The Seven Weeks' War

by H M Hozier

  This is a district not unacquainted with war. After the last attempt to overthrow an established monarchy in England it was the scene of that Seven Years’ strife through whose baptism of blood Prussia advanced into the hierarchy of the great powers of Europe. It was repeatedly trodden under foot by the conquering legions of the First Emperor of the French, and it was in its very centre that the battle was fought which led to the first overthrow of his power. Its wide extent is inhabited by two distinct races, and is the seat of two antagonistic creeds. The Teutonic race prevails in the north, and the generally established religion is Protestant; the Slavonic blood predominates in the south, owns the Catholic faith, and politically was under the sway of the Kaiser.

  The basin of the Elbe is the central geographical division of Germany. This basin is divided into two; that of the Upper Elbe forms a plateau surrounded by mountains, and is the kingdom of Bohemia; that of the Lower contains Saxony and the central provinces of Prussia. The upper basin is in general ill cultivated, and little has been done to develop its resources. It possesses, however, forests, considerable iron mines, and breeds horses which are valuable in war. Its roads, except one or two main chaussées, are few, mountainous, and bad; but it is a country easily defensible, for its forests, mountains, and rivers present at every point obstacles to an invading army. The lower basin of this river is, on the other hand, a country of plains, marshes, and small lakes: not very fertile, but well cultivated, thickly populated, and opened up by a multitude of roads. The Elbe, entering it from a close defile between the mountains of Northern Bohemia, runs through its whole length, passing by the fortress of Königstein, Dresden, the capital of Saxony, and the fortified town of Wittenberg. This river, within Prussian territory, supported by the fortresses of Torgau and Magdeburg, forms a strong line of defence against an army advancing on Berlin from the west, but one which can easily be turned from Bohemia.

  The basin of the Oder, bounded on the south by the mountains which overhang Braunau, Glatz, and Troppau, contains on the upper course of the river the province of Prussian Silesia. The river itself forms an angle near Breslau, which allows of its being used as a line of defence for the eastern districts of the kingdom of Prussia against an attack from either the south or west This line is supported by the fortresses of Glogau, Küstrin, and Stettin. The country through which the Oder flows is in general flat, marshy, and woody; the land is fertile only in pasture, but is well cultivated, and inhabited by an active and industrious population.

  The basin of the Weser, in which lies the western portion of the kingdom of Hanover, is bounded on the south by the mountains of the Thuringian Forest and the Hartz, and is in general sandy and covered with thickets; its principal riches are flocks and herds. The Danube, the southernmost of the four rivers which were introduced into the theatre of war in Central Germany, runs through a plain which lies on the south side of the Bohemian and Moravian mountains.

  Starting from the confluence of the Main with the Rhine at Mayence, following upwards the valley of the former river, skirting the southern slopes of the Thuringian Forest, passing along the summits of the Erz-Gebirge, the Riesen-Gebirge, and the mountains of Moravia, and terminating at the southernmost point of Upper Silesia, runs the line which geographically divides Northern from Southern Germany. This line now divided from one another the territories occupied by the troops of the two great parties into which the Germanic Confederation was rapidly splitting. By the sudden razzia made by her troops into Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, and Saxony, and by surrounding the Hanoverian troops, Prussia secured free communication between her Rhenish provinces and Berlin, disarmed the hostile forces in her rear, and divided the whole of Germany into two distinct areas for military operations.

  These northern and southern areas, separated by the central geographical line of Germany, were now in the possession of the troops of the northern and southern antagonists respectively.

  The Prussian occupation of Saxony had also the effect of separating the troops of the southern league quartered on the east of the line of the Saale from those assembled on the west, and divided Germany into an eastern and western theatre of war.

  On the western theatre the Prussian troops which had invaded Hanover and Hesse-Cassel were ranged against the Hanoverians, the Bavarians, the troops of Cassel, and those of the eighth Federal corps.

  On the eastern theatre the main armies of Prussia were drawn up against that of Austria with its Saxon allies, where they occupied, positions in Saxony and Silesia on the one side, on Bohemia and Moravia on the other. Between Bohemia and Saxony lie the chains of the Iron and Giant Mountains; between Moravia and Silesia, a part of the Giant chain, the mountains of Schweidnitz, and the Sudetic hills. These mountains as a rule are steep towards Prussia, and slope more gently towards Bohemia. They consist of several parallel ridges, and are of very unequal heights, sometimes falling as low as a thousand feet, sometimes, raising their peaks high into the air, they tower over spurs themselves fifteen hundred feet high.

  On the west of Bohemia the Fichtel Mountains divide the passes which lead from North Germany into Bohemia from those which by the sources of the Saale lead in the neighbourhood of Hof and Eger into Bavaria. This feet added to the importance and to the value of the Prussian occupation of Saxony, for the presence of the troops of Prince Frederick Charles in that kingdom, if it did not entirely prevent, certainly threw great difficulties in the way of a junction between the Austrians and Bavarians, and placed the Prussians in about the advantageous position of having broken the line of the armies of the South German States.

  The south-western frontier of Bohemia is formed by the hills of the Bohemian Forest; the south-eastern by the mountains of Moravia, The eastern theatre of operations lay between the mountains which separate Bohemia and Moravia from Saxony and Prussia and the Danube.

  In this theatre two main lines of railway exist, and show the lines along which the troops on either side would draw together, in order to repel an offensive movement of the enemy. The northern line is that which runs from Oderberg, by Oppeln, Brieg, Breslau, and Görlitz to Dresden and Leipzic; the southern is that which leads from Prerau by Olmütz and Pardubitz to Prague. These lines at three points are joined to each other by lines from Dresden to Prague, from Löbau to Türnau, and from Oderberg to Prerau.

  Within Bohemia lies the important quadrilateral of railways between Prague, Türnau, Josephstadt, and Pardubitz, from which lines lead to Leipzic, Dresden, Berlin, Görlitz, Breslau, Cracow, Vienna, Pilsen, Nüremberg, and Regensburg, and which, in consequence, forms a highly advantageous position for the concentration of troops. The fortresses enclosed in this theatre are, on the Austrian side, Cracow on the Vistula, Olmütz on the March, Josephstadt and Königgrätz on the Upper Elbe, Prague on the Moldau, and Theresienstadt on the Eger. On the Prussian side are Kosel on the Oder, Neisse on the Neisse, Glatz, Schweidnitz,. and Torgau, on the Elbe.

  From Schweidnitz, which is of little importance as a fortress, to Torgau, the distance is about one hundred and fifty miles.

  After the Prussian occupation of Saxony, the main armies of the two great Powers were separated by the mountains along which run the northern frontier lines of Bohemia and Moravia. The Prussian Army consisted of three principal parts, which all received orders from the king as commander-in-chief of all the forces, and numbered, inclusive of the reserve corps of General Mülbe in Dresden, about 280,000 combatants, with 900 guns.

  The Austrian Army, on the south of the mountains, mustered about 245,000 combatants, with 600 guns, to which was added the Saxon army, that had retired into Bohemia, with a force of 25,000 combatants, and 60 guns.

  Plan of Operations.—The Austrian Army was not in such a forward state of preparation for taking the field as the Prussian. Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek had not apparently anticipated such extreme rapidity and energy of movement as was exhibited by the Prussians, and had before the outbreak of hostilities announced his intention of assuming the offensive, and of invading
Prussian territory, when he had given most humane and praiseworthy directions to his own troops for their behaviour in the enemy’s country. An Austrian invasion of Prussia may be effected by either of two routes: the first leads over the Lusatian mountains to Bautzen and Görlitz to Berlin; the second by the valley of the Oder into Silesia. An offensive movement by the first route would have given the Austrians the advantage of seizing Saxony, and of covering the passage of the Bavarians by the passes of the Saale to Wittenberg, where the whole of the invading army might have been united. The other route did not offer these advantages, and in it lay as obstacles the Prussian fortresses of Glatz, Neisse, and Kosel.

  The rapid invasion of Saxony by Prussia, and the consequent retreat of the Saxons, appears to have determined the Austrian commander to relinquish any attempt of crossing the mountains into that kingdom. His army was concentrated round Brünn and Olmütz; he could not draw it together in time to seize the passes into Saxony; and he appears to have then determined to act upon the defensive, and to hold one portion of the Prussian troops in check, while he threw himself with strong force on the others issuing from the mountain passes, in order to crush them in detail.

  To secure a favourable position for this operation, he concentrated his army towards Josephstadt. He sent one corps d’armée with the Saxon troops to cover the issues of the passes from Saxony, there to check the armies of Prince Frederick Charles. With his forces from Josephstadt he intended to hold the crown prince in issuing from the mountains, and to reinforce Clam Gallas to crush Prince Frederick Charles at Gitschin. On the 19th June the Austrian movements with this aim commenced: that day the headquarters of Feldzeugmeister Von Benedek were moved from Olmütz to Böhmisch Trüban, and on the 23rd June his army occupied the following positions:—

  The 1st corps, the Saxons, the brigade Kalik, and the 1st light cavalry division, were posted under the supreme command of Count Clam Gallas, amounting altogether to nine brigades, with 60,000 men, on the left bank of the Iser, between Weisswasser, Münchengrätz, and Türnau, in order here to check the enemy advancing from the northwest. The 4th and 8th corps, and 1st division of reserve cavalry, were at Josephstadt; the 10th and 6th corps were pushed forward to the Silesian frontier on the north-east of Josephstadt; the 3rd corps and the 2nd and 3rd divisions of reserve cavalry were held in reserve north of Pardubitz; the 2nd corps and the 2nd light cavalry division formed the extreme right of the Austrian line at Böhmisch Trüban. By this disposition of his troops, Feldzeugmeister Benedek held a force much superior to that of the crown prince, immediately opposite to the defiles leading to Silesia, and covered the ground on which all the roads from Saxony and lower Silesia unite together in Bohemia, so that he actually stood in front of the point where the armies of Prince Frederick Charles and of the crown prince must unite.

  Prussian Plan of Operations.—How and why Prussia assumed the offensive in Saxony has been already seen. To increase the advantages gained by the possession of this kingdom, it was extremely desirable to push forward into Bohemia, and thus diminish, by a concentration forwards, the extent of the arc covered by the different armies. Political and financial reasons also required a speedy termination of the war. It was determined in the Prussian councils to assume the offensive.

  An invasion of the Austrian dominions from the positions of the Prussian armies could be effected in two ways: by the first the armies could cross the north-eastern and north-western frontiers of Bohemia, and be directed to unite in the north of Bohemia. By the second plan the Elbe Army and the First Army could have been ordered to cross the frontier, and to move on Prague, while the Second made an offensive movement against Olmütz. The latter plan was considered too dangerous; by its prosecution the communications between the two armies would have been entirely broken; and if Benedek had ignored the Second Army he could have fallen with much superior forces on Prince Frederick Charles, and overthrown him, when the distance from Olmütz to Vienna would not have been less than that from Josephstadt to Berlin.

  The first plan was accordingly adopted; and in order to carry it out, it was determined that the Army of the Elbe, acting as the extreme right wing of the Prussian advance, should move from Dresden by Neustadt, and over the mountains by the passes of Schluckenau or Gabel. The First Army, which formed the centre of the invading forces, was to move with the cavalry corps from Zittau, Görlitz, and Löbau, by the passes of Krottau Friedland and Neustädtl or Reichenberg. The Second Army, as the left wing, was to move from Landshut and the county of Glatz through the passes near Schatzlar or Trautenau, and through the pass of Nachod or Skalitz.

  The First Army and the Army of the Elbe were to unite near the Iser, and to gain together the left bank of that river towards Gitschin. The Second was to gain the right bank of the Elbe. When these points were gained, the two armies would be in close communication, and could act in conjunction along the line of railway leading by Pardubitz and Brünn to Vienna.

  The distance from Schluckenau to the county of Glatz, along which the Prussian front extended, is about one hundred miles. The Army of the Elbe and the First Army, which were to move through passes only about thirty or thirty-five miles distant from each other, could unite on the Iser in four marches, and immediately assail the enemy with four and a half corps d’armée, if the Austrians attempted to make an offensive movement towards Silesia. The circumstances of the country, and the strategical situation, threw more difficulties in the way of the Second Army during its defiling through the mountains, and there was considerable danger that it might be attacked while still isolated. On this account the Army of Silesia was made stronger by one corps d’armée than the First Army, and was to commence its movements four days later, so as to allow the Austrian attention to have been distracted by the presence of Prince Frederick Charles in Bohemia, and to permit of the complete junction of the First Army and of the Army of the Elbe on the Iser.

  To hold the Austrian commander as long as possible in uncertainty as to the points at which the army of the crown prince was about to break into Bohemia, and, if possible, to make him remove his guards from the passes by which the descent was really to be effected, a false demonstration was made by the Second Army. This army had been concentrated round Landshut and Waldenburg, but on the 15th June, the crown prince, leaving only one corps d’armée in its original position, moved two of his remaining three corps thirty miles to the south-east, and there placed them in position near Neisse, sent at the same time the Guards to Brieg, and shifted his own headquarters to the fortress of Neisse, in order to make the Austrians believe that the Army of Silesia intended to await attack in a defensive position near the fortress, or to break out southwards from that point upon Olmütz.

  The possession of Saxony and of the passes over the Iron Mountains, enabled the defence of that kingdom to be entrusted to the single reserve corps of General Mülbe. In case, however, that Austrian raids might be made into Saxony, or to oppose the Bavarians in case they might attempt by way of Hof into that country, fortifications were thrown up round Dresden.

  On the left wing of the Prussian base of operations. Lower and Middle Silesia were covered from an Austrian attack by the nature of the Prussian offensive movement as well as by the fortresses of Glatz and Neisse. That portion of Silesia, however, above Oppeln, which penetrates into Austrian territory, was exposed to hostile attacks from Oderberg and from Galicia. In order not to weaken the armies of operations by detaching troops to protect this portion of the province, new and peculiar means were adopted. Two scouting parties were formed which were to support each other; and in case of formidable attack, to withdraw into the fortress of Kosel. One of these was under General Knoblesdorf, and consisted of three battalions of infantry, some battalions of Landwehr, a regiment of cavalry of the line, and one battery. Its headquarters were at Ratibor. The other consisted of Landwehr only, and mustered six battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of Jägers, and one battery. It was commanded by Count Stölberg, and stationed at Ni
colai. These parties were not only intended to watch the frontier and oppose an irruption by the Austrians, but were also to annoy the enemy beyond the frontier, and to break up his railway communications.

  As a consequence of these arrangements, a lively war of detachments was soon developed along the Upper Silesian frontier, the details of which afford many interesting records of personal adventure, and the results of which demonstrated that the Prussian possesses in rapidity, subtlety, and endurance, all the qualities necessary for the accidents of petty warfare. Each detachment protected well its own position of the frontier, and only at a few points did the enemy succeed in effecting momentary sallies: they kept the Austrian troops in Western Galicia in check, and did considerable damage to their enemy. In one instance they destroyed the railway from Oswiecin to Oderberg so thoroughly, that the communication from Cracow to Bohemia as well as to Vienna was completely broken.

  CHAPTER 2: Passage of the First Army through the Mountains

  On the 23rd June the Army of the Elbe and the First Army were to cross the Bohemian frontier. When it is considered that not only the concentration and advance of the troops had to be arranged after the occupation of Saxony, but also the supply of provisions and ammunition, the establishment of hospitals, and the bringing up of reserves, it seems wonderful that these two armies could have been ready in so few days to take the field.

  The southern boundary of Saxon Lusatia runs forward for a distance of about fifteen English miles within the general line of the Bohemian frontier of Austria. In the salient angle of Saxony formed by this peculiar tracing of the border line stands within Saxon territory the frontier town of Zittau. This town covers the issue of the passes which lead from Reichenberg and Friedland in Bohemia, through the mountains into Lusatia, and commands the railway which by the pass of Reichenberg runs from Türnau to Bautzen. About six miles to the northeast of Zittau and about seventeen south-west of Görlitz the village of Hirschfeld is situated on the Neisse, at a point where this river receives a small affluent called the Kipper. To this village the headquarters of the First Army were moved on the 22nd June.