Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  As the fronts came together, the unauthorized Boeotian stacking and rightward swing did its inevitable work. The Spartans had taken advantage to extend their wing outside the terminus of the enemy's line and now pushed aside any light-armed screen on that end to wrap around the Athenians there. At the same time, the Boeotians enveloped on their flank to send the enemy into flight as far down as the Tegeans, who stood beside the Spartans and faced a portion of the Argive array. The only Spartan allies that held their ground for long were the men from Pellene, who kept fighting equally determined Boeotians from Thespiae. However, even as most of their allies ran, the Spartans themselves were taking down many of the opposing spearmen from Athens. They chased the rest off and advanced to pivot in formation. (Their front rank facing right into column and following its lead man to turn left at his original post and move up until all could spin left and face toward the enemy flank. Each subsequent row in turn then did the same thing, lining up behind the one ahead until the entire formation had rotated 90 degrees to its original orientation.) Dressing ranks, the Spartan phalanx then swept laterally across the field. It first met the Argives as they returned in poor order from their brief chase. Letting the leading ranks pass, the Spartans charged into the rest, taking them on their unshielded right to slaughter many and scatter everyone else. The Spartans kept on going after that, steadily progressing down the enemy line to launch similarly devastating flank attacks on the Corinthians, the Thespians and other Boeotians and, finally, the Thebans, cutting up each contingent either where it stood (Thespians?) or as it straggled back from pursuit. The allies thus met costly defeat in detail mere minutes after seeming victorious across most of the field. They lost 2,800 men (nearly 12 percent of their hoplites) per Diodorus, while the enemy paid only 1,100 (6 percent), including a mere eight Spartans. (A report of 10,000 allied dead that Xenophon [Agesilaos 7.5] said was sent out from this battle clearly must have been extremely overblown.) It was a stunning reverse against an outmanned foe, reinforcing the impression of Spartan invincibility even as it shattered allied confidence.

  BATTLE OF NEMEA RIVER (394 B.C.) (BoxES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED TO SHOW RELATIVE SIZES.)

  Coronea 11(394 B.C.)

  Agesilaos had by now entered northernmost Greece to learn of the Spartan victory at Nemea River. He proceeded down into Thessaly along the northwestern Greek coastline where he met some resistance from Boeotia's allies in that region, who were renowned equestrians. Forced to fend off cavalry attacks against his rear, he took to marching in a hollow square with his hoplites on the outside and trailing a guard of horsemen. This led to a cavalry action near Mount Narthacium in which the enemy riders, unwilling to engage his smaller mounted force supported by hoplites, were caught and defeated by an unexpected charge of his horsemen. Having thus battered the Thessalians off his tail, he was able to move into Boeotia without difficulty, where his men carried a couple of skirmishes along the route of march. But more serious opposition soon arose as Agesilaos met a large allied force near Coronea in west-central Boeotia at the southwestern corner of Lake Copais.

  The contending armies spread out in battle order across the plain below Coronea. Agesilaos had some Spartan troops with him, since a mora had arrived from the national army that had fought at Nemea River along with a personal bodyguard for him of 50 volunteers from Sparta (Plutarch vol. II Agesilaos, 51-52). Also, a lochos (battalion) that had been half of a mora garrisoning Orchomenos came over, bringing with it that nearby allied polls' troops. This gave him around 1,500 Spartan and up to 2,000 Orchomenian hoplites. Among the men he'd brought from Asia were his helot spearmen (somewhat less than their original 1,000 by now) plus the mercenary and Ionian hoplites gathered there (4,000 per Diodorus [14.79.21). He'd also added troops from uppermost Asia Minor and the Hellespontine region, including perhaps another 2,000-3,000 heavy infantrymen. Phocians (and possibly Malians) had joined him upon entering Boeotia, bringing maybe 1,000 hoplites along, and he had attached spearmen from Greek poleis in the Thraceward region during his march, these last a possible 3,000 in all. Though highly speculative, this suggests that the Spartan king had some 15,000 hoplites. He had started with 400 horsemen when he entered Ionia and had boosted his cavalry there and likely since (adding riders from the northern Greek cities and Phocis); thus, his mounted corps could have come to 1,000 men. Xenophon's account (Hellenica 4.3.15-21) claims that the Spartan force was superior to the other side in light infantry, suggesting that its skirmishers might have numbered 6,000 or more. Agesilaos set up a phalanx that was likely eight shields deep, splitting cavalry and light footmen off either wing. The king and his Spartans took post on the far right of the heavy array with the mercenaries and then the helots next in line followed by the Asian contingents and then the other allies. The Boeotians from Orchomenos held the extreme left.

