Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  The Macedonian ruler's first stop was at Crenides. Here, he further locked down the surrounding area and then marched against Centriporis and his Odrysian tribesmen. The army that accompanied him likely boasted a little over 6,000 Macedonians (2,000 hypaspists, 3,000 phalangites, 500-1,000 light infantrymen and 600 companion riders). And it probably had an even larger contingent from the Chalcidian League in the form of an allied muster approaching two-thirds, including some 6,000 hoplites, 600 light cavalry and 1,000-2,000 foot skirmishers.

  Much like for Parmenio's campaign in Illyria, the summary of Diodorus again describes a foe beaten in the past and unwilling to take the field. Yet once more this is surely wrong, as it was western Odrysians under Cersobleptes rather than these easterners under Centriporis that had incurred that earlier pounding. And while we don't have an explicit reference to a pitched battle this time, it seems quite improbable that one of the dominant tribes among a race long known for ferocity and martial prowess would simply cede its homeland without putting up a fight.

  Needing to incorporate so many foreign troops, Philip must have adjusted his usual battle order. It's very likely that this called for deployment of the Chalcidian cavalry off his left wing and assignment of the League hoplites to the formation center. Neither of these posed much of a challenge to his tactical scheme; indeed, he had used light horsemen in this same way in Thessaly and the allied hoplites were merely subbing for phalangites, themselves replacements for just such traditional spearmen. On the other side, the Odrysians surely had a strength and array similar to those of their kinsmen in the previous action at Crenides. And as then, their javelinarmed riders would have sought to carry the day from posts outside a loosely ranked line of light infantry. If so, Philip's system once more proved up to the challenge, with the hetairoi on the right probably running off their lighter-armed opponents in a brief duel and the Chalcidian horse on the left then keeping pace as the phalanx moved up. A final decision must have come quickly as minimal effort from the Macedonian and Greek heavy footmen chased their overmatched foes into the hills. Casualties were doubtless modest all around. However, the clearly repeatable nature of this triumph utterly demoralized its victims and cleared the way for Philip to seize the entire Thracian coastal belt.

  The last Athenian proxy, Lyppeius of Paeonia, probably fell to Parmenio late that summer. It's here where Diodorus' tale of cowed barbarians simply giving way strikes its most believable chord. The Paeonians had indeed suffered in pitched battle against Philip's phalanx and can't really be blamed for not wanting to risk another such thrashing. Moreover, word had certainly reached them by now of the recent Macedonian victories in Illyria and Thrace against armaments that were considerably more powerful than their own. It's therefore easy to imagine that Lyppeius came to terms after no more than token resistance - a response that some sources might then have mistakenly assigned to Grabus and Centriporis as well.

  Adding to Philip's successes in this period was an impressive string of investments as one city-state outpost after another fell before him. In fact, the Macedonian army was proving just as adept at siege-craft as on the battlefield. By late 355, Philip was going against Methone, the only Greek center in the region still outside his control. The king would suffer a fearsome wound here (Worthington 2008, 49), struck in the face by a catapult bolt (toxeuma). Though this cost Philip an eye and left a frightful scar from cheek to forehead, he soldiered on to take Methone in 354. Yet, even as he was making these gains in the far north, a major conflict was underway in central Greece that would soon draw Macedonia deep into Grecian affairs.

  Sacrilege and War

  The Third Sacred War (the first two being 6th and 5th century events) arose out of a petty rivalry between Thebes and Phocis. It seems that in the fall of 357 the Thebans were in the throes of righteous anger over their recent expulsion from the island of Euboa (Hornblower 1991, 246). The Phocians became the focus for this rage because, despite being erstwhile allies, they had refused to come to Thebes' aid. The Thebans elected to avenge this perceived insult through the Delphic Amphictyony, a regional league overseeing Greece's most revered shrine at Delphi. This oracle sat naturally within Phocian territory, but the league dictated its affairs and Thebes had firm control of that body. It was thus a simple matter to have the Amphictyony assess a fine on Phocis for cultivating land set aside for grazing shrine sacrifices. Doing this in the spring of 356, the Thebans made sure that the penalty was outrageously costly so as to justify further action when the Phocians refused to pay. Seemingly trivial, this act of spite would have a surprisingly significant impact on Greek history.

