Hunt the Bismarck

by Angus Konstam

  By then, two of the four guns in Prince of Wales’ ‘A’ turret had malfunctioned, and Captain Leach considered himself lucky that Bismarck had turned away. However, despite the continuing problems with his guns, Prince of Wales had acquitted herself well, and one of her salvos had come very close to straddling the Bismarck. Even Norfolk had joined in, firing three salvos at Bismarck, despite being at the very limits of her range. Later, Wake-Walker said he thought the brief action had a good effect on Leach and his crew. He also hoped it would help to placate the first sea lord.

  At this point, the two British cruisers were back on station, shadowing the Bismarck from a safe distance astern. However, something had changed. This time, the Bismarck was on her own. The Prinz Eugen was nowhere to be seen.

  Operation Hood had worked. Captain Brinkmann sped away to the south before turning west and then north, working his way around the back of the British shadowers. Thus, at 19.14, Lütjens was able to signal Paris: ‘Short action with King George V without result. Prinz Eugen released to refuel. Enemy maintains contact.’20 However, while Lütjens had successfully detached the Prinz Eugen, the Bismarck was still being shadowed as she continued on to the south-south-west, and Admiral Tovey’s Home Fleet were still closing in. Now, everything depended on shaking off the British pursuers during the night.

  Victorious intervenes

  Earlier that afternoon, Admiral Tovey had realised that it was now unlikely that he was going to intercept Bismarck before dark. So, at 16.00, he detached Captain Bovell in the Victorious, accompanied by R. Adm. Alban Curteis’ 2nd Cruiser Squadron: Galatea (flagship), Aurora, Kenya and Hermione. 21 The new fleet carrier was faster than the rest of his capital ships and so Tovey hoped that by continuing on towards the south-west, she might just be in position to launch an air strike against Bismarck before it got dark. In fact, Bovell hoped to be within strike range of the enemy by 22.00. Given the limited range and performance of the Fairey Swordfish, that meant reaching a point 120 miles from the target. Meanwhile King George V, Repulse and another screen of destroyers would alter slightly to port and head towards the south-south-west. That way, they might be in a position to intercept the Bismarck at dawn the following morning – 25 May.

  Meanwhile, Bismarck held her course, although by now she was heading due south. Just before 21.00, Lütjens signalled Group West, informing them: ‘Shaking off contact impossible due to enemy radar. Due to fuel, steering direct for St Nazaire.’ This suggested that he was becoming increasingly frustrated by his shadowers, but that he felt he now had a chance of avoiding the Home Fleet. As a result of this signal, Dönitz abandoned his U-boat screen south of Greenland and instead began marshalling his boats to cover the approaches to the French coast. However, Lütjens had by this stage learned from radio intercepts that an aircraft carrier was somewhere at sea, and looking for him.

  Unknown to the Germans, at that moment Victorious was a little over 130 miles away to the west and steering a converging course. That meant she was almost within range of an air strike. An air attack at sea was a dangerous undertaking at the best of times. Many things could go wrong, such as failing to locate the enemy, attacking friendly ships by accident, or the aircraft failing to make it back to their carrier. This was particularly true for Victorious that evening, as she headed towards her flying-off point in difficult weather conditions. Her aircraft and their crews had only been embarked four days beforehand and she only carried a fraction of her normal aircraft complement, as she’d also embarked crated-up fighters, bound for Malta. Now, these inexperienced pilots and handful of aircraft were being sent out to attack the most powerful battleship in the world.

  At 22.15, Bovell turned Victorious into the wind and the nine Swordfish torpedo bombers of 825 Squadron took off, each laden with a single 18in. Mark XII torpedo. The flying conditions were hardly ideal – there was low cloud at 1,500ft, rain squalls, and the north-westerly wind was becoming stronger, blowing into the faces of the pilots.22 The squadron was divided into three flights, each of three aircraft. While most of the pilots were green, the strike was headed by a veteran, Lt Cdr Eugene Esmonde. He led one flight, while the others were commanded by two other experienced pilots, Acting Lt Cdr Philip ‘Percy’ Gick, and Henry ‘Speed’ Pollard.

