Khrushchev's Cold War
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70. “Delegates’ Arrival in London of Suez Conference; Mr. Shepilov on equality of States,” Times (of London) August 15, 1956.
71. Compare Kuznetsov’s draft of “Soviet Declaration on the Question of the Organization of an [International] Conference,” August 14, 1956, in 01/02/20, to Shepilov’s draft, 01/02/19, MFA. Shepilov redrafted this document on or about August 20.
72. Telegram 10107, JFD to Washington, August 16, 1956, RG 59, State Decimal File, 974.7301, NARA-II.
73. Telegram 10119, JFD to Washington, August 16, 1956, RG 59, State Department Decimal File, 974.7301, 8-1656, NARA-II; also FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 16, pp. 206–09
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Telegram, August 17, 1956, FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 16, pp. 216–18.
77. DDE, August 17, 1956, ibid., pp. 218–19.
78. Memcon, August 18, 1956, ibid., pp. 221–26.
79. Ibid.
80. JFD to DDE, August 18, 1956, ibid., p. 227.
81. DOS to JFD (London), August 18, 1956, ibid., pp. 230–31.
82. DDE to JFD, August 19, 1956, ibid., pp. 232–33.
83. “Khrushchev Warns West on a Suez War,” New York Times, August 24, 1956.
84. Ibid.
85. Dmitri Shepilov, Pravda, August 5 and 10, 1996.
86. Edwin L. Dale Jr., “Suez Committee Asks Quick Reply by Egypt on Talk,” New York Times, August 25, 1956.
87. Dmitri Shepilov, Pravda, August 5 and 10, 1996.
88. Protocol 37 of August 27, 1956, AOK.
89. Kiselev to MFA, August 29, 1956, APRF.
90. Protocol 38, Presidium meeting of August 31, 1956, APRF.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Central Committee [hereafter CC] instruction, August 30, 1956, APRF.
94. Afiani and Ivanov, op. cit.
95. On February 24, 1956, Andrei Gromyko forwarded to Suslov and Molotov a request by Elliot and Frazer (Burgess and Maclean) to meet with two British Communist leaders who were coming to Moscow and with S. Russell, a correspondent for the Daily Worker, who was also expected in the Soviet capital, Fond 5, Microfilm Reel 4581, Delo 162, pp. 37–38, RGANI. On October 26, 1956, Khrushchev received a report on Burgess’s subsequent meeting with Tom Driberg and with Labour, MP Konni Zilliacus, Fond 5, Microfilm Reel, 4582, Delo 163, pp. 119–27, RGANI.
96. I. Tugarinov to Nikita Khrushchev [hereafter NSK], August 14, 1956, Fond 5, Microfilm Reel 4581, Delo 162, pp. 114–16, RGANI.
97. Afiani and Ivanov, op. cit.
98. Ibid. On September 6 a transcript of this conversation was distributed to the Presidium.
99. Afiani and Ivanov, op. cit.
100. Ibid. In early October the Presidium voted to authorize the KGB to send this security detail to Nasser because of the threat of assassination.
101. Percy Craddock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 117.
102. Ibid., pp. 117, 124.
103. Spravka, “O voennykh meropriiatiiakh zapadnykh derzhav v sviazi c natsionalizatsiei Egiptom kompanii suetskogo kanala [On Military Measures of the Western Powers in Connection with the Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company],” GRU, September 1956. From internal evidence it appears to have been written after September 27, 1956. Regarding eventual U.S. participation, the report stated that “the military forces of England, France and the United States in the Mediterranean are training for the carrying of landing operations.”
104. Tugarinov, “The Alignment of Political Forces in England on the Suez Question,” September 25, 1956, 087, 19/39/8, pp. 60–66, MFA.
105. Tugarinov, “On the Alignment of Political Forces in France on the Suez Question,” September 29, 1956, 19/39/8, pp. 69–75, MFA.
