One Hundred Days
Page 58
On balance, I think that only the last question leaves me in any real doubt and even that one seemed right at the time the decision was made (D+3 for D+4 deployment). BROADSWORD appeared reasonably confident; COVENTRY seemed to have serviceable systems; D+3 had been another poorish day in the AOA as the Args shifted target to the AW ships and we found that Sea Dart/Wolf were not really achieving much inshore. Hard to tell. In hindsight of course, it’s not too difficult to regret the loss – perhaps the event analysis will reveal whether it need have happened.
First ideas suggest that COVENTRY blew it by:
a. Hauling off CAP to engage with SD and gun.
b. Failing to engage with SD and gun.
c. Turning end on – thereby assisting her attackers and ‘wooding’ her aft 909.
d. Turning across BROADSWORD’s line of sight so SEAWOLF went to reset!
Very sad if this is so.
23 June
Apart from these sorts of aftermath problems, there is the basic one of keeping people up to the mark out here. CLFFI and COMAW are eyes down on getting the land forces down to minimum size quickly. I don’t seem to have had anything useful on the large scene from Fleet for a week – there seems to be a planning blight that end. So rang them up. MOD COS have apparently got round to agreeing (with amendments) the long-term defence plan. It seems extraordinary that it has had to take so long; it should have been done more than a month ago for a variety of situations e.g.:
Total surrender of all claims.
Cease Fire but keep claims (as is).
NO Cease Fire.
And then select whichever for the day. Bloody idle I call it, but fairly standard MOD in-fighting no doubt.
1100: another calm dawn with sucker holes in the low fog; fantastic colours, lilac, pale lemon yellow and palest blue, – very pastel with occasional diffused flares of sunlight in the banks. This is my most common memory of the weather out here with, as the sun gets higher, wide-banded rainbows in the fogbanks with the ships looming like shadowy toys.
1415: saw my first ‘free’ penguins today: they appeared between the ship and the tanker, frenziedly swimming along and too stupid just to let us go by. Thought they were fish at first.
Otherwise another peaceful day. No fixed wing flying for fog. Helos exercising with ONYX nearby. Staff busy sorting out long-term defence, reviewing OPGENS [operational directives], analysing Exocet attacks, planning CAG [Carrier Air Group] disembarkation and thinking about Easter leave at last! Personal plans for Cowes week looking rather more hopeful than they did last April.
Meanwhile I must prepare a bit more carefully for getting back. I fear there are bound to be Press conferences, invitations to speak, maybe an opportunity to speak to the PM. Don’t look forward to this part one bit, another Exocet day holds slightly more appeal.
Having only just seen the ITN news for 2 June where they ‘report’ from Chile that SAS took out 5 Super Etendards at Rio Grande, I took a reading of Etendard radar intercepts – none since last attack on 30 May. So it could be true – but no one is telling me.
Just read a sad letter from Beagle Burne in the CANBERRA. He reports (and it won’t all be scuttlebutt I’m afraid) that there is more petty bickering, squabbling, backbiting, complaining and plain b-ering about between the various Land units over who goes home first, best and gets the biggest welcome where, than you’d believe possible. His letter ends ‘you’ve no idea how I envy you the peaceful life offshore’. It is sad to hear that the soldiers are so diminished after three weeks of hard fighting, hard slogging and miserable conditions culminating in a fine and well-deserved victory. I’m afraid CLFFI has to be to blame and ought to grab his Colonels and bang their wretched heads together: this sort of thing can sour it all.
Am hoping that Gen Moore can fly home in same aircraft as me; this will be much better PR, in light of the sort of thing that can occur, highly desirable to avoid dangers of crossed threads. Unfortunately, I gather there is an Army/RAF 2* hassle going on at home over who’s in charge. This can only delay J. Moore and my worst fears are nearly realized. But I really can’t haul up the ladder and go home?
24 June
But it seems I can! CLFFI’s relief not due out until 18 July and I see little point in hanging about for a fortnight to achieve a nicety. Perhaps we’ll jack it up after his return. Don’t particularly want to perpetuate it all anyway.
