One Hundred Days

by Sandy Woodward

  1530: after VALIANT warning of six high fliers out-coming, 1620 – four Mirages bang into AOA and 2 at LSLs in Port Fitzroy. PLYMOUTH apparently hit (did her Flasher [eye damage laser] work?) but fires reported under control. VALIANT reported two Mirages returned high (but may, of course, have missed some). (AOA reported one splashed, two damaged, one clear?) Fog of war. My main worry is for the LSLs though.

  At almost same time, USCG [Coast Guard] report that SS Hercules (100,000 ton tanker) 400 miles NE of FI attacked with bombs by four-engined aircraft: listing, on fire, making for nearest port. Liberian flag, US-owned, probably in ballast. CinC Fleet are sending hospital ship. Bad news for the tanker: possibly good political news for UK.

  Because of VALIANT’s (off Rio Grande) warning, we have been at ‘Exocet warning’ Stations for an hour and a half, but I don’t really expect them to come because visibility is four miles in haze.

  Later: my worries for the LSLs all too well justified – I could strangle that COMAW. After being told not to plan on putting INTREPID and LSLs into Fitzroy even with a frigate in daylight (but possibly given to understand he might consider one LSL a reasonable bet to get by unnoticed – see remarks 4/6) and what does he do but fire the Welsh Guards in by two LSLs in broad daylight with predicted good flying weather. COMAW is a c-t! [see Glossary]. I should have stopped him, of course, and it’s my own fault – if only I’d seen it coming in time. Hadn’t realised the two LSLs were out on their own until mid-afternoon when, almost without thinking, I decided not to countermand and hope they’d get away with it. Countermanding wouldn’t have helped as LSLs would still have been exposed albeit somewhere else with more kit/people on board and a good deal further to swim. Dammit – why can’t people do as they’re bloody told?

  2230: I now hear CLFFI is going to delay an extra twenty-four hours on top of the last seventy-two. His people will soon run out of steam I’m afraid – the cold front is due in tonight, and the trench feet etc. must be roaring away by now.

  And there seems to be stuff all I can do, except hope the Army get on with it and succeed before the Args nibble too much of our naval strength away. It is only a matter of time before the Args find some way to get at us effectively be it by submarine, A4s plus Etendards for attack direction, Canberra or whatever. Attrition is very difficult to cope with when your assets are both finite and critical to the operation; which is why it is so important to get off the hook on flat tops and Sea Harriers – almost everything else we can afford to lose albeit we don’t want to do so. I still see no likely end to this war and the only comfort is that the Args possibly don’t either. Repossession by UK of the Islands should set them back fairly badly, but the defence has to be on such a scale that they are totally discouraged for good otherwise they will be able to feed on small tip and run type successes while our politicians refuse to hit the mainland.

  I think what worries me most is that the Args will get hold of some new technology before our own people. LGBs [Laser Guided Bombs] would help them perhaps. Sub Exocet not an option, but their SMs could become a major pain. Aerial minelaying would slow us up – the list has to be endless.

  We will no doubt continue to be reactive because the penny pinchers must be in amongst us soon! So we must look for the cheapest but most convincing long-term defence. So far this has hinged round F4s [Phantom all weather interceptors] at PSA, and not gone much deeper. Radars also will be essential so we must try to keep the Arg radars for our own use since I doubt we’d ever get enough out of UK.

  9 June

  A quiet, too quiet night followed by a cold bright day. Args seem to have stopped flying again, at least no stirring by 1700 and it’s fabulous Etendard weather. CinC and I both managed to avoid saying ‘I told you so’ by a hair to CLFFI. Otherwise CinC had nothing to say except typically right at the end in a sort of throwaway remark that FOF3 won’t be coming as soon as we thought! Sounds like a ‘sine die’ sentence to me.

  By 1800 we have the classic raid warnings from Rio Grande again – expect arrivals at 1915 – plenty of warning really and may not happen. I fear we may have too much CAP up too early. Perhaps survivors’ leave will solve the roulement problem.

