Khrushchev's Cold War

by Aleksandr Fursenko

  Eisenhower was among those who were most alarmed by the situation in Laos. This contrasted sharply with the cool head that he had displayed during the missile gap debate earlier in the year. Perhaps because the president knew less about the developing world than he did about the strategic balance, any perceived Soviet gains in the third world touched an exposed nerve. In what became a famous metaphor, he compared Laos to a piece in a game. “[T]he fall of Laos to Communism could mean the subsequent fall—like the tumbling row of dominoes—of its still-free neighbors, Cambodia and South Vietnam and, in all probability, Thailand and Burma. Such a chain of events would open the way to Communist seizure of all Southeast Asia.”18

  Washington really had no clear idea of what was happening in Laos. In the words of an administration staffer, the problem of intelligence there was “a question of gathering data on the basis of two men who met on a jungle path in the middle of the night.”19 Eisenhower later recalled that “we studied intelligence reports day-by-day and sometimes hour-by-hour.”20 But this did little to clear the fog in what the president described as “this mysterious Asian land.”21 A general pessimism about the strength of communism—or the weakness of liberalism—in Southeast Asia led to a tendency to opt for worst case assumptions, even in the absence of hard data. As of October, Eisenhower and his team believed that “Souvanna Phouma was either an accomplice or a captive of Captain Kong Le who, himself, was an accomplice of the Communist Pathet Lao.”22

  THE SOVIETS also had no idea what was going on in Laos in October, but there was some hope they might find something out. Moscow’s appointed ambassador, Aleksandr Abramov, the current Soviet ambassador to Cambodia and a former envoy to Israel, arrived in Laos on October 13, 1960. He had been nominated as ambassador five days earlier. One of his missions was to send Moscow a deeper assessment of the character of both Souvanna and Kong Le. A useful source of information was the Indian ambassador in Vientiane, Patnom. According to the Indian diplomat, Kong Le was the most popular man in Laos.23

  The Indian also reinforced the Vietnamese view that the U.S. aid program in Laos had been a political failure. Few Lao villagers benefited from the assistance. He told Abramov that of the thirty to thirty-two million dollars in aid, twenty-five million went to the army, an additional three and a half million went to pay for the activities of the U.S. team in the country, and one and a half million was allocated to pay off the Lao budget deficit.

  Kong Le asked to see Abramov within a few days of his arrival. He wanted the Soviet diplomat to meet with representatives of the Neo Lao Hak Sat, the political wing of the Pathet Lao. Abramov was careful not to. Having not yet met with the king, he lacked official blessing as an ambassador to the court. Moreover, he worried that any meeting with the Pathet Lao, but especially one that came before he had seen Souvanna, would confuse the neutralist and the king about the nature of his mission.

  When Abramov finally met Souvanna on October 27, the Lao leader wasted no time in telling him that the Laotians needed fuel “as much for military as civilian purposes.” They needed airplane fuel and diesel for automobiles. The government was building a road to the Burma-Lao border that was scheduled to be completed by December, but in the meantime Souvanna hoped the Soviets would provide fuel supplies by air.24

  MOSCOW’S PASSIVITY in Laos continued. The Kremlin waited to hear from Souvanna again before doing anything about his request for aid. There is also no evidence that Moscow stepped up aid to the Pathet Lao. Meanwhile the neutralist government’s hold on power began to deteriorate rapidly. On November 14 the government garrison guarding the royal capital of Luang Prabang joined the antigovernment forces led by Phoumi Nosavan. Souvanna tried to project an air of confidence, telling reporters, “[W]e are taking steps to retake Luang Prabang.”25 But privately his doubts were mounting. When Luang Prabang fell to its ally, Washington dropped its pretense of neutrality. On November 15 it advised the Laotian prime minister not to try to retake his own capital. “It…seems to us that such an open use of force would further exacerbate the situation,” announced the State Department’s spokesman; “it would lead to further divisions and might facilitate additional communist gains.”26 Instead it was Washington’s intervention on behalf of the rightists that was to be the greatest catalyst for Communist gains. Even though he knew Phoumi Nosavan was supported by the United States, Souvanna had requested a continuation of U.S. military assistance for the Royal Lao Army. Privately Washington told Souvanna not to expect any more U.S. military assistance, leaving him few options to maintain a semblance of control over his country. On November 17 his government announced it would recognize the People’s Republic of China and send “goodwill missions” to Hanoi and Beijing.27 The following day Souvanna took members of the Pathet Lao into a coalition government. The Lao government and the Pathet Lao then issued a joint announcement that Laos had accepted aid from Beijing and Hanoi.28