106. Shepilov cited in Kyle, op. cit., p. 272.
107. Afiani and Ivanov, op. cit.
108. Roosevelt, report of conversation on Suez, Cairo, October 9, 1956, RG 59, 58D776, INR, 1945–1960, Box 11, NARA-II.
109. Although not conclusive, it is suggestive that there is no evidence in Malin’s notes for the Presidium meeting of October 11 or in the Foreign Ministry archives that the Presidium acted on this request in early October. Also significant is that in their discussions of the Egyptian problem on November 4 and 5, 1956, the members of the Presidium made no reference to any direct Soviet military assistance offered in October. See Protocol 41 (continuation), November 4, 1956, and Protocol 52, November 5, 1956, AOK. For the U.S. response to this request, see FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 16, pp. 674–75, 678–81. The United States interpreted Nasser’s initiative as a welcome sign of Egyptian interest in negotiating a peaceful end to the crisis. But the administration did not apply any additional pressure on the British in the days that immediately followed. Indeed, Eisenhower did not believe what Nasser had said about his relationship with Moscow. On October 11 the president wrote to Eden that the Soviets had “developed quite a hold on Nasser.” Letter, DDE to Eden, October 11, 1956, ibid., p. 694.
110. During a meeting with the Egyptian ambassador on October 11 Shepilov got the impression that to achieve agreement, Cairo would accept a Western proposal to exclude Moscow from the Suez Canal users’ association. Shepilov to CC, October 11, 1956, APRF.
111. Television broadcast, The People Ask the President, October 12, 1956, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1956 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958) pp. 903–21.
CHAPTER 5: TWIN CRISES
1. Protocol 36, August 24, 1956, AOK.
2. Protocol 44, October 4, 1956, AOK. Khrushchev did not attend this meeting.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., p. 365.
5. Wayne G. Jackson, “Allen Welsh Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence, February 26, 1953–November 29, 1961,” vol. 5, Intelligence Support for Policy, unpublished CIA history July 1973, declassified 1994.
6. Ibid.
7. W. Scott Lucas, Divided We Stand: Britain, the U.S., and the Suez Crisis (London: Nodder & Stoughton, 1991), p. 215.
8. Percy Craddock, Know Your Enemy: How the Joint Intelligence Committee Saw the World, (London: John Murray, 2002), p. 121.
9. Khrushchev quoted in William Taubman, Khrushchev (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 293.
10. Ibid.
11. Taubman quotes from an autobiographical note on the Polish events of 1956 dictated by Mikoyan on May 28, 1960. Taubman, op. cit., p. 294, n. 86.
12. Protocol 47, October 21, 1956, AOK.
13. Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 317.
14. Ultimately the Anglo-French attack took place forty-eight hours after the Israeli attack. At the last minute the British delayed a little.
15. Spravka, “Military Actions by the Western Powers in Connection with the Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company by Egypt,” September 1956, GRU.
16. Spravka, “On Syrian President Shukri Quwatly,” October 1956, GRU.
17. Semyonov to el-Kouni, October 16, 1956, 087, 19/38/2, pp. 78–84, MFA.
18. Ibid.
19. Gromyko to NSK, with memcon of D. A. Elliot (G. Burgess) with Thomas Driberg, October 26, 1956, f. 5 (rolliki 4582), opis 30, D. 163, ll. 119–23, RGANI.
20. This is clear from Khrushchev’s statements at the November 5, 1956, Presidium meeting, AOK.
21. Note 3, Document 73, “Sovyetskii Soyuz i Vengriia Krisis 1956 r.: Dokumenty [The Soviet Union and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis: Documents]” (Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopaedia, 1998).
22. Protocol 48, October 23, 1956, AOK.
23. Ibid.
24. Mark Kramer, “New Evidence on Soviet Decision-making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises.” CWIHP, issues 8–9 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Soldiers, Winter 1996–1997), pp. 366–67.
25. This information comes from Protocol 81, October 28, 1956, AOK. In the notes Suslov is said to have reported that 600 Soviet soldiers had died and only 350 Hungar
ians, but this appears to be an error.
26. Ibid.
27. Chaim Herzog, “The Suez-Sinai Campaign: Background,” Selwyn Ilan Troen and Moshe Shomesh, eds., The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), pp. 8–9.
28. Cited in Kyle, op. cit., p. 358.
29. Ibid., p. 359.
31. Cited in Diane Kunz, The Economic Diplomacy of the Suez Crisis (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), p. 120.
32. Edward L. Merta, “The View from Washington, October 14–November 30, 1956,” May and Zelikow Suez compilation.
32. The letter was sent on October
33. Merta, op. cit.
34. The late Richard Neustadt made this insightful point at the Harvard-sponsored conference on Suez at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, February 15–16, 1997.
