Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  With the terrain in his favor, Hicetas must have been quite confident. But that doesn't appear to have been the case with his soldiers, who seemingly lacked the kind of intense fervor for battle that was manifest among their foes across the river. Eager to get at the opposition, Timoleon's thinly arrayed troops charged with such elan that they overcame the waterway's sharp rise and its hesitant defenders in a single rush. Probably broken more by fear than steel, Hicetas men threw down their arms and fled. The initial clash and subsequent pursuit took the lives of 1,000 (20 percent) among the losers (Plutarch Vol. I Timoleon, 350) and broke their will for good. Timoleon was thus soon after able to capture Hicetas with his entire family. Duly executing all of these, the people of Syracuse put paid at last to their longest running Greek enemy.

  Timoleon followed up his destruction of Hicetas with a victory near the Abolas River. This came against Mamercus, despot of Catana, in an action that perhaps featured 6,000-10,000 combatants on either side. The Syracusans most likely took advantage of superior cavalry and light infantry to execute an envelopment and hard chase that slaughtered some 3,000 (30-50 percent) of the tyrant's men (Plutarch vol. I Timoleon, 351). Most of these casualties were Greek mercenaries provided by Carthage and this disaster soured its taste for further Sicilian adventures. The Carthaginians therefore made peace with Syracuse, promising not to stray beyond their old limits in the west.

  The Fourth Sacred War: Greece Falls

  The late 340s saw Philip's forces engage a wide variety of foes all across the northern span of his realm. We're told by Justin (8.6.3) that he reorganized his homeland at this time, shifting entire communities into frontier areas that he might better guard his borders. He would accompany these internal moves with a series of campaigns against the regions past those boundaries. These expeditions had the aim of not only further securing his kingdom, but were also meant to gain sway over large new populations. Philip would move some elements of the subjected people inside Macedonia so as to refill recently emptied sectors with fresh reservoirs of manpower. Others would remain in place, but with an obligation to provide allied reserves and auxiliaries. Either way, Philip was set on growing his military strength with an eye to pushing his conquests farther into Greece and beyond.

  Ardiaea (345 B.C.), Odrysia II and III (341 B.C.) and Strymon Valley (340 B.C.)

  Philip's opening border campaign in this period was against the last Illyrians still eluding his control. These were the Ardiaei, a tribal group living within the Adriatic coastal region near the Rhizon Gulf in what today is northern Albania. The king marched a "large army" (Diodorus 16.69.7) into Ardiaea (perhaps resembling that employed against the Chalcidice in 348) and bested the tribesmen and their leader Pleuratus in a set battle. We know little about this engagement, but it was probably much like the actions at Lyncus Plain (358) and Grabaea (356). This time, however, the Macedonians would have had superior manpower with at least twice their opponents' strength in heavy infantry. Philip therefore likely used his deeper array to break the Illyrian left wing and initiate a rout. The primary shock fight was surely brief and decisive in favor of Philip's side, yet took at least a small toll in that we hear of the king receiving a broken right collarbone that led Isocrates to chide him for taking needless risks in combat (Worthington 2008, 108-109). And what looks to have been an extended pursuit claimed a price as well. It seems that some 150 of the hetairoi took wounds in this chase (Hammond [1994, 117] from Didymus). Damage of better than 10 percent suggests that these chosen riders suffered 30 or so fatalities. In the end, the Ardiaei bowed to Philip and a good many must have added to other tribal men and boys transplanted into Macedon as a future source of hardy spearmen (Polyaenus 4.2.12).