  Abramov, who was still Soviet ambassador to Cambodia, was back in Phnom Penh in the midst of planning Prince Norodom Sihanouk’s state visit to Moscow when he received word that Souvanna Phouma wanted to meet with him in Vientiane as soon as possible. Souvanna had sent his request on November 19, and by November 22 Abramov was back in Laos.

  The next day, November 23, Souvanna Phouma described a bleak situation to the Soviet ambassador.29 As the result of a blockade established by the Thai government with U.S. blessing, the Lao economy was “completely disorganized.” He estimated that many thousands of tons of food intended for his citizens were rotting at the port of Bangkok. The official capital was now without sugar, lard, and milk products.

  Besides requesting airlifts of food, Souvanna wished to broach a more sensitive subject. His army lacked sufficient supplies to carry on the war with Phoumi Nosavan because the United States was now refusing to provide any military assistance to the Royal Lao Army. Souvanna explained that sometime before, a list had been sent to the U.S. military mission of necessary supplies for three infantry battalions and two airborne battalions. Abramov noted: “Souvanna said this list represents the maximum and the Lao government would be happy if the Soviet government gave us 1/2 or even 1/5 of what is on the list.” Souvanna added, “We need…pistols, automatics, machine-guns, mortars, grenade-launchers, machine guns, light artillery and ammunition for all of this.” Souvanna also did not mince words about when it should arrive: “All of this is needed as soon as it can be brought here.”

  Souvanna explained that the loss of Luang Prabang had been “a great misfortune to the country,” and he had received reports that the military situation might get worse. Phoumi Nosavan was receiving U.S. military assistance and U.S. dollars. As a result, Souvanna revealed that he was trying to form a government of national unity, with representatives from his group, the Pathet Lao, and even Phoumi Nosavan’s “revolutionary committee.” Souvanna explained that he had talked to his half brother about how this was the only way to avert a wider war. “Without the foreign intervention,” Souvanna said, “there would be no division in the country.” Souphanouvong and other members of the Pathet Lao leadership had agreed to the proposal for a government of national unity.

  The meeting with Abramov pleased Souvanna. The Soviets reaffirmed their agreement to provide food and fuel to Vientiane, and Souvanna left the meeting believing these would arrive by an emergency airlift “within three or four days.” He did not know if he would be receiving any weapons. Although the meeting had been private, he had announced his intention to request economic and “perhaps” military assistance from the Soviets at a press conference a few hours before he met Abramov.30 The Laotian did not want to poison any future negotiations with Phoumi Nosavan or the United States by acting in a sneaky manner. Following the meeting, Souvanna told the press that the Soviets had agreed to airlift milk, floor, sugar, and 220,000 gallons of gasoline to Laos very quickly.31

  EVEN BEFORE Souvanna announced he would be getting Soviet assistance, the Eisenhower administration had been looking for reasons to unlea
sh its allies on the Laotian right. The defection of the garrison at Luang Prabang had changed the military situation on the ground in Phoumi Nosavan’s favor, and Souvanna’s subsequent decision to bring the Pathet Lao into his government and recognize Red China provided a welcome excuse to let Phoumi Nosavan launch an all-out attack on the neutralist government. Washington was not impressed with Souvanna’s announcement on November 20 that he would be broadening this government to include supporters of Phoumi Nosavan, seeing this as purely a tactical move. On November 21 President Eisenhower ordered U.S. representatives in Laos to “take the wraps off Phoumi right away.” The State Department quickly instructed the commander in chief, Pacific (CINCPAC) to forward CIA payments to Phoumi Nosavan’s forces, to give him necessary air support, and to “remov[e] any military restraints hitherto imposed by us on Phoumi.”32

  Phoumi Nosavan had been waiting for Washington to give him a green light to attack Souvanna’s forces, and he wasted little time in taking advantage of his new opportunity. On November 30 he launched an assault from his headquarters at Savannakhet on the border with Thailand, a hundred miles south of Vientiane.33 His strike force was small by U.S. and Soviet standards, consisting of only three battalions with some tanks, but in the Laotian conflict it was frighteningly large.

