by H M Hozier
Another fact which may aid to corroborate the theory advanced above, is the telegram in which Feldzeugmeister Benedek first announced to Vienna the loss of the battle In this he said that some of the enemy’s troops, under cover of the mist, established themselves on his flank, and so caused the defeat Probably at that time he thought that the troops that got into Chlum were a detachment from those engaged at Benatek. If the Austrian general had suspected any attack from the direction of Königinhof, he would surely have watched the country in that direction with his cavalry, but the troops of the crown prince did not fall in with a single patrol till they actually came into collision with the Austrian line of battle.
How the Prussian Guards were allowed to get into Chlum appears inexplicable. From the top of Chlum Church tower the whole country can be clearly seen as far as the top of the high bank of the Elbe. A staff-officer posted there, even through the mist, which was not so heavy as is generally supposed, could have easily seen any movements of troops as far as Choteborek. A person near Sadowa could see quite distinctly Herwarth’s attack at Hradek, and, except during occasional squalls, there was no limit to the view over the surrounding country except where the configuration of the ground or the heavy smoke overcame the sight. From the top of Chlum Church there was a clear view over all the neighbouring hills, and the top of the spire generally stood out clear over the heavy curtain of hanging smoke which, above the heads of the combatants, fringed the side of the Lipa hill from Benatek to Nechanitz.
So little apprehensive, however, was Benedek of an attack on his right, that he stationed no officer in the tower; and himself took up a position above Lipa, where any view towards the north was entirely shut out by the hill and houses of Chlum. No report appears to have reached him of the advance of the Guards, yet they were engaged at Horenowes, and passed through Maslowed. From that village, without opposition, they marched along the rear of the Austrian line, apparently unobserved, until they flung themselves into Chlum and Rosberitz. It seems that the fourth corps to whom the defence of the ground between Maslowed and Nedelitz was entrusted, seeing their comrades heavily engaged with Franzecky in the Maslowed wood, turned to their aid, and pressing forwards towards Benatek quitted their proper ground.
A short time afterwards the second Austrian corps was defeated by the Prussian eleventh division, and retreated towards its bridge at Lochenitz. The advance of the fourth corps, and the retreat of the second, left a clear gap in the Austrian line, through which the Prussian Guards marched unmolested, and without a shot seized the key of the position. Once installed they could not be ejected, and the battle was practically lost to the Austrians.
The Prussian pursuit was tardy, and not pushed. The men were fatigued, and night was coming on. The Austrian cavalry was moving sullenly towards Pardubitz. The Prussian cavalry of the First Army had suffered severely. The Elbe lay between the retreating Austrians and the victorious Prussians. The victory, although fortuitously decisive, was not improved to such advantage as it might have been.
CHAPTER 3: Defence of Silesia
Before proceeding to review the events which have in the meantime been taking place in the western theatre of war, it is requisite to cast a glance upon the operations of the two Prussian corps which had been left to guard the province of Silesia. On the concentration of the Austrian Army in Bohemia, a corps of 6,000 men, under General Trentinaglia, had been left at Cracow. Two Prussian independent corps had, as was already noticed, been stationed at Ratibor and Nicolai, to shield south-eastern Silesia, against a probable attack from this corps. The former was commanded by General Knobelsdorf, and consisted of the 62nd regiment of Infantry, the 2nd regiment of Uhlans, a few battalions of Landwehr, and one battery. The latter, under General Count Stölberg, was formed of Landwehr alone, and mustered six battalions, two regiments of cavalry, two companies of Jägers, and one battery.
The corps of Knobelsdorf was to defend the Moravian frontier, that of Stölberg the Gallician; and both, in case of attack by overwhelming numbers, were to fall back under the protection of the fortress of Kosel.
On the 21st June, Stölberg’s corps obtained its first important although bloodless success. That day it marched rapidly, many of the men being conveyed in waggons to Pruchna, blew up the railway viaduct there, and so destroyed the communication between General Trentinaglia and the main Austrian Army.
