Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  Taking advantage of a monsoon storm to help cover his departure, Alexander set out at night to ford the Indus. He came over the flood (maybe unplanned) at a spot where a large island partially hid his passage; nevertheless, enemy scouts spotted this movement and sent word to Porus. The Indian leader reacted cautiously to the news of a possible crossing and didn't immediately commit his entire army. Instead, he dispatched his son to address what he thought might be yet another feint, sending him out with 40 percent of his chariot force (120) and most of the cavalry (2,000). By the time that this detachment arrived, Alexander had already gathered his phalanx on the east side of the river and was beginning to advance. Hypaspists held the right wing of the Macedonian array and phalangites the left, with the javelineers split along either flank. While this infantry formation came on at marching pace, Alexander led the cavalry ahead in a column by squadrons, having horse-archers in the van and bow-armed footmen trailing closely. Upon seeing Alexander and his riders breaking for them at speed, the outnumbered Indians turned and fled. However, their chariots proved fatally slow on the muddy ground and were easily caught from behind, leading to a massacre in which almost all aboard were killed (nearly 400 dead including Porus' son).

  Porus learned of this initial engagement and the death of his son; yet, facing Craterus' large force across the river, he remained unsure of what to do. Finally, he elected to leave about a third of his infantry (10,000) and elephants (40-50) behind to check Craterus and led the rest of his army against the Macedonian king. Moving out with the Indus on his left, he arrayed with the elephants (80-90) in a line at the fore. Spaced every 15m (Polyaenus 4.3.22), this yielded a frontage of just over 1,200m that had squads of javelineers and swordsmen backed by archers filling in densely (perhaps 20-deep) on each side of the pachyderms. His horsemen stood across 200-250m on the ends of the line with the chariots leading.

  As the Indians closed toward Alexander, he paraded his cavalry out front. This bought time for the phalanx to arrive and catch its breath. He then carefully evaluated the enemy formation and spread out all his horsemen save for two squadrons of hetairoi on the right side of his foot array. These riders covered a span of just over 1km at eight-deep and were supported by the Agrianians and foot-archers. The phalanx next stretched along another 500m in files of eight and then the last couple of hetairoi squadrons under Coenus took post at eight-deep on the far left in company with the remaining peltasts. Alexander was thus able to match up with the Indian line's extent. It was his intention to initially refuse his left, consisting of the phalanx and the hetairoi on the far end, holding it back until he could use his superiority in cavalry on the right to break the enemy beside the Hydaspes.

  The Indian horsemen charged out as their infantry came into bow range. Alexander then launched his contingent of Scythian horse-archers at the enemy's left-side riders, putting them into some confusion. He himself followed this up with a flanking attack using the right-wing hetairoi. Meanwhile, Coenus and his horsemen were threatening the other end of the Indian array so as to keep the hostile cavalry there from withdrawing to counter Alexander. But as the Macedonian king drove the enemy riders before him, Porus and his main line came forward. The phalanx troops, aware that the foe's horsemen were in flight near the river to secure that flank, moved up to meet Porus' advance and pin their portion of the opposing front in place. Diodorus noted that "they used their sarissai to good effect against the men stationed beside the elephants and kept the battle even" (17.88.2). As for the pachyderms themselves, "the phalanx also proceeded to exert relentless pressure against the frightened animals" (Curtius 8.14.25) and flanking javelineers took deadly aim at their mahouts. Along other parts of the front, the hetairoi prodded the great beasts back with their lances as attached skirmishers gave support and the foot-archers chipped in from the rear. Some of the Macedonian light infantrymen even hacked away at the elephants' feet with axes and curved blades taken along for this very purpose. The massive creatures charged individually as best they could and, here and there, did some significant damage. Diodorus described this carnage (17.88.1), with men trodden underfoot "armor and all," others lifted by trunks to be fatally dashed down and even more "pierced through by tusks" to die instantly. Still, these monsters ended up being largely stymied by both the tight phalanx and fluid up and back flow of agile horsemen and foot skirmishers elsewhere. While this was going on, the Indian cavalry attempted to rejoin the fight, but again proved no match for Alexander's much more numerous and better-equipped horsemen on one side and Coenus and his riders on the other.

