Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC

by Fred Eugene Ray Jr

  The battle at Crannon served to bring down Athens despite its somewhat inconclusive results. Seeing no chance for victory in the long run, the Athenians gave up and Antipater installed a garrison in their city, replacing the democracy there with an oligarchy of the wealthy. All of the other rebels began falling away after this save for the Aetolians, who fled into their highlands and held out into the winter. They were thus able to gain better terms when the Macedonians had to bring the Lamian War to a quick end in order to deal with a new conflict in Asia.

  Cyrene II-IV (322 B.c.) and Cyrene V (322/321 B.C.)

  Even as events played out in the Lamian War, other battles were being fought on the North African coast. The Spartan adventurer Thibron had landed there with a force of mercenaries and some exiles from Cyrene with the intent of exploiting ongoing civil unrest in that distant Greek colony. His men were, in fact, refugees from the shake-up in Babylon that had followed Alexander's return from India, having at that time fled to Crete in the employ of the king's corrupt treasurer, Harpalus. Thibron, who was part of Harpalus' inner circle, had then murdered him. This let him take what remained of the slain man's stolen fortune as well as control of his mercenary band of perhaps 6,000 hoplites and 1,000 missilemen. (Arrian's report [17.108.6] of 6,000 men with Harpalus likely counted only the spearmen, while Diodorus' 7,000 [18.19.2] provides the total.) Considering likely Cyrenean manpower (see discussion for Cyrene I in 400 B.C.), Thibron could add maybe 1,500 exile hoplites, 500 local foot skirmishers (one for each three spearmen) and 400 horsemen (around one per four spearmen). About a quarter of the latter would have formed 30 three-man chariot teams while the rest rode on horseback. In opposition, the Cyrenean loyalists might have fielded round numbers to the tune of 6,000 hoplites, 2,000 light footmen and 1,000-1,500 mounted troops. The horsemen would have been some 100 chariot teams and 1,000 cavalry.

  These forces met in battle (Cyrene II) on open ground outside of the city and Thibron carried the day. Based on the foregoing speculation on manpower, the Spartan's edge came in heavy foot troops at the cost of a distinct disadvantage in horsemen. This suggests that his riders with the aid of superior light infantry support from their professional skirmishers were able to keep opposition mounted forces at bay just long enough for his phalanx to win the battle. No doubt deployed eight shields deep versus only six, the mercenary spearmen rapidly bested their amateur hoplite opponents, "killing many and taking captive no small number" (Diodorus 18.19.3). In this we might see 5-10 percent losses for the Cyreneans against only 3-5 percent for their foes. Thibron and his men extorted a treaty and money from Cyrene in the engagement's aftermath, going on to pillage what they wanted from its harbor and plan wider conquests in neighboring Libya. However, there was a falling out of thieves and one of Thibron's subordinates, Mnasicles (from Crete and possibly leader of his archers), deserted to the Cyreneans. He then led a successful attack against the harbor that scored a fair share of the Spartan's booty and military gear. Thibron lost some men and ships soon afterwards while trying to raid into Libya for food.

  Thibron did not give up after these reverses, but arranged instead to hire better than 2,500 additional soldiers from Greece to more than replace his losses. The Cyreneans decided to attack before these men could arrive and sallied to fight another battle (Cyrene III). This time, with the enemy phalanx probably no larger than theirs (maybe 6,000 hoplites on each side), it was the men from Cyrene who defeated Thibron, "killing many of his soldiers" (Diodorus 17.21.2). We might imagine that with both phalanxes at eight shields deep and the locals better inspired, the infantry fight stalemated as a superior Cyrenean mounted force carried the action on at least one wing. Still, the Spartan marauder survived to regain something like his original strength once the new mercenaries came ashore. He then fought the Cyreneans again in what Diodorus described as "a great battle" (18.21.4).

  It's hard to square Diodorus' claim for the city's manpower at Cyrene IV (30,000 including citizens, Libyans and Carthaginians) and what we know about the size of the force with Thibron (7,000 original soldiers plus 2,500 additions) with the Spartan taking the victory. It would seem more likely that the action involved only around 8,000 heavy infantrymen on each side with the Cyreneans having been reinforced by no more than a couple of thousand hoplite-style LibyPhoenicians. If so, it was the professionalism of Thibron's men that gave them the winning edge in an otherwise closely matched contest. All the same, the idea that the victors visited "great slaughter" on their foes might still be accurate. Indeed, a hard pursuit could very well have run losses for the locals and their allies up to 30 percent or more. At any rate, Thibron was successful enough on the field to then begin a siege against Cyrene itself.

