Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Once arrived in the Chalcidice, both mercenary peltasts and more horsemen joined the Spartan effort. Macedonia's king Amyntas III had hired the javelinmen (no doubt Thracians) and also sent 100 or so elite troopers from his own cavalry. Amyntas seems to have been motivated to give this aid in hope of then gaining Spartan help to recover land that he had ceded to the Chalcidian League in a state of weakness after a recent defeat against the Illyrians. An additional 400 horsemen came from Derdas, who was ruler of the then separate Upper Macedonian district of Elimea. He was presumably throwing his lot in with the Chalcidians' foes out of fear that he might soon himself fall victim to the same sort of bullying that the League had inflicted on Amyntas.

  BATTLE OF OLYNTHUS I (382 B.C.) (BOXES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED TO SIIOW RELATIVE SIZES.)

  Teleutias approached Olynthus and put his phalanx in order, lining up with his Spartans on the left wing and arraying the allies rightward with the Thebans perhaps at the far right end. Having called in all of Eudamidas' troops (Diodorus 15.21.2), he was able to deploy some 12,000 hoplites, probably filing them twelve-deep over a Ikm width. It was, of course, unusual for Spartan spearmen to ever stand solely on the left, the other wing being the traditional leadership slot. In this rare case, it seems that Teleutias took post on the left side so that his best men could hold station in front of the gate from which the enemy would have to emerge. With the heavy infantry so arranged, he then split his light forces into place on either flank. This put the Theban, Spartan and Macedonian riders with half the Thracian footmen on the right and the remaining peltasts and Derdas' cavalry on the left.

  The locals issued forth and formed up into a phalanx in front of their ramparts. Their numbers for this action might have come to some 8,000 hoplites and 800 horsemen along with a couple of thousand foot skirmishers. (This honors Demosthenes' estimate of Chalcidian League strength in the later 4th century [19.230, 2661 less about 20 percent, the reduction reflecting manpower lost from cities currently in rebellion.) If so, the spearmen would have had to line up eight-deep if they were to match widths with the Spartan heavy array. The light infantry moved into position off each end and then it was the cavalry's turn to set up in the rear. That's when the defenders sprang a novel maneuver that nearly won the fight at its very onset. A signal rang out and the entire Chalcidian mounted corps charged from an obscured post behind its phalanx. Led by their light footmen from the left flank and riding hard, these horsemen swept ahead to fall upon the enemy flank-guard on that side of the field. So swift an assault from a cavalry force half again their size caught Teleutias' riders unprepared and they and their skirmishers broke and fled. And as the victors turned upon the now exposed allied hoplites on that wing, those too began to give way.

  All was on the verge of calamity for Teleutias when Derdas and his Elimean troopers came to the rescue. Breaking from the Spartan left edge, they took advantage of the enemy having committed all of their cavalry on the other side of the field to ride forward without opposition. They skirted the enemy's light footmen and made for the still open gate. The Chalcidian horsemen saw this and took fright, wheeling back that they might rescue their path for retreat. The Elimeans were able to kill many of these panicked riders as they galloped past to escape back into town. Meanwhile, Teleutias and his left wing had followed up on Derdas' initiative by advancing into contact with the northern phalanx. With their cavalry in flight, being exposed to a possible mounted attack at the rear and quickly getting the worst of a shock fight against a deeper and determined enemy formation led by Spartan fighters of fearsome reputation, the Chalcidian hoplites gave up as well and trailed their cavalry inside the city. Technically a victory for the Spartans in that they held the field at day's end, Diodorus' claim that the battle was "an even contest" is much closer to the truth. Likewise, the description of Xenophon (Hellenica 5.2.40-43), while noting significant losses among the Chalcidians' horsemen, makes the point that very few of their foot soldiers died "because the wall was near." Teleutias duly set up a trophy, yet still had to use great caution as he pulled away from the battle site, finding it necessary to cut down trees and strew them in his wake as a precaution against mounted pursuit. He dismissed his Macedonian and Elimean allies as fall approached, but ended up suffering from galling Chalcidian raids throughout the winter months.