  The next round of fighting began three years later when Philip invaded the farther interior of Thrace. The Odrysians there under Cersobleptes and Teres had attacked neighboring Greeks, which gave Philip all the leave needed to take action. He did this with a host much larger than that fielded only a decade earlier. Absorbed peoples and relocated captives had joined good times under Philip's rule to give him a population fit for doubling his native pool of soldiers, and he had the means to add a lot of mercenaries as well. Most of this newfound strength now came down on Odrysia as Philip led out an infantry force 30,000 strong (probably some 5,000 hypaspists, 15,000 phalangites, 5,000 hired/allied hoplites and 5,000 foot skirmishers) as well as both companion and light (Thessalian and/or mercenary) horsemen. All we really have on the combats that followed is Diodorus' note that the Macedonian king "overcame the Thracians in several battles" (16.71.2). What seems likely is that most of these actions were small, but events peaked in 341 with two major engagements. The first involved Cersobleptes, who had lost to Philip at Crenides (356) and surely realized that he had even less chance this time around. Indeed, only extreme desperation could have led him to abandon holding actions and finally risk open battle. With no greater manpower than he had at Crenides, the Thracian's defeat was inevitable and must have come with a long pursuit and severe losses. Teres and his tribesmen would shortly fare no better under almost identical circumstances, leaving Philip clear to reduce a last few remaining hilltop fortifications and claim the entire Odrysian realm by 340.

  Secure throughout the north, Philip now decided to bring to a head his long-running duel with Athens for leadership among the Greeks. He therefore went after Athens' allies in the Hellespont, investing Byzantium, Perinthus and Selymbia as a gross provocation. So great was his manpower at this stage that Parmenio and Antipater as well as his son Alexander could operate separate columns at the same time that the sieges were ongoing. We've no details on these forays, but they must have been of modest size. It seems most probable that each campaign involved columns of 5,000 heavy footmen (2,000 hypaspists and mercenary hoplites plus 3,000 phalangites) backed by cavalry and light infantry. While Parmenio and Antipater led splits from Philip's main force, the prince had troops left at home for just such an eventuality. It was this latter, reserve element that seems to have fought the only significant combat, defeating the Paeonian Maedi in the Strymon Valley above Amphipolis. Alexander was still in his teens, but seems to have done well in this first battlefield test, no doubt with aid from senior officers assigned by the king to provide oversight. Lacking particulars, we might assume that this victory bore strong likeness to that of Philip over the Paeonians in 358. The only real difference would have been one of scale, with the father having faced a multi-tribe effort maybe half again to twice as large.

  Dobruja Plain and Hister Valley (339 B.c.)

  Philip's investments in the northeast dragged on into 339 without success, and when Athens and some of the Persian satraps sent aid to those besieged he made terms and withdrew. Before doing this, however, he took another bold step against the Athenians by seizing their annual grain shipment as it sailed south from what is today the Ukraine. Destroying all the Athenian ships while letting the rest go, Philip caused a food shortage that drove hostility toward Macedonia to high pitch in Athens. He then turned northward on the way home to attack Atheas, the Scythian king whose lands lay immediately above Odrysia. That geriatric monarch (said to be 90) not only posed a threat to the recent Odrysian conquests, but had also reneged on sending supplies in support of the Macedonian siege efforts. Marching into Scythia, Philip fought an action on the Dobruja Plain along the west side of the Black Sea.

  The Scythians were mounted archers, who normally avoided shock fighting. Their favored approach was to either perform repeated charges and retreats against foes with a fixed flank or make a running assault that circled around and fired flights of arrows into troops exposed on open ground. We can deduce what happened from a probable misreport by Frontinus (confusing infantry for cavalry [2.8.14] as per Hammond [1994, 136]) and likely similar tactics used by Alexander against the Scythians a decade later (derived from Arrian [4.4.6-7]). Philip had his phalanx (perhaps partially anchored) form a bulwark at the rear while his cavalry and light footmen advanced in mixed ord
er. This kept the Scythians from surrounding his mobile vanguard for fear of being pinched between that and the spears and pikes behind. At the same time, his riders and skirmishers, their rear now well protected, dashed out to turn back every enemy charge at the front. With their tactics frustrated, being out-ranged by the Macedonian peltasts, slingers and archers and with no screening infantry of their own, the Scythians took a sound beating to yield both the field and their dominion to Philip after Atheas fell during the course of the fight.