  The Cyreneans came under so much duress that they turned on each other, the common folk depriving the wealthy of their goods and driving them from town. Some of these outcasts fled to Thibron, while others made their way to Egypt where they appealed to Ptolemy for help. The Macedonian saw an opportunity here and sent Ophellas with an army to restore the oligarchs to power. This set off a round of realignment. The exiles with Thibron tried to join up with their peers among the approaching column and the Spartan and his men cut them down. Meanwhile, Cyrene's democratic regime saw more to fear from its native oligarchs than from the Greek raiders and allied with Thibron to oppose the invasion from Egypt. The ensuing battle might thus have found Thibron and his newfound friends fielding some 12,000 hoplites, 4,000 foot skirmishers, 700 cavalrymen and 100 chariots. Ophellas could have had a strong strike force of 9,000 pikemen (mostly Egyptian pantodapoi) and 3,000 hypaspists plus 2,000 or so outcast hoplites and 4,000-5,000 in light infantry. His cavalry perhaps came to no more than 500 horsemen if we follow Diodorus' claim that aid from Egypt included only "infantry and naval" elements (18.21.7). However, this seems extremely improbable. It's much more credible that Ptolemy provided cavalry support of some sort as well, maybe on the order of 600-800 riders. As such, the combat most likely turned on the Ptolemaic phalanx gaining the upper hand on one wing (probably with its hypaspists on the right). Cyrene V was a solid victory for Ophellas, who captured Thibron and went on to deliver the entire region to Ptolemy.

  An Empire Divided

  With Alexander little more than a year dead, competition among his former officers started to seriously afflict his legacy. The first overt outbreak was a plot by Perdiccas. He had adjudicated the dispersal of titles at Babylon in 323, keeping control over the new kings for himself to become de facto ruler of the realm. Now he planned to marry Alexander's sister Cleopatra and create a royal blood line as the basis for a legitimate dynasty. Seeing Antipater as a rival and potential roadblock to this scheme, Perdiccas went after his supporters, particularly Antigonus. But Antigonus and his son Demetrius fled to Europe and exposed the plot. Antipater reacted by bringing his current campaign in Aetolia to an end and making plans to send an army into Asia against Perdiccas. The first war among the Successors thus began.

  Hellespont, Aetolia and Thessaly (321 B.C)

  Antipater put Polyperchon in charge of Europe with a substantial force that included 15,000 heavy infantry (out of around 41,000 on hand) and 2,000 horsemen (out of 5,000) of whom 800 were hetairoi. He and Craterus then marched off for Asia that spring with the rest of the army. An embassy had gone to Ptolemy and he enlisted against Perdiccas as well. Seeing these threats on two fronts, Perdiccas split his forces to address them. He had a close bond with Eumenes after fighting to secure that man's satrapy and sent him to contest the crossing from Europe while he himself marched against Egypt. To help ensure Eumenes' success, Perdiccas assigned him capable assistants in the form of his brother Alcetas, who took charge of the fleet, and Neoptolemus, who had led the hypaspists. However, the latter chose to cast his lot with the other side and tried along with some of the Macedonians in Eumenes' army to usurp command. A skirmish followed in which many of Neoptolemus' followers died and he barely escaped, fleeing with 300 horsemen. The forces from Europe had, meanwhile, co
me over into Asia unopposed. Gathering in Neoptolemus, Antipater divided his own efforts. Taking 6,000 phalangites, 2,000 Greek hoplites, 1,000 foot skirmishers and 1,000 cavalry (including 400 hetairoi), he moved to join Ptolemy while Craterus led the remaining troops against Eumenes in a battle near the Hellespont.

  Craterus had 20,000 infantry (Diodorus 18.30.4); mostly Macedonians, these were probably 15,000 pikemen (3,000 of them hypaspists), 2,000 Greek hoplites and 3,000 foot skirmishers. His cavalry numbered 2,000, including perhaps 800 hetairoi. Eumenes had an equal number of foot soldiers, though less capable Asians made up their majority. We might suspect 12,000 pantodapoi with pikes, 3,000 Macedonian phalangites and 2,000 mercenary hoplites along with 3,000 Asian light infantry. Where Eumenes held an advantage was in horsemen. He had 5,000 of these on hand, probably all javelin-armed. Craterus likely laid out his phalanx 16 men deep with his hypaspists on the far right. He himself rode with the hetairoi and some of the other horsemen on the right flank. Neoptolemus led the remaining, javelin-armed cavalry on the left. The light infantry split to give support to their horsemen on either wing. Eumenes would have copied this deployment; however, it was his intention to withhold his phalanx and settle the issue with cavalry and light footmen. He thus took post with the best of his horsemen on the right, directly opposite the traitorous Neoptolemus.

