Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Alexander was able to observe the Persian formation as he drew near and the plain continued to widen. He took advantage of these developments to shift some of his men, adjusting his formation and tactics to counter the enemy's arrangements as he filled the added space. He stretched out his phalanx, thinning the files to minimums of eight-deep for the phalangites (Polybios 12.19.6) and four for the hypaspists. This spread the heavy infantry across some 1,750m in order for it to match frontages with that of the opposing hoplites and heavy-armed kardakes. At the same time, he had the Thessalian cavalry transfer to the seaward flank to address the dense concentration of Persian horsemen on that side of the field, doing so without the enemy's knowledge behind cover of the phalanx. He would continue to adjust his supporting units as he closed, with archers and Thracian peltasts finally ending up on the left between the pikemen and cavalry there and the Paeonian horsemen and lancers adding on to his right wing. He also had archers, the Agrianians and some of his Greek mercenaries come up to support his cavalry force on the right (where he himself held post), these having chased some of the enemy's light footmen back into the hills (he had then posted 300 cavalrymen behind on that side to make sure these beaten skirmishers didn't return). The rest of the allied and mercenary hoplites and foot skirmishers remained in the rear, there being no more room at the front.

  Alexander led his formation toward the Persians standing firm on the other side of the Pinaros, advancing at first at a walk to maintain orderly ranks; then, as the distance closed and the massed kardakes archers on his right began to rain down arrows, he came on at the double across the stream. However, while this helped to reduce exposure to missile fire for the horsemen and light footmen around his person, it was difficult for his heavy infantry to avoid some disarray at such a pace in traversing the streambed. A gap thus opened in the Macedonian line, most likely between the hypaspists and the first regiment of pikemen on their left. Here, the Persian mercenary hoplites opposite were able to flank the pike hedge and take down a regimental commander and 120 (8 percent) of his now disadvantaged phalangites in a close-in fight. It's a tribute to the adjacent Macedonians' heart and discipline that they maintained formation and didn't break at this development. And elsewhere along the heavy-armed front, Alexander's men were holding their ground as well, staving off the enemy despite having a very thin array. The pikemen were able to use their long weapons to good effect against the kardakes hoplites on the left and the mercenaries across the center. Meantime, the hypaspists' spears took a toll among the remaining hirelings and the heavy-armed kardakes facing their part of the line on the right, all the while resisting any shield-pushing pressure coming that way. Next to the shoreline, a fierce cavalry action was raging. The Persians had charged there, crossing the Pinaros to go on the attack in hopes that they could win the battle by turning the Macedonians along that flank. Again, Alexander's outmanned forces hung tough, giving him a chance to carry the day on his right.

  BATTLE OF ISSUS (333 B.C.) (BOXES REPRESENTING FORCES ARE EXAGGERATED TO SHOW RELATIVE SIZES.)

  The Macedonian king and his shock cavalry had weathered the initial missile fire from the light-armed kardakes on their side of the ground through a mix of determination and speed; now, they put those foes to the lance and drove them away in a brief melee. As the bowmen and peltasts fled under pursuit from the Paeonians and lancers, Alexander and his hetairoi turned against the freshly exposed side and rear of the Persian hoplites on that end of the field. The kardakes were unable to withstand this sudden lateral assault along with renewed pressure from the hypaspists; as a result, their formation began to disintegrate. Whether the Alexander Sarcophagus depicts this moment at Issus or a similar one from Gaugemela, its images perfectly illustrate the scene that now unfolded, with the kardakes struggling against Macedonian hetairoi and hypaspists as a few Persian cavalrymen come up in an attempt to cover their withdrawal. Some of the Persians still held aspis and spear, while others were down to broken shafts with sauroters or swords as they were washed to the rear in a swirl of hand-to-hand combat that saw Alexander himself take a cut to the thigh. In short order, the Persian spearmen were shattered and they streamed rearward to join the light-armed members of their regiments already on the run.