  The next spring, Derdas rejoined the war with his horsemen and inflicted another reverse on the enemy during a cavalry action in which he surprised and routed a 600-horse contingent of raiders. This kept the Chalcidians close to Olynthus, where Teleutias again closed against them with his army that summer. This time, the defenders sent out their riders to harass him as he approached a nearby river and he countered with some of his peltasts, whose appearance caused the horsemen to draw back across the stream. The javelinmen saw this and pursued into the water only to have their quarry wheel about and attack. The Chalcidians dealt the peltasts a costly defeat, killing 100 including their leader. This so enraged Teleutias that he sent his cavalry and remaining peltasts after the offending horsemen while he followed close behind with his hoplites. The Chalcidians fled into Olynthus as the furious Spartan commander chased them near the periphery of the city. He then assembled his phalanx to offer a rematch of last year's battle. But in the heat of anger, he was guilty of a grave tactical error, having deployed within range of skirmishers on the wall above. These now showered missiles onto his men so densely that they had to pull back out of reach in some disorder. And at that vulnerable moment, the Chalcidians struck.

  Lead by their cavalry and peltasts, the defenders' hoplites emerged from the nearest gate to quickly form up and rush the Spartan phalanx. Teleutias and his troops were in confusion, caught with ranks jumbled in retreat and distracted by darting attacks from the Chalcidians' riders and foot skirmishers. This left them poorly prepared and their front crumpled before the northerners' well-ordered charge. The Spartan general then fell fighting in the ensuing melee. Once Teleutias had been killed, his countrymen on that wing (probably once more the left) abandoned what had already proven an unequal combat and the rest of their phalanx fell apart to send men fleeing in all directions. The Chalcidians pursued in earnest, killing so many foemen that Xenophon's account of the battle (Hellenica 5.2.2-3.6) claims their victims made up "the most serviceable part of the army." Likely listing only Spartan spearmen, Diodorus cited more than 1,200 slain (15.21.2), a good +40 percent of those present. The victors' losses must have been slight in contrast at well less than 5 percent.

  The Spartans reacted to this disaster by sending out a new army that they mustered by calling upon volunteers from all classes within their own state in addition to fresh levies drawn from the allies. This host rushed northward under the king Agesipolis, attaching horsemen from Thessaly on the way. Macedonia and Elimea again contributed reinforcements when the Spartans arrived on the ground. So strengthened, Agesipolis descended on Olynthus and, when the inhabitants wouldn't engage, took it out on their croplands. The Spartan monarch would die of a fever that summer, but his replacement as general, Polybiades, went on to see the campaign through, continuing to besiege the Olynthians until they surrendered in 379.

  The Third and Fourth Carthaginian Wars of Dionysius

  In the west at this time, Dionysius had used the wealth gained from Pyrgi to hire even more mercenaries. This was part of preparations for waging yet another war with Carthage toward adding western Sicily to his realm. The Syracusan kicked off this conflict by supporting successful revolts of several cities in Carthaginian Sicily and then ignoring Punic pleas for their return. Seeing common cause, Carthage launched the Third Carthaginian War against Dionysius by allying with Italian Greeks. It was a move that opened two fronts against the tyrant, allowing action against his interests in Italy while freeing Punic forces to hit at Sicily. Fortunately for Dionysius, the fighting ended up progressing in two phases that he was able to address separately. The first sequence played out in Italy, where the Syracusan was successful in takin
g Greek sites while preserving his own strongholds over the period 383-380. Diodorus described this interval's action as consisting of scattered skirmishes between small contingents "in which nothing of consequence was achieved" (15.15.3). Only later did the Carthaginians land a significant army on Sicily to activate that second theatre.

  Cabala (377 B.c.) and Cronium (376 B.c.)