  By sunset – no raids at all – suspect the opposition are moving north – maybe they’re worried that RG and Gallegos are too exposed. If this can be substantiated, I should alter my habits, use southerly route to Carlos and generally bias my ops to south. SSN might be handy off Espora.

  10 June

  Lucky YARMOUTH didn’t sink Monsunnen last night. Bloody fools in Bluff Cove went to sea in her after dark, unannounced and bogged around off the Port Stanley minefield and getting in the way of the gun line. No wonder they have high casualties.

  This waiting is awful. I believe even the Args are getting fed up with it and threatening to attack. If CLFFI gets to hear about it, he’ll no doubt have to completely reorganise and delay several more weeks. If I had behaved like the land forces, we’d never have bloody well landed! I just don’t understand and therefore can’t accept these interminable delays: the Navy gets prepared and goes in within a day. These ceremonious duffers take two weeks for a recce. There seems to be no room for improvisation, initiative or even real skill: it‘s straight ‘left, right, left, right’ and most of it spent marking time. To my mind, the idea of ’mobile forces’ has been completely lost again and we must be as vulnerable to ‘blitzkrieg’ as we were last time. Absolutely appalling – they’re even waiting for their NAAFI packs now with cigarettes, soap and razors. The mind BOGGLES.

  As ever there has to be ‘a tide’ for us to catch. I already know we missed the first tide which was at about D+4 or 5, possibly a day later. We waited for 5th Infantry Brigade to land (after which you might as well wait for them to deploy) which gave Args time to reorganise their defences vs an attack from the west. No profit here for us; both sides have improved their capabilities ashore, only the Navy has gone downhill (another FF + two LSLs – not to mention about 1000 4.5 shells).

  And it’s easy to see that, bearing in mind that Args have better cover on the ground, the ‘wastage of capability’ rates will be similar except only that our naval power is on the verge of running out. Hence the ‘Tide’ is setting in our direction as strongly now as it ever will. This may or may not be strong enough but it’s the best we’ll ever get. Therefore, GO NOW and accept the risks. So far, it has to be noted, the land forces have lost half a major unit in this war; and that was effectively self-inflicted against advice. My mind continues to boggle.

  1430: no action in the air. YARMOUTH had an exciting night NGS firstly because they seem to have achieved something on the ground for a change, and secondly because in the middle of it the 5th Infantry Brigade went to sea in a Monsunnen as noted earlier. I guess the Arg Air are a bit buggered today and won’t come till dusk, if then. The rumour mongers [Intelligence Staff] are out in force today; Paras to drop more or less anywhere, massive Arg air efforts, even gas at Carlos now. Hope they’re not proved right.

  Sent only slightly miffed signal to CinC re long-term plans. Despite his bland assurances all is happening, I have not been consulted, which strongly suggests that either it is NOT happening, or that if it is, it won’t be right! Ho hum.

  Meanwhile my remark to no one in particular in the Force Ops Room that I intended sending the Army’s next NAAFI packs direct to Port Stanley has gone the rounds. I think an ‘eve of battle’ message might also be appropriate.

  1800: Still no action; but it seems important to keep going at a fairly high rate while weather holds and just in case they’ve got cunning, I’m keeping CAP going over AOA and Army positions.

  Threat Reduction

  Arg Navy

  RR nil – no strike air Gp. FF/DD nil – bust or frightened. SMs nil – I think mainly because I assess that Arg management now probably assesses FI lost and naval assets best held until ours thin out in a month or two.

  Air Etendard

  – no AM39s left.

  A4s
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br />   – few left, but still will come – relatively inexpert.

  Mirages

  – few left.

  Land

  Should find out soon, I hope.

  All this is overlaid by the assumption that Args won’t stop when they lose the Islands. Indeed, why should they? We are not attacking the mainland, not even inside their TML [Twelve Mile Limit] so while that ridiculous constraint on our action continues, they operate from a safe haven (like mine with the CVBG well back). If they do give in and stop at the end of the FI bit, they will surely lose their jobs and presumably their heads – all of which makes it easier for them to go on for as long as it takes for either UK to relax too much, or their own support to waste away.