  Porus' lightly armed men were taking serious casualties and most of the elephants, which had lost their riders and accumulated many wounds, began to rampage about in the tight battle space, trampling and killing indiscriminately to deal harm to friend as well as foe. As it turned out, given their closer proximity to the beasts, it was the Indians who actually took the greater damage from them. With the Macedonian cavalry completely triumphant on either end of the battle front and wrapping around to envelop, the phalanx now closed ranks that had become somewhat jumbled in the fight and its men moved forward in unison, finally breaking the enemy array for good. The Indians, under assault from ahead and around both flanks, raced rearward through the only remaining opening. But death awaited them in that quarter too, since Craterus had by now brought his holding force across the river to bar the way (what happened to the Indians left behind to block such a move is unknown, most likely they remained in camp or simply ran away). These fresh troops dealt out heavy losses to the fleeing men to make Alexander's victory even more decisive.

  Arrian's claim (5.18.2) of almost 20,000 Indian foot soldiers killed along with some 3,000 horsemen is clearly a tally of the total host defeated (two-thirds of Porus' army) rather than actual casualties. All the same, the death toll must have been steep. Diodorus' figure (17.89.12) of 12,000 killed (roughly 50 percent) seems possible. He also noted another 9,000 captured (35-40 percent of Porus' combat troops). As for the Indian monarch, he was seriously wounded, having been shot off his elephant while fighting cavalry and light footmen in the center of the battle line. He would, however, recover and keep charge of his kingdom under Alexander. With regard to Macedonian losses at Hydaspes River, Arrian put them at 80 (1 percent) of the 8,000 infantry with the king's main force (the phalanx and peltasts), 20 hetairoi (just over 1 percent) and 200 other horsemen (nearly 6 percent). But Diodorus' report is much more realistic for such a hard-fought action. This puts the dead at 700 infantry (almost 9 percent) and 280 cavalry (about 6 percent).

  His victory at the Hydaspes was to mark the height of Alexander's career. He set out that summer to work his way eastward across the Indian subcontinent, capturing cities and lands along the way while occasionally turning about to put down a rebellious site at his rear. However, his army soon had had enough. Assaulted by the steamy climate more than overmatched enemy soldiers, the men didn't want to go any farther away from already distant homes. Despite every attempt to change their minds, including a three-day sulk in his tent, Alexander had to relent and turn back. He got reinforcements at this time of allied and mercenary troops from Greece, including 7,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, who arrived with 25,000 panoplies in tow per Curtius (9.3.21). (Diodorus [17.95.4] claimed a rather less believable 30,000 footmen and 6,000 riders, perhaps putting bodies into all the suits of armor.)

  Leaving Porus to govern the conquered Indian territories, Alexander moved down the Hydaspes-Indus river system to the Indian Ocean, with part of his men aboard a fleet of small ships and others on foot. He lashed out along the way to take strong points and eliminate hostile native elements refusing to come out and fight a fixed battle. Alexander continued his habit of exposing himself to danger in some of these actions, personally leading his troops in assaults on two walled cities during the winter of 326/25 and being first up the scaling ladders. The second time, it nearly cost him his life. This happened when he was briefly isolated on the far side of the wall against a swa
rm of attackers, who put an arrow through his cuirass and into his lung. Fortunately, more Macedonians climbed over to his rescue and, though the wound was very serious, he recovered to resume the march.

  Sending off a portion of the army with more cumbersome elements (including captured elephants) to take an alternate route, Alexander reached the sea with the rest in late summer of 325. He then divided his men again and started for the Persian Gulf, with some aboard ships brought down-river while he and the remainder moved along the beach. Eventually, the need to seek food and water led the party on shore to divert inland. Separated from the fleet, it would endure a horrific trek through desert country, losing many men before reuniting with the shipborne division as well as the group that had split off along the Indus for the journey's final leg.

  Persia 324 -323 B. C.