  The ensuing action saw cavalry charge out to initiate fighting off either flank at some distance in front of the infantry arrays. Craterus fell early on, either thrown from his horse and trampled (Diodorus 18.31.3) or cut from the saddle by a Thracian (Plutarch vol. II Eumenes, 27). Either way, his riders were then defeated and fled to their phalanx. On the other end of the field, Eumenes engaged Neoptolemus in a duel amid the general combat, killing him while taking only light wounds. The mounted fight here was fairly even, but the slain Neoptolemus' horsemen eventually broke off once they realized that their comrades on the right had been beaten. With leaders gone and both flanks and rear exposed to mounted attack, the opposing phalanx men surrendered to Eumenes without a fight, pledging to take up Perdiccas' cause. But they soon betrayed him and escaped at night to link with Antipater's column on its way to Cilicia.

  Perdiccas marched into Egypt with Eumenes' victory having secured his rear, but was to meet disaster. Reaching the Nile, he came up against a strong point known as the Fort of Camels and wasted a day plus some good soldiers in a failed assault. Perdiccas responded by breaking camp to execute a night march and then attempt another crossing of the river, this time near Memphis. Things went even worse here. Getting only a portion of his force over before retreating under attack, he lost 2,000 men and top officers. It was a fiasco that cost Perdiccas the respect of his remaining troops and the Macedonians under Pithon now led a revolt that killed him. And when the mutineers subsequently went over to Ptolemy with the kings in tow, the Egyptian ruler played his hand well, gaining acclaim by not taking over himself and giving command to Pithon and Arrhidaeus (one of the rebel leaders and not the king).

  The effort against Perdiccas thus bore fruit despite its defeat against Eumenes. Yet all was not going well back in Greece. The Aetolians there had taken advantage of Antipater's absence to break their recent treaty and attack neighboring cities. The Macedonian general Polycles marched to confront them and was beaten. The size of this action is not cited in our source (Diodorus 18.38.2), but perhaps involved no more than a small imperial detachment. This was probably 3,000 pikemen, 1,000 mercenary hoplites, 1,000 light infantry and 400 horsemen. The Aetolians would have used their full, 7,000-man levy: maybe 4,000 hoplites, 2,500 light infantry and 500 riders. If so, the victory likely came as a result of cavalry backed by a superior force of foot skirmishers overwhelming Polycles' light-armed flank screens. This triggered a rout that killed him and "no small number of his soldiers" (perhaps 20-30 percent).

  The Aetolians next invaded Thessaly, where they convinced many of the natives to join in an uprising against Macedonia. They were thus able to initially put together a large army of 25,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry (Diodorus 18.38.3). However, when the Acarnanians began raiding into the Aetolians' territory, the latter went home. This left the insurgents with maybe 12,000 hoplites, 7,000 light infantrymen and 1,000 or so horsemen. These were under the command of Memnon of Pharsalus. Polyperchon in his role as Antipater's proxy came against Memnon "with a considerable army" (Diodorus 18.38.6). This was probably a force of 9,000 pikemen, 3,000 hypaspists, 3,000 Macedonian light infantry, 2,000 mercenary missilemen and 1,600 horsemen. By deploying his hypaspist as spearmen four-deep on his right and the phalangites in eight-man files elsewhere, Polyperchon could have matched heavy-armed fronts with an eight shield deep rebel array. It then must have been his horsemen (800 hetairoi) on the right that carried the day. Coming to grips behind a strong skirmisher screen, they cleared out the Thessalian riders there to make a flank attack. This allowed the hypaspists, who likely had been no more than holding things even up to that point, to break through the opposing hoplites on their end of the line. Wrapping around from the flank, they then routed the rest of the insurgent phalanx. Menon fell as his foes "cut most of his army to pieces" (i.e. losses probably in excess of 25 percent). Polyperchon thus subdued Thessaly with just a single engagement.