  Phaedriades and Amphissa I and II (356 B.C.)

  Philomelus, the Phocian leader, now seized Delphi. He had prepared for this act by using a sum of 30 talents (half his own and the rest from Sparta) to secure a band of mercenaries for that summer's campaign season. These likely consisted of 2,000 hoplites (each paid one drachma per day for 90 days), whom he supported with some of his own men, perhaps 500 peltasts and a few hundred horsemen. The Ozolian (western) Locrians marched straight away to free the shrine. As members of the Amphictyony closest to hand (their lands lying just south and west of Delphi) they might have felt the need to do this in order to prevent abuse of the sacred precinct. However, enmity toward the Phocians, bitter rivals of long standing, must have been a factor as well. And it's probably this intense hatred that best explains why the Locrians were willing to chance a battle at this time despite having an inferior force of perhaps no more than 1,500 hoplites, 750 peltasts and 150 cavalrymen.

  The armies came to blows on a gentle incline leading down to Phaedriades, a circle of rocks on the south side of Mount Parnassos that formed a cliff plunging toward Delphi. Approaching from the east, the Phocians aligned their phalanx down the slope, likely making use of greater numbers to stand at a depth of twelve shields along both wings while only eight in the center. This compelled the Locrians to avoid an overlap by filing less than eight-deep along their entire front. With light-armed contingents offsetting each other at the edges of the fight, Phocis' deeply stacked and better seasoned mercenaries appear to have carried the day on their right by making the most of natural drift to sweep that flank. This caused the Locrian array to break apart in a downhill progression as men came under attack from the side and tossed shields to run. The Locrians took heavy losses, some suffering capture but many more (perhaps 20-30 percent) being either slain in flight or driven over the nearby precipice.

  Philomelus had been able to inflict a crushing defeat on Locris at trivial cost to his own forces (a percent or two in fatalities at most). This encouraged him to punish his foes by descending on their home territory. To this purpose, he called up the Phocian national levy, which let him put around 5,000 men into the field (Diodorus 16.25.1). These would have included the peltasts and hired spearmen from Phaedriades as well as some 1,500 native hoplites and Phocis' full complement of 500 light horsemen.

  Philomelus struck at Amphissa, the main town of Ozolian Locris, which lay but a short distance to the west of Delphi. He did this by sending out separate raiding parties so as to better spoil the surrounding croplands, each detachment having a core of hoplites backed by cavalry and light footmen. Such a dispersion of strength was common for Greek invaders when encountering little or no opposition; still, it was a course fraught with peril, since these detachments could easily end up far from the main body of their army and make tempting targets for resistance fighters.

  This theoretical risk soon turned real as one of the raiding groups did indeed come under attack. The size of this unit is speculative; however, 600-800 men appears reasonable on the basis of reported casualties. This suggests a lochos of 400-500 hoplites (perhaps Phocian militia) working with 150-200 peltasts and maybe 50-100 horsemen. Hiding within the wooded district around Amphissa, the Locrians sprang an ambush with a force likely about equal in size to that of the Phocians, using survivors from Phaedriades plus old age/youth reservists. Caught unprepared,
the raiders fled after a sharp action that ended before aid could arrive from the central Phocian column. Though the fight was brief, it still cost the lives of 20 of Philomelus' men (Diodorus 16.25.2) and, perhaps, even more, since this figure might represent only hoplite losses at a rate of 3-5 percent. By the time Philomelus came to the rescue, the victors had withdrawn, carrying away the Phocian dead along with their own.

  In the aftermath of this minor triumph, the Locrians chose to add insult to injury by refusing the Phocians a truce to recover their slain, claiming that those who had defiled a holy site like Delphi didn't deserve honorable burial. It was a bold move that came back to haunt the Locrians when they tried to repeat their ambush tactic. This time, the targeted troops (mercenaries?) were ready and inflicted a stinging defeat. Philomelus was now able to claim a number of Locrian bodies, which he then traded for his own dead before wrapping up the campaign and heading home.

  Argolas and Neon (355 B.c.)

