I can’t say.’

  Hitler: ‘There’s always a Galician Division floating around. Is that the same as the Ukrainian Division? Because if it’s made up of Austrian Ruthenians the only thing to do is to take their weapons away immediately. The Austrian Ruthenians were pacifists. They were lambs, not wolves. They were miserable, even in the Austrian Army. This is just self delusion. Is this Ukrainian Division the same thing as the so called Galician Division?’

  Göhler: ‘No, the Galician Division is the 30, the Ukrainian is the 14. The 30 is being rested, I believe in Slovakia.’

  Hitler: ‘Where did it fight?’

  Göhler: ‘The 30, the Galician, was originally committed in the Tarnow sector, and hasn’t been committed since.’

  De Maziere: ‘The division was committed in the area of the 1 Panzer Army during the battles around L’wow [L’viv]. At that time it was attached to, I believe, the XIII corps and suffered the encirclement, and only some parts of the division came back. As far as I know, it hasn’t been used since.’158

  Hitler: ‘And they’ve been resting ever since? Do they have weapons?’

  Göhler: ‘I’ll have to check on that.’

  Hitler: ‘We can’t afford a joke like this while I don’t have enough weapons to equip other divisions. That’s ridiculous.’

  Göhler: ‘The Ukrainian division has a table of organisation strength of 11,000 and an actual strength of 14,000.’159

  Hitler: ‘Why more actual strength that T/O strength?’

  Göhler: ‘They probably got more volunteers that the T/O allowed them.’

  Hitler: ‘And the equipment?’

  Göhler: ‘They gave a large part of their equipment to the 18 SS.’

  Hitler: ‘But if they are ready for combat now, they must have weapons again. I don’t want to insist that you can’t do anything with these foreigners. Something could be done with them, but it takes time. If you have them for six or ten years, and if you govern their home territories, as the old Hapsburg monarchy did, then they will become good soldiers of course. But if you get men, and their homelands are on the other side—why should they fight at all? They are susceptible to every piece of propaganda. I assume that there are still very strong German elements among them.’

  [Sturmbannführer Göhler submits a report]

  Göhler: ‘They have the following weapons: 2,100 pistols, 610 sub-machine guns, 9,000 rifles, 70 rifles with telescopic sights, 65 automatic rifles—M-43, 434 light machine guns, 96 heavy machine guns, 58 light mortars, 4 heavy mortars—’

  Hitler: ‘You could equip two divisions with that.’

  Göhler: ‘22 flamethrowers, 1 medium AT gun, 11 75 mm AT guns, 17 light infantry howitzers, 3 heavy howitzers M-33, 9 37 mm AA guns, 37 light field howitzers, 6 heavy field howitzers.

  Hitler: ‘I must know what this division is worth. I want to speak to the Reichsführer right away tomorrow. He’s in Berlin anyhow. We have to investigate exactly what we can expect of a unit like that. If one can’t expect anything, there’s no sense to it. We cant afford the luxury of keeping units like that.’160

  Waffen-Kameraden No More

  Despite the erroneous information provided in relation to it,161 from this point on it was Hitler’s unequivocal intention to disarm and dissolve the Galician Division forthwith. Following the conference, Hitler conveyed this to the Reichsführer-SS Himmler who obediently issued an order for the Division to be disarmed.162 Receipt of the order by the Division’s command was greeted with incredulity as previous encounters with spurious ‘Führer’ or ‘Reichsführer’ orders, caused its staff to be inherently suspicious of this potentially catastrophic directive. The suggestion that the arrangement was to be a temporary measure did nothing to assuage the understandable fears.

  Consequently, the next day SS-Brigadeführer Freitag immediately left for Himmler’s Feldkommando-Stelle (Field Command Post) ‘Bergwald’, situated at Salzburg-Aigen where the order was confirmed. As the Reichsführer himself was absent and there was no immediate latitude for negotiation, his Chief of Staff promised that he would take up the matter of revoking the order with Himmler personally. Freitag then returned to Divisional HQ at Selnica to await further developments, whereupon he temporally suspended most of the Division’s ongoing anti-partisan activities.