  The situation quickly unraveled in Vientiane. On December 2 several hundred demonstrators friendly to the Pathet Lao denounced Souvanna’s efforts to create a broad coalition that included Phoumi Nosavan. “The choice is yours,” a beleaguered Souvanna announced from the steps of the National Assembly, “peace or war. If you want war you can have my resignation.”34 Meanwhile Souvanna asked Phoumi Nosavan for a cease-fire and sent a message through the U.S. ambassador to ask Eisenhower to stop assisting Phoumi Nosavan so long as he continued the fighting.35

  Despite the perilous situation of Souvanna and his Pathet Lao allies, the Kremlin lacked a sense of urgency about events in the country. The promised Soviet food and petroleum supplies were expected by the end of November. On December 3 the Soviet Embassy in Vientiane announced that the first shipment of petroleum products would arrive that day. Abramov hurried to the airport to discover that the plane, which arrived several hours late, was carrying only pilots “on a familiarization run.”36 The first Soviet supplies finally arrived two days later. Five Il-14s brought merely forty drums of oil.37 On December 6 Abramov formally announced the start of the Soviet airlift of petroleum. “The Soviet Government and people always accord assistance to their friends who find themselves in danger,” he said at the Vientiane airport in front of Soviet pilots and their World War II–era planes, some of which had just been used to ferry assistance to Lumumba’s forces in the Congo.38

  Abramov’s words had moved him far ahead of Soviet policy. In Moscow, Khrushchev was still taken up with what he considered far more important matters to make any real investments in Laos. Representatives of eighty-one Communist parties came to Moscow for a special meeting ostensibly to discuss the international situation but in fact to manage the Sino-Soviet dispute. The Kremlin got around to considering Souvanna’s request for military aid only on December 7, the day after the delegations had left Moscow. Abramov, still shuttling between Vientiane and Phnom Penh, was immediately instructed to tell Souvanna that his request had been approved. The Soviets promised light weapons for the Royal Lao Army’s three infantry battalions and two airborne battalions. But Moscow did not pick up on the need to send the weapons quickly. The instruction to Abramov was that delivery would be made in December and January. Moscow also requested overflight permission from Beijing and Hanoi to deliver these weapons directly to Laos.39

  The Vietnamese greeted the news that Moscow was finally going to do its part in Laos with some disappointment. Soviet weapons were to go to Souvanna’s government and not to the Pathet Lao. It would be up to Souvanna to determine what was shared with the Pathet Lao. The Vietnamese, who expected an armed struggle between the Pathet Lao and Souvanna once Phoumi Nosavan was defeated, saw Moscow’s policy as shortsighted.

  IN SPITE OF the preferences of his Vietnamese ally, Khrushchev had decided to view Laos as a testing ground for a more flexible and muscular form of the peaceful coexistence strategy. Recently in Cuba and the Congo, the Soviet leader had learned that he had to take real risks to defend ideological allies in the developing world. In Laos he would build upon those lessons but apply the policy differently. Moscow would continue to support its ideological allies but over the objections of the local Communists, it would also forge a tactical military alliance with the neutralists. The reasons were complex. Believing that the United States held a decisive military advantage in the area, Khrushchev rejected the optimism of the North Vietnamese and the Chinese that violent revolution could succeed in the region regardless of Washington’s preferences. The Soviet strategy would instead be to buy some time to allow the Pathet Lao to become politically dominant in Laos. Accordingly, Khrushchev wanted the Lao Communists to join in the neutralists’ united front, which would be armed by Moscow and strengthened by international agreement. “The fundamental task with regard to Laos,” the Soviet Foreign Ministry wrote in an early 1961 position paper, “is to struggle for the liquidation of the sources of international intervention in this region and the neutralization of this country.”40

  The promotion of Souvanna Phouma became the centerpiece of the Soviet strategy in Laos. He had international credibility, and his vision of a neutral, nonaligned Laos was the right one for the medium term. Since the United States would provide weapons to Souvanna’s enemy, Moscow was determined to match that military assistance to ensure that the neutralists won. Thus could Khrushchev make a point to Washington, Beijing, and Hanoi.