Good DSSS with Fleet this am. New COS, happily, seems to have a firm grasp of essentials. No disagreements between us on roulement (yet?), FEARLESS departure shambles (intel, comms and many other loose ends), South Georgia, leave, COMAW relief and all that. It really makes me very happy to know we are on net again after a worrisome couple of weeks. I also feel a bit better for arresting CLFFI/COMAW if Fleet are with me (we may both, of course, be wrong). They do seem to indulge in some very loose Staff work – everybody makes mistakes including us, but I have a feeling they are not so firmly directed from the centre.
Busy trying to produce a new threat assessment and ‘fail warlike’ set up for the exercise programme. Not too easy and don’t much like the idea of exercises at all; but they do have to be done.
Captain getting at me to allow HERMES to go through the Falkland Sound. By the time I’d reminded him we didn’t know the southern entrance was clear of mines, that the Args just might cotton on and find a dozen Mirages from somewhere and that SAN LUIS just could be off Cumberland Point, he decided against. Basically though, it would be silly to throw it all away, albeit on an outside chance of no relevance, at this stage. So we do the dull thing: close Port Stanley to disembark GR3s and gear and get out to the east again where the opposition really have zero hope of getting to us, and so won’t come and even try. As usual, you have to remind yourself not to let your guard down for so much as an hour. PLYMOUTH did, after a week of no attacks, and was thumped within minutes of clearing Carlos: so the timing was the worst of luck but the wise operator wouldn’t have taken the tiny chance simply because it existed and there was no need.
There seems to be a fair amount of confusion reigning at the moment and the complaints are rolling in. Rather like the FEARLESS chaos, different Brigadiers are telling different ships different stories – and the ships are naturally getting very fed up. There’s also a bit of backbiting going on as people get impatient to go home and the Army who are most impatient of all, bugger them about.
25 June
The requirement to go and meet the ‘Commissioner’ (Hunt) today is a handy opportunity to have a go at a variety of other areas of worry, not least accommodation where a full audit is needed so that the bill can be presented to MOD. I want to see how PSA is coming on and to talk to people concerned. I must discuss the South Georgia problem and Rapier locations in FI with CLFFI. Hope the weather is OK.
26 June
An eventless day in glorious weather here but awful inshore where a band of wind/rain is stationary.
27 June
Overnight VALIANT started to pick up C130 and Mirage III noises. Could be anything from SF insertion to a local panic/exercise. We shall probably never know. The MONKEY [frigate in West Falkland] had no contacts looming our way so I’m reasonably confident that it wasn’t an actual operation.
AMBUSCADE tripped over FORT TORONTO who was bogging about off PWS [Port William/Stanley] in the middle of the night. Made a TACSIG reporting an UNIDENT [Unidentified contact] on radar and buggered off. Extraordinary behaviour. Told off fairly firmly along with 317.0 for giving no TORONTO Navtrack [Navigational track].
AVENGER trying to set up big dinner and overnight stay ashore but these sort of events (and the absence of my GWOs) convince me that my place of duty is still in this tin box – not soaking it up ashore in a false spirit of victorious conviviality which can turn very sour very suddenly. All a bit dull of me but eventually I find myself saying on all these occasions ‘Tho’ the likelihood of disaster occurring in your absence is itself very small, whose fault would it be?’ Then the priorities begin to
fall into place. Roulement at last is beginning to look firm and really only the inshore helos plus QHM [Queen’s Harbourmaster]/COMAW Staffs remain looser than I would wish. Told the FOF3 SAVO/SAEO [Staff Aviation Officer/Staff Air Engineering Officer] to grip the WESSEX 5s by the throat and stop hanging about waiting for someone else to sort it out. Life remains a DIY kit if you want anything done quickly and I am in no doubt that we do want this sorted quickly.
Received COVENTRY’s report of proceedings and loss. Upset to see the report of my one time CPO WEA [Chief Petty Officer Weapons Electrical Artificer] Heath’s (from SHEFFIELD) death. A very nice man, gentle, hardworking, sensitive and intelligent – like many others. But I knew this one.