35. Memcon, October 29, 1956, 7:15 P.M., FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 16, p. 835.
36. Kiselev to MFA, October 31, 1956, MFA.
37. Nasser to NSK, undated [probably early November 1956], APRF.
38. Shetemenko (GRU) to Zhukov, October 30, 1956, GRU.
39. Protocol 49, October 30, 1956, AOK.
40. Protocol 49 (continuation), October 30, 1956, AOK.
41. S. Shetemenko to Zhukov, November 4, 1956, GRU.
42. Protocol 49 (continuation), October 31, 1956, AOK.
43. Kiselev to MFA, October 31, 1956, MFA.
44. Carol R. Saivetz, “The View from Moscow: October 14–November 30, 1956,” May and Zelikow Suez compilation.
45. Taubman cites a figure of twenty thousand Hungarian casualties and fifteen hundred Soviet casualties. See Taubman, op. cit., p. 299.
46. S. Shetemenko to Zhukov, November 4, 1956, GRU. For an excellent discussion of Nasser’s movements during this period, see Jon Alterman, “The View from Cairo: October 14–November 30, 1956,” May and Zelikow Suez compilation.
47. Protocol 52, November 5, 1956, AOK.
48. Oleg Bukharin et al., Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), pp. 177–79.
49. The Presidium approved the deployment of the R-5 only in late 1957. See Protocol 128, December 7, 1957, AOK.
50. Protocol 52, November 5, 1956, AOK.
51. Memcon, with the president, November 5, 1956, 5:00 P.M., FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 16, pp. 1000–01.
52. Cable, Paris to DOS, November 6, 1956, 2:00 A.M., ibid., p. 1012.
53. Kunz, op. cit., pp. 116–52.
54. Patrick Reilly Memoirs, Bodleian Library, Oxford.
55. Timothy Naftali interview with Chester Cooper, April 2005.
56. FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. 16, p. 1029, note 1.
CHAPTER 6: “KHRUSHCHEY’S COMET”
1. Naftali interview with Dino Brugioni, Havana, October 13, 2002. Brugioni was the CIA photo analyst who brought the briefing board to Eisenhower.
2. Keith Kyle, Suez (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1991), p. 545.
3. “Egyptian Proposal to Cooperate with U.S.,” November 8, 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States, [hereafter FRUS], 1955–1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office), vol. 16, p. 1087.
4. See Eisenhower’s comments at the 303rd Meeting of the National Security Council, November 8, 1956, FRUS, vol. 16, pp. 1070–86.
5. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956–1961; The White House (Garden City, NY.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 180. In response to the executive branch’s request for joint action, the U.S. Congress passed a joint resolution on the Middle East that the President signed into law on March 9, 1957.
6. Ibid., pp. 182–83.
7. For a concise discussion of the background to the Eisenhower Doctrine, see Robert D. Schulzinger, “The Impact of Suez on United States Middle East Policy, 1957–1958,” in The Suez-Sinai Crisis 1956: Retrospective and Reappraisal, ed. Selwyn I. Troen and Moshe Shemesh (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).
8. Protocol 58, November 20, 1956, AOK.
9. Protocol 61, November 29, 1956, AOK; Protocol 62, December 6, 1956, AOK.
10. KGB statistic quoted in Anne Appelbaum, Gulag: A History (New York: Doubleday, 2003), p. 579.
11. Khrushchev cited ibid., p. 514.
12. Protocol 62, December 6, 1956, AOK.
13. Ibid.
14. On the basis of her research in former prisoners’ accounts, Appelbaum writes that Hungarian sympathizers started showing up in the gulag in 1957. See Appelbaum, op. cit., p. 529.
15. For Mikoyan’s criticism of Khrushchev’s conduct of the Suez crisis, see meeting of October 14, 1964 [no protocol number], AOK. His critical comments on Suez in October 1964 were tame compared with those of Aleksandr Shelepin, who lambasted Khrushchev’s risk taking in the crisis. A general criticism of Khrushchev’s handling of that crisis appeared in the document prepared by the leaders of the coup that successfully removed him in October 1964. Many of the coup leaders were his protégés in 1957. See “The Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the October Plenum of the CC of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,” “Not Later than October 14, 1964” (draft), RGANI.
16. Protocol 68, January 11, 1957, AOK. Perhaps because he was vulnerable to criticisms that he had invested too much Soviet prestige in Egypt, Khrushchev did ask his colleagues if giving this support would “draw us into giving [further] assistance to Egypt.” But with the exception of some grumbling by Molotov support for this arms package was strong.
