One Hundred Days

by Sandy Woodward

  13 April

  The many calculations now made it look as if the most sensible date for setting off south would be 21st April – a matter of aviation fuel availability seemed then to be the critical factor. The overriding feeling was one of hurry though, and our experience was beginning to show that things tended to happen earlier than we had planned – most unusual and most heartening. I received a lunchtime visit from Captain Bob MacQueen (our man in charge of the Naval Party ashore), the Officer in Charge of the RAF detachment and the US Air Base Commander, who appeared to be under instructions to help us in any way he could providing he wasn’t caught at it. We completed our arrangements for the flagshift and thought we were beginning to get on top of our many problems.

  14 April

  We set off north in GLAMORGAN to rendezvous with HERMES for the flagshift. At the same time, BRILLIANT, COVENTRY, SHEFFIELD, GLASGOW and ARROW were sailed suddenly southwards from Ascension to establish a ‘presence’ as far down as possible without running out of fuel. So off they went at twenty-five kts with their tanker trailing along behind, with orders to stop with thirty per cent of fuel remaining, and then loiter until the tanker could catch up. I began to get a bit frustrated at about this time – every time I was allowed to gather a few ships together and train them to act as a cohesive group, they were seemingly whipped away and I had to start all over again. It says much for the Navy’s peacetime training that this was possible without total chaos.

  15 April

  After a busy morning heading north preparing to shift the whole staff to HERMES, I flew some 200 miles in an SK4 (Sea (Sea King Mark 4 helicopter) through brilliant blue skies to arrive on board HERMES. I was greeted by the Captain of the ship, Linley Middleton, whom I knew from MOD (Ministry of Defence) days – it seemed an age before. I arrived clothed in tropical whites with khaki green flying overalls on top – known as ‘Baby Grows‘, presumably because the legs stop about 6 inches shorter than most to suit the wearing of flying boots. The consequence of all this was a photograph in the national press of this ridiculous figure prancing about the flight deck of HERMES. However, at the time, you are a bit too busy to be worrying about such things.

  I think this day marked a personal change of gear in hindsight. I left my familiar surroundings in GLAMORGAN and my own business of destroyers and frigates for an aircraft carrier. I had never served on one before; I did not know the habits, language, geography or people. So I was forced to change – a sort of end of innocence from GLAMORGAN days of sunshine, exercises and visits, an open fairly careless sort of peacetime life. I had to change to the narrow confines of an aircraft carrier, very little open air, everything concentrated on aviation, a ship built to Second World War standards for battle robustness and by comparison, stark, dark and functional. All this was brought home particularly by my quarters for the next few months; a nine-foot-square cabin with a five-foot-square shower and WC off it, with a decor of cream painted steel and pipework.

  16 April

  ARROW, GLASGOW and COVENTRY all reported propulsion defects probably due to their high-speed run south, and I went, with five of my staff, to FEARLESS for discussions with COMAW and Commander 3rd Commando Brigade; this was the first opportunity I had had to do so. Discussions included consideration of possible landing areas which the Flagship’s log recorded as Stevelly Bay (in West Falkland), San Carlos Cove (which tells you how familiar we were with the geography) and Port Stanley. Our discussions seemed amiable enough to me – intended to settle arrangements for the forthcoming passage south and to narrow the landing options so that Special Forces reconnaissance could be more sensibly concentrated.

  That afternoon and evening, GLAMORGAN, BROADSWORD, ALACRITY, YARMOUTH, RESOURCE and not least INVINCIBLE all arrived at Ascension.

  17 April

  This was the big day for our meetings with the CinC/Task Force Commander and his staff, COMAW, Commander 3rd Commando Brigade and their staffs, and my own. Subjects covered the whole range of business, background, intelligence, communications, logistics etc., but centred on timings of the broad operational plan. By use of a basic ‘bar chart’ I was able to make it clear that while the Carrier Battle Group could and should arrive off the Falklands on lst May, the Landing Force, which needed to wait for INTREPID (the second LPD – Landing Platform Dock), could not arrive before 16th May. It further followed that, if the Battle Group was not to be on station for far too long without proper maintenance, the landing should not be delayed beyond 23rd May. This left two or three weeks for reconnaissance prior to landing and a further two or three weeks for the land battle, which it was felt would need to be over by mid-June at the latest. I must, of course, emphasise that all these plans for military action rested on the basis that, while political negotiations might succeed at any time, a contingent military plan had to be made which allowed for political failure to agree. Plainly, it is much easier to stop a complex military plan than it is to start it.