  Carthage suffered a series of calamities 379-378. These included a plague along with a pair of rebellions (in Libya and Sardinia) that sought to exploit the disease's weakening of Punic strength. As a result, it wasn't until 377 that all was back in order for a strike on Sicily. Magon received command of the expedition, but our sources don't record the size of his armament. Caven has reasonably suggested (1990, 196) that Carthage's recent problems likely resulted in a somewhat smaller effort than had been mounted in 397. Magon also probably had fewer of the rebellious Libyans aboard. This would have forced him to rely more heavily than in the past upon manpower called up from his city's native population. We might therefore propose that he undertook this campaign with something on the order of 25,000 fighting men. Perhaps 15,000 of his infantry were heavy-armed, representing approximately 60 percent of the army's total manpower and equaling Diodorus' minimum for Africans later killed and captured in battle (15.15.3). Most of these troops of the line must have been full citizens and Liby-Phoenician perioeci. There also probably would have been 6,000-9,000 light-armed footmen involved, including troops drawn from garrisons already in place on the island. Finally, we can reasonably assume that the Carthaginians had substantial cavalry support, possibly to the tune of 1,0003,000 riders.

  Magon advanced in late summer, perhaps marching via an inland path. (Polyaenus [6.16.1] implied that their route led to a battle site at some distance from the coast.) Dionysius met them at an otherwise unknown location called Cabala, which may have lain in eastern or central Sicily (Champion 2010, 214). The Greek leader had come back from Italy after having stabilized affairs there for the moment only to then gather all available troops in order to deal with this new threat. Given ongoing commitments on the mainland and his separation from any potential allies in western Sicily due to Magon's position, it's likely that the tyrant fielded an army of mercenaries and Syracusans much like the one for his last bout against Carthage in 392. If so, he would have had about 20,000 fighting men, including around 15,000 hoplites. Light footmen might have been 3,500 to 4,000 strong (around 20 percent of the infantry force) while there could have been 1,500 horsemen at one per ten hoplites.

  There is no account of what took place on the field at Cabala. All the same, our surviving claim for severe Carthaginian losses there, even if exaggerated, points to quite a strenuous engagement, one in which Caven proposes that Dionysius might well have taken serious casualties as well (1990, 198). Based on the foregoing projections, the Punic force would seem apt to have been much deeper in light-armed men; however, it might have no more than equaled Greek numbers in heavy infantry. Granting that hoplites were the meat of Dionysius' army, it was probably these hardy spearmen who provided the key to victory in a long and vicious fight that severely sapped the strength of both sides. Again, we have no specifics, but it's highly probable that the Greeks held their own in light-armed skirmishing off the edges. This then allowed them to flank at least one end of the opposing heavy array and spark a rout. Such a turn of events best explains their ability to cut off the number of troops said to have given up at the same time they took down many more in pursuit.

  Magon was killed in the battle and the bulk of his men fled the field. Making good their immediate escape, they sought refuge in a stout defensive position on nearby high ground. Dionysius regrouped his victorious troops and followed to surround the Carthaginians. Despite Diodorus' claim of hefty losses among the defeated Africans, they clearly remained potent. Dionysius thus elected to negotiate their surrender rather than risk another potentially costly fight against desperate men that no longer seemed to pose a strategic threat. He granted a truce (Diodorus 15.16.1-2; Polyaenus 6.16.1) and stood down to give his foes time to consider terms. The Carthaginians took advantage of this temporary respite to recover their dead. However, they then exploited the situation by making an escape when the Greeks had relaxed their guard. Reaching the coast ahead of any chase, they reunited with their fleet and proceeded to safely retire into secure winter quarters at Panormus.

  Magon's son Himilco took command of the Punic expedition before the following campaign season. Replacing his father's losses, he next put his troops through an intense and highly effective training program. This allowed him to take the field in late summer and menace Syracuse with an army that was not only at least as large as that of the preceding year, but also rather more capable. Dionysius answered by heading back into action with a force likewise very similar in strength to the one that had fought at Cabala. (We might here consider Diodorus' report on the tyrant's casualties as being more in line with a tradition on his heavy infantry total. The historian's "more than 14,000" matches very closely with probable size of the previous engagement's hoplite contingent less about 5 percent losses.) Bursting with confidence on the basis of their year-earlier success, the Greeks met Himilco's host somewhere near Panormus at a site called Cronium, where both armies set up camps. Cronium appears to have been a barbarian enclave (maybe Sican) allied to Carthage and either already besieged or under threat of siege from Syracusan forces (Polyaenus 5.10.5).

