5. Charles Williams, Adenauer: The Father of the New Germany (New York: Wiley, 2000), pp. 23–24. Williams notes that the first mention of this story came in Adenauer’s authorized biography, written by Paul Weymar and published in 1955.
6. James Critchfield, Partners at the Creation (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2003), pp. 131–50.
7. The SPD chief, Erich Ollenhauer, was not a neutralist, but he opposed the possession of nuclear weapons by NATO troops in Germany and advocated a more concerted effort at negotiating with Moscow. To blunt SPD attacks on West German foreign policy, Adenauer made sure to emphasize his government’s support for the ongoing general disarmament talks at the United Nations.
8. Memcon, May 1, 1957, U.S. Delegation to the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, Conference Files 1949–1963, Entry 3051B, CF 878, RG 59, NARA II. The authors are grateful to Laura Moranchek for finding this document.
9. Memcon, Adenauer visit, May 26, 1957, Conference Files, 1949–1963, Entry 3051B, CF 888, RG 59, NARA II. Soviet belief in these assurances comes out in the text of Mikoyan’s meetings with Adenauer in April 1958. See 0757, FRG 1958, 3/17/3, pp. 30–51, MFA.
10. Hans-Peter Schwarz, Adenauer: Der Staatsmann: 1952–1967 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlages-Anstult, 1991). Schwarz, Adenauer’s authorized biographer, describes this as the zenith of Adenauer’s power.
11. Cable, DKE Bruce to secretary of state, March 24, 1958, 662a.00/3-2458, RG 59, NARA-II.
12. This was the general view of the Kremlin and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See “Results of Mikoyan’s Visit to Bonn,” May 1958, and “An Account of Soviet-FRG Relations,” August 1958, MFA.
13. Protocol 146, March 29, 1958; Protocol 147, March 31, 1958, AOK.
14. Memcon, Mikoyan and Adenauer, April 26, 1958, 0757, FRG 1958, 3/17/3, MFA; Soviet Embassy in Bonn, “Results of Mikoyan Visit to FRG,” May 13, 1958, 0757, FRG 1958, 3/18/16, MFA.
15. In November 1958 Khrushchev hinted at his assumptions about U.S. acceptance of a West German nuclear force. See Protocol 190, November 6, 1958, AOK. Marc Trachtenberg argues that U.S. policy toward nuclear sharing with its allies, including West Germany, was indeed “extraordinarily liberal” in this period, but apparently the Eisenhower administration either delayed consideration of Adenauer’s May 1957 request for tactical nuclear weapons or found some particular reason not to approve it. By 1960 the administration had shifted to a policy of preferring the establishment of a single European nuclear force over fostering national nuclear arsenals by its allies. Trachtenberg, op. cit., pp. 204–15.
16. CIA, Berlin Handbook, December 27, 1961, NSF, Kissinger, Box 462, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.
17. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin’s Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 196.
18. Hope Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet–East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis,” Cold War International History Project [hereafter CWIHP], Working Paper 5, pp. 8–21.
19. Ibid.
20. Gromyko to CC, November 3, 1958, 3-64-718, p. 185, APRF.
21. Ibid.
22. Protocol 188, October 23, 1958, AOK.
23. Protocol 190, November 6, 1958, AOK.
24. The authors are grateful to German historian Matthias Uhl for his counsel and assistance. Dr. Uhl and Vladimir I. Ivkin unearthed documents in Moscow and Koblenz that revealed the Soviet medium-range ballistic plan in 1955 and the much-delayed Soviet deployment to East Germany in 1958. See Matthias Uhl and Vladimir I. Ivkin, “‘Operation Atom’: The Soviet Union’s Stationing of Nuclear Missiles in the German Democratic Republic, 1959,” CWIHP Bulletin, issue 12/13 (Winter–Spring 2001), pp. 299–307. The Malin notes confirm that R-5ms were not deployed in 1956 during the Suez crisis, but they do not refer to any decision in 1958 to proceed with the East German deployment.
25. Hope Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall, Soviet–East German Relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 128.
26. Max Frankel, “Consumer Wooed at Moscow Fete,” New York Times, November 7, 1958.
27. The reconstruction of this event is based on Malin’s notes for the meeting and Mikoyan’s later recollections. See Protocol 190, November 6, 1958, AOK.
28. The description of Gromyko’s fear of Khrushchev comes from Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, a former Gromyko assistant, cited in William Taubman, Khrushchev (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 398.