  I must say, I don’t see that we can easily return to the status quo ante. The islanders will be much more anti-Arg after the recent events – particularly Goose Green; and I’d be anti giving up too after so many lives lost. Though I might be accused of throwing good money after bad, for it is going to be very expensive unless Args finally give up all claims to the FI.

  As a result of all this, I’m beginning to lay plans to return to the FI for Christmas if not sooner – this will depend on many things e.g.:

  a. May get the sack.

  b. FOF2 may be given a turn after FOF3.

  c. It may all fizzle out.

  But whatever happens, I don’t see the Falklands ever being the same again.

  Plainly not ‘ceremonious duffers’. Though no complaint was heard from ashore at the time, the loss of ATLANTIC CONVEYOR’s Chinook and Wessex 5 helicopters (which could be laid at my door) had a major effect on land force mobility. My impatience stemmed from chilling consciousness that the BG was running out of steam. This kind of comment is an excellent example of the dangers of reading too much into a contemporary diary; having written it, I felt a bit better and avoided sending an offensive and probably counter-productive message to CLFFI thereby.

  As for an ‘eve of battle message’, I several times felt the possible need for some kind of historic statement ranging from ‘England expects’ to ‘I have Scind’ but all the options seemed either pretentious, unoriginal or both.

  11 June

  A quiet night with the usual NGS, convoys, minesweeping and general change round. The opposition are beginning to understand what we are about all too clearly for my ease of mind, and it becomes yet more important to unhook the carriers from support of the land battle – and to finish the land battle so that Arg radars are taken over. Trying an early raid into Port Stanley with VT toss [bombs] to hack up their Pucaras – but very difficult as we don’t know where they [the Pucaras] are from one minute to the next. Once again it is as clear as a bell out here and calm with it.

  2100: Another day is done with little to mark it. The GR3s undertook four or so ineffective sorties: LGBs failed because designator u/s or asleep. CBUs [Cluster Bombs] aborted because a/c IFF [Identification Friend or Foe] failed. Next pair failed because LL [Low Level] delay action bombs skate/skip. Pointless – beginning to wonder if these people are earning their keep on board. Perhaps they’ll be more use in AD role as SHAR wing men will.

  Absolutely no Arg air activity today at all. Can’t help wondering what on earth they are at. CVBG largely denuded of escorts in order to give support to multifarious activities day and night, not least mending the bent frigates. PLYMOUTH will have to go home now I fear.

  I don’t quite understand why the A4s have never come at us in any numbers barring that one occasion. If they’d tried as hard as they did on D-Day, we’d be a carrier down by now and the whole operation in a shambles. Can’t help feeling this has to be the next effort, but I don’t really think so – anyway, the next few days will be crucial and the probabilities of disaster for the BG will start to recede. We have, of course, been lucky (and pushed it too). Their SMs seem to be ineffective so the policy of wait for a flaming datum and prosecute that has paid off! The mining threat, also with a policy of suck it and see rather than frightened rabbit, has paid off so far. I suspect the MSAs [minesweepers] don’t much enjoy being used in this way, but I haven’t got anything else. Even the Exocet bit – pickets, despite vulnerability, have paid in preserving the RRs so necessary to continued ops – as has Chaff Sierra even at the price of ATLANTIC CONVEYOR. Not comfortable policies any of them – and representing deliberate offering of attrition in areas not crucial in order to achieve the aim. That it all suits those who ride the RRs is a less worthy thought!

  Beginning to wonder about first few days after Stanley falls; may be chicken counting but it does need thinking through. Main priorities are:

  Rapier around airfield.

  MCM for harbour entry – can’t be impossible if BAHIA PARAISO can do it.

  Reckon UGANDA to enter with BP best answer? Or H Class [hospital ferry ships]?

  Rather too open a roadstead for keeping major units in, so BG remain well off to east.

  12 June

  The day of the big ‘land forces’ race. First reports are that progress is good but expensive, LONGDON, HARRIET, TWO SISTERS.