Am having to face the dreary ‘social’ scene properly again. Though the AVENGER idea does not hold up too well, I am determined to get around HERMES and BROADSWORD in the next couple of days. YARMOUTH to lunch today, still thinks he had something that day SHEFFIELD went (never learns); ANTRIM for lunch tomorrow on his way home, we thought he ought to see Port Stanley before he goes, probably to scrap.
SK is having absolutely no joy with COURAGEOUS – couldn’t even get a reading on a buoy alongside in flat calm! Quiet boat? ADEXes AAWC EXETER – coming in quite nicely after initial rubbish and total chaos on AAWC HF which shouldn’t have had a whisper. No one actually fired at any of the aircraft – which I can’t help feeling is a bit of luck. This exercising is very difficult to judge; having taught everyone to shoot first, ask questions afterwards, we’re now reversing the process – in order to make it look better on the day. There’s a touch of the Irish about it all but I see no way round.
28 June
Having failed with Jez – fairly predictable after all – tried SKD [Sea King Dipper – active sonar] with no more success. So much for this being an ASW force. Sonar conditions were reputedly good – I just thank our stars the Args didn’t get their SM act together. 826 Squadron serviceability was abysmal too. BROADSWORD complained that we weren’t in a proper ASW screen – which is not too clever either since AAW remains the major threat and we have to have a screen with that as the first requirement. Helos should fill the holes but sit on deck instead. Tried a Blue Whale [Lynx/SSN missile exercise]. Despite last night’s assurances re plenty of Lynx available, none actually worked and BROADSWORD eventually got his off some three hours late.
Plans for future CASEXES are to aim markedly lower! (But had to check on our ASW capability first if only to find it was nil.) SWO(U) [Staff Warfare Officer, Underwater Warfare] turns up with your boringly, time wasting standard A2 [basic anti-submarine exercise]. Will people never learn that SSNS, sensibly briefed, can find you from fifty miles, swerve in, speak on UWT [Underwater Telephone], do your bidding and go away afterwards – all with no hassle? I despair. The 1950s Portland buffs [floating markers towed by the submarine] syndrome still reigns supreme.
29 June
Weather worsening as one of the ‘Bad lows’ develops off N Argentina. No flying (FW) for visibility. Blue Whale went well and modified CASEX gave all ships good tracking for two hours each. Even HERMES. Did some limited rounds of ship – in very good heart, so they should be with end firmly in sight and conscious of a good job well done.
30 June
Achieving zero in F9 SEly gales. Dracone [aircraft fuel container] lost ashore at PSA, hangar blew away though I think they caught it before it went into the minefields. No flying, not even vertreps! Good opportunity to catch up on the CCTV and social scene while getting through the dreaded ROP. It makes me so glad I’m through my Commander’s days.
Last day of this diary? Turnover tomorrow and won’t be much time or much of interest/importance to note I trust.
1 July
Turnover day – very good to see D. Reffell. No real tensions, though with some of the tales, I have to wonder. If you believe the scuttlebutt, Derek made the most tremendous effort to get the job from the beginning – argument ran:
a. FOF3 owned the ships (HERMES, INVINCIBLE).
b. Reffell had:
(1) Commanded HERMES.
(2) Been COMAW.
(3) Been SOO [Staff Officer, Operations] to the Admiral when HERMES was a FW/CVA/carrier.
c. He was instantly available in UK with the CVS.
On balance, I would have found his case irresistible and I remain astonished that he wasn’t given the job. I expect that it was a very near thing.
I do just wonder whether, in the same circumstances, I would have tried very hard to get the job – I have a feeling not on balance. My other tiny worry concerns ‘backbiting’ – the potential for it is considerable between RN, RAF, RM and Army and even between the various factions of each. Lin Middleton says that for every one person prepared to be uncritically supportive, there will be 10 hackers and slicers and that it is as well that I am to be the first one home.