On the 24th and 26th June, as well as on the intermediate days, several Austrian parties made demonstrations of crossing the frontier near Oswiecin. Large bodies of troops appeared to be in the act of concentration at that place, and General Stölberg determined to assure himself of the actual strength of the Austrians there by a reconnaissance in force.
To aid this, General Knobelsdorf sent a part of his troops to Myslowitz, to cover the rear of Stölberg’s corps while it marched on Oswiecin,
At the latter place. General Stölberg found a considerably superior force of the enemy. He seized the buildings of the railway station, placed them hastily in a state of defence, and determined by making a long halt here to force the Austrians to develop their full force.
After he had achieved this object, General Stölberg retired to his position near Nicolai. The detachment at Myslowitz had at the same time to sustain an action there, and fulfilled completely its purpose of holding the enemy back from Oswiecin.
On the 30th June, Stölberg’s detachment was so weakened by the withdrawal of his Landwehr battalions, which were called up in order to aid in the formation of a fourth battalion to every regiment, that it could no longer hold its own against the superior Austrian force near Myslowitz. It retired accordingly nearer to Ratibor, in the direction of Plesz, and undertook from here, in connexion with General Knobelsdorf, expeditions into Moravia against Teschen, Biala, and Skotchau, annoyed the Austrians considerably, and made the inhabitants of Moravia regard the war with aversion.
BOOK 8
CHAPTER 1: Operations in the Western Theatre of the German War
As has been already shown (Book 4, chapter 2), the Prussian troops which had invaded Hanover and Hesse-Cassel occupied on the 19th June the following positions:—
The divisions of General Goeben and General Manteuffel were in the town of Hanover, and that of General Beyer in Cassel. Of the allies of Austria the Hanoverian army was at Göttingen, the Bavarian in the neighbourhood of Würzburg and Bamberg, the eighth Federal corps in the vicinity of Frankfort. The latter consisted of the troops of Würtemberg, Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt, Nassau, and Hesse-Cassel, to which an Austrian division was added. We have seen under what disadvantages the Hanoverian Army left Hanover, and commenced its southward march. Its formation and preparations began only at Göttingen, and they were necessarily conducted under every untoward circumstance. The soldiers of the reserve, and those who had been absent on furlough, nobly responded to the call of their king, and made their way through the country which was in Prussian possession, and sometimes even through the lines of the enemy, to join the ranks at Göttingen. By their firm determination to reach their regiments they afforded an earnest of the gallantry and courage which they afterwards displayed upon the field of battle. By the arrival of these men, the army at Göttingen mustered about twenty thousand combatants, with fifty guns.
Southern Germany expected great deeds of the Bavarian Army. It might have thrown serious difficulties in the way of the Prussian successes, had not an uncertainty and vacillation pervaded all its operations. Prince Charles of Bavaria, the commander-in-chief, under whose orders the eighth Federal Corps was also afterwards placed, seems to have conducted his campaign without a definite strategical object, and without energy in its prosecution. Against him in command of the Prussian Army of the Maine, (this name was only given on the 1st of July to the Prussian divisions amalgamated together under the command of General Vogel von Falckenstein), was a general gifted with prudence and clear foresight, who pursued his aim with an iron vigour. The Bavarian is a smart soldier in time of peace, and conducts himself well i
n battle: but the ranks of Bavaria do not contain such intelligence as do those of Prussia, for men drawn for military service are allowed to provide substitutes, so that only the poorer and less educated classes of society furnish recruits for the army.
The eighth Federal corps did not assemble either with zeal or rapidity. The troops of the Grand Duke of Baden not only came very late to the place of concentration, but when actually in the field were handled in a manner which gave rise to grave suspicions of the affection of their government for the South-German cause. The kernel of this miscellaneous corps was formed by an Austrian division composed of the troops which had been withdrawn from the fortresses of Rastadt, Mayence, and Frankfort. Even if the princes of the small states which furnished their contingents to the eighth corps had made clear to themselves the end or object of the war which they had undertaken, their reasons for the quarrel had not penetrated the lower ranks of their armies. The troops had no idea, no knowledge, of the causes for which they were to shed their blood, and markedly in this respect contrasted with the Prussian soldiery, which held that the honour, integrity, and even existence of its fatherland was in jeopardy.