  The hetairoi moved next to take Darius' Greek hoplites from behind as the hypaspists, having cleared the last of the kardakes on that side, folded around to envelop the denuded left end of the mercenary line. This is the moment shown in such romantic fashion on the Alexander Mosaic, with the famed Macedonian riding with xyston in hand toward an alarmed Persian king. Whatever the reality might have been (the two monarchs more likely being well separated), Darius saw that his left wing was defeated and his hired spearmen were being cut off, making it high time to take advantage of his unblocked rearward position and beat a speedy personal retreat. It was a wise move that might well have saved his life.

  Behind the fleeing Great King, his battle line rapidly collapsed from left to right, with the mercenaries giving way, then the kardakes hoplites on the seaward side and, finally, the imperial cavalry that had up until now been making some progress along the beach. The resulting rush to the rear was a nightmare, with masses clawing to get away along the narrow coastal plain under hot pursuit. The Thessalian horsemen were especially effective in that sector, chasing and cutting down so many enemy riders that their foes (quite unusually) lost a higher percentage in mounted men (both Arrian [2.11.8] and Curtius [3.11.27] indicate a third) than foot soldiers (15 percent). Across the field overall, infantry casualties must have been greatest among the kardakes and hireling Greeks. For the latter, we hear of only abut 10,000 getting away (Arrian cited 8,000 deserting over the mountains to Phoenicia with their exiled Macedonian commander, Amyntas, and another 2,000 later joining Darius). This suggests the loss of a third, consistent with Arrian's claim that infantry and cavalry casualties were about equal and assuming that by "infantry" he meant only heavy footmen. As it was, the Persian death toll would undoubtedly have been even higher if night hadn't begun to fall at the battle's end. As for Macedonian losses, they were surely modest; still, the extremely low fatalities claimed by Curtius are dubious. These also conflict with the damage Arrian reported among the phalangites that had been penetrated. We might more reasonably suspect that some 3 percent of the heavy infantry lost their lives along with perhaps 5 percent of the mounted troops and a similar cut of their intermingled foot skirmishers.

  Further trouble would hit the Persians following Issus in the form of marauding by some of their defeated mercenaries. The men who had escaped the battle with Amyntas ended up taking ship in Phoenicia, 4,000 of them then joining that Macedonian refugee in sailing to Cyprus (Curtius 4.1.27) and the rest accepting service under Agis, king of Sparta, for a campaign on Crete (Diodorus 17.48.1-2). (Note that Diodorus gives all of the mercenaries that Arrian said had followed Amyntas to Agis, but adds 4,000 more that stayed with the Macedonian. Curtius' account can be taken to mean that these latter were merely a split of the original 8,000, suggesting that Agis actually took only half of the hirelings that reached Phoenicia. Alternatively, it's possible that some of the mercenary counts in our sources include light infantry [perhaps at 25 percent of the total as suggested above for Alexander's own assessment at Issus] while others do not.) While the fighting on Crete would be on behalf of Persia, Amyntas and his hoplites went rogue and were willing to prey in any manner that yielded profit. They thus recruited more troops on Cyprus (likely a force of 1,000 or so missilemen for skirmisher support) and sailed off to attack Egypt, hoping to take advantage of confusion in the wake of the death of that satrapy's governor (Sabaces) at Issus.

  Pretending to be an advance party for Darius, the Greeks gained the harbor at Pelusium and captured that city. They then marched on Memphis where the local garrison came out to offer battle. Given their willingness to engage openly, we can suppose that the defenders were at least even if not actually superior in numbers. And, indeed, a baivaraba at the 30-60 percent
parade strength common for long-standing garrisons might well have put enough men into the field at a depth of ten to equal fronts with Amyntas' spearmen filed at eight. The Memphian troops were most likely heavily equipped Egyptians. These used a large, elongate, wooden shield held by a combination of center-grip and shoulder strap, wearing linen body armor and wicker helmet and carrying a long spear (Nelson 1975, 20-21). Though otherwise a fair match in a shock fight, the Memphians couldn't hope to long hold their ground under the sort of pressure that the Greek hoplites could impart via othismos; therefore, once dueling with spears gave way to a shoving match with shields, they must have given way. The mercenaries chased their foes back inside the city, probably having inflicted fair damage (5 -10 percent) at considerably smaller cost (2-3 percent). Yet all then went bad for the Greeks when they lost discipline while ravaging the surrounding area and the defenders sallied once more to catch them scattered and unready for another bout. The result was a massacre without quarter that wiped out Amyntas and his raiders to the last man.