  Following his victory in Locris, Philomelus faced an invasion by Thebes and its allies in the coming year. He was well aware that Phocis' army was hopelessly inadequate to meet this threat without massive mercenary help, but lacked adequate funds to hire the required troops. This compelled him to take a drastic measure. Delphi was actually much more than just a religious site - it was also a repository of immense riches. Nearly every polis in Greece donated to its famed oracle in return for highly prized state prophesies. No doubt feeling already damned for his previous acts such that no greater infamy seemed likely to accrue from further sacrilege, Philomelus used the shrine's treasury to pay for forces needed to protect his homeland.

  As summer 355 approached, the Thebans were moving closer to all-out war with Phocis. They had hesitated to take this step to date out of fear for what Athens might do. But Athens, despite being the Phocians most powerful supporter, had its own worries. The still raging Social War was draining the Athenians of means to fully engage in another conflict, whether in Macedonia (where they had to settle for rather feeble proxy campaigns against Philip) or now in central Greece. With courage bolstered by this, Thebes was at last ready to move against Philomelus.

  With the Thebans set to enter the fray, attention shifted from the south of Phocis to that state's upper reaches. Here, below the northern slopes of Mount Parnassos and bordering on Opuntian (eastern) Locris, the land lay open to invasion. Yet defense of this region was imperative in that it held the vast majority of the Phocian population, which resided along the valley of the Cephissus River. Philomelus therefore moved his entire armament northward to await the pending enemy advance.

  The opening round went well for the Phocians when their cavalry defeated a team of riders from Boeotia and Opuntian Locris. Sometime after this, a major battle took place on the Locrian plain near a hill called Argolas. Philomelus fielded a force of over 10,000 men for this action (Diodorus 16.29.3). These probably counted around 8,000 hoplites that included mercenaries (5,000), Phocian militia (1,500) and perhaps allies from Achaea (1,500, though this reinforcement might have arrived after the battle). Light support would have been on hand to the tune of 2,000 peltasts and 500 horsemen. In opposition was a 6,000-man army from Thessaly (Diodorus 16.29.4). This likely consisted of hirelings in the form of 4,000 spearmen and 1,000 peltasts plus 500 militia riders with a matching force of hamippoi. The Thessalian League and Pherae (in rare harmony) sent these troops along with a small contingent from local allies. As the armies prepared to fight, Philomelus must have put his numerical advantage to use by setting up his heavy formation twelve-deep along its full length, sandwiching the less experienced Phocians in the middle and forcing the enemy to reply with files at half his depth.

  The following engagement seems to have resulted in a fairly rapid triumph for Phocis. Undoubtedly a prime display of othismos, concerted shoving by the Phocians' spearmen must have projected much greater muscular energy that powered through the thin opposing line. Panic on the other side would have fueled this penetration as well, rising quickly to fever pitch as soldiers found themselves stumbling awkwardly backward at an ever increasing pace. Within a few minutes at most, terror-struck men began peeling away to bolt from the Thessalian rear. Luckily for those trying to flee, their mounted comrades, who were of outstanding strength and quality, must have intervened to screen the retreat and drastically cut losses from pursuit. Casualties were likely on the order of 1-2 percent killed for the victors and 5-8 percent for those defeated.

  Philomelus followed up by advancing into the passes over Mount Kallidromon, thus blocking all direct paths onto the Phocian plain from Thebes' northern staging area. However, Philip's old Theban host, Pammenes, frustrated the ploy by looping around to enter from the east. This compelled Philomelus to withdraw southward toward Mount Parnassos. As the Phocian and Theban armies shifted position, they lost track of each other only to then have their advance elements inadvertently make contact while marching through a densely wooded area near the foothill village of Neon. This chance meeting of vanguards soon led to a full scale battle, which took place across open ground on the far side of a deep ravine holding the Kachales River where it flowed to the northwest in front of Neon.

