Greek and Macedonian Land Battles of the 4th Century BC
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Tