The Seven Weeks' War

by H M Hozier

  The most famous cavalry in Europe had been overthrown.

  Before and during this charge both divisions of the fifth Prussian corps had cleared the defile, and scarcely had the effect of the cavalry charge been seen than General Steinmetz, who commanded the whole corps, determined to assume the offensive. Then, in rear of their cavalry, the Prussian infantry and artillery dashed forward. Some of the battalions turning aside, marched against the village of Wisokow, already in flames from a Prussian shell, with their bayonets at the charge. Among the burning houses the Austrians waited for them: a sharp struggle ensued, but the village was carried, and the Austrians were driven out of it.

  In the meantime the Austrian heavy horsemen had rallied, and again returned to the charge. This time they advanced with skill as well as courage, and bore down on the flank of the Uhlans; but their approach was seen, and before they reached the Prussian line it had quickly changed its front, and met the advancing squadrons face to face. Again the Austrians recoiled, but now without a chance of rallying; they were broken and scattered, and the Uhlans, spreading out in pursuit, went dashing in small knots over the plain after them, and captured two guns from their horse artillery. This cavalry charge decided the fortune of the day, and the Austrians retired, pressed by the Prussian infantry.

  General Steinmetz, who commanded the fifth corps, which was here engaged, led forward all his troops, leaving only three battalions of the royal regiment in reserve, and pushed the enemy back. But his men, after a long march and a severe action, were too fatigued to pursue in mass, so they were halted, and the cavalry and one or two battalions alone followed up the pursuit; but they did well, for they brought back 2,000 prisoners and three guns, besides the two taken by the Uhlans; and these were not the only trophies, for three sets of infantry colours were taken by the Prussians, and the standards of the Austrian cuirassiers fell into the hands of the Uhlans. The crown prince thanked General Steinmetz on the field in the name of the king for the victory, and well the general and his troops merited the compliment, for all the first part of the action was fought with twenty-two battalions against twenty-nine, and with an inferior force of cavalry and artillery.

  This victory cost the Prussians a loss of nine hundred men killed and wounded; among the latter were the two generals, Von Ollech and Von Wunck. The fifth Prussian corps, notwithstanding that on the 27th it had marched over fifteen miles through a narrow defile, and been engaged in action for eight hours, was still so strong and so confident that General Steinmetz resolved to resume the attack the ensuing day without loss of time.

  General Ramming, who had deservedly the reputation of being one of the most able and talented generals of the Imperial army, after having engaged the Prussians at Nachod, with his whole force retreated to Skalitz on the evening of the 27th. On arriving at that place he sent a despatch to the headquarters of the army, in which he requested that the eighth Austrian corps, which was posted at Josephstadt, might be allowed to assist him with two brigades. Feldzeugmeister Benedek thereupon ordered that the eighth corps should advance to Skalitz, and be prepared to engage in the first line, while that of General Ramming should form its reserve. Both corps were placed under the command of the Archduke Leopold. One brigade of the Prussian sixth corps, which was to follow the fifth corps through the defile of Nachod, had reached Nachod on the evening of the 27th, and was ready that day to advance with General Steinmetz. General Steinmetz determined to advance. At the same time the Austrian general replaced the sixth corps by the eighth corps at Skalitz, in order to oppose the Prussians and drive them back. Hence arose the

  ACTION OF SKALITZ

  The Austrians were soon forced to quit all hopes of the offensive, and to assume the defensive energetically in front of Skalitz, on the road and railway, which are flanked on the north and south by two woods. The country was entirely unfavourable for the action of cavalry. Either side brought up as much force as possible. The battle swayed hither and thither, but ultimately the superior strength and armament of the Prussian soldier told against his weaker antagonist.

  On the north of the railway the 37th and 58th Prussian regiments and 4th Dragoons with three batteries advanced; while on the south the King’s own regiment, though exposed to a terrible fire of artillery, gained the wood on the south of the town, and here succeeded in sustaining the assaults of far superior numbers, until the 6th, 46th, and 52nd and 47th regiments could come up to its aid, and join with it in an attack on Skalitz.

  This attack was made about 3 p.m. On the north side of the town the 6th and 52nd regiments advanced, and along the high road the 7th, 37th, 58th, and 47th regiments.

  The Austrian position was forced, and the Archduke Leopold compelled to fall back to a strong position behind the Aupa, where he intended to hold his ground, supported by his numerous artillery. This position was however also carried by the Prussians, who there took many prisoners, and by it they gained the command of the defile of the Aupa.

  General Steinmetz, by this victory, captured four thousand prisoners, eight guns, and several stands of colours. On this day, the 28th, depended whether the Army of Silesia would effect its issue from the mountains, or fail in the attempt. The corps of the Guards was engaged at Trautenau, the fifth corps at Skalitz. The crown prince, in person, could not be present at either action. He was obliged to choose a position between the two, whence he could proceed to any point where his presence might be necessary. He accordingly posted himself on a hill near Kosteletz, where the heavy cavalry of the Guard took up its position on coming through the hills, and where it was joined at a later period of the day by the reserve artillery of the Guard. The time passed heavily on that hill of Kosteletz.

  The thunder of cannon rose ever louder from Skalitz on the south, and from the direction of Trautenau on the north. With anxious ears the commander-in-chief and his staff listened to the progress of the cannonade, and with eager eyes scanned the positions of the eddying clouds of white smoke which rose from the engaged artillery. It was the intention of the crown prince, if an unfavourable report of the progress of the action on either side was brought to him, to repair to that point, and in person to encourage his pressed troops. But every orderly officer, every aide-de-camp, brought the intelligence that the battles in both places were going well for the Prussians.

  At last, between three and four o’clock, the commander-in-chief received the positive report from General Steinmetz that he had stormed Skalitz, and driven back two of the enemy’s corps. No longer had the crown prince to give a thought to this side. He immediately started for Eypel, in order to be present at the action in which the Guards were engaged. At this place the news reached him that the Guard had also victoriously achieved its task, and not only had forced the defile from Eypel, but had also opened the pass from Trautenau. Here, then, were the three issues from the mountains, the defiles of Trautenau, Eypel, and Nachod, popularly called the gates of Bohemia, in the secure possession of the Second Prussian Army, and the junction of the hitherto separated corps almost certain to be effected on the following day. To accomplish the junction of his united army with that of Prince Frederick Charles, the crown prince ordered the advance the next morning to be made as far as the Elbe.

  The quarters of the crown prince on the night of the 28th were fixed at Eypel, where he heard for the first time that the first corps had only returned on the 27th from Trautenau to their former bivouac, and were fit to advance again on the 29th, having halted there on the 28th. The report of General von Bonin had not before reached headquarters, and all that was heard of the first corps was that it had not assisted the Guards in the action of the 28th.

  The crown prince immediately ordered General von Bonin to advance at daybreak on the 29th, from Trautenau to Pilnikau.

  On the 29th June, General Steinmetz, with the fifth and sixth corps, was to advance from Skalitz in a westerly direction, towards Königinhof, as far as Gradlitz, in order to approach the other corps of the crown prince, so that the whole Army of
Silesia might be united on the Elbe before commencing general operations in concert with the First Army. Fresh forces of the enemy opposed this march, and took post in a situation which caused the

  ACTION OF SCHWEINSCHÄDEL

  The Austrian troops, which here opposed the advance of the Prussian fifth corps, were those of the fourth corps, under the command of General Festetics, whom Feldzeugmeister Benedek had sent forward from Jaromirz, after he had withdrawn the 6th and the 8th corps. Of this corps there were present only three brigades, for one brigade had been detached to Königinhof, where on the same day it was engaged in an action against the leading battalions of the Prussian Guard, as has been already noticed. General Steinmetz attacked, and after an action of three hours, which consisted of little more than a cannonade, the Austrians were driven back, and retreated under the guns of the fortress of Josephstadt, which opened hotly upon the advancing Prussians. General Festetics made his retreat in good time, in order not to suffer a loss similar to that which had befallen the other Austrian corps which had been engaged at Trautenau and Skalitz. Early as he retired, however, he lost eight hundred prisoners.

  General Steinmetz, after pushing the retreating Austrians close up to Josephstadt, did not venture to press further in this direction, as by pursuing such a course he would have been exposed to be cut off and isolated from the other corps of the crown prince. He detached, accordingly, one brigade, to observe the garrison of Josephstadt, and moved the remainder of his corps to Gradlitz, about two miles east of Königinhof, in order to concentrate with the rest of the Army of Silesia, He arrived there on the night of the 29th June, and took up a position near the division of the Guards, which was already stationed there.

  The sixth Prussian corps, which followed the fifth corps by the defile of Nachod, from the county of Glatz, had only sent forward one brigade to aid the corps of General Steinmetz in the actions of the 28th and 29th June. It reached Gradlitz, however, late on the 30th June, so that now three corps of the Army of Silesia were concentrated in the vicinity of Königinhof. The first corps had reached Arnau, where there is also a bridge over the Elbe, about seven miles to the north of Königinhof. Thus the army of the crown prince, four days after its inroad into Bohemia, had successfully united its divided columns of advance, and had made itself master of the line of the Elbe from Arnau to near Josephstadt Four Austrian corps had been repulsed, three of which were decidedly defeated, and had lost ten thousand prisoners, twenty guns, five colours, and two standards to the crown prince.

  On the 30th of June a cavalry regiment, sent out from Gitschin by Prince Frederick Charles, fell in with the outposts of the corps of the crown prince at Arnau. Communications between the two main armies were now established in Bohemia, and their secure junction almost certain. For the sake of simplicity, it may be here advisable to give briefly a general sketch of the steps taken each day by the two armies from the time of their crossing the Austrian frontier to bring about their common concentration.

  SUMMARY OF THE ADVANCE OF THE THREE PRUSSIAN ARMIES INTO BOHEMIA FOR CONCENTRATION

  On the 23rd June, the army of Prince Frederick Charles advanced in three columns from Zittau, Görlitz, and Laubau, towards Reichenberg.

  The same day the Army of the Elbe advanced from Saxony.

  On the 24th, Prince Frederick Charles occupied Reichenberg, and concentrated his three columns, which had passed through the mountains.

  On the 26th, the advanced guard of the fifth corps (Army of Silesia) seized Nachod in the evening, and the Guards crossed the frontier of Bohemia by the Wünschelburg road.

  The same evening Prince Frederick Charles secured the passage of the Iser at Türnau and Podoll, and the Army of the Elbe occupied Hayda and Bömisch Aicha.

  On the 27th, the first corps of the crown prince’s army seized Trautenau, but was defeated and driven back by General Gablenz.

  The fifth corps of the crown prince’s army defeated General Ramming in the action of Nachod.

  The Army of the Elbe, after a skirmish, occupied Hühnerwasser.

  On the 28th, the Army of the Elbe and Prince Frederick Charles defeated the corps of Count Clam Gallas at Münchengrätz, and secured the line of the Iser.

  The Guards, under the crown prince, defeated General Gablenz at Soor, and cleared the issue from the Trautenau defile for the first corps.

  The fifth corps defeated the Archduke Leopold at Skalitz.

  On the 29th, the Guard corps stormed Königinhof; and the fifth Prussian corps drove General Festetics from Schweinschädel. The crown prince concentrated his army on the left bank of the Elbe.

  The army of Prince Frederick Charles that night stormed Gitschin.

  On the 30th, communications were opened between the army of Prince Frederick Charles round Gitschin and the first corps of the army of the crown prince at Arnau.

  OBSERVATIONS

  For some reason, political or military, Benedek did not assume the offensive. He threw this advantage into the hands of his adversaries. It is supposed that political causes and the request of the Germanic Confederation prevented the Austrian general from taking this line of action, and carrying the war into Saxony.

  After having determined to fight on the defensive, he intended to check one portion of his enemy’s armies with a detachment, while with superior forces he threw himself upon the other. The lines of operation of the Prussian armies, convergent from separate bases, gave him a favourable opportunity to reap successful results from such a course. He could either send a detachment to hold Prince Frederick Charles while he assailed the crown prince, or could hold the latter while with the mass of his army he threw himself upon the former. To hold the crown prince, however, while he attacked Frederick Charles was much more hazardous than to adopt the alternate line.

  The crown prince, if he beat the detachment left to bar his way, could sweep down upon the Austrian communications with Vienna ere Benedek had laid his grasp upon the First Prussian Army. If this had been his intention, he should have held the Castle of Nachod and the passes at Trautenau and Eypel. If, on the other hand, he intended to delay Frederick Charles, the line of the Iser should have been tenaciously held between Türnau and Münchengrätz. None of these things were done. Inferior forces of the Austrians were exposed at almost all points to superior forces of the Prussians; while the masses, which cast at the proper moment to either side would have turned the scale, oscillated vaguely backwards and forwards under vacillatory or contradictory orders.

  On the evening of the 26th June Benedek knew that the crown prince was on the frontier, and that Prince Frederick Charles was close to the Iser. His corps at this time were stationed, the tenth at Pilnikau, the fourth at Königinhof, the sixth near Skalitz, while of the three others, two were south of Josephstadt and one as far off as Böhmisch Trübau. On the 27th, after Türnau on the Iser had been evacuated without a blow by Clam Gallas, and the passage of that stream at Podoll stormed by Frederick Charles, Benedek appears to have made no movement to support with his reserves his corps at Nachod or Trautenau against the crown prince, or to send reinforcements to Clam Gallas.

  On the 28th, the crown prince determined to retrieve the misfortune of his right on the previous day, by energetically attacking the position of the Austrian corps; while at the same time the fifth corps, supported by the sixth, should move against Skalitz. Benedek had had only two corps engaged on the previous day. One of these had been defeated at Nachod and driven back to Skalitz, but had by no means been routed.

  The other had well held its own and had repulsed its assailants. As yet the Austrian commander had lost nothing so important that he might not hope, by vigorous action on the 28th, to gain a decided success, and with one blow to turn the fortune of the campaign, and the destiny of Austria.

  The first Prussian corps was not on the morning of the 28th sufficiently recovered from its repulse on the previous day to engage at all. The fifth corps was able to engage, but was supported only by one brigade of the sixth, because t
he three remaining brigades of that corps were still in the defile through the mountains.

  Thus, the crown prince had only the two divisions of the Guard corps, the fifth corps, and one brigade of the sixth corps ready to go into action on the morning of the 28th, in all about 67,000 men.

  General Benedek ought to have known on the 27th by daybreak, that he had nothing to fear in the direction of Olmütz, for the demonstration of the sixth Prussian corps made in that direction on the previous day had been withdrawn. He could therefore on the 27th have moved the third corps from Böhmisch Trübau to Josephstadt that day, and would then have had six corps, about 150,000 men, ready to push into action energetically on the morning of the 28th, and with them to drive the crown prince back into the defiles. This great opportunity, however, was missed. The sixth Austrian corps at Skalitz was indeed reinforced by the eighth; but the tenth corps was left without reinforcements at Trautenau, so that, although he had a force at hand double that of his adversary, on the morning of the 28th only three corps, about 70,000 men, were placed in position to come under fire. It is natural to inquire why Benedek did not employ on the 28th the three corps which did not come into action that day. The reason, as far as can be gathered, appears to be, that Benedek made the vital error of attempting to check the crown prince when he was already past the defiles, and in a position to threaten the Austrian communications, with a detachment, while he directed his principal blow against Prince Frederick Charles. At this time the distance between the two Prussian armies was about forty miles. They were too far separated to afford each other mutual assistance. The distance from Benedek’s headquarters, (Josephstadt), to the Iser was nearly fifty miles; that from the same place to Skalitz, about eight miles; to Trautenau about twenty.