Now that is a very disturbing thought which I would rather ascribe to his nature than accept as true. Anyway, it should not affect my reactions. Clearly I must think through possible criticism and sharp-shooting and be ready just in case – and also do all in my power to forestall any backbiting. The difficulty is how to avoid contention without being utterly stupid-seeming, eg:
Q. Whose fault was the ‘Bluff Cove’ disaster?
A1. Mine, if anyone’s.
A2. It was no disaster.
A3. The Argentinians.
A4. CLFFI’S? COMAW’S?
A5. Don’t know.
A6. No comment on grounds that if it was a culpable disaster, I should not prejudice it: if it wasn’t, then the question of fault doesn’t arise.
Obviously, I prefer Al, true or not. A2–A5 are wet or criminal and A6 patently a neat evasion.
Q. It has been said frequently that you commanded the South African Tack Group (or should be awarded the Burmah Star): what have you to say to that?
Al. Not a lot.
A2. South Atlantic would be more correct.
A3. Who said it, how often, and for what reason?
A4. You shouldn’t believe all you hear.
A5. Next question.
Q. What have you to say to Mr Nott about his cuts in the Navy?
A1. Nothing, he has not invited me to give my views.
A2. I am a Naval officer; I would regret them.
A3. That would be between Mr Nott and myself since I am a public servant.
Q. What was your first thought on getting back?
A1. Shit, it’s bloody raining still.
A2. Oh Gawd, I’ve got to face the Press yet.
A3. England, my England.
A4. Sorry for those left behind, temporarily or permanently.
Q. Was it a walkover then?
A1. No, obviously not: should it have been?
A2. That’s a very odd question, why do you ask? ‘Because you said so’. Who said I said so?
‘Er – um – well did you say so?’ I really don’t think I did.
General Rules
a. Analyse the question.
b. Be honest and factual.
c. Do not speculate.
d. Avoid opinion, particularly political.
Points to get over:
a. Joint Operation. All Arms interdependent.
b. Successful, because good people.
c. Some errors – no doubt others could have done better.
The Turnover Notes were simple enough:
a. Residual Threat.
b. Take charge of HQ.
c. Excercise Programme.
d. Reports.
e. The Past – ROP and Diary.
f. Long-Term Defence Plan.
g. Honours and Awards.
h. SF Ops.
i. South Georgia.
j. RMLO.
And was all done by 1500.
2 July
Last tour round inshore and lunch with Mr Hunt at Government House. Good briefing for FOF3 by land forces team and general air of getting on with it in reasonable good heart. Cold with occasional sun and s
now showers. Airstrip coming on but slowed by recent bad weather – no fuel supply yet which is bad; and no real solutions yet on offer that I was able to see. Fast jet capability unlikely before mid-August. ILLUSTRIOUS will be needed – and on time because they’re almost bound to overrun their schedule.
Decided I wouldn’t mind coming back in the summer too much – sailing ought to be good – only difficulty is how to get a boat out.
Had enough though, and glad to get away – not looking forward to piping peace because it will probably be a galloping bore either as FOF1 or FOSM. Wonder if I’ll be shifted and where to? Feel I have rather ‘done’ this job; and I’m not sufficiently far from it to see attraction in anything else.
4 July
I believe that it is worth noting the signal I made on my final departure that day. The text was: ‘AS I HAUL MY SOUTH ATLANTIC FLAG DOWN, I REFLECT SADLY ON THE BRAVE LIVES LOST AND THE GOOD SHIPS GONE DURING THE SHORT TIME OF OUR TRIAL. I THANK WHOLEHEARTEDLY EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU FOR YOUR GALLANT SUPPORT, TOUGH DETERMINATION AND FIERCE PERSISTENCE UNDER BLOODY CONDITIONS. LET US ALL BE GRATEFUL THAT ARGENTINA DOESN’T BREED BULLDOGS AND, AS WE RETURN SEVERALLY TO ENJOY THE BLESSINGS OF OUR LAND, RESOLVE THAT THOSE LEFT BEHIND FOR EVER SHALL NOT BE FORGOTTEN.