The Federal troops did not fail in bravery, but no enthusiasm thrilled through their ranks. Individual bodies were doubtless animated by a high courage, and in many cases displayed a heroic devotion to their leaders and their princes. But the mass did not work evenly; a want of harmony existed amongst its heterogeneous units, which, in combination with the clouded plans of its chiefs, facilitated the task of General von Falckenstein. There was also dissension in the councils of the leaders. Prince Alexander not only habitually disagreed with his superior. Prince Charles, and so originated causes of disaster; but himself was often engaged in paltry squabbles with the lieutenants who commanded the different contingents.
CATASTROPHE OF THE HANOVERIAN ARMY
The Hanoverian Army had marched from its capital almost totally unprepared to undertake a campaign. It stood in dire need of several days’ rest in order to be organised, and to allow time for the formation of a transport train, as well as for the clothing and armament of the soldiers of reserve who had been recalled to the ranks, and for the horsing of part of the artillery. On this account it was forced to halt until the 20th June at Göttingen, and the favourable moment for its unmolested march to unite with the troops of Bavaria was allowed to slip away.
On the 19th June, by the successful occupation of Cassel by Prussian troops, the ultimate retreat of the Hanoverians was first endangered. On the same day the Prussian General von Falckenstein set out from Hanover with Goeben’s division in pursuit of them. The Hanoverian army had gained a start of almost seventy miles on General von Falckenstein, which was of the more importance, inasmuch as the latter could not make use of the railroads, which had been torn up and broken.
The King of Hanover determined to move in a south-easterly direction, and to attempt to reach Bavaria by passing through Prussian territory on the road which leads by Heiligenstadt and Langensalza, and then by Gotha or Eisenach, or to unite with the Bavarians in the neighbourhood of Fulda, The roads in this direction through the mountains of the Thuringian Forest are very convenient, and by no means difficult. Had the march been pushed on with certainty and rapidity, there seems to have been no reason why it should not have been successful in its issue. The portion of the Prussian province of Saxony through which the line of march lay from Heiligenstadt to Langensalza was entirely denuded of Prussian troops.
The only force to oppose the progress of the retreating army on this road was the contingent of Saxe-Coburg Gotha, at Gotha. This consisted, however, of only two battalions. It seems, therefore, that the direction proposed for their route offered considerable chances of success, if on the one side the Hanoverians had forced their marches, and on the other the Bavarians had pushed forward by Coburg in strength, in order to effect a junction with their threatened allies. But neither the Hanoverian nor Bavarian leaders acted energetically.
The Prussian staff, on the contrary, took most prompt measures to cut off the Hanoverian retreat, and to occupy the principal points on their line of march with troops. The Duke of Coburg had declared openly and decidedly on the side of Prussia, and his troops were in consequence at the service of the Prussian Government On the 20th June, Colonel von Fabeck, the commandant of the Coburg contingent, received a telegraphic order from Berlin to post himself with his two battalions at Eisenach, because it was expected that the Hanoverians would there first attempt to break through. Three battalions of Landwehr, one squadron of Landwehr cavalry, and a battery of four guns, were sent from the garrison of Erfurt to reinforce him. A battalion of the fourth regiment of the Prussian Guard, which had reached Leipsic on the 19th, was also despatched to his aid, a detachment of which, on the 20th, rendered the railway tunnel near Eisenach, impassable.
At the same time General Beyer, pushing forwards from Cassel towards Eisenach, occupied the passages of the River Werra, between Allendorf and that place.
