Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Having absorbed a couple of beatings, Elis now asked their new ally for more overt assistance. Archidamus answered by bringing his army into southern Arcadia and capturing the town of Cromnus, garrisoning it with three of his lochoi (1,500 hoplites). If designed to divert Arcadian attention from Elis, this worked splendidly. But if meant to discourage the Arcadians from further aggression of any kind, it was an absolute failure, because they now took the force prepared for an Elean campaign and promptly invested Cromnus, surrounding it with a double wall to contain their men in safety. Archidamus took once more to the field and laid waste southern Arcadia hoping to draw the besiegers away. Failing to raise a response, he then moved directly against Cromnus. His force probably consisted of the remainder of the regular Spartan army less one mora left at home. This would have been some 3,500 spearmen (seven lochoi) with support from a few horsemen and maybe 1,000 mercenary peltasts. His cavalry and javelinmen caught a contingent of the Arcadian regulars (smaller than the Spartan hoplite force per Xenophon [Hellenica 7.4.24], perhaps at a half-strength of 2,500) outside the stockade. The light-armed troops attacked and forced these spearmen to draw together in a tight body. Archidamus, meanwhile, was unaware of the situation and approaching with his hoplites in column two-abreast. Coming suddenly on the scene, he had no chance to reorder before the Arcadians charged out at him. The Spartans hurried to meet this attack and converted their column into line of battle by a simple 90 degree turn toward the enemy. This left them far too thin (only two shields deep) and they quickly buckled when the densely formed eparitoi struck.

  Archidamus took a spear-thrust through the thigh and 30 of his men died in the following melee as the Spartans fell back down the road by which they had come. Eventually, this path opened up onto a field and the embattled Spartan hoplites were finally able to assemble into a proper phalanx as their Arcadian foes took position across the way still in their deep formation. A stand-off now ensued, with the eparitoi confident but outnumbered and the Spartans with a stronger array yet in poor spirits. The end result was a truce, allowing Archidamus and his men to carry away their dead while the Arcadians set up a trophy. Ultimately, the Spartans would manage to break through the stockade at Cromnus in a night attack and rescue most of their men (around 100 were captured before they could escape).

  Cynoscephalae I and Olympus (364 B.C.)

  Thebes was to take a hard blow the following summer with the loss of Pelopidas. This came about in Thessaly as he led an army north to aid the enemies of his old nemesis Alexander of Pherae. Diodorus' account (15.80.1-6) indicates that the Theban took 7,000 men with him. This probably included 5,000 hoplites, 1,500 foot skirmishers and 500 horsemen. He then added Thessalian allies, perhaps roughly equal to his Thebans in infantry of all types (the spearmen being Greek mercenaries and the light footmen allied tribesmen) and rather stronger in cavalry with maybe 2,000 riders. Pelopidas confronted Alexander where he had taken a strong position behind some steep hills east of Pherae outside of Thessalian Cynoscephalae. Diodorus claimed that the tyrant had an army of 20,000. And Plutarch's assessment is only a bit smaller (Vol. I Pelopidas, 405), citing an infantry contingent twice that of his Thessalian enemies. This indicates 10,000 hired hoplites and 3,000 skirmishers. Given an overall cavalry potential for Thessaly of 6,000 riders (Xenophon Hellenica 6.1.8), a similar ratio for mounted troops yields 4,000 horsemen and a total 17,000 combatants.

  Action opened with a contest between light infantry for possession of the intervening high ground while the cavalry dueled on the plain. Pelopidas' riders prevailed below, but it was Alexander's peltasts that took the heights. When the Theban's Thessalian allies then sent their hoplites up to dislodge the enemy, they took significant losses and fell back without doing any real damage. Seeing this, Pelopidas sent a recall to his horsemen and moved out with his Thebans. He personally joined and reorganized the Thessalians, putting them into long files on the left while sending his own hoplites to form up at similar depth on the right wing. He then led this rearranged array up the hilly terrain to the attack. Alexander and his men repulsed two or three advances; yet each time, Pelopidas' formation drew back, redressed and came on again. Finally, fearful of the now returning enemy cavalry and its growing threat to their rearward approaches, the tyrant and his men took advantage of the opposing phalanx's latest round of reformation to withdraw down the backside of their position. That they did this in some semblance of order says much for the discipline of Alexander's professional spearmen; still, they were in at least modest disarray as they got down onto the flat and tried to recover behind their skirmishers.