  WHEN ABRAMOV finally received word on December 10 that the Kremlin had agreed to send weapons, it seemed as if this help would arrive too late. With Phoumi’s forces only fifty miles from Vientiane, there was panic in the air. The day before, the situation had forced Souvanna to declare that the capital, with its population of 110,000, would be not defended. On December 9, Souvanna’s minister of information, Quinim Pholsena, had requested Soviet assistance in flying to Hanoi to hand deliver a letter from Souvanna to Ho Chi Minh that requested immediate military assistance. Abramov provided his plane, and Pholsena received promises of Vietnamese support.41 Three days later Pholsena, supported by Kong Le’s troops, who had rushed to Vientiane for the last stand against Phoumi, established a provisional government to replace the collapsed Souvanna regime. Souvanna had already left the capital.

  Pholsena was very pro-Soviet, but his elevation did not alter Khrushchev’s handling of the situation. The Soviet leader made no public comments about Laos. Soviet spokesmen decried U.S. support for Phoumi Nosavan’s “aggressive” actions, but the Kremlin chose not to warn Washington about the consequences of this policy.42 Modest military support was Moscow’s only response to the emergency. The first of the Soviet military deliveries arrived on December 12, when Kong Le’s forces received a shipment of howitzers.43

  The Soviet artillery pieces did not come in time to prevent the fall of Vientiane. On December 20 Abramov and the remaining members of Souvanna’s government had to leave the city or face capture. By the end of the month the Soviet airlift of military supplies had begun to tip the balance in favor of the neutralist government. Using Hanoi as the central staging area, six Soviet Li-2 transports carried supplies to Kong Le’s forces and the Pathet Lao in the eastern part of the country, nearest the border with North Vietnam. On December 31 the resupplied Lao forces launched an offensive, causing alarm in the White House and relief in the Kremlin. In under a month Kong Le and the Pathet Lao had retaken Vientiane and pushed Phoumi’s U.S.-backed forces out of central Laos.

  In early January the Soviets met with the Poles, the Vietnamese, and Souvanna to discuss the situation. The Poles, who with Canada and India constituted the international control commission that monitored the 1954 Geneva settlement, said that “the resolution of the Laos question now
depends on the military situation.”44 Moscow wasn’t so sure, and Khrushchev decided to associate himself with efforts by the Cambodian leader, Prince Sihanouk, to open an international conference on the crisis as soon as possible.

  The turnaround in Laos pleased Khrushchev. Soviet military assistance had been more effective at rescuing an ally than it had been in the Congo that summer. Nevertheless, he must have been aware that by delaying military assistance until Vientiane was on the verge of collapse, Moscow had almost misplayed its hand. At one point in December the Chinese representative in Hanoi had told his Soviet counterpart that Moscow had to “drop all the political nuances and do what it could to send arms to Laos.”45 Fortunately for the Kremlin, the conflict involved such small numbers of people and weaponry that, even late, the Soviet military airlift was able to prevent a complete collapse of the Communist and neutralist forces.

  As 1961 began, Khrushchev felt the need to formalize the lessons he had learned in the developing world in 1960. On January 6 he delivered a widely quoted speech on the problem of revolution in the third world. While not at all recanting his commitment to peaceful coexistence, he allowed that at certain times military action might be required to ensure the success of national liberation movements. With specific reference to the civil wars in Vietnam and Algeria, Khrushchev introduced the term “sacred war” to describe these violent struggles. Given all that he had invested in his politically based approach, this was a big concession for Khrushchev. What he now hoped was that this concession would not mean Soviet involvement in many future small wars.