  At this point the horse-drawn Artillery Regiment plus the 2 and 3 companies of the Fusilier Battalion which were guarding it, were still south of the River Sava. Additional time was needed for the slow moving regiment to relocate as the horses needed to be periodically fed and rested, hence it was immediately instructed to return to Maribor.163 Only WGR 31 which was in the field with the 2 company of the Pioneer Battalion continued with security operations south of the Sava.164

  Due to the seriousness of the disarmament order which showed no regard for either the Division or the precarious military situation, its command did not wish to comply with it with undue haste and deliberately procrastinated, believing that after due consideration it would be countermanded.

  In response to the repeated demands of the Chief Quartermaster of Army Group South which now followed, the Division’s command agreed to hand over the weapons only when the requisite number of freight cars arrived to transport them. The movement of all the weapons, matériel and horses required 38 transport trains and not a single one had arrived,165 moreover, with Allied forces already in the vicinity of Nüremberg any shipment was unlikely to reach its destination. This information was communicated to the Chief Quartermaster who promised to review the matter with the OKH.166

  The Division’s command reacted to these developments with a sharply worded teletype message to the higher authorities including Himmler, outlining its concerns,167 in response to which it received a spate of new and often contradictory orders and directives which followed in rapid sequence. The prevailing confusion caused a flurry of activity within its staff which remained busy day and night. In the interim, it continued to receive orders issued by various authorities all vying for its weaponry,168 such as the following order dated 28 March:

  From OKH 14 SS (Ukrainian) Div. via Army Group E: -

  28 March 1945.

  In accordance with the Führer’s order, 14 SS (Ukrainian) Div. No. 2(†) is to be disarmed in order that its weapons may be made available to the C in C West at once as immediate assistance in material. Army Group E will send off at once an acceptance detachment under the command of a senior ordnance officer of the Army Group to 14 SS Div at Marburg an der Drau [Maribor].

  Task

  1) To carry out most rapidly the disarming and collecting together of the weapons and equipment at the railway loading stations.

  2) Rapid loading in complete trains.

  3) To make certain of transport indent and speedy allocation of railway vehicles by director of transport Army Group E.

  4) Army Group E is providing transport escort personnel under the command of officers.

  5) Destination will be made known later.

  6) Report that handing over has taken place to OKH/General Staff of the Army QMG Abt III. A numerical, detailed list regarding weapons, equipment etc given up is to follow.169

  Note

  (†) Error for No. 1

  A ‘commission’ (acceptance detachment) duly arrived from Army Group South under the command of a senior ordnance officer from the quartermaster section and under its pressure, part of the small arms arsenal was collected from some soldiers (but not all) both Ukrainian and German,170 but the weapons could still not be moved. The large number of freight cars that were needed could not be provided by the local transport officials in addition to which military facilities, factories and Maribor railway station were all subjected to periodic, very heavy bombardment by Allied aircraft. In the case of the latter, this halted all rail traffic for several days thereby preventing the movement of any shipment of weapons and associated war matériel. As a consequence of this coupled with the proximity of the front and the realistic prospect of m
utiny,171 after a short period those weapons which had been collected were returned.172

  It was extremely fortuitous that at this point the original founder and driving force behind the Division Dr Wächter arrived accompanied by the head of the Military Board Oberst Bisanz173 only to find that Freitag was unwilling to accommodate them at the staff HQ and only relented on Heike’s insistence. Both Dr Wächter and Oberst Bisanz were well acquainted with the general military situation but knew nothing about the disarmament order.

  Dr Wächter who had a vested interest in preserving the Division to facilitate his ongoing ‘political plans’, was mortified and he immediately determined to rectify the situation and set about attempting to secure a revocation of the order. He wasted no time in asserting his influence and contacting key individuals including the Reichsführer Himmler and the local Gauleiter of Steiermark and ‘Defence Commissar’ Dr Siegfried Uiberreither (who had been granted emergency powers by Hitler to defend his province to the last).174 Compliance with the order he argued, ultimately served neither German nor Ukrainian interests as the Division still potentially had much to offer. Not only did it provide critically needed reinforcements for the eastern front, but in the event of total German defeat, it could also be used by the Western Allies as an anti-Bolshevik force in the event of the much anticipated outbreak of a conflict between them and Stalin’s Soviet Union.