  At the time, Bismarck was 120 miles away – the utmost limit the aircraft could reach. That meant that not only would they be attacking in the dark, but there would also be barely enough fuel left to get back to the carrier. So, after launching off, Victorious would steam on, trying to close the distance, despite the increasingly rough seas. Within seconds of the Swordfish taking off, the carrier was lost from sight in a rain squall. They managed to form up, though, and Esmonde led them off to the south-west, and the enemy. Meanwhile, a flight of three Fulmars was also launched. The job of these fighters was to observe the attack and to help guide the slower biplanes home.

  Overall, the chances of success were slim. Several of the pilots had never trained for a torpedo attack and some had only made their first carrier landing a week before. Sending them was a real gamble, but Tovey felt he had no other choice. The plan was to head towards Wake-Walker’s cruisers, who could guide them in using radar, then continue on to the south until they found the Bismarck. The Swordfish had their own radar, and just before 11.30 they made radar contact. It was Norfolk. She then directed Esmonde on to the south. At 23.50 they made radar contact again, but it proved to be a neutral ship – the US coastguard cutter Medoc.23 Then, just a few miles beyond her, was the Bismarck. This meant that the crew of the Medoc had a ringside seat for what followed.

  At midnight, Esmonde began his attack, as each of the three flights split up to simultaneously attack the battleship from both port and starboard.24 Bismarck’s anti-aircraft guns opened fire as soon as the lumbering aircraft came within range. There were eight of them now, since one had got lost in the clouds. As Müllenheim-Rechberg said of the attacking aircraft: ‘They were moving so slowly that they seemed to be standing still in the air, and they looked so antiquated. Incredible how the pilots pressed their attack with suicidal courage, as if they did not expect ever again to see a carrier.’25 Gick attacked from the port bow, Esmonde from the port beam, and the rest from starboard. Esmonde noticed Bismarck was nicely silhouetted against the setting sun. Amazingly, only one of the biplanes was hit and they all reached their attacking positions. The three Swordfish of Esmonde’s flight dropped their torpedoes at a height of 100ft, then turned away, pursued by a hail of flak.

  Despite this, Kapitän Lindemann was able to turn Bismarck and comb the torpedo tracks (steering the ship so the torpedoes passed harmlessly by her like hair running through a comb). He did the same when Gick led his attack, but he couldn’t evade all of the eight torpedoes. Sub Lt Lawson, attacking from the starboard beam, released his torpedo and turned away, while Bismarck’s helmsman was busy evading the torpedoes coming in from the port side. One of the Fulmars saw a huge column of water erupt on Bismarck’s starboard beam. On the Bismarck, Müllenheim-Rechberg recalled feeling a slight shudder, but the explosion was absorbed by the armoured belt and did little damage. However, one crewman was killed – the battleship’s first casualty – and six injured. Despite this, not only did Bismarck survive the attack, but the crew were also heartened since it seemed that her armour was impervious to aerial torpedoes.

  Now came the problem of landing back on their carrier. She was roughly 100 miles away to the north-east, and Esmonde led his planes towards her estimated position. Unfortunately, her homing beacon had broken down and so they had to reach her by dead reckoning – no easy feat in the dark, wind and rain. Captain Bovell expected them back by 01.00 and had signal lamps and searchlights switched on to guide them in, but the rain reduced visibility to almost nothing. The minutes ticked by, and now he worried they would run out of fuel. This possibility was going through Esmonde’s mind too, until at 01.55 he spotted the red signal lamp on one of the cruisers. Dropping down, he and his pilots found the carrier,
and one after the other the Swordfish landed safely.

  Three of them had never made a night landing before. One plane ran out of fuel as it was landing, but made it down safely and was snagged by the carrier’s arrester wires.26 Eventually, all nine Swordfish and their crews were accounted for. Two of the three Fulmars weren’t so lucky: they had to ditch in the sea, but their crews were rescued. So ended Victorious’ first air strike. Given the conditions and the lack of experience of most of the air crews, it was lucky that they’d scored a hit at all. It was even more surprising that everyone had made it back, or at least was still alive. Unfortunately for Admiral Tovey, however, that one torpedo hit hadn’t been enough to slow down the Bismarck. Now he had to hope Wake-Walker could maintain contact through the night so his capital ships could intercept the German battleship in the morning. He now estimated that would take place at around 09.00.