29. John W. Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nichols, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement after the Second World War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1972), pp. 278–79.
30. Ibid.
31. Johannes König, “Comments on the Preparation of the Steps of the Soviet Government Concerning a Change in the Status of West Berlin,” December 4, 1958, GDR Foreign Ministry Archives, trans. Harrison, in CWIHP Bulletin, vol. 4, pp. 36–38.
32. Cited in Harrison, Driving the Soviets Up the Wall, loc. cit., p. 107.
33. CWIHP Bulletin, “Minutes from the discussion between the Delegation of the PRL [People’s Republic of Poland] and the Government of the USSR,” October 25–November 10, 1958,” from Douglas Selvage, “Khrushchev’s November 1958 Berlin Ultimatum: New Evidence from the Polish Archives; Introduction, Translation and Annotation by Douglas Selvage,” www.wilsoncenter.org (accessed February 20, 2006). Dr. Selvage did groundbreaking research in Polish sources for his unpublished doctoral dissertation, “Poland, the German Democratic Republic and the German Question, 1955–1967,” Yale University (December 1998).
34. Ibid.
35. Khrushchev address, November 10, 1958, U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985. Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 542–546.
36. Reilly to London, November 11, 1958, Prem 11/2715, National Archives—UK.
37. Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS, 1958–1960] (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), vol. 8, p. 69, n. 1.
38. Telcon, Dulles and McElroy, November 17, 1958, ibid., p. 81; telcon, Dulles and McElroy, November 18, 1958, ibid., p. 85. On November 16 Norstad formally requested permission to send a convoy of military trucks up the autobahn.
39. In a telephone call to Eisenhower, Dulles called these views “extreme.” Telcon, November 18, 1958, ibid., pp. 84–85.
40. In his memoirs, Mikoyan writes that Khrushchev made his November 10 speech without a preliminary discussion in the Presidium. In fact there had been a discussion, which Mikoyan attended. But Mikoyan objected to the fact that the Soviet leader had proceeded with the speech without any instruction from the Presidium. See Anastas Mikoyan, Tak Bylo (Moscow: Vagrius, 1999), pp. 604–05.
41. “Soviet to Submit Plan,” New York Times, November 15, 1958.
42. The men took pains not to speak of these truths where they could be overheard. Serov let his guard down once among Khrushchev’s family, and it was an event that remained indelibly printed on the minds of those who were there. It had happened during a lunch when Khrushchev was away from the dacha. Serov was being entertained by Khrushchev’s son-in-law, the editor of Pravda, Aleksei Adzhubei. Adzhubei was interested in recent requests from the Poles for the truth about what had happened in the Katyn Forest. For Khrushchev’s children, Rada, Adzhubei’s wife, and Sergei, the story was Cold War propaganda, fabricated to blame Moscow for something that Hitler’s henchmen had done. Serov’s response was as unexpected as it was disturbing. He stammered that the Belorussian chekists, secret service men, had been lamentably ineffectual: “They couldn’t cope with such a small matter.” Sergei Khrushchev then recalled how Serov “let the cat out of the bag”: “There was a lot more in the Ukraine when I was there. But not a thing was said about it, nobody even found a trace.” How many had Serov killed? How many had Khrushchev ordered Serov to kill? The Khrushchev children n
ever asked their father. They were too afraid. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), pp. 165–66.
43. See Protocol 188, October 23, 1958, AOK.
44. Notes by James Reston, November 19, 1958. Allen W. Dulles File, A. H. Sulzberger Collection, New York Times Archives.
45. Ibid.
46. Brooks Richards to Philip de Zulueta, November 19, 1958, Prem 11/2715, National Archives—UK.
47. Ibid.
48. Protocol 191, November 20, 1958, National Archives—UK.
49. Mikoyan, op. cit., p. 605.
50. Gromyko’s suggestion of an approach to the West German ambassador appears in a memorandum to the Central Committee dated November 20. It does not appear to have been prepared for discussion at the Presidium meeting of that day. There is no mention of it in Malin’s notes for that meeting. Moreover, the Presidium accepted the proposal on November 21 and assigned it the next protocol number. For the acceptance, see extract from Protocol 192, November 21, 1958, 3-64-718, p. 212, APRF, or References to Presidium decision 192/9 of November 21, 1958, in the Bischoff initiative materials at the MFA, 0757, FRG 1958, 3/18/14, and 065, Third European Department, 1958, 42/224/3, MFA.