  Numbers for the allied army are also uncertain, but Xenophon said that "the opposing lines of battle were exactly matched in strength and the number of cavalry on both sides was about the same" (Agesilaus 2.9). If so, the hoplites probably included 4,000-5,000 Boeotians, 2,000-4,000 Athenians, 2,000-4,000 Argives, 1,000-2,000 Corinthians, 1,000-2,000 Euboans and 1,000-2,000 combined from elsewhere including Opuntian Locris. The cavalry's 1,000 or so troopers would mostly have been Boeotians and Athenians. This left the light infantry as the only inferior allied arm, likely counting only some 4,000-5,000 men. The allies must have designed their phalanx to match that of Agesilaos at eight shields deep over a front of nearly 1,900m. Thebans held the right end of this formation with the other Boeotians next to them and the remaining contingents spread leftward along the line down to the Argives against the opposite flank.

  The battle arrays marched on each other slowly and in silence at first; however, as they drew close together, the Thebans gave a shout and sped to the fore followed by a similar rush among the mercenaries and the other troops from Asia on the Spartan side. Probably already badly demoralized by their recent thrashing at Nemea River, the men from Argos broke before the Spartans even got to spear-length, tossing shields to run for the nearby slopes of Mount Helicon. And their panic took most of the rest of their army with them as Agesilaos' phalanx swept the field with minimal effort. The exception to this swift victory was on the allied right, farthest from the king's position; here, the Thebans had pushed through an Orchomenian contingent that seems to have been as spooked by its past defeat against Thebes (at Haliartus) as the Argives had been by theirs against Sparta. Maybe thinking that their companions were equally successful, the Thebans continued on through to the enemy baggage train.

  Agesilaos acted swiftly upon learning that the Thebans were victorious and to his rear. However, rather than following the tactics that had worked so well at Nemea River and seeking to make a flank attack, he turned his phalanx a full 180 degrees to face his returning foes headon. (Rotating left into column, the formation advanced to the other end of the field, turned back into phalanx and then countermarched to reverse its original facing, the men in the rearmost rank holding position as their files moved around to redress in front of them [Asclepiodotus 10.141.) He thus blocked the Theban route of escape with his "main body" (Xenophon Agesilaos 2.11), this likely being the Spartans and mercenaries (some 3,500 spearmen), the rest of his army having scattered in pursuit. Probably at about even strength with Agesilaos, the Thebans formed up and closed front-to-front for a second round. And this time there was no quick giving way on either side; instead, it was an extended and brutal action in which "setting shields against shields, they shoved, fought, killed and were killed" per Xenophon (Hellenica), who was a participant. The Thebans were eventually able to punch a hole through the enemy line, cutting a narrow path along which some of them escaped as their weary foes drew back on either side. Agesilaos' men soon recovered and turned to chase the Thebans. They killed many of the fleeing men, but most got away, 80 finding sanctuary in a temple while the majority joined their beaten allies on Mount Helicon.

  At day's end, th
e Spartans held a field that Xenophon described in some detail: "the earth stained with blood, friend and foe lying dead side by side, shields smashed to pieces, spears snapped in two, daggers bared of their sheaths, some on the ground, some embedded in the bodies, some yet gripped by the hand" (Agesilaos 2.14). The allies sent down from Helicon the next day to get a truce from Agesilaos (who'd been badly wounded late in the fight), which he granted so that they might recover their dead. Nepos (17.4.5) cited 10,000 allies slain, but that is surely an impossible figure and likely an echo of the inflated claim Xenophon reported for Nemea River. It's more probable that the Thebans lost 500-1,000 spearmen (15-25 percent) and their allies another 1,000-2,000, while Agesilaus' cost was below 600.