  Dionysius set his troops up in phalanx with the light-armed outboard. Taking command of one wing (most likely the right) in company with a select team of his best hoplites, he gave the other wing to his brother, Leptines. Dionysius then closed against the similarly arrayed Africans, his formation entering into a hard fight which saw the tyrant and his picked men eventually begin to push ahead along their part of the line. However, things were not going so well elsewhere. Despite a heroic personal effort, Leptines fell in the fight, with his death in the middle of so closely contested a struggle sending those around him into a profound panic. As unreasoning alarm spread like wildfire through the Greek ranks, the spearmen on that wing gave way. This collapse on his far side exposed Dionysius' inner flank and forced him to abandon all progress to that point and run from the field as well. While Dionysius managed to get clear, thousands of his men were less fortunate, being cut down in flight such that "the whole region close at hand was heaped with dead" (Diodorus 15.17.4).

  The tyrant and his surviving troops took up a fortified position in their camp near Cronium. They spent a tense night in anticipation of a follow-up attack in the morning. The next day, however, Himilco seems to have judged an assault upon his beaten but still capable foes to be a rash and unprofitable prospect. The Punic general therefore decided to retire on Panormus and negotiate an end to the conflict from there. This led to Dionysius obtaining what appear to have been quite generous terms. He had to cede some modest territory and pay an indemnity, yet gained a withdrawal of the Carthaginian invasion force that preserved his dictatorship.

  Dionysius would spar once more with his old African foes in 368 to set off his Fourth Punic War. Largely a campaign of maneuver paced around a couple of naval actions, this lesser affair closed on a sour note for the Syracusan ruler with loss of a fleet to surprise attack. Thus weakened, he agreed to a halt in the conflict, signing an armistice at the end of the campaign season of 367. Nonetheless, it's very likely that he intended to again take the field the next year, but fate would intervene to short-circuit any renewal of hostilities when the aged tyrant took ill and died that spring. His empire now passed to his son, Dionysius II, a rather less capable man.

  The Boeotian War

  After three years of its rule, the people of Thebes had grown restive under their new, proSpartan government. Leadership of the fast growing opposition to this regime rested in two sites. One group consisted of men who had stayed in the city, including that heroic survivor of the Mantinean plain, Epaminondas. A scholarly man, he had been playing a sage role in i
nspiring his polls' youth to remain fit, hoping that they would some day be able to successfully battle the Spartans for the independence of their land. At the same time, there was a hard-core team of pro-democratic exiles residing in Athens as well. Pelopidas, the man Epaminondas had saved from death at Mantinea and his close friend ever since, was a prominent young firebrand among these. The two resistance factions were in close touch and combined their efforts in the winter of 379/78 to mount a counter-coup that sparked what is known as the Boeotian War.

  Plataea-Thebes Road (379 B.c.) and Cithaeron Pass (378 B.c.)

  The conspirators from Athens returned to Boeotia near year's end 379 and waited outside of Thebes as Pelopidas and a handful of others stole back into the city disguised as country folk. These young men that night exchanged their costumes for those of women and gained entry to the homes of key members of the oligarchic faction ruling the city, attacking and killing them. Having thus cut the head from the oligarchy's leadership, Pelopidas and his mates next joined with their friends in town and set about rousing the population, arming men with whatever weapons they could find toward taking back their freedom by force. Meanwhile, the 1,500-man garrison in the Cadmea, which was composed of both local and foreign troops with two Spartan officers (the third being out of the city), had been alerted by the commotion in the streets. The Spartans kept their command quietly in place, deciding against taking immediate action with their modest strength in the face of what appeared to be a widespread uprising. They instead sent out couriers to summon help from friendly Boeotian forces at Plataea and Thespiae. The remaining plotters from Athens came into Thebes at sunrise and an assembly of the people promptly put the resistance in charge of the city. Pelopidas, having taken the position of military lead, then began marshaling fighters in preparation for surrounding the Cadmea for an assault.