  As the order had originated with Hitler himself, Dr Wächter was unable to obtain the assurance that he sought. Recognising that there was no immediate prospect of the vital rescindment from Hitler, Dr Wächter correctly deduced that only drastic action could save the Division from an ignominious end, therefore the following day in an attempt to circumvent the order, he approached the local military authorities directly in order to secure their agreement in obtaining a combat posting for it.175 As Freitag had refused requests to allow his 1a, Major Heike to accompany Wächter, he took along the first Liaison Officer Waffen-Hauptsturmführer Makarushka. Together they hastened by car to the HQ of Army Group South where he insisted to its commander Generaloberst Alexander Löhr, that the ‘14. Waffen Grenadier Division der SS [ukrainsche Nr.1]’ was in fact, as had been originally planned, ready to be given an immediate combat role.176 As a trained and equipped division it could move quickly to the nearby threatened sector of 2 Panzer Army and rather than occupy a secondary position it could engage the enemy at the front and provide instant reinforcement to hold off the inexorable advance of the Red Army.

  With the Division still under orders to hand over its weapons, WGR’s 29 and 30 remained entrenched within twenty four hours march of Maribor. In the event of a Soviet attack on this vital communications and supply centre, on its own initiative the Division’s command drew up plans for the defence of the city which were reported to 2 and 6 Armies. WGR 31 and the 2 company of the Pioneer Battalion were still in the district south of Ljubljana were they had been sent by HSSPF Rösener to combat partisans.177 The Training and Reserve Regiment was located across the Austrian border at Deutschlandsberg where it too was still heavily engaged in battling Tito’s insurgent forces.

  Dr Wächter returned from the Army Group HQ, with the encouraging news that its commander would try to get the Division initially assigned to his Army Group.178 In his memoirs Heike writes that finally, the continuing efforts of both Dr Wächter and the Division’s command appeared to have brought some success and a temporary reprieve looked to have been secured when on the evening of 28 March 1945, the Division received notification via Himmler’s Field Command Post in Salzburg that no arms were to be given up and that further orders would follow.179 The crucial official revocation from OKH was however, still not forthcoming. Wächter knew that now only the successful implementation of a fait accompli as regards getting the Division to the front would be sufficient to stymie Hitler’s plans to disarm and dissolve it.

  Fortunately circumstances played into his hands as the situation at the front had, in the meantime become perilous. As had been anticipated, Soviet reconnaissance forces had detected a weakness in the German front line on 6 Army’s southern flank at its juncture with 2 Panzer Army.180 Here, at the end of March the 57 Army, 1 Bulgarian Army and elements of 27 Army, broke through the German and Hungarian formations manning the Reichsschutzstellung (a hastily dug line of field fortifications) which was the last barrier before the Reich frontier and now the Red Army threatened to drive deep into south eastern Austria (Styria).181

  In expectation of a combat deployment, at this time the Division’s command had on its own volition, made provision to this end which it had already begun to implement moving some elements to Spielfeld to protect the Mur narrows and the crucial road bridge.182 The Division could not be deployed en masse because of the geographical dispersement of its units and the non-availability of sufficient motorised or rail transportation. Its integration into the front line therefore would have to take place in phased stages, hence the commanders of its strongest units—WGR 29 and the Fusilier Battalion183 which were designated to participate in the initial advance against the threatened sector were advised accordingly and placed on standby.

  Heike states that on 30 March 1945,184 with Freitag’s approval he travelled to the HQ of 2 Panzer Army in his capacity as Operations Officer and reported to its Chief of Staff the condition, battle readiness and pre-emptive steps already initiated by its command and requested immediate deployment orders be issued within 2 Panzer Army. The Chief of Staff who had not seen such a strongly manned and well armed unit as the Galician Division in a long time, endorsed fully all the measures taken to date and indicated that he would immediately apply for its allocation. Pending formal acceptance, it was initially to be assigned the mission of closing the breach between 2 and 6 Armies—a line running from Gleichenberg to Feldbach.