  Agesilaos sailed home to recuperate while Gylis, who had led the mora that came up from Corinth, took command of the army. He would march into Phocis and lose some troops skirmishing with Locrian missilemen. Seemingly a mere side note, this action is worthy of attention because it marked the sort of minor clash that now came to dominate the war. Badly beaten in two large-scale outings against the Spartans, the allies weren't willing to chance a third. The fighting on land would henceforth be confined to smaller engagements, primarily in the vicinity of the allied base at Corinth, thus giving the conflict the name it carries today. Meanwhile, the larger, strategic struggle would play out for the most part at sea over the next several years.

  Sicily and Italy

  Colonists stepping westward from the Greek home cities had founded poleis in the 8th century across both southern Italy and its large, satellite island of Sicily. On the latter, they had come into competition for the land not only with earlier tribal inhabitants (the Elymians, Sicans and Siculi), but also with "Punic" settlers from Phoenicia. The tribesmen had largely taken to the less desirable interior by the early 5th century, and that's when warfare broke out in earnest between the newcomers. The Greeks worked the soil and had built cities at the best sites from the broad eastern side nearest Greece along a majority of Sicily's roughly triangular shoreline. The Phoenicians were largely merchants and held trading centers in the western tip of the island closest to their powerful colony at Carthage on the North African coast. As frictions arose, the Carthaginians had mounted campaigns against the Greeks on Sicily. Outcomes for their efforts ran from disastrous to moderately successful. The last of these conflicts in 406-405 had led to the overthrow of democracy in the leading Grecian city of Syracuse on the island's southeastern shore. A young aristocrat there, Dionysius I (to be dubbed "the Great"), set up a tyranny and negotiated to keep his polls and Carthage at peace going into the new century. But in the days when Agesilaos was campaigning in Ionia and tensions on the Greek mainland were moving it toward the long grind of the Corinthian War, Dionysius was casting a covetous eye upon Carthaginian land in western Sicily and plotting to add to his domain by force of arms. This would kick off the tyrant's "Second Carthaginian War" (that of the late 5th century being the first).

  Messana II and Taruomenium (394 B.c.) and Abacaene (393 B.c.)

  Dionysius sent an ultimatum to Carthage in the spring of 397. This unreasonably demanded that all Greek settlements remaining under its control be freed. He then marched against Motya, which was the leading Punic city on Sicily. Motya sat on a small, rounded island off the west coast, connected by a long causeway to the mainland. Dionysius came against this place with a possible 40,000 infantry and 3,000 horsemen (Caven [1990, 1001, the figure for footmen disputing Diodorus' unlikely claim of 80,000 [14.47.7]). These included both a large number of local tribesmen and a probable 10,000 or so Greek mercenaries. Beating back a Carthaginian seaborne relief force by using bolt-throwing mechanical bows (a Syracusan invention dating to the turn of the century per Diodorus [14.42.1]), Dionysius was able to capture Motya before the end of the summer. However, the Carthaginians landed a large army in 396 and, after the tyrant lost a major sea battle, he retired to Syracuse to face a siege. The following campaign season saw small skirmishes on land and a modest Greek naval victory in the Great Harbor of Syracuse on the south side of the city. However, the main event that year didn't take place in combat, but rather in the Carthaginian camp where a plague broke out. Weakened by disease, the Punic fleet and encampment came under damaging attacks by Dionysius' forces and the Carthaginian commander, Himilco, eventually agreed to pay an indemnity and withdraw his citizen soldiers (perhaps 3,000-6,000 men whom he evacuated on 40 ships). This callously abandoned the rest of his army to be captured and enslaved by the Greeks. (The lone exception was a Spanish mercenary unit. This put up strong resistance and was taken into service at Syracuse.)