The idea of uniting with the Bavarians, by moving from Heiligenstadt by Eschewege and Fulda, was under these circumstances, given up by the King of Hanover. On the 20th of June such is said to have been his intention, and on that day he moved his advanced guard from Göttingen to Heiligenstadt. On the 21st he ordered his whole army to move upon Gotha, and crossed the Prussian frontier with his troops, after taking leave of his people by means of a proclamation, in which he mournfully expressed his hope soon to return victorious at the head of his army, to the land which he was then temporarily forced to quit.
General Arentschild, on entering Prussian territory near Heiligenstadt, issued a proclamation in which he disavowed any intention of treating the country in a hostile manner, and declared that he only desired to be allowed to march through without interruption. The Hanoverian army, dependent for its subsistence upon requisitions, moved but slowly. On the 22nd it occupied Mühlhausen, and on the 23rd Grosz-Gottern. From this place advanced guards were pushed forward on the one side towards Erfurt, on the other to the railway between Eisenach and Gotha. The latter found that this line was already occupied by the Prussians. On the 24th the Hanoverian army reached Langensalza.
In the meantime Colonel Fabeck, the commander of the Coburg contingent, quitting his position at Eisenach, approached Gotha, and occupied the road by which the Hanoverians might have broken through in this direction. A second squadron of Landwehr cavalry and a depôt battalion were sent from Erfurt to reinforce him; and a second battalion of the fourth regiment of the infantry of the Prussian Guard was hurried up from Berlin. One battalion of this regiment occupied Weimar, and the other Eisenach.
On the 24th June, the force opposed to the Hanoverians at Gotha consisted only of six weak battalions, two squadrons, and four guns. There can hardly be any question but that, if the King of Hanover had marched rapidly on Gotha that day, Colonel von Fabeck would have been quite unable to hold his position. But the Hanoverian leaders failed to take advantage of this last opportunity. The king rejected a proposal made by Colonel von Fabeck, that his army should capitulate; but applied to the Duke of Coburg, and asked him to act as a mediator with the Prussian Government. The Hanoverians desired a free passage to Bavaria, and were in return willing to pledge themselves to take no share in the war in Germany during six months. The Duke of Coburg insisted that this time should be extended to a year, to which the Hanoverians assented, and the duke telegraphed a report of the negotiations to Berlin.
Had the Hanoverians obtained these terms, their intention was to move into Italy, and there to act on the Austrian side against the Italians,—a, course of action which would have recalled to memory the past times in which the Electors of Hanover sent so many of their subjects to combat in the cause of the republic of Venice.
The King of Prussia, immediately on the receipt of the telegram of the Duke of Coburg, despatched his adjutant-general, General von Alvensleben, to Gotha, to treat with the King of Hanover. In the meantime an armistice was agreed u
pon, which was to expire on the morning of the 25th. This armistice was violated, doubtlessly by some misunderstanding, on the night of the 24th, by the Hanoverians, who advanced to the Gotha and Eisenach railway, and broke up the line near Frötestadt. General von Alvensleben sent a proposal from Gotha to the King of Hanover that he should capitulate. To this no answer was returned; but the king expressed a wish that General von Alvensleben should repair to his camp, in order to treat with him.
This wish was complied with early on the 25th, when an extension of the armistice was agreed upon, and General von Alvensleben hurried back to Berlin for further instructions. It was not at this time the interest of the Prussians to push matters to extremities. Their troops were widely scattered, and the small force at Gotha was unequal to engage the Hanoverian army with any chance of success. The Hanoverians seem to have been ignorant of how small a body alone
barred the way to Bavaria, and to have hoped that time might be afforded for aid to reach them. On the night of the 24th a messenger was sent to the Bavarian headquarters at Bamberg to report the situation of the Hanoverian Army, and to solicit speedy assistance. To this request Prince Charles only replied that an army of nineteen thousand men ought to be able to cut its way through. In consequence of this opinion only one Bavarian brigade of light cavalry was advanced on the 25th of June to Meiningen, in the valley of the Werra, while a few Bavarian detachments were pushed forward along the high road as far as Vacha.