  0630 approx: GLAMORGAN (on S gun line with AVENGER and YARMOUTH) hit in gear room by Exocet twenty miles S Cape Pembroke.

  0650: still has power, making ten kts to S, fire reported under control and no need for INVINCIBLE F/F teams. AVENGER/YARMOUTH in company. Putting CAP overhead and will have to keep it there. Told them either to head for Fitzroy and Rapier cover (if unseaworthy) or head offshore and rejoin CVBG (if seaworthy). Decided against sending BROADSWORD in addition.

  0750: barring the galley, where the ‘fires not yet under control’, GLAMORGAN making eighteen kts on steam plant and ‘things improving’. No weapons system I suspect. Fingers crossed for the next hour but it is beginning to sound hopeful. However, there is a very long way to go yet.

  0800: seems a bit callous, but had breakfast. Once dispositions made, it’s so important to let people get on and not hassle.

  0820: no excitement obvious ashore – so maybe Args don’t know what they’ve done, or maybe they’re too busy on other things this morning.

  By 1000 it is becoming apparent that it was more likely to have been a Bull Pup-type missile or small bomb probably from a Pucara ex Port Stanley. Ships were just clearing area on completion of NGS and may have relaxed at precisely the wrong moment. Either way it does look as if night air attacks may be becoming fashionable and that our continued existence is going to depend on alertness and good missilry. Sea Cat [missile system], of course, quite useless so this ship is defenceless XMT CAP. Conclusions therefore:

  a. Don’t let the missile coverage fall away. 4 chans SD [channels of Sea Dart] fire all over.

  b. Keep plenty of Chaff Sierra near HVUs.

  c. Go to night CAP/Deck Alert. Fear Deck Alert not good enough as warning will be insufficient. It’s this damnable lack of AEW which is going to prove our undoing.

  d. Dusk/Dawn Action Stations?

  e. Warning signal.

  1130: GLAMORGAN looking better, fires out so now much same as PLYMOUTH. Easier to see her as attrition and an important reminder of it too. This is the process we are going to have to face apparently indefinitely unless we can bring effective political pressure to bear.

  To date attrition bill stands at two DDs sunk, 3 seriously damaged; two FFs sunk, two seriously damaged; one container ship sunk; two LSLs sunk, one seriously damaged.

  After much toing and froing, I think we are all agreed that GLAMORGAN was hit by a land-based Exocet (from Eliza Cove) in her hangar – surprisingly high above the water, twenty nm from the launcher, i.e. at near extreme range. Thus they were both unlucky to be shot at, and lucky to be hit as they were. Meanwhile we feel we know a lot more about the opposition. Sadly, it is the whole flight who were wiped out – about as many casualties as the Army had ashore.

  During the afternoon we celebrated a classic Etendard attack although it never reached even the outer screen. Timings were:

  1430-ish

 
VALIANT, off Rio Grande, intercepted C130 [Hercules transport aircraft] radar.

  1530-ish

  COURAGEOUS, in N TEZ, intercepted Handbrake (Etendard) radar to NW.

  1625-ish

  COURAGEOUS, in N TEZ, intercepted Handbrake to SE.

  1630-ish

  VALIANT intercepts inward bound C130.

  Allowing 400kts as Etendard speed, and an arbitrary twenty miles for COURAGEOUS Handbrake intercept ranges when low or 100 when not, we get a reasonably sensible deployment policy of:

  a. am. Deploy from MOB [Main Operating Base] at Espora to Rio Grande/Gallegos wherever.

  b. Refuel and climb to r/v with Hercules tanker from wherever but usually Rio Grande or Gallegos since required there for A4a and Mirages at other times.

  c. Transit high to 250 miles from est BG position, keeping well clear of FI now. (Args know 966 capability vs high fliers.)

  d. Proceed to max ROA [Radius of Action] with late climb out.

  e. RTB without further AAR.

  All this explains their limited range and, in light of today’s attempt in perfect Etendard attack weather, suggests they have more AM39 than the original five and with double AAR could increase their range if they cared to do a Black Buck.