  THE GREEK WEST - SOUTHERN ITALY/SICILY

  The operations of 397-395 had not gained either side its strategic goal (taking western Sicily for the tyrant and permanently crushing that Syracusan threat for Carthage). This guaranteed that the war would continue. There was, however, some delay. Carthage had to first deal with a revolt among its Libyan subjects, who had lost a large contingent among the men betrayed and left behind at Syracuse. This uprising couldn't be brought under control until the end of 394. Meanwhile, Dionysius had distractions as well. His finances were hard pressed and he found it difficult to pay the mercenaries and honor stipends owed to his citizen hoplites. As a result, he had to scramble to avoid a rebellion of his own. Dionysius solved the problem by giving land to the hired men. And among the communities he set up, ceded or resettled at this time was Messana, which sat on the northeastern corner of Sicily along the strait that separated the island from Italy. Across the way, the Greek colony of Rhegion commanded the Italian side of this narrow channel.

  The Rhegians had taken in a good number of Dionysius' exiled foes and were concerned that their city might soon become a target for the tyrant's ambitions. They therefore decided to preempt an attack by crossing over and taking out his outpost at Messana to control both sides of the strait. As Rhegian forces prepared an investment, the new Messanian settlers sallied to fight on open ground. Based on its population of the recent past (Diodorus 14.78.5), Messana could likely field around 4,000-5,000 hoplites with 1,000-1,500 foot skirmishers. As for the Rhegians, previous deployments suggest that they might have sent at least 3,000 spearmen of their own (Ray 2010, 26). To these we can then add 1,000-2,000 Syracusan exiles, the present invasion force being led by just such an outcast named Heloris. With hoplite manpower thus closely balanced, the Messanians scored a solid victory in the ensuing battle, slaying 500 of the enemy (Diodorus 14.87.2). Such hefty casualties at 10-12.5 percent on the losing side suggest either a thorough pursuit or the envelopment of a wing. Messanian losses would have been much lower, probably less than 5 percent.

  Dionysius wanted to repay the Rhegian attack. First, however, he felt it best to better secure the strait-crossing that would be in his rear by eliminating the nearby hostile Siculi hilltop stronghold of Taruomenium. But when he and his army of perhaps 10,000 mercenaries (with 7,000-8,000 hoplites) managed to break into the city, they found themselves in serious trouble against its skirmisher-equipped defenders despite outnumbering them by maybe as much as 3 to 1. The barbarians formed into a body and blocked the town's narrow passages. Unable to deploy at any width, the tyrant's superior manpower proved of little value. At the same time, the heavier equipment of his spearmen was offset by hordes of enemy missilemen firing down from the rooftops and other high ground to devastating effect. The barbarians ultimately pushed their Greek foes out of the city and inflicted serious losses (600 men per Diodorus [14.88.4]). So bloodied, Dionysius decided to put his plans for Rhegion on hold.

  Messana would again become a flashpoint the next year when the Carthaginians, not yet fully recovered from the uprising at home, used resources already on Sicily to launch an attack there. Magon, who commanded all Punic forces on the island, led his men around to ravage the countryside. However, he then withdrew upon the approach of Dionysius, falling back on the allied city of Abacaene. The Carthaginians rallied there and offered the Greeks a pitched battle.
Our lone source (Dionysius 14.90.3-4) gives no strengths for the contending armies, but we can assume from the mutual agreement to accept engagement that they were comparable. Complements of around 10,000 might have been present on either side, each fielding perhaps 8,000 or so in heavy infantry. This represents an effort on the tyrant's part that used only his mercenary contingent. Magon's force would have been a combination of levies drawn from garrison troops (hoplite-type soldiers from North Africa and Italy and perhaps some armored spearmen with shields from Spain) and allied Siculi light infantry and cavalry. Once combat opened, the more uniformly armed, professional hoplites of the dictator seem to have carried the day, killing 800 of Magon's men (8 percent of his line infantry) and chasing the rest into Abacaene. Dionysius withdrew with his army intact (having undoubtedly suffered only a couple of percent loss) and took ship to finally strike Rhegion. Though he was unable to take that city, he did pillage the area and forced the Rhegians into a truce that let him return home with his booty.