  Back in Asia, Alexander had now laid claim to Cilicia and marched into Phoenicia, where he put the imposing island fortress of Tyre under siege. This developed into an epic operation that wouldn't see the city fall until the summer of 332. But the effort proved highly worthwhile, since it brought the region under Macedonian sway and took away home bases for the conscripted Phoenician fleet of Darius. This destroyed the Persian naval effort in the Aegean within a matter of months. Having grown more fearful as the siege at Tyre progressed, the Great King sought a negotiated solution. However, an offer of half his empire was rejected by Alexander, who had his sights on the entire realm. Alexander moved toward Egypt that fall, attacking and capturing strong-walled Gaza. There, much like his father had been struck by a catapult bolt outside of Methone, Alexander was hit by a mechanically thrown missile, which resulted in a serious shoulder wound. Recovering sufficiently, the hardy young man pushed on, founding Alexandria at the mouth of the Nile and spending the winter consolidating control over Egypt.

  Gaugamela (331 B.c.)

  Antipater sent 500 Thracian horsemen and 400 mercenaries to Egypt during the winter of 332/31 and Alexander arranged a major recruiting campaign back in Greece toward further boosting his mercenary manpower for a final confrontation with Darius. Once reinforced that spring, the Macedonian left a garrison behind and marched back into Asia. Darius had elected to await his arrival on favorable terrain near the small town of Gaugamela, which lay close to the Boumelos River, a tributary of the Tigris. The Persian monarch had learned from his disastrous first encounter with Alexander and was sticking to a wide plain this time, where his large cavalry force wouldn't face the kind of restrictions that had so seriously limited it at Issus. Going even further, he had taken the step of artificially altering the ground, having teams of workmen clear and level it into a surface ideal for his horsemen.

  Our data on the Persian army at Gaugamela is especially poor, with ancient sources giving fantastic figures. Infantry claims range from 200,000 (Curtius 4.12.13) through 400,000 (Justin 11.12.5) and 800,000 (Diodorus 17.53.3) to 1,000,000 (Arrian 3.8.5). None of these figures appear even remotely realistic. We know that Darius had recovered at least 2,000 mercenary hoplites from Issus and there might have been heavy-armed kardakes as well. Even assuming that the latter had suffered as heavily as their Greek comrades at Issus (perhaps a third lost), there could have been 10,000 still on hand. We can also add 2,000 heavily equipped bodyguards for the Great King. These last manned two select units at full strength, having undoubtedly replaced any casualties sustained earlier. Losses at Issus for the other infantry (light-armed kardakes and satrapal levies) probably ran about 5 percent, including a third of 5,000 or so men that would have served alongside the fiercely pursued cavalry. Still, over 40,000 light footmen could have been present, with casualties and dropouts having been compensated for by troops from Darius' eastern provinces. We might then project that the imperial army at Gaugamela had at least 50,000 foot troops and more likely some 60,000-65,000. This was down about 20 percent from Issus, with only around a quarter of the total being heavy-armed versus 40 percent or so at that earlier engagement.

  As for cavalry, Arrian said 40,000, Curtius 45,000, Justin 100,000 and Diodorus 200,000. The first two numbers are thankfully non-astronomical and we might take the lower as a basis for projection. Arrian's figure here is a third above what he claimed for Issus. Halving this for the same reasons as proposed there, we get 20,000, which is quite possible. Fresh manpower, including replacement of casualties, seems to have come from satrapal sources not previously tapped. Beyond boosting their numbers, Darius had tried to improve his horsemen's weaponry as well, supplying many with sturdier spears that could better match the Macedonian xyston. He also had taken steps to add a new horse-borne element in the form of scythed chariots such as those that had so damaged the Greeks at Dascyleium in 395. Arrian's order of battle indicates 200 chariots at Gaugamela, which is consistent with reports of 150-200 of these potentially lethal vehicles seeing action at Cunaxa in 401. And Darius actually had even more exotic weapons in his mounted arsenal: 15 Indian elephants. However, while Arrian included these animals in his Persian deployment, he seems to have derived this from a written plan captured afterwards (3.11.3). In fact, he later reported that the pachyderms (and some camels) were captured in camp, thus they missed the battle.