  Back in Asia, Antipater took advantage of his control over the kings to make a fresh distribution of the satrapies and other appointments. Notable among these was the assignment of Babylon to Seleucus and Antigonus' posting as general of the royal army. Leaving the pursuit of affairs in Asia to Antigonus, Antipater returned to Macedonia. This let him restore the kings to their proper homeland.

  Orcynii (320 B.c.) and Cretopolis (319 B.C)

  Antigonus marched into Cappadocia to confront Eumenes near Orcynii and managed to repeat the trick that Pithon had used against the Upper Satrapies' rebels three years previous. He contacted Apollonides, Eumenes' commander of cavalry, and arranged for him to desert during battle. With this pact in hand, the royal general took position on high ground above the enemy camp, which sat on a broad plain suitable for horsemen. His forces included more than 10,000 foot soldiers per Diodorus (18.40.7). This was probably only the heavy infantry with 9,000 pikemen (6,000 Macedonian and the rest pantodapoi) and 3,000 hoplites. In addition, he could call on 2,000 horsemen and must have had around 3,000 light infantry as well. (There were also 30 elephants present, but they don't appear to have seen any action at this time.) Eumenes had 20,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry, essentially the same force fielded at the Hellespont. His foot troops were 12,000 pantopoi pikemen, 3,000 Macedonian phalangites, 2,000 mercenary hoplites and 3,000 Asian skirmishers.

  Eumenes would have arranged his heavy infantry eight ranks deep with the hoplites on the right. This forced the royals to deploy part of their line very thinly in order to match frontages. Antigonus likely did this by setting up his pikemen at a depth of eight, but stretching out the hoplites on his right wing in files of only four. Once engaged, the phalanxes stalled against each other. This was, in fact, a signature moment in Grecian warfare. It was the very first time that two pike phalanxes had ever clashed on the field of battle (the heavy arrays hadn't come to blows at the Hellespont).

  On the right wings, hoplites faced deep hedges with overlapping sarissai of sufficient length (4.6m) that they couldn't penetrate. Eumenes' longer files for his spearmen here were utterly wasted, since othismos and other advantages of depth simply couldn't be brought to bear. In the center of the field, where pikeman dueled with pikeman, there was more potential for offensive success, since there the weapons of the leading ranks reached to foes that were not so well protected. Yet strike capability still remained lower than in a traditional hoplite action. And given the less draining nature of a pike fight versus the muscular demands put on a shieldpushing Spearman, it would take a good deal longer for any mismatch in physicality to be decisive. As a result, the non-elite pikemen engaged in the center were no more likely to deliver a quick decision than the phalangites and spearmen stalled ag
ainst each other on their wings. This shifted the focus onto mounted action. It was here where the well-timed desertion of Apollonides and his troopers won the day for Antigonus. Stripped of their cavalry screen, Eumenes' heavy footmen underwent flank and rear attacks from the imperial riders and light infantry to disastrous effect, suffering a double envelopment that ran their losses up to 8,000 (40 percent). Antigonus and his troops followed up by capturing Eumenes' supply train as well. Bereft of food, most of the beaten men changed sides and Eumenes fled with 600 followers into the fortress at Nora.

  Antigonus set out the next spring to take care of Alcetas and Attalus. The latter had joined the former with what remained of Perdiccas' army after his murder in Egypt as well as with other defectors upset with Antipater's dominance. These two had resisted all attempts against them to date and were encamped near the city of Cretopolis in Pisidia above the southern coastal plain of Anatolia. Attalus had brought about 10,000 infantry (maybe 6,000 pikemen, 2,000 hoplites and 2,000 light footmen) and 800 cavalry with him. Alcetas chipped in some 6,000 infantry and 100 horsemen. Perhaps 4,000-5,000 of his foot troops might have been professional hoplites with the rest being javelineers provided by local Pisidian allies. Antigonus made a swift surprise march and took post on high ground above the rebel camp much as he had done against Eumenes at Orcynii. Now with a little over half of Eumenes' men and having added more troops during his march to the coast, he had better than 40,000 foot soldiers and 7,000 horsemen (Diodorus 18.45.1). The infantry probably broke down into 24,000 pikemen (maybe 9,000 of them Macedonian), 8,000 hoplites and 8,000 lights. Importantly, Antigonus' sudden arrival and position let him hide his actual manpower, since the elevation and placing of screening forces in front made it difficult for his foes to judge the true nature of his contingents and for mation. In particular, most of his cavalry could keep out of sight. In contrast, he had no trouble in accurately gauging enemy strength and dispositions from his vantage point on high.