17. Instruction, Moscow to Damascus, March 27, 1957, MFA.
18. Protocol 89, April 13, 1957, AOK.
19. Protocol 90, April 18, 1957, AOK.
20. Protocol 89, April 13, 1957, AOK.
21. Ibid., Protocol 91, April 23, 1957, AOK.
22. U.S. Department of State, United States Participation in the United Nations: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year [1957] (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1958), p. 17.
23. The trio disagreed over Khrushchev’s economic management reform. Kaganovich supported them; Molotov did not. Malenkov was cautiously supportive, almost neutral. See Protocol 85, March 27, 1957, AOK.
24. Martin McCauley, Khrushchev and the Development of Soviet Agriculture: The Virgin Land Program, 1953–1964 (London: Macmillan, 1976), p. 80.
25. Ibid., p. 91.
26. William Taubman, Khrushchev (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 305.
27. Cited in “Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, Major Speech Chronology,” Joseph Alsop Collection, Box 46, Library of Congress. This document is found among materials apparently prepared by the U.S. government and given to Alsop before his 1958 trip to the Soviet Union.
28. Ibid.
29. Cited in Taubman, op. cit., p. 305.
30. At a Presidium meeting in February 1961, Khrushchev disdainfully recalled Molotov’s, Malenkov’s, and Kaganovich’s reaction to his catch and surpass campaign: “[T]hey got frightened by the call to catch up with America. I was certain though that it [was] possible to catch up with America quickly.” Steno, February 16, 1961, AOK.
31. Ibid.
32. Protocol 88, April 6, 1957, AOK.
33. There were eleven full members of the Presidium in June 1957: Khrushchev, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Kirichenko, Malenkov, Mikoyan, Molotov, Pervukhin, Saburov, and Suslov.
34. Taubman, op. cit., p. 312.
35. Pervukhin, Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich all disagreed with Khrushchev. See Protocol 98, June 15, 1957, AOK.
36. Taubman, op. cit., pp. 310–24; William J. Thompson, Khrushchev: A Political Life (New York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1997), pp. 179–84. See also N. Kovalena, ed. Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, 1957: Stenogramma iyun’skogo plenuma CK KPSS i drugie dokumenty [Stenographic Account of June Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU and other documents] Moscow: International Foundation “Democracy,” 1998.
37. Cited in Thompson, op. cit., p. 184. Thompson has written a very useful summary discussion of the politics of the 1957 coup.
38. Paul Dickson, Sputnik: The Shock of the Century (New York: Walker & Co., 2001), pp. 94–95.
39. Dickson writes that the CIA and the Defense Department competed to see who could decipher the beeps first. Ibid., p. 113.
40. Ibid., pp. 105–6.
41. Sergei N. Khrushchev, Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), p. 259.
42. Ibid., pp. 88–89.
43. Cited in Dickson, op. cit., p. 11.
44. Ibid., p. 24.
45. Ibid., p. 117.
46. Geoffrey Perret, Eisenhower (New York: Random House, 1999), pp. 557–61.
47. Dickson, op. cit., p. 119.
48. Ibid.
49. John S. D. Eisenhower, Strictly Personal (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), p. 199.
50. Protocol 116, October 10, 1957, AOK.
51. Protocol 117, October 17, 1957, AOK.
52. Protocol 106, August 6, 1957. See Khrushchev’s discussions of this disagreement as part of the indictment against Zhukov, Protocol 121, October 26, 1957, AOK.
53. Protocol 176, December 24, 1955, AOK. Zhukov stated in a discussion on the navy, “We need floating bases.”
54. Protocol 103, July 26, 1957, AOK.
55. Protocol 117, October 17, 1957, AOK.
56. Ibid.
57. Protocol 118, October 19, 1957, AOK.
58. Protocol 120, October 25, 1957, AOK.
59. Protocol 121, October 26, 1957, AOK.
60. Protocol 117, October 17, 1957, AOK.
61. Richard P. Stebbins, The United States in World Affairs, 1957 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 138.
62. Protocol 122, November 2, 1957, AOK.
63. For a detailed description of U.S. and Soviet proposals and counterproposals for aerial inspection zones, see U.S. Department of State, Documents on Disarmament, 1945–1959 (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 1960), vol. 2, Documents 213 and 215 and Maps 1 and 2.
64. Ibid.
65. Protocol 116, October 10, 1957, AOK.
66. Protocol 126, November 15, 1957, Fond 3, Opis 12, Delo 1008, pp. 30–30a.
67. Aleksandr Fursenko interview in September 2005 with a former Kremlin guard, who had worked in this building at the time.
CHAPTER 7: COUP IN IRAQ