  Alexander stopped well short of the Persian position and set up camp so his army could recover from the rigors of its march. Then, after four days, he left his baggage train and men unfit for battle behind and struck out at night, intending to open battle at dawn. Darius learned of this and arrayed his forces on the plain, ready to fight; however, Alexander suddenly halted his advance on the slopes of some hills within sight of the Persian lines and set up a field camp in order to scout the situation. There was some consideration given at this time to attacking Darius under cover of darkness, but Alexander rejected the idea and rested his forces in place. The Persians, fearing an assault after sundown and not having a fortified encampment, spent the night in discomfort fully arrayed for action. The Macedonians were therefore fresher when dawn broke on the day of decision.

  The imperial host stretched across the plain with its horsemen posted at the fore and the infantry set up behind. There were likely around 8,000 horsemen on each wing of the main alignment, combining to front along approximately 4km at a depth of eight and 2m spacing. Behind the riders in the center of this formation was a second line composed of foot soldiers that had 2,000 elite spearmen of the royal guard standing ten-deep in its middle with the Great King at their rear. Divided into 1,000-man splits on either side of the guards were Greek mercenary hoplites eight shields deep and there was a contingent of archers in place on the left flank to complete the infantry array. In addition to these footmen immediately rearward of the main line of cavalry, there were screening forces in advance of it as well. On the left, some 2,000 riders held post outside of 100 chariots, the combination covering the last 1.5km of the battle front on that side with the vehicles in single file at 10m spacing. Another 50 chariots sat across 500m before Darius and his infantry units in the Persian center. And over on the right wing, the final kilometer was preceded by 50 chariots with 2,000 cavalrymen outboard. As for the rest of the footmen on hand, they massed some distance to the rear. The kardakes (both heavy and light-armed), if present, must have centered these in a phalanx ten men deep stretching across maybe lkm. The various satrapal levies would then have projected off either side. These latter were mostly light missilemen, but some armored Babylonian spearmen with large shields were on hand as well.

  Arrian gives us a detailed description of how Alexander set up his forces in response to this imposing Persian array (3.11.8-12.5). He put his companion horsemen on the right, placing before them a screen of Thracian peltasts along with half the Agrianians and their normally attached archers. The agema of royal hypaspists stood beside the hetairoi; next in line came the other hypas
pists and then the pike regiments filled out the rest of the phalanx leftward (with 2,000 men each as at Issus). Some of the allied Greek horsemen held station alongside the last unit of phalangites on the far side with the Thessalian cavalry lined up beyond to complete the battle line. Probably filed at four (hypaspists) and eight (phalangites) much as at Issus, the heavy infantry began the day in open order that kept wide spacing between files.

  Even thus spread out, Alexander could see that once his phalanx closed ranks for combat and his cavalry adjusted inward accordingly, he would face an overlap on either flank from the long opposing array of Persian horsemen. He therefore made special deployments off both ends of his main formation. On the right, he posted the other half of the Agrianians and associated bowmen, refusing them at an angle from the companion horsemen's flank. He then placed cavalry (a mercenary squadron leading the Paeonians and lancers) in front of these foot skirmishers and added a contingent of hoplites to their right side (the "Old Mercenaries," presumably a picked unit of maybe 1,000 from the hirelings that had come over in 334). This mixed-arms team was to either extend the main line or fend off any enemy attempt at envelopment as circumstance might dictate. Alexander similarly refused a force from the other flank that was mostly mounted. Consisting of the remaining riders of the 7,000 or so Arrian claimed were on hand, these had another squadron of mercenary horsemen standing in front of allied Greeks and Thracians, with the latter accompanied by their javelineer footmen. (Note that contingents of foot archers and mercenary hoplites might have been present to support the horsemen on the left wing as per Fuller [1960, 171] and Green [1991,291]. This is logical and attractive, but is derived from Curtius [4.13.29] and Diodorus [17.57.3], who both seem to actually be describing cavalry squadrons in agreement with the battle order of Arrian that is preferred here. )