The Seven Weeks' War

by H M Hozier

  Towards the end of October Metz capitulated, and the army of Marshal Bazaine was made prisoner. The army of Prince Frederick Charles was thus released for active service in the field. His army was divided: the 1st, 7th, and 8th corps were placed under the command of General Manteuffel, and sent to the north of France to repulse and break up French troops, which were being raised under cover of the various fortresses. Prince Frederick Charles himself, with the 3rd, 9th, and 10th corps, moved rapidly from Metz by way of Fontainebleau towards Toury, and, joining the Duke of Mecklenburg, who commanded at that place, formed a screen between the Prussian armies round Paris and the Army of the Loire.

  At first Prince Frederick Charles was retained in observation; but the king decided towards the end of November that he should assume the offensive and advance upon Orleans. At the same time the French leaders came to a similar determination. M. Gambetta ordered General d’Aurelles de Paladine, who had now collected an army of 180,000 men, to advance upon Paris, and at the same time the garrison of Paris made a vigorous sortie towards the south. This sortie, which was at first partially successful, was subsequently repulsed with great loss, and all hopes of communicating with the Army of the Loire from Paris had to be abandoned. The failure of this sortie was not, however, known to General de Paladine; on the contrary, he believed that the Paris garrison had burst through the investing line, and he hastened to its assistance.

  On the 28th November he moved a considerable force from his right flank on the village of Beaune-la-Rolande, where he fell upon the left flank of Prince Frederick Charles. The Hanoverians, who formed the garrison of Beaune, were for some time severely pressed, and at one period almost surrounded. They held firm, however, in the town, and repeated efforts on the part of the French storming-columns failed to carry the houses. In the afternoon Prince Frederick Charles himself came up with the 3rd corps to their aid; the French assailants of the town were taken in flank and reverse, and although they were commanded by General Bourbaki, were driven off with loss.

  After his failure to penetrate the Prussian position at Beaune-la-Rolande, General de Paladine transferred the bulk of his army during the next few days to his left flank, and attempted, on the 1st December to advance by the main road from Orleans to Paris by way of Toury. A little to the north of Arthenay his advanced guard fell in with the corps of the Duke of Mecklenburg, and a severe action took place. Prince Frederick Charles also moved in this direction, and the whole forces of the two armies became engaged in front of Orleans. The French were everywhere pressed back, their entrenchments were stormed with the loss of many guns, and, after several days’ fighting, Orleans was occupied by the Prussians on the 4th December.

  The broken army of General de Paladine retired partly to the south and partly down the Loire. The columns which followed the latter route were under the command of General Chanzy, who stood to fight, and sustained for three days severe conflicts round Beaugency. He then retired towards Le Mans: the Army of the Loire was dispersed, and, the covering army of Prince Frederick Charles took up a position around Orleans.

  While these events were taking place on the south-west of Paris, Prussian generals on the other hand occupied Amiens, and had repulsed the French troops in that direction. The sieges of fortresses in Alsace were being prosecuted, and many had surrendered. Prussian forces were also pushed towards Dijon to watch some hostile masses which were gathering in that direction.

  The investment of Paris was steadily maintained, and preparations made for more active measures. Batteries were dug and armed, ammunition and ordnance brought up, and at the end of December a bombardment of the forts and city commenced.

  Shortly afterwards the French armies of the provinces made another and a final attempt to relieve the metropolis. General Chanzy advanced from Le Mans, at the same time as General Bourbaki, moving rapidly towards the fortress of Belfort in Upper Alsatia, which was being besieged by a Prussian contingent, appeared to desire to raise the siege of that place, and then to strike against the great line of the Prussian communications with Germany.

  At the same time as General Chanzy advanced from Le Mans, Prince Frederick Charles moved from Orleans with the intention of attacking him at Le Mans. The heads of the two armies, moving in opposite directions, came into collision accidentally at Vendôme. The French were defeated, and were pushed back, fighting hard, however, as they retreated. After five days, however, of constant battle, they were pushed through Le Mans, and that important strategical point captured with large supplies of food, arms, ammunition, rolling-stock, artillery, and many prisoners.

  The Battle of Le Mans decided the fate of Paris. Provisions had already been getting very short, and the bombardment, although it did not appear to do much damage to the works, harassed the garrison. It was perceived that assistance from without could no longer be hoped for; for Bourbaki had been headed towards Belfort and defeated by General Werder, and General Manteuffel hurried across France to fall upon his flank. The greater part of the army of General Bourbaki was driven across the Swiss frontier and disarmed, after having suffered many privations and hardships. One more sortie was indeed made by the garrison of Paris, but more apparently with the idea of demonstrating the inutility of further resistance than with any serious ideas of success. On the 27th January an armistice was agreed to, which was prolonged in February, and ultimately led to the peace signed between Prussia and France at Frankfort in May, 1871.