51. Background on the initiative can be found both in the Russian Foreign Ministry Archive and in the Presidential Archive. In the MFA, see Briefing note for Bischoff, November 20, 1958, 0757, FRG, 1958, 3/18/14; in the APRF, see Gromyko to CC, November 20, 3-64-718, p. 197.
52. Gromyko to the CC, November 20, 1958, 3-64-718, p. 185, APRF.
53. Hans Kroll, Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters (Cologne: Liepenheuer U. Witsch, 1967), pp. 15–17.
54. Ibid., p. 19.
55. Extract from Protocol 192, November 21, 1958, 3-64-718, p. 212, APRF.
56. Memcon, Gromyko and Bischoff, November 22, 1958, 065, Third European Department, 1958, 42/224/3, MFA.
57. Memcon, Gromyko and Bischoff, November 24, 1958, 065, Third Department 1958, 42/244/3, MFA. This is how Bischoff described the meeting to Gromyko. This memorandum was distributed to Presidium members on November 27. A copy is in 3-64-719, p. 3, APRF.
58. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva, pp. 71, 103, cited and trans. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall, loc. cit., p. 109.
59. The Foreign Ministry’s draft of the note containing the free city proposal is dated November 22. See Gromyko to CC, November 22, 1958, 3-64-719, pp. 65–79, APRF. Khrushchev’s intervention may well have occurred on November 21 or 22.
60. Uhl and Ivkin, “‘Operation Atom,’” loc. cit.
61. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall, loc. cit., p. 129.
62. Protocol 73, February 6, 1957, AOK.
63. Extract from Protocol 192, November 24, 1958, 3-64-719, p. 5, APRF.
64. Mikoyan, op. cit., p. 605.
65. Telcon, DDE and JFD, November 24, 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 8, p. 119.
66. The British thinkpiece is summarized in Cable, DOS to Bonn, November 17, 1958, ibid; pp. 82–83. Selwyn Lloyd’s comments are in London to DOS, November 19, 1958, ibid., pp. 86–88.
67. Editorial note, ibid., p. 134; telcon, JFD, and DDE, November 30, 1958, ibid., pp. 142–43.
68. Embassy in Bonn to DOS, November 28, 1958, ibid., pp. 136–37.
69. This message was conveyed back to the Soviets by Bischoff, who met with Kroll after he returned from Bonn after the new note was published. See Memcon, Gromyko and Bischoff, December 3, 1958, Third Department, 065 1958, 42/224/3, MFA.
70. This final act in the Serov drama can be reconstructed from Mikoyan’s memoirs, op. cit., pp. 607–8, and Malin’s notes on the December 3 Presidium session: Protocol 194, “O Serova,” AOK.
71. Embassy in Moscow to DOS, December 3, 1958, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 8, pp. 148–52.
72. Ibid.
73. Uhl and Ivkin, “‘Operation Atom,’” loc. cit., Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall, loc. cit., p. 128.
74. Editorial note, FRUS 1958–1960, vol. 10, Part I, p. 207. The Soviet note was dated November 16, 1958.
75. December 18, 1958, Holeman File, General Correspondence, RMN, Box 347, NARA-LN.
CHAPTER 9: KHRUSHCHEV IN AMERICA
1. Mikoyan may have learned something about canneries, but it was his discovery of ice cream that had a profound effect on Soviet life. After tasting his first cone, Mikoyan received permission to license American ice-cream machinery. For the next thirty years, until the end of the Soviet Union, the standard Soviet style of ice cream imitated what Mikoyan had tasted in the United States.
2. Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956–1961: The White House Years (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1965), p. 340.
3. John S. D. Eisenhower, Strictly Personal (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), p. 218.
4. Ibid.
5. Note, Protocol 203, January 24, 1959, AOK.
6. William Taubman, Khrushchev (New York: Norton, 2003), p. 409.
7. In his fine biography of Nikita Khrushchev, Taubman relies on the recollections of Sergei Khrushchev to conclude that the Soviet leader was disappointed by Mikoyan’s visit (see pp. 409–10). In fact, the opposite was true, and this would help explain Khrushchev’s actions throughout the year.
8. Note, Protocol 203, January 24, 1959, AOK. Mikoyan returned on January 21.
9. See the New York Times front-page coverage of the press conference, January 25, 1959. At his press conference Mikoyan said that “the main thing was not the deadline but to have talks.”