  It wasn’t to be. During the air strike, and while passing the Medoc, Wake-Walker’s force had temporarily lost contact with the Bismarck. Radar contact was regained by Suffolk at 01.10, and 20 minutes later lookouts on the Prince of Wales spotted her, some 16,400 yards (8 miles) away to the south. She fired two salvos with her working forward guns and Bismarck replied with her four after guns, but neither side came close to straddling the enemy. However, by then it was clear that the high-speed manoeuvring to avoid the torpedoes had dislodged the collision mats covering the shell holes from the morning’s battle. Because of this, Bismarck had to slow to 16 knots to allow divers to replace them over the holes in the hull. This was completed by 02.00, by which time Lütjens had reported his ‘immaterial’ torpedo hit to Group West, as well as his skirmish with ‘King George V’. Now, with his speed back, it was time to try to evade his pursuers.

  The Germans had noticed that for the past hour or so the British cruisers had been steering a zigzag course. This was because the Admiralty had intercepted German signals that suggested a screen of U-boats was being assembled to block their path, causing Wake-Walker to order his ships to steam in an evasive pattern. This presented Lütjens with a heaven-sent opportunity. The Bismarck’s hydrophones and after radar allowed Lütjens to track these manoeuvres, and he soon saw that the British zigzag pattern took the enemy ships to the port side of Bismarck’s wake, but not over to the starboard side. So, at the height of the ‘zig’, the three British ships were roughly 13 miles off Bismarck’s port quarter, to the north-east. He also judged that Suffolk would be at the extreme range of her radar.

  Armed with this information, at 03.06, when the British ships neared the end of their eastward ‘zig’, Lütjens made his move, ordering an increase of speed to 27 knots and turning hard to starboard, heading directly away from the British ships.27 Sure enough, the British had temporarily lost radar contact. When they turned on their inward leg or ‘zag’, heading towards the south-west, there was no sign of Bismarck. This wasn’t alarming at first – everyone was dog-tired and this had happened before, only for the signal to be reacquired. By 03.30, though, Captain Ellis of the Suffolk was becoming worried. His radar was the best in Wake-Walker’s force, and she was the westernmost ship. So, if anyone would locate Bismarck again it would be her. By 04.00 there was still no contact, and Ellis was forced to tell Wake-Walker the bad news. The British commander ordered his ships to spread out, Norfolk heading west, Suffolk south-west and Prince of Wales south. They searched in vain.

  In fact, Kapitän Lindemann had headed west, then at 03.40 turned to starboard and steamed north, about 8 miles west of his original course.28 Now the British ships were due east of him, heading south. This meant that Bismarck was working her way astern of them. At 04.00 he turned towards the north-east, and at around 04.15 he bisected his original course, 11 miles north of where he’d begun his evasive manoeuvre. By then, the nearest British ship was 16 miles away to the south, and steaming in the wrong direction. Lütjens had pulled it off. After more than 33 hours of being shadowed, he had broken contact with Wake-Walker and his cruisers.

  By 04.30 Bismarck had turned on to a new heading of 130°, and was heading towards the French coast.29 Meanwhile, the British kept searching in vain for their elusive prey.

  Chapter 12

  Hunting for the Bismarck

  Tovey’s options

  On board the King George V, Admiral Tovey was roused from his cot by the bad news. He dressed and stepped into his Plotting Office next door, where Cdre Brind was waiting for him. Together, they considered the problem. Captain Ellis of the Suffolk lost contact with Bismarck at around 03.20 on 25 May. After fruitlessly attempting to reacquire Bismarck on radar, he told R. Adm. Wake-Walker in Norfolk. 1 Then the two cruisers and the battleship Prince of Wales spread out and searched to the south and west, but found no trace of the enemy ship. Wake-Walker also didn’t tell Tovey about this until well after 05.30. So, at roughly 06.00, Brind inscribed a circle on the chart, centred on Bismarck’s last known position. Depressingly, at 28 knots, its diameter was over a hundred miles across. The German battleship could be anywhere in that circle, which was expanding by the minute.