  Throughout this period, some elements including WGR’s 29, 30 and several of the independent battalions had returned and collected their registered hand weapons several times.185 The limited disarmament even within these units which did take place was not however comprehensive, for example the Jagdzug platoons which were often formed from men who had come from the Volhynian Legion, were not disarmed as they had mostly retained their own private weapons of Soviet origin.186 Likewise, Waffen-Grenadier Volodymyr Keczun of 4./I./WGR 29 recalled:

  […] Orders arrived for our Division to be disarmed, so our armaments could be given to German troops who were defending the Fatherland. Our unit hardly felt any effect of that order because our mortars, MG 42, lafettes and ammunition were always on a wagon, or in small carts in the barn, with a sentry with an M 42 guarding them and us. After the order we took our registered rifles, pistols and machine pistols to the barn and put them on the wagon. We were not left defenceless because all of us had some kind of ‘unregistered’ weapon from Slovakia, plus an [unregistered] heavy anti-aircraft gun.[…]187

  Amongst the units that did surrender their weapons,188 wild rumours began to spread undermining morale and generally causing great consternation among the ranks.189 Platoon commander 4./Fusilier Battalion Waffen-Untersturmführer Volodymyr Kudla:

  […] for a week before the end of March 1945, we were in limbo unaware of what was going on. From boredom men cleaned their weapons, sat talking or sang. Primarily we asked each other what would happen now. Rarely did our senior officers tell us anything as to what was happening.

  Shortly before noon on 31 March 1945, we were told to surrender our weapons. The first heavy machine gun platoon and the light mortar platoon placed their rifles on the ground across the road from where they were billeted and went back to their quarters. The rifles lay on the ground until evening with no one guarding them. The machine guns and mortars remained with the soldiers. The heavy mortar platoon which was billeted a few kilometres away from the rest of the fourth company received no such orders. We were anxious not knowing what would come next.

  Late in the afternoon, before dark we were told to retrieve our weapons and prepare for departure. Further we lear
ned from the battalion commander Sturmbannführer Bristot that we were on our way to Austria where we would engaged in battle with the Soviets.[…]190

  According to Heike’s testimony, on 31 March an order was issued by Army Group South formally subordinating the Division to the 2 Panzer Army commanded by General de Artillerie Maximilian de Angelis191 which in turn assigned it to the command of General der Kavallerie Gustav Harteneck’s 1 Cavalry Corps192 which had the lowest combat effectiveness in the whole of 2 Panzer Army and joint lowest of the whole of Army Group South.193 In accordance with the general directive, the advance by the 1 Cavalry Corps on the Soviet breakpoint between Feldbach and Radkersburg was scheduled to begin the following day on 1 April 1945 at 0630 hrs.194 As would soon be apparent, all of this took place without the knowledge or consent of either Hitler or Himmler both of whom remained blissfully unaware of the events which had already taken their course.

  On the same day Rösener confirmed in a message to the SS-Gauleiter Dr Siegfried Uiberreither, that he would release WGR 31 and the 2 company of the Pioneer Battalion which were still operating deep in Slovenia under his jurisdiction. It read ‘[I] am going to release immediately to Brigadeführer Freitag part of the 14 SS Ukraine Nr.1.’.195

  Again the Eastern Front

  The first element to attack the breakpoint was WGR 29 which included Wildner’s experienced battalion and beginning at dawn on 1 April all three of its battalions supported by a detachment of light artillery, marched to the Mur which formed the Slovenian/Austrian border.196 Movement was restricted to the hours of darkness to minimise the threat of attack from American aircraft. Having reached it, the I and III battalions commanded by SS-Obersturmbannführer Karl Wildner and SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Salzinger crossed the river by bridge at Mureck whilst to avoid congestion, part of SS-Sturmbannführer Otto Blankenhorn’s II battalion crossed at night further to the east with the infantry ferried across in pontoons and barges.197 The three battalions then moved northwards separately over the hills, parallel with, and a few kilometres behind the front line. The regiment’s objective was to recapture and secure the height of Gleichenberg Kögel and its environs including, Gleichenberg Schloss, Gleichenberg Dorf and Gleichenberg. This task was made considerably harder since its command was lacking crucial intelligence information about the strength, objectives, location and dispositions of the Red Army forces in the area.