  Back in Persia, Alexander set about restoring order where problems had arisen in his absence. This called for either executing or chasing off officials (like his treasurer Harpalus) who had become corrupt. Most of the mercenaries that had acted as guards for these renegade officials fled the realm as well. The king then began preparing for his next grand campaign. This was to focus on the Arabian Peninsula as a prelude to conquering North Africa beyond Egypt. His plans for this project included the use of Asian soldiers to replace his dwindled and aging European troops. He had arranged before departing for India that some 30,000 picked men from the Persian provinces be recruited, equipped and trained in Macedonian warfare (Curtius 8.5.1; Diodorus 17.108.1-2). Likewise, he now collected 1,000 Persian and Median riders to form another division of hetairoi (Arrian 7.6.3) and brought in 20,000 local bowmen and slingers to combine with the other Asian troops into a new imperial host nearly devoid of European content (Diodorus 17.109.2; Arrian 7.11.3-4).

  These moves naturally raised an outcry from the Macedonian soldiers and commanders that still formed the backbone of his army. Addressing their concerns, Alexander sought to create more of a blended force in which he would use manpower from both Asia and Europe. To this end, he sent Craterus home with a large number of veterans who were to be dismissed. His instructions were to take charge of Greece and have Antipater bring back replacements from Macedonia for the retirees. Alexander's revised plan was to reorganize the phalanx to contain both phalangites and missilemen. This called for a file of 16 that featured three Macedonian pikemen up front and twelve Asian archers and javelineers behind followed by a final rank of Macedonian file-closers (Arrian 7.23.3). In fact, this appears to be a variant upon the previous kardakes concept. The main differences were that the new array would have fewer heavy footmen at the fore (three versus five) and more light infantry (twelve versus five) while being closer geared to defensive tactics in substituting phalangites for hoplites.

  Alexander made one brief campaign in this period, attacking and destroying a troublesome mountain tribe in the winter of 324/23 before retiring to Babylon. It was here where he intended setting up a forward base for the campaign into Arabia. But all his plans for military improvements and new conquests came to an end that summer when the still young king (only 33) took ill and died.

  Tactical Discussion: 337-324 B. C.

  Alexander the III of Macedonia is the most accomplished and highly regarded military figure not only of the 4th century but of all ancient history. However, was his success in battle a product of great tactical innovation or more the product of skilled application of inheritances from his father?

  With regard to heavy infantry techniques, there's no reason to think that Alexander varied significantly from Philip's practices in any of his larger phalanx battles, since all featured the same sort of arrangements documented at Chaeronea for the older man. However, Alexander was more creative than his sire in the use of light infantry. And his invention of a second, reserve phalanx behind the first was definitely something entirely new. Still, it's probably the unusual deployments of heavy footmen in a number of lesser actions that best illustrate his creative talents. We have no record of Philip fighting this kind of engagement after the pre-phalanx ambush at Methone, thus there's no way of saying for sure how he would have reacted to such challenges. Nonetheless, Alexander masterfully adapted his arrays to each unique situation in very novel and successful ways. Therefore, when it came to infantry combat, he relied heavily on previous routines, but definitely advanced the art in that area, adding enough new wrinkles to qualify as a major innovator.

  All the same, Alexander is probably most lionized today for his cavalry attacks. This too moved along an already established trajectory; indeed, 75 percent of Philip's successful phalanx actions saw cavalry play a significant role in their decision and the figure for Alexander's victories is actually slightly lower at 67 percent. However, Philip won only twice with horsemen as his sole element of decision while his son did so eight times (44 percent of all his victories). To a large extent, this reflects the different theatres in which the two men waged their battles, since Alexander's Asian campaigns played out in venues much more suited for horsemen than the European environs of his father's portfolio. Yet, whether forced upon him by his opponents or not, Alexander employed cavalry with a boldness never before seen in Greek warfare. He personally led his horsemen out in front of the phalanx in all of his largest actions save Issus, where the terrain wouldn't permit it. If his father had raised mounted forces to something approaching an equal partnership with his heavy infantry, then Alexander had by career's end promoted them to senior partners.