  Seeking to exploit the temporary confusion among his foes and spotting Alexander directly opposite on the enemy right striving to organize his men, Pelopidas led a charge down the rise. Unfortunately, this advance became a ragged affair in its rush, leaving the eager Theban out in front and an easy target for javelinmen below; thus, though he got among these and killed several hand-to-hand, others had shot him down by the time most of the following Thessalians could get there to help. Pelopidas' hoplites were somehow able to reorder and reengage despite his death and, after their cavalry came up to help, they succeeded in routing Alexander's army. Adding in a thorough pursuit, the victors ran enemy casualties up to 3,000 dead per Plutarch. Costly as this action was to Thebes in the loss of one of the era's truly great commanders, it served its strategic purpose well. Alexander was forced to not only return all the lands he had seized, but had to agree to a Theban alliance as well (perhaps only after a second engagement alluded to by Diodorus but not attested elsewhere - see Stylianou's discussion of this possibility [1998, 499-5001).

  Meanwhile, back in the Peloponnese, the Arcadians prepared to host the games at Olympus, having captured that sacred site from Elis. The Eleans were not about to let this pass. They enlisted aid from the Achaeans and launched an attack on Olympus. This took the Arcadians by surprise and they didn't come out to meet it, forming up instead into a phalanx along the Cladaus River within the sacred precinct. Either their heavy array (probably 5,000 hoplites) must have taken up the available space or (as seems more likely) they needed to guard more than one approach, because they seem to have detached 2,000 spearmen from their long-time ally Argos as well as 400 horsemen from Athens (under obligation of the bilateral treaty of 366). The Eleans (on the right) and Achaeans (on the left), likely having 2,000-3,000 hoplites each, arrayed their own formation on the other bank. Advancing (the stream does not appear to have provided an obstacle), the hoplites from Elis and their allies closed into the Arcadians.

  Perhaps unnerved by the unexpected enemy mobilization and far from eager for action, the lesser troops on the Arcadian left wing gave way at first contact. This collapse soon sent their entire array into a panicked run for the rear. Keeping well-ordered to give slow chase, the Elean phalanx advanced to now meet the spearmen from Argos coming up in an attempt to rescue their beaten allies. The outmanned Argives could probably file only half as deep as the Eleans and Achaeans that now moved into them, with the result that they were rapidly pushed from the field to break and join the Arcadians in flight. Any Athenian horsemen that might have come on the scene at this point must have been swept along with the frantic mob streaming away from the fight. However, once the pursuit had carried as far as the city center, the invaders' skirmishers began to fire down from the rooftops to good effect. A number of the Eleans were killed, including Stratolas, who led the elite Three Hundred. Under this lethal rain of missiles, the victors broke off their chase and withdrew to their camp outside town. Those defeated spent the night putting up a stockade. In the morning, the Eleans, judging the barrier formidable, prudently retired to their capital.

  Spoiling of the sacred site at Olympia by members of the occupation force would ultimately bring an end to the Elean-Arcadian conflict. Condemnation of this behavior by the Arcadian assembly led by Mantinea cowed the Tegeans and other confederacy hawks, leading to productive talks and the signing of a peace accord between El
is and Arcadia in 363. As it turned out, however, hardly a year would elapse before the Peloponnese was to be roiled by an even greater war that would once more greatly shift the power-base in Greece.

  Mantinea 11(362 B.c.) and the Egyptian Canals (360 B.c.)

  The dispute in the Arcadian assembly over Olympus had revealed a deep division within its league, with Mantinea and Tegea heading contending factions. These neighboring poleis were rivals of old and it's not too surprising that they would eventually come to loggerheads again over regional leadership. The new element this time was Thebes. No longer were Arcadian disputes simply that; rather, there now existed the potential for Thebes in its role as hegemon to play a deciding hand in this kind of local issue. Many of the Arcadians resented such interference and had come to see the Thebans less as allies and more as ambitious conquerors. Mantinea was the leading state in this group. On the other side, the Tegeans were eager to use Theban power in promoting their bid to exert local ascendancy. By the summer of 362 this volatile situation led to open hostilities between Mantinea and Tegea, with the former gathering in help from Sparta and Athens and the latter calling upon Thebes. Both camps mobilized for war and Epaminondas again marched south.