  Philip gathered booty from his Scythian triumph and headed home. He moved up the Hister (Danube) Valley with the intent of entering Macedonia from the north by passing through the territory of the Triballi. These were notoriously fierce and unruly people so influenced by neighboring Scythians and Illyrians that they were almost distinct from their fellow Thracians (Webber 2001, 10). The Triballi demanded a share of Philip's loot in return for a peaceful transit of their land and attacked when he refused. Possibly repeating schemes employed in Scythia, the king charged out on horseback with his cavalry and light footmen to engage riders leading the enemy attack. The Triballi fell back before this onslaught to cover behind their infantry, especially those men wielding a long spear (`sarissa' in Macedonian parlance). One of these lengthy weapons took Philip in the thigh, passing through so deeply as to kill his mount (Justin 9.3.2). Seeing their king go down, many thought him dead, leading to disorder among the Macedonians. The Triballi took advantage to make off with most of Philip's hard-won goods before he was able to rally his men for an orderly retreat. He did this by having the rear ranks of his phalanx stand fast with weapons deployed while the rest of the army drew back behind them, the rearguard then joining their comrades to clear the field with minimal loss (Polyaenus 4.2.13). (This may be similar to the tactics employed in 368 by Epaminondas along the road from Pherae.) Philip thus escaped with his army intact and returned home, but having a permanent limp to mark his third (and last) battlefield defeat - the only one he would ever suffer against a barbarian foe.

  Chaeronea (338 B.c.)

  While Philip was in the final stages of his operation in Thrace, problems were once again arising with regard to fields near Delphi. In a repeat of the sort of dispute that had sparked the Third Sacred War, the Ozolian Locrians of Amphissa stood accused of using land set aside for the shrine. The Macedonians and their allies in the Amphictyony voted in the winter of 340/39 to declare against the Locrians, thus igniting the Fourth Sacred War. This gave Philip authority to act against Locris and its chief supporter Athens. The Athenians for their part had already set aside an existing peace with Macedonia in outrage over the attacks on their allies and the grain fleet. Philip, whose leg had healed somewhat, marched into Phocis late in the fall of 339 to threaten not only Amphissa, but Thebes and Athens as well. At this juncture, he offered a choice of submitting to his hegemony or facing attack. The decision was to fight. Since Philip's troops were recovering from their last campaign and he was still not fully fit, the king withdrew to ready a major effort. In the meantime, he sent small detachments to wage a guerilla war along the Cephissus Valley in Phocis and Boeotia.

  Philip set out in force late the next summer. The national army was now roughly triple what it had been upon the reunification that followed his victory at Lyncus Plain in 358. The phalanx stood 24,000 strong with the backing of perhaps 2,400 hetairoi (one per ten heavy footmen in a dozen 200-horse squadrons) plus 3,000-4,000 light infantrymen. This count of line troops matches that for 334 given by Diodorus (17.17.3-5) and likely represents 6,000 hypaspists and 18,000 phalangites in the same 1 to 3 ratio detailed by the historian for Alexander's expeditionary force. (Note that a popular view, see Hammond [1994, 1501 for example, has been to cap the hypaspists at 3,000 in 334 and send all of them against Persia, filling the rest of the heavy corps with 21,000 phalangites. This appears less likely in that it ignores clear tactical needs for the army left in Macedonia and is out of step with documented expansion in every other part of the Macedonian military.) As for the host Philip had in tow for this particular campaign, it must have included the entire national phalanx plus some 6,000 hired hoplites. But his shock cavalry doesn't appear to have been at full strength, maybe amounting to a third or so of the hetairoi. Thessalian light horsemen (presumably the "laggard confederates" mentioned by Diodorus [16.85.51) made up the difference, bringing the king's mounted contingent up to 2,000 in all. Several thousand foot skirmishers must have been present as well to push his infantry above 30,000.

  A modest coalition of Greeks prepared to meet the invasion, gathering near the western Boeotian city of Chaeronea on Philip's projected route along the Cephissus River. The allies had around 28,000 hoplites, maybe 2,000 horsemen and up to 7,000 in light infantry for 35,000 foot troops in all. Their spearmen came from Athens and Boeotia (10,000 apiece) with another 2,000 each from Corinth, Megara and (per Hammond 1994, 148) the mercenary ranks. There were also troops from a number of other poleis representing Euboa, Achaea, Leucas, Corcyra and Acarnania. These lesser levies totaled an additional 2,000 spearmen. Athenians and Boeotians made up the cavalry for the most part and were of good quality. Diodorus said that Philip outnumbered this allied muster (16.85.6), which appears marginally true of the heavy infantry. Yet, Justin's claim (9.3.9) of greater manpower among the allies looks slightly more accurate overall. In truth, the opposing forces were so close in size that confusion as to their relative strength is not surprising.