  Diodorus claimed that Pammenes brought 13,000 men to Neon (16.30.4). If true, it's probable that some 10,000 of them were hoplites from Thebes (3,000), elsewhere in Boeotia (4,000) and the hired ranks (Parke [1933, 135] from Pausanius). The rest would have been peltasts/hamippoi along with 700 horsemen. As for Philomelus, he stood across the way with the same force that had fought at Argolas. This gave Pammenes a decided numerical edge, which would have let him deploy the spearmen from his native polis at 25 shields deep. A disciple of Epaminondas, the Theban probably positioned these troops on his left wing while filing the remainder of his hoplites at a depth of only eight. Seeking to avoid being outflanked, Philomelus now had to arrange his entire formation at eight shields deep. It's likely that these preliminaries weren't complete until late afternoon, at which time the phalanxes finally began to advance. Closing deliberately at first, the spearmen on both sides would have rushed over the last few meters to precipitate a desperate melee.

  Diodorus' account of the battle at Neon (16.30.3) indicates that it turned on the Boeotians' greater manpower. If this was actually the case, then the climax likely came on the Phocian right wing. The Thebans could have used their superior depth there to steadily push back and eventually pierce the facing array. With what were presumably its best troops beaten, the Phocian phalanx must have collapsed in short order, sending men flooding rearward toward the Kachales defile and the mountain beyond. It seems that Philomelus was among those who escaped to higher ground; however, looking down from the sheer cliff that sat above Neon town, he could see the bodies of 30 percent or more of his men strewn over the rugged terrain below. These lay in heaps near the abandoned line of battle and scattered along the path of retreat all the way onto the lower mountain slopes. Dismayed and disgraced, the Phocian commander sought to atone by leaping over the rock face to his death. Yet, all was not lost, as another general, Onomarchos, now led the bulk of the beaten army to safety.

  Neon might well have marked the end of the Third Sacred War if not for three conspiring factors. The first was Onomarchos, who would emerge as a more than adequate replacement for Philomelus. The second factor was the largely mercenary nature of the Phocian military. No matter how often it might suffer defeat or how many casualties it took, the seemingly inexhaustible pool of unemployed fighting men in Greece enabled Phocis to keep throwing new armies into the field as long it had the funds to pay for them. This brings us to the last factor: the riches of Delphi. The Phocians remained firmly in control of that vast reserve of wealth, thus guaranteeing their ability to continue the war. As a result of this confluence of elements, the events of 355 terminated no more than the opening phase of a conflict that was destined to last a full decade and have the gravest consequences for all of Greece.

  Philip Marches South

  Onomarchos made go
od use of Delphic funds to restore strength to his fighting force over the fall and winter. He then struck back with a punitive campaign in spring 354 that dealt a good deal of damage to Opuntian Locris and the Boeotians. But the most fateful event at this time proved not to be tactical, but rather diplomatic. This occurred when Pherae and the Thessalian League, who had found common cause at Argolas, renewed their long running civil war in Thessaly. In decline and seeking to stave off defeat, the Pheraeans turned to Athens and Phocis for an alliance. Their agreement would soon create a seismic shift in the balance of power by bringing Macedonia, an ally of the Thessalian League, into the Sacred War.

  Pherae II and III, The Crescent Hills and Hermeum (354 B.C.)

  Philip marched south with what was likely a full national muster as Diodorus' account sets no limitation, simply saying that he "entered Thessaly with his army" (16.35.1). At this time, his forces probably totaled on the order of 3,000 hypaspists, 9,000 phalangites, 3,000 skirmishers and up to 1,600 hetairoi, all at nominal unit strength. Allied troops would have met him shortly after entering Thessaly. These could have been as many as 2,000 hoplites, 500 peltasts, 1,000 light horsemen and 1,000 hamippoi - the League's full hired levy and around two-thirds of its native cavalry with light infantry support. Philip must then have closed on Pherae that he might invest the enemy's seat of power. It was near here where Phayllos, brother of Onomarchos, confronted him, having marched up from Phocis with 7,000 men (Diodorus 16.35.1). Adding in a full mobilization of local resources, Phayllos might have had roughly 8,000 hoplites (what his polis had fielded a year earlier plus 3,000 more from Pherae)- all mercenaries. His supporting forces likely amounted to around 2,000 peltasts along with at least 1,500 native Pheraean horsemen and an equal number of hamippoi.