  Epaminondas entered the Peloponnese and paused at Nemea to block an Athenian contingent from joining the Mantineans. But upon learning that these troops were coming by sea, he went on to Tegea. He found there that the opposition was gathering at Mantinea and awaiting Spartan reinforcements. He attempted to prevent this by marching his northerners against Sparta directly. However, the Spartans under their aged king Agesilaos prepared stout defenses as they had seven years earlier. Assessing the enemy's strong position and fearful of having his foes mass here and catch him without his own allies, Epaminondas returned to Tegea. He organized his forces there and sent parties up to raid the Mantinean countryside. This resulted in a cavalry action that saw the Athenians best his own highly regarded Theban and Thessalian riders.

  Epaminondas now decided to settle things in a grand battle. Diodorus put his numbers at 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry (15.84.4). The core of his army was the Boeotians at 7,000 hoplites and 600 riders. The allies he'd brought with him from the north might have been on the order of 4,000-5,000 spearmen. These were maybe 3,000 mercenaries from Thessaly and the rest from Locris and Euboa. The Thessalians would also have provided 1,000 horsemen at a third the strength of their hoplite contribution (added to the Theban cavalry to get the 1,600 horsemen mentioned by Polyaenus [2.3.14]). As for support from the Peloponnese, this probably included 4,000 hoplites (a majority of the Arcadians), another 2,000 from Argos and a combined 2,000-3,000 from Messenia, Sicyon and elsewhere. The Peloponnesians might have thrown in 400 or so riders as well. These all totaled 20,000 spearmen and around 2,000 horsemen. Given the strong presence of light-armed men from the tribal peoples bordering Thessaly that was emphasized by Diodorus (15.85.4-5), Epaminondas might have had 8,000 or more foot skirmishers to approach that historian's overall count of his infantry strength.

  For the anti-Theban coalition, we have Diodorus' claim of 20,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. The hoplite corps included 6,000 Athenians (Diodorus) and a likely 2,000 from Arcadia plus some 5,000 from Elis, Achaea and elsewhere. Sparta's contribution poses the largest uncertainty. Xenophon reported (Hellenica 7.5.10) that only three lochoi had initially gone to Mantinea. However, these were to be reinforced and, after the initial confrontation with Epaminondas had been resolved, it's probable that most of the rest of the Spartan army had now joined its advance party. If we allow for a single mora remaining on home guard, there would therefore have been five morai at Mantinea for a total of 5,000 spearmen. This brings the coalition count to around 18,000 hoplites, not too far below that for the opposition. And with their cavalry at 2,000, the allies had a good match in that arm as well. It was thus only in light infantry where they fell short - Diodorus putting their numbers at only about a third those in Epaminondas' camp and of lesser capability to boot.

  Instead of moving straight on his foes, Epaminondas first led his army northwest along the mountain front bordering the valley that held Tegea and Mantinea (see Pritchett [1969, 37-72] for a discussion of the topography). He then put his troops into battle formation, though initially indicating that he might just be setting up camp. The allies had been watching these movements and relaxed briefly when they thought the enemy might be preparing to stand down for the day. But when it became obvious that their foes were actually preparing for action, they too readied their phalanx.

  The coalition forces took position across the narrowest part of the valley. The Mantineans occupied the far right post of honor in their own land, followed leftward by their Arcadian supporters and then the Spartans to complete that wing. On the left wing stood the Athenians, leaving the Eleans, Achaeans and others to fill across the middle. Filed at a depth of eight shields, these spearmen would have spanned a front of 2,250m, leaving some 75-125m rising onto higher ground off each flank to be covered by cavalry and light infantry. Some of the Eleans led Peloponnesian mounted forces on the right side and the Athenians had their own riders beside them on the left. In addition, the rest of the mounted contingent from Elis formed a reserve in the rear set to reinforce either flank should that be needed.