  As Philip's army drew near on the morning of September 1st, the Greeks set up across his path in combat formation within the valley of the Cephissus. The allied line faced northwest and stretched from an anchor along the marshy bank of the river on the northeast to the other side of the plain, where that flank was equally fixed against a slope leading up to the acropolis of Chaeronea. The phalanx covered a front of some 2.3km with its hoplites standing in twelveman files. The Athenians took the left wing, having the lesser allies alongside with the hired men to complete the array through center. On the other wing were the Boeotians with the hoplites from Thebes rightmost and their 300 elites of the Sacred Band at the very end. Since both flanks of this phalanx abutted terrain barriers, part of the light-armed men spread into the hills to the southwest. The rest moved across the Cephissus, where their cavalry sat to block any attempt at a wide envelopment around that side of the valley.

  Seeing this arrangement, Philip set up in phalanx as well, taking post with his hypaspists on the right, placing the mercenary spearmen next left and with his pikemen on the far wing under the leadership of the young Alexander. The Macedonian line would have matched the enemy front by filing its hypaspists twelve-deep, the other hoplites at ten to twelve and the phalangites at their usual depth of ten. (Note that files of eight for both hoplites and hypaspists could have achieved the same frontage had the latter been only 3,000 strong.) With the ends of their heavy formation anchored on the same topography as the Greeks, Philip's cavalry and its screen of footmen crossed the river to engage their opposite numbers while the remaining skirmishers moved against the Greek light infantry scattered over the uplands.

  BATTLE OF CHAERONEA (338 B.C.) (BOXES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED TO SHOW RELATIVE SIZES.)

  Philip's troops advanced in good order to initiate a hard-fought shock action that raged across the valley floor for quite a while. The Boeotians and their mercenary comrades found themselves stymied on the northeast side of the field by the long pikes of the Macedonian phalangite array as they tried to push in tight and ply their shorter weapons. Yet some of the hoplites did manage to penetrate and deliver fatal strikes. This is attested by the remains of pikemen that have been found interred nearby and there can be no doubt that, once inside the pike front, a hoplite's shield and spear were superior for close combat, letting him lance down lightly protected foes whose elongated pole-arms were now useless. All the same, such successes by the Greek fighters were way too few and far between to overcome the Macedonian formation. Meanwhile to the southwest, Philip's season
ed hypaspists were fairing no better in their attempt to push through or turn the Athenians opposing them. Stabbing with spears or shoving with their shields all along the front, the facing formations were equal in depth and desire; straining, sweating, bleeding and dying, neither side would give way. Nor were these the only stalemates on the day, as neither the skirmishing light infantry in the hills nor the cavalries and their fronting footmen across the river were any more decisive.

  It was at this crucial moment that Philip gave a signal by horn for his hypaspists to draw back. Starting from the rearmost, each rank spun about in turn and calmly moved away, the leading row (now at the rear) edging backwards to swing at last and join an orderly retreat that was heading toward rising ground. The king's mercenary hoplites on the left of this withdrawal must have played an important role at this point, holding station as the hypaspists marched off, with the rightmost few files pivoting slightly to keep well-shielded while presenting spears cantered toward their now abandoned flank. Stunned, the Athenians facing this maneuver hesitated for a moment in surprise. Then, thinking the fight won, they gave shouts of triumph and, ignoring the mercenaries opposed to their right, moved out in a pursuit led by their general Stratocles. Perhaps a few of the more experienced, like those who had fought at Mantinea in 362, felt that something was wrong, but they had no hope of holding back the green crowd that dominated their ranks and were carried along as the Athenian array became jumbled in an increasingly enthusiastic chase. That's when Philip and his men reached higher terrain and a second signal blared out. With frightening precision, the finely drilled hypaspists once more swung around from rear rank to front, reversing direction to redress for a beat and then advance upon a third signal.