  The final decisions were taken for the Amphibious group to remain at Ascension doing essential business and waiting for INTREPID to catch up and for the Battle Group to sail at 1200 on 18th April and to make an overt passage south since:

  a. It was probably not possible to effect a covert transit anyway.

  b. The Args knew we were coming.

  c. We wanted to encourage them to believe we were coming in force with a feint towards Buenos Aires for the first leg and then a landing straight away in the FI (Falklands Islands).

  The intention behind all this was to get the Args to reveal their air and sea battle plans and in the process to reduce their forces as much as possible while we were still unencumbered with the amphibians. However, we had no great hopes for either, recognising that a sensible and well-informed enemy should beware of such a deception and wait for the ‘real’ landings if he can.

  18 April

  In fact, all ships sailed early in response to a reported submarine periscope which caused a major flurry. Although various underwater contacts were obtained, none was that good and eventually a sighting of a pod of whales dampened enthusiasm. It was nevertheless a useful work up and got the Battle Group away in good time.

  19 April

  I held a Staff and Commanding Officers meeting on HERMES from which our plans for the Exclusion Zone were developed. Basically we intended to enter the zone from the east at dusk, strike Port Stanley airfield at dawn with Sea Harriers [SHARS], bombard shore positions during the day, conduct an anti-submarine sweep in a likely Arg submarine patrol area and follow up with Special Forces ‘insertions’ the following night.

  From this date on, the original diary largely covers events but some amplifying comment is occasionally helpful. In hindsight, it was only now that the seriousness and reality of the situation struck home enough to make me keep my log on a daily basis: departure south from Ascension must have been the trigger.

  20 April

  Much (yet little) has happened. Transferred flag from GLAMORGAN to HERMES and now settled in quite well after three days. Relationship with Lin Middleton [who automatically became my Flag captain and Second-in-Command] OK. We went N [North] from Ascension to meet up, then returned to store, then off (after a whole day with CinC aboard discussing plans for future action) for FI, RESOURCE, OLMEDA, BROADSWORD, YARMOUTH, ALACRITY, INVINCIBLE and GLAMORGAN in company. BRILLIANT group [COVENTRY, GLASGOW, SHEFFIELD and ARROW] is still well ahead with their tanker APPLELEAF. Political scene has Haig nipping back and forth between capitals, but progress not yet apparent. Military scene has me under orders to go towards a 200-mile Exclusion Zone and make aggressive type noises – presumably in the hope that the Argentinians will just fade away; militarily not very sharp since, should the opposition decide to the contrary they will be able to carry out a co-ordinated pre-emptive strike on my flat tops [aircraft carriers] and ruin any chances we had of retaking the FI. It isn’t as if the Args had not already proved they were prepared to pre-empt – witness South Thule, South Georgia and finally the
Falklands themselves. Not happy with this state of affairs, not least since loss of our HVUs [High Value Units] would firstly solve the Args’ difficulties (and hence justifies a high price if need be) and secondly it could solve Mrs Thatcher’s difficulties too (she could call it ‘naval incompetence’ and gracefully wrap her hand in). Nasty thought. Coward [Captain of BRILLIANT] agitating to rush on ahead with his team and bash Port Stanley. Could swing it I expect. Though I’m not sure what he should do thereafter and it’d be splitting my force (against Rule 1), it would get the war under way before the Args can pre-empt on the CVs [anti-submarine aircraft carriers].