  Across the field, Epaminondas arranged his phalanx to match. He set up his Thebans on the left extreme in a deep array per their custom of recent years, seemingly 25 shields deep this time. The Sacred Band apparently had their usual station along the first two ranks here, the narrowness of the battle ground and inward position of the cyclosis-prone Spartan contingent removing any need to stand apart as they'd done at Leuctra. As for the rest of his army, the Theban filed it rightward at a depth of eight, completing a formation near equal in width to that of his foes. The remaining Boeotians held post alongside the Thebans, followed in order by the Tegeans and other Arcadians, the lesser allies and, finally, the Argives at the far end of the line. Epaminondas seems to have hoped to again hold back his right wing, but arrayed it at an effective depth. He was no doubt mindful that the Athenian spearmen on the enemy left were not likely to be as passive as their counterparts had been at Leuctra. If they took the initiative and advanced, his weaker allies would have no choice but to fight. Like his opponents, he placed his light forces outboard for flank security.

  The arrays closed on signal, opening one of the largest hoplite battles in Greek history. As their spearmen dueled and shoved across the long battle front, the mounted forces and their attached light footmen fought it out off either flank. The importance of light infantry in screening ahead of horsemen in this era is revealed in what happened on the coalition left, where the Athenian cavalry and its skirmisher screen faced Theban riders and supporting missilemen from the hilly regions of Thessaly. Outnumbering the peltasts standing with Athens' horsemen by 200 percent and being more effectively intermingled with their mounted comrades rather than standing apart like those opposed, the javelinmen and slingers fighting for Thebes heavily wounded and pressed their foes, driving them back. The Athenian riders didn't lose good order, however, and were still able to turn with success against a body of enemy troops they found circling through the bordering upland in an attempt to menace the coalition rear. The Theban cavalry, meantime, followed up its skirmishers by wheeling against the enemy phalanx. The hoplites from Athens there had (just as Epaminondas feared) come forward to engage the Argives and others on that part of the field. They were nonetheless tiring in the course of what had been a hard-fought scrum; therefore, this sudden assault on their now exposed flank nearly broke them. It was the Elean mounted reserve that intervened at this crucial juncture to avert disaster. Charging from the rear, it took the Boeotian riders and light footmen by surprise and put an end to their attack.

  Elsewhere, Epaminondas' light-armed forces were gaining the upper hand on his left even as his overly deep wing there began to make progress amid a terrible struggle of thrusting spears and shield-shoving. Smashing forward "pr
ow on, like a trireme" in the words of Xenophon (Hellenica 7.5.23), the Thebans penetrated at last, driving the coalition right wing from the field as their cavalry turned that flank as well. Yet at the same time, the Athenians, having been rescued by the Elean horsemen, were now carrying the day against the Argives and other Theban allies across the way; and though the extent of their victory isn't clear, they took possession of the contested ground there. Prevented by the enemy's aggressiveness from keeping his weaker wing out of action as he'd done at Leuctra, Epaminondas had at the last been unable to complete his conquest of the opposing right fast enough to prevent an exchange of triumphs on opposite ends of the engagement. And at the very outset of his own pursuit, he received a fatal wound. The Thebans faltered as their general was carried off to die and they became aware of the enemy still in place to their right. No doubt mindful of the costly second attacks at Nemea River, Coronea II and the Long Walls, the Boeotians cut short their chase to bring the action to a close.

  Both armies set up trophies immediately after the fight to mark their competing successes on separate portions of the field. They then withdrew, each to later recover their dead under truce. The engagement and its disputed results ended up settling nothing, but Thebes' era as the dominant power in Greece had passed for good with the death of Epaminondas. An armistice emerged in the battle's aftermath that ended fighting on a major scale for a while. The last significant Greek combat of the decade therefore took place in Africa.

  Agesilaos may have retired from commanding Spartan armies, but that hadn't meant that he would stay home in peace. In fact, he'd been earning coin for his polis by hiring out as a mercenary leader overseas. First plying this trade in Ionia during the Satraps' Revolt, he went to work for the Egyptian pharaoh Tachos sometime before spring 361 as commander of a 10,000- man Greek mercenary corps. This likely consisted of some 6,000-8,000 hoplites and 2,0004,000 skirmishers. However, when a coup removed Tachos from power, the Spartan deserted with all his men to the new regime. He then had to face Persian forces invading Egypt on Tachos' behalf. In the campaign that followed, Agesilaos made good use of the well-worn tactic of setting up his spearmen between impassable barriers to best Persians where their greater numbers and light-armed superiority gave no advantage.