  Alexander was thus highly creative in his tactics, improving on older techniques and adding some unique twists of his own. Nonetheless, there were other areas where he came up short. For one, his logistical planning could leave much to be desired. Carrying only a 30-day supply of food into Asia probably would have cost him the campaign had the satraps followed Memnon's plan for a scorched earth response. This is all the more questionable when we consider that Agesilaos, when faced with a similar task some 60 years earlier, had taken along a full six month's worth of provisions. Unlike Alexander, the crafty Spartan couldn't be starved out of the field. This same failing looms over the costly march from India. If that disaster had come from someone with any less illustrious a battle record, then it would more frequently be cited as one of the worst military blunders of all time. Nor was Alexander always prudent in his attacks. He ignored sound advice before Granicus River not to charge over the stream and won despite doing the wrong thing. And a similarly risky advance dealt him the only defeat of his career at Jaxartes (329). Alexander was also fortunate in his opponents. Beside the satraps throwing away Memnon's strategies in 334, that worthy foe died unexpectedly the next year and Darius later chose not to fight on the open plains of Assyria the only time he had both the cavalry and heavy infantry to make a successful challenge. Therefore, it's fair to say that Alexander was nearly as lucky as he was great. But, then, maybe that's no different than can be said for many another of military history's giants.

  At the time of his death, Alexander the Great's empire stretched across portions of three continents. His realm was, however, a fragile entity. It was once said of Napoleon Bonaparte that the only part of Spain that he really controlled was that which fell within the shadow of a French bayonet. Thus, the minute any region lacked active occupation it reverted to the enemy. Much the same was true for a lot of the conquests that Alexander left behind. Even in his lifetime, he never really had a hold on India. He had given its administration over to Porus less in recognition of the man's loyalty and skill as a governor than in acknowledgement of the reality that it was too distant to rule. Some areas, like Cappadocia, were still effectively inde pendent while others were more like private fiefs being run with little beyond a nominal nod to the central government. In truth, it seems unlikely that Alexander could have kept so large and complex a construct intact even had he lived. As it was, his passing without a clear heir bequeathed that impossible task to a cadre of very capable, but still much lesser men with strong ambitions of their own. The result w
ould be nearly a quarter century of conflict as one after another of Alexander's former subordinates strove in vain to lay claim to the vast legacy he left behind.

  Battles of the Successors (323-301 B.c.)

  "When [Alexander] was quitting life in Babylon and at his last breath was asked by his friends to whom he was leaving the kingdom, he said, `To the best man; for I foresee that a great combat of my friends will be my funeral games.' And this actually happened; for after the death of Alexander the foremost of his friends quarreled about the primacy and joined in many great combats."

  Diodorus (18.1.4-5)

  The scene in Babylon in early June 323 offered a foretaste of disputes to come. The native Macedonian infantry proclaimed the late king's half-brother Arrhidaeus to be the new monarch, while the army's elite cavalrymen backed Roxanne's unborn child (having miscarried at the age of 14 in 326, she was again pregnant). The contending groups managed to reach a compromise in which Arrhidaeus would co-rule as Philip III along with the expected offspring should it prove male. In fact, it was Perdiccas, Alexander's former chiefof-staff, who was really calling the shots. He divvied out the realm's 20 satrapies to the most prominent imperial subordinates. These men, known as the Successors (Diodochi), would become major players in a violent contest for control of Alexander's patrimony. Most of them were present to receive their bequests, including Ptolemy (Egypt), Lysimachus (Thrace), Antigonus (Phrygia), Peithon (Media) and Eumenes (granted Cappadocia, which was not yet under Macedonian control). Also on hand was Seleucus, Perdiccas' second-incommand and a future satrap. Two other major figures were out of town - Craterus and Antipater. The former was in Cilicia with the arsenal and a large army; he would be named a roving commander of the empire. Antipater was still in Macedonia gathering reinforcements for the planned Arabian campaign and would stay there to administer the Greek mainland.