  21 April

  Coward still rabbiting on even after being told to ‘wait for me and stay out of trouble’. He is reading more into the ROE than is intended, and fancies starting the war all on his own. Can’t entirely blame him but a pesky nuisance all the same. My own intentions are to concentrate my force and ‘walk down to do the lot’ much as discussed with CinC. Meanwhile I shall have to amplify the ROE so that all COs [Commanding Officers] can know what I’m thinking rather than them apply their own interpretations – which might range from ‘ask them to lunch’ to ‘nuke ’em for breakfast’! At midday, while still a very long way off Argentina they managed to get an ex-Civil 707 [Boeing] out to have a look at us. We got a SHAR in – albeit later than pleased me. I think I shall have to have pickets [ships with long range anti-aircraft radar stationed well up threat] if we’re to get sufficient warning.

  22 April

  The 707 returned at 0300 but came no closer than twenty-six miles again – almost as if he knew about the twenty-five[-mile] limit and had us on his radar from well out. I don’t actually think he did since there was no alteration of his course from initial detection until he was well past. Tweaked Fleet [Naval HQ Northwood] to ‘leak’ instructions to shoot! Don’t suppose it’ll work. Args appear to think we have twenty-plus ships here. Will try to keep up the fiction, but Soviet satellites will probably give us away. YARMOUTH reporting his ESM [Electronic Support Measures – radar intercept]. TRACKER (Arg surface surveillance aircraft) radar out to NE/SE again. Don’t really believe it but sent SHARs on surface search just in case and tried to grab our tame Nimrod (maritime patrol aircraft). SSNs were sent up the coast to look for the Arg CVBG [Carrier Battle Group] but called back almost at once so that politicos could continue nattering. Used NIMRODs and SHARs to look over to East as result of YARMOUTH and BROADSWORD [intercepts of] radars over that side. Found nowt but I have to cater for the most dangerous as well as the most probable case. 707 returned at 2000 – AAWC [Anti-Air Warfare Co-ordinator] had three SHARs racing after it in a trice! Ridiculous so gave him a hard time. Not well handled our end either – helo [helicopter] slow to get airborne and CTs [Communications Intercept Technicians] not warned. You wonder how on earth we’ll ever get it to go right. Then we tripped over a surface contact (SHAR on CAP [Combat Air Patrol]). 16nm nav [navigational] errors didn’t help but useful SAGEX [Surface Action Group Exercise]. Ships slow to get on Cackle [secure speech UHF]. GWO [Group Warfare Officer] forgot to wind on main body speed when it was all over so we ‘lost’ sixty miles along track.

  As for the Boeing 707 visitation, he carried normal airliner lights and his nationality was not revealed until, when well clear, the attending SHAR reported that he waggled his wings and headed for home. I had been given to understand that civil aircraft cloud avoidance radar had no surface search capability – since this aircraft used his throughout, I began to doubt this intelligence fairly early. This was subsequently borne out when we finally learnt how to use it for this purpose from our own Hercules aircraft.

  The late detection of the surface contact incident reported here might possibly have been confused with a similar incident on the night of the 26th. Either way, the incident started with a SHAR report of a surface contact 115 miles away and ended with a Soviet merchant ship in amongst the Battle Group. Nothing for us to be proud of and another very useful work up for my still scattered force [see comments against 14 April]. Certainly, I was encouraged by some similar event that night to ask CinC to return the BRILLIANT group – which he obligingly ordered without further ado.

  23 April

  Minor worries on the Press front. Signal from MOD, not actually critical but not exactly delirious. Difficult this one: I’m under firm riding instructions to give Press ‘every facility’ and go hard for good PR, but, of course, at this stage the political scene is predominant and the military are following a day or two behind so there is always a danger of my pre-empting the politicos. I am, in fact, exceedingly careful not to be over-specific and to warn against quoting any of my speculations in a singular manner. Intercepted a Brazilian air liner - international scene!? Sent long state of nation and political ‘whinge’ to CinC as asked. Hurrying on towards the forward group. Lost a SK4 during vertrep: first casualty of Corporate [code word for Falklands operation].