  So, as Tovey didn’t have the ships and aircraft to search everywhere, he had to make some hard choices. First, Wake-Walker informed him that his ships had spread out in a quadrant, to the south and west of Bismarck’s last known position.2 Dawn was approaching, and while no contact had yet been made, at least the improved visibility meant that Wake-Walker’s cruisers could launch their floatplanes. Prince of Wales had lost hers in the Denmark Strait. During the night, Repulse and Tovey’s flagship King George V continued on their original course towards the south-west, as Tovey had hoped to intercept the Bismarck at around 09.00 the following morning. Now, though, it was clear that wasn’t going to happen. At 06.00, he therefore ordered Wake-Walker to release the Prince of Wales to him, hoping that if Bismarck were found he’d have the firepower to deal with her. This was necessary as Repulse was running low on fuel, and would soon have to break off to replenish.

  That left Wake-Walker’s two cruisers, which continued their search to the south and west of Bismarck’s last position. Meanwhile, to the north, R. Adm. Alban Curteis, who had command of the 2nd Cruiser Squadron, had also fanned out his light cruisers Aurora, Neptune and his own flagship Galatea, as they searched to the north of Wake-Walker’s ships. Kenya stayed with Victorious, which as the news broke was preparing to launch her own search aircraft. Captain Bovell was disappointed that the three Fulmars he had sent up at 04.00 hadn’t managed to maintain contact during the night.3 Still, he was hopeful that his newly blooded Swordfish crews would find the enemy battleship, despite the murky visibility. In fact, at 07.00 he was preparing to launch seven Swordfish, led by Lt Cdr Esmonde, to probe the waters to the east of the carrier. He sensibly thought that if Bismarck were heading to the French coast, that’s where his airmen could find her.

  Then, at 07.16, as the aircraft were preparing to take off, a signal arrived from Admiral Tovey.4 It ordered Bovell to send his aircraft out to the north and west, fanning out in a quadrant. So, Bovell had to change Esmonde’s orders. The Swordfish then took off and began their search – one that would prove fruitless. The reason for Tovey’s decision was simple: he had limited resources and he had to consider all the likely options. Bismarck’s course during the previous evening suggested she was probably heading towards the French coast, but she might also be doubling back and heading home through the Denmark Strait. This was the more dangerous of the two options, as the Bismarck in Brest or St Nazaire could be more easily neutralised by the RAF.

  For Tovey, though, the most dangerous option was if Bismarck was planning to refuel from a German tanker in the mid-Atlantic and then rendezvous with the Prinz Eugen. The point where contact was lost with her lay astride the main transatlantic convoy lanes, and several British convoys were to the east and west of her last known position. Therefore, she might be planning to attack them, so they had to be protected or moved out of the way. Of the three possible options, the French port one was the least th
reatening. Had he known it, by simply reversing course he could have intercepted Bismarck in a few hours; she was only 100 miles away at the time. The admiral, of course, lacked the gift of hindsight and instead had to make his plans based on his own professional assessment of the situation.

  Meanwhile, he began marshalling his resources.5 He had three groups of warships concentrated in the area. First, there was his own force: King George V and Repulse. Heading towards them from the north-west was Captain Leach in the Prince of Wales, whose crew were still battling to overcome their gun’s technical problems. Further to the north-west was Wake-Walker with Norfolk and Suffolk, both searching for the elusive Bismarck. To the north was Curteis, with Victorious and the 2nd Cruiser Squadron. All three groups of ships were now engaged in fruitlessly searching to the north and west of Bismarck’s last position.

  To the east of Tovey was Captain Dalrymple-Hamilton, commanding the battleship Rodney. Having been detached from escort duties and accompanied by the destroyers Somali, Mashona and Tartar, she was now en route to join Tovey. Far to the west, between him and Newfoundland, the old battleship Ramillies was steaming east to help protect the now-exposed convoys. Her sister ship Revenge was in Canadian waters. Still, Rodney would more than make up for the loss of Repulse, which was about to steam off to refuel.