  A short time before the conclusion of hostilities a most important event in the history of the world took place at Versailles. The Battle of Sedan was the corner-stone of German unity. After that victory diplomatic negotiations were entered into between the Southern States and Prussia, which resulted in the entrance of the former into the North-German Confederation. But it was necessary for the solidity and stability of this augmented fabric, that some guide and superior should be raised who should stand before the world as the avowed and recognised head of the amalgamated German nation. Who could be so fit to sustain so august a post as the warrior-king—the commander-in-chief of the German forces, who had led those forces from victory to victory over the enemy of German unity? and where could his inauguration to the restored and emblazoned dignity of emperor of Germany be so well conducted as in the palace associated with the memory of the rape of Strasburg and the commencement of a settled French interference in Germany?

  On the 21st January, 1871, King William of Prussia was proclaimed Emperor of Germany in the palace of Versailles, amid the cheers of the assembled German chieftains, and within the sound of the guns engaged in the bombardment of Paris.

  This event was hailed throughout Germany as of equal importance with the result of the war, and well it might be, for it was the most certain guarantee of the future independence of Germany. It is possible that France may again rise to a high military position; the enthusiasm and gallantry of her soldiery may again carry her colours to her old frontier; she may become more powerful in arms than her late rival, and may even tear from Germany the left bank of the Rhine. This may be possible; but it is impossible that she ever again will be able to exert that ascendancy and interference in the internal affairs of the country which was more galling to the proud Germanic people than loss of provinces or disastrous defeats. From that the declaration of the empire of United Germany has saved Germany for ever, and that declaration could not have been made in 1871 but for the war which occurred in 1866.

  BOOK 1

  CHAPTER 1: Introductory

  Who cares with foemen when we deal.

  If craft or courage guide the steel?—Conington.

  Although the animosity between Prussia and Austria which led to the outbreak of hostilities in 1866 had been the gradual growth of many years, the immediate causes of collision were the consequences of the war waged by Germany against Denmark in 1864. The results of this contest were embodied in the Treaty of Vienna of that year, by which King Christian of Denmark surrendered all his rights to the Elbe duchies of Schleswig and Hol
stein, and the duchy of Lauenburg, in favour of the Emperor of Austria and of the King of Prussia. (For translation of Treaty of Vienna of 30th October, 1864, see Appendix 1).

  The Danish war had been undertaken in the first instance by the Germanic Confederation, in consequence of a decree of Federal execution against the King of Denmark as Duke of Holstein, and, in virtue of that duchy, a prince and member of the confederation. The diet which passed this decree had intended that the execution should be carried out by amalgamated detachments of such troops of all the States included in the confederation as might be determined by the diet. Some of these troops actually marched into Holstein. But the occupation of the Elbe duchies by troops of the confederation, and the consequent establishment of these districts as an independent State, would not have suited the political purposes of Prussia.

  The object of this power was not so much to free Holstein from the dominion of the Dane as to secure the harbour of Kiel for the new fleet which was to be formed in order to carry the black eagle of Brandenburg into a forward place among the naval ensigns of the world: but the diet was determined to carry out the execution; and, if the troops of the Federal powers were once allowed to declare Schleswig-Holstein independent, the subjection of the duchies to the domination of Prussia would require a display of force and a violation of public opinion for which Count Bismark did not at that time consider himself strong enough. To annex an independent community, established under the auspices of the diet, with a popular and chosen prince, would have roused all Germany. The policy of the Cabinet of Berlin demanded that Schleswig-Holstein should not become independent yet.

  Prussia was not, however, sufficiently confident in her strength to set aside at this time, with her own hand alone, the decrees of the diet. To have done so would have raised a storm against which she had no reason to suppose that she could successfully bear up. England was excited, and the warlike people of that country eager to rush to arms in the cause of the father of the young Princess of Wales. France was discontented with the insolence of the English Cabinet, but might have accepted a balm for her wounded pride in a free permission to push her frontier up to the Rhine. Austria would have opposed the aggrandizement of Prussia, and all Germany would have at that time supported the great Power of the South in the battle for the liberation of Holstein from the supremacy of the Hohenzollerns as eagerly as from that of the House of Denmark. The independence of Holstein, which could not be opposed by open force, had to be thwarted by stratagem.

  Prussia sought the alliance of Austria with a proposal that those two great powers should constitute themselves the executors of the Federal decree, and put aside the troops of the minor States. Austria agreed, and rues at this hour the signature of that convention. Yet she had much cause of excuse. To allow Prussia to step forward alone as the champion of German national feeling would have been for Austria to resign forever the supremacy of Germany into the hands of her rival. Old traditions, chivalrous feeling, and inherited memories, caused Austrians to look upon their emperor as the head of Germany, the modern representative of the elected tenant of the Holy Roman Empire’s crown and sceptre. Prussia was rapidly approaching to that supremacy with gigantic strides. Austria was already reduced to the position of being the advocate of German division and of small States, purely because amalgamation and union would have drawn the scattered particles not towards herself, but within the boundaries of her northern neighbour.

  To permit Prussia to act alone in the matter of the Elbe duchies would have been to see her certainly obtain an important territorial aggrandizement, and also to lose the opportunity of creating another independent minor German State, which, if not a source of strength to Austria, might be a slight obstacle in the path of Prussia.