  We were very close indeed to shooting this airliner down – it was approaching the force from south of east (not an impossible direction), on a steady course (which had happened before), and using its cloud avoidance radar (quite normal). ROE had been tightened up after the earlier visits but the SHAR alert aircraft was late off the deck and would not get into visual contact before the airliner entered the Battle Group’s missile engagement zone. With the air contact approaching the permission to fire range limit, there was time to check the South Atlantic airline schedules and find no warnings of civil flights were forecast as far as we knew. Despite this, something made me call for another check, this time for its flight path to be plotted on a large-scale chart. It was reported back to me that it could well be on the direct air route, Durban to Rio de Janeiro. With seconds to spare, missiles were put on hold. The SHAR subsequently intercepted and reported normal airliner lights. To this day, I am all too uncomfortably clear that we had been within seconds of the later South Korean 747-type disaster, and of the VINCENNES horror.

  24 April

  Tension is heightening. South Georgia op seems bogged down for fear of Arg SSK[diesel-electric powered submarine] SANTA FE. MRR (Maritime Radar Reconnaissance aircraft) incapable of useful surveillance at this range from ASC (Ascension) sadly. Slowed down by unforecast low [pressure area] giving F8 winds and swell from SE. A taste of things to come I fear. I’m anxious to catch up my forward group – having not been allowed to bring them back yet so I’m caught with our escort force ahead and my RFAs astern.

  I wrote home near the time: I’m starting this just in case opportunity arises to send it off because if it does, it’ll probably be a fleeting chance and I’ll miss it as like as not – unless I’ve actually written it. Like just about everything else at the moment the circularity of that remark is typical. Though we are, in fact, steering for the ‘sound of the guns’, progress is painfully slow and the political scene is far from clear. I am finding my time fairly pressed one way and another; there’s a world of things to try and to think ahead about – all in the nature of ‘If this sort of thing happens, in that sort of situation, what will I do about it?’ At the same time, there’s the minute to minute business of managing the force as events occur, a surface contact here, an Argentinian reconnaissance aircraft there (is a strike likely to follow it?), a sonar contact somewhere else. Is John Coward starting a war on his own? Does Mike Barrow know what he ought to be doing? Where on earth does Bill Canning think he’s off to? Can I trust Andy Buchanan to manage on my behalf for a few minutes while I have breakfast? And, behind all this, there’s the constant planning for tomorrow, next week, next month against a background of continuously shifting facts, non-facts, figures and sums that don’t add up. The Press hammer at my door every day and I must be careful not to give anything away or pre-empt the politicians but yet give them useful material and make them feel as wanted as everyone else, whether they are or not. Then there’s the ship’s TV to appear on so they can see the rabbit himself in a hot sweaty little studio practically inside the funnel. And if all t
his were not enough, Lin Middleton puts his head through the door and tells me that I really ought to fly over to RESOURCE (a stores ship of the RFA) to give them confidence in me and make them feel loved and protected. Altogether that last was a bit much – any spare time I have left is spent flat on my back either resting, or thinking, or trying to do both at once.

  25 April

  We’re through the low and cracking on. Quiet night. International scene hardening further. I remain very upset that I have still not been allowed to gather the BG together – hence it remains unworked up and dangerously vulnerable. During the day, we picked up all the other members of the BG (bar BRILLIANT) one by one and listened to the South Georgia action. After all the talk about recce and the submarine threat, the Arg guppy was caught (probably unable to dive anyway), hammered and driven ashore in Grytviken and the landing and surrender accomplished before the main party of Boots [Royal Marines] (in TIDESPRING) could be brought to bear from outside the 200 mile limit! On this occasion, the time spent in recce was largely spent rounding up the ‘brave’ Argentinians – 140 of them. By midnight, the Georgia problem appeared to be reduced to wondering what on earth to do with the prisoners. My main worry was how to control APPLELEAF and YARMOUTH as we made the final r/v [rendezvous] – both were running around like mongrels after a cat having totally lost their cool apparently. An unseamanlike and dangerous mess. Meanwhile Mike Barrow in GLAMORGAN has been nit picking over his authority (or lack of it) by the small print to obey/apply the ROE. “Confisticate” (local CTG [Commander Task Group] release for all to shoot) at least he does seem to understand, but the rest of his hang-up is probably more inspired by the Bandar Jissah syndrome than ought else.