10. Note, Protocol 204, February 11, 1959, AOK.
11. Soviet Draft Peace Treaty with Germany, January 10, 1959, Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of State, office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1985), pp. 594–607.
12. Memcon, August 1, 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1955–1957 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), vol. 16, p. 108.
13. SecState to DOS, February 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1993), vol. 8, pp. 321–22.
14. Note from the United States to the Soviet Union Proposing a Foreign Ministers Meeting on Germany, February 16, 1959, U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1944–1985, pp. 607–8. The basic model used by the CIA and State Department to understand Soviet politics placed Khrushchev as a captive of the hawkish members of the Soviet hierarchy and the Berlin issue as a Soviet ploy to undermine the unity of NATO. Under those circumstances, negotiations were really not possible. All one could hope for was that the Soviets would be dissuaded from continuing to pressure for these radical changes to the status quo in Germany. The note was an effort at dissuasion.
15. This is evident from Mikoyan’s comments at the February 21, 1959, Presidium meeting. See Protocol 206, February 21, 1959, AOK.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid.
18. Protocol 206, February 21, 1959, AOK.
19. Sir Patrick Reilly to Macmillan, August 25, 1958, Prem 11/5115, National Archives—UK. Evidence that Macmillan absorbed this view comes from a note from his assistant Philip de Zueleta to D. C. Tebbitt at the Foreign Office, September 1958, also Prem 11/5115, National Archives—UK.
20. Alistair Horne, Macmillan, 1957–1986 (London: Macmillan, 1989), p. 122.
21. Ibid., p. 125.
22. Patrick Dean (Moscow) to Hoyer Millar (London), February 26, 1959, Prem 11/2715, National Archive—UK.
23. Horne, op. cit., p. 126.
24. Protocol 219, May 24, 1959, AOK. On May 23 one Grishin cabled from Geneva requesting instructions for the use of one Libich. Grishin is not listed as one of the key Foreign Ministry officials accompanying Gromyko, and Libich has not been identified. However, from the Kremlin discussion it appears that Libich, who was possibly a European diplomat or journalist, was in contact with the Americans on behalf of the Soviet intelligence services.
25. Protocol 219, May 24, 1959,
AOK. At the same time, the Soviets decided to send Presidium member Kozlov to the United States to open the Soviet National Exhibition of Science, Technology and Culture in New York City in late June.
26. Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet East German Relations, 1953–1961 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 122.
27. “Protocol on the Guarantees of the Status of the Free City of West Berlin,” undated, but submitted to the conference by the Soviet delegation on May 30, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 13, pp. 810–11.
28. Herter to DOS, June 9, 1959, ibid., vol. 8, pp. 865–67.
29. DDE to NSK, June 15, 1959, ibid., pp. 901–3.
30. NSK to DDE, June 17, 1959, ibid., pp. 913–17.
31. Khrushchev cited in Harrison, op. cit., p. 127.
32. Ibid., p. 122.
33. Telcon, Herter and DDE, July 8, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 10, pp. 308–9.
34. Dwight Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 405.
35. Ibid.
36. Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach [CIA History Staff], The CIA and the U-2 Program, 1954–1972 (Washington, D.C.: Center for the Study of Intelligence, CIA, 1998), pp. 144, 162–63.
37. Ibid., p. 122.
38. Quoted by Dwight Eisenhower, op. cit., p. 46.
39. Once it became clear that Khrushchev would be coming to the United States, Eisenhower again placed a freeze on U-2 overflights of the USSR. Still concerned about Soviet missile development, he permitted the CIA to fly fourteen electronic intelligence-gathering missions along the Soviet border. These picked up the emissions from Soviet rockets during testing. Pedlow and Welzenbach, op. cit., p. 163.
40. Memcon, July 8, 1959, FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 10, pp. 306–7.
41. See FRUS, 1958–1960, vol. 10, pp. 307–19.
42. Receiving the invitation from Kozlov on July 13, on the eve of a trip to Poland, Khrushchev formally accepted a week later. NSK to DDE, July 21, 1959, ibid., pp. 324–25.
43. H. S. Foster, “American Opinion on Khrushchev’s Visit,” October 8, 1959, RG 59, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Subject Files, 1957–1963, Box 4, NARA-II.
Khrushchev's Cold War Page 79