  The war against Denmark was undertaken. The Danes, terribly inferior in numbers, organisation, equipment, armament, and wealth, after a most gallant resistance, lost their last strongholds; while a Western Power, which had certainly by insinuations, if not by facts or words, encouraged the Cabinet of Copenhagen into the delusion that other soldiers than Danes would be opposed to the German invaders of Schleswig, calmly looked on, and sacrificed in a few weeks the reputation which, fortuitously won on the plains of Belgium, had lived through half a century. The Danish war terminated in the treaty signed at Vienna on the 30th October, 1864, and the duchies of Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg were handed over to the sovereigns of Austria and Prussia.

  At this time the troops of Hanover and Saxony, which had been ordered by the diet to carry out the decree of Federal execution against the King of Denmark, were in Holstein. The next step in the policy of the great German Powers was to rid the duchies of their presence. On the 29th November, 1864, Austria and Prussia laid the treaty of peace with Denmark before the Germanic Diet, and proposed that, since the decree of Federal execution had been carried out, the presence of the Hanoverians and Saxons was no longer necessary in the duchies, and that both the troops and civil commissioners of these States should be required to vacate their position. This motion was opposed by the representative of Bavaria, and was negatived by a majority of one vote.

  On the 30th November, however, the representative of Prussia announced in the diet that the claims of the prince of Augustenburg to the duchies would be settled by treaties between Austria and Prussia, and that these two powers would enter into negotiations with the pretender on the subject, but that, in the meantime, the Saxons and Hanoverians must retire from the disputed ground, and that notes had been sent by the Cabinet of Berlin to Dresden and Hanover, to demand the withdrawal of the contingents of those States. The representative of Hanover declared that his government was ready to withdraw its troops: the deputy of Saxony appealed to the decision of the diet. On the 5th December, 1864, the diet passed the motion proposed by Austria and Prussia, in opposition to a protest from the Bavarian representative. In consequence the troops and civil commissioners of Hanover and Saxony were recalled from the duchies by their respective courts, and Austria and Prussia took upon themselves the military and civil administration of Schleswig-Holstein.

  Prussia stationed in the duchies six regiments of infantry, two of cavalry, and three batteries of artillery. Austria left there only the brigade Kalik, which was composed of two regiments of infantry, one battalion of rifles, two squadrons of cavalry, and one battery of artillery. (The strength of the forces left would thus amount to about 12,000 Prussians and 5,200 Austrians, as troops left here were maintained on a peace establishment).

  The Austrian Government appointed Herr Von Lederer as civil commissioner, who was shortly afterwards recalled to Vienna, and replaced by Herr Von Hahlhuber. The Prussian civil commissioner was Herr Von Zedlitz. The Hanoverian and Saxon commissioners gave over the government of the duchies to the commissioners of the great powers on the 5th of December, who immediately entered upon their duties, and established the seat of government at Schleswig. The expulsion of the civil commissioners of the minor States, from the Elbe duchies was the last act of the Schleswig-Holstein drama in which Austria co-operated with Prussia. From this time she drew near again to the smaller States, which were now embittered against Prussia.

  The administration of the duchies by the great powers was openly announced as only a temporary measure, and was regarded in this light by the whole world. Austria wished to give, up what she considered only a temporary trusteeship as soon as a possible, and proposed to place the Duke of Augustenburg provisionally at the head of the duchies, while the rival claims of the Houses of Augustenburg and Oldenburg to permanent occupation should be investigated. In Prussia, however, meanwhile the lust for increase of territory had been developed. It was discovered that the House of Brandenburg had itself claims to succession.

  In a despatch of the 13th December, Count Bismark informed the Austrian Cabinet that Prussia could not accept the proposal to place the Prince of Augustenburg at the head of the duchies; and that such an act would forestall the claims of other pretendants, and would be viewed wit
h disfavour by the courts of Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia that an annexation of the duchies to Prussia could not indeed be carried out without the concurrence of Austria, but that such a step would be very advantageous to the interests of Germany in general, and would not be antagonistic to those of Austria in particular; while Prussia’s geographical position made it her special duty to insure the duchies against the recurrence of revolutionary disturbances. In this despatch the Cabinet of Berlin also proposed that in furtherance of this scheme the military organisation of the duchies should be assimilated to that of Prussia, and that their maritime population should be made available for recruiting the Prussian marines and navy.

  By a despatch of the 21st December Count Mensdorf, the Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, answered the above despatch from Berlin, and said that Austria had undertaken the solution of the question in the interests of Germany; that the Austrian Cabinet was upon as friendly a footing with the Courts of Oldenburg, Hanover, and Russia, as was that of Prussia; that Hanover made no definite claims, but only expressed ideas of doing so; that the Austrian Cabinet would also investigate the claims of Oldenburg; but that Russia had lately declared that she would accept as authoritative only the decision of the Germanic Confederation on the question of succession; that if Prussia had wished to advance claims to the inheritance of the duchies, she ought to have done so before she made the declaration of the 28th May, in common with Austria, at the conference in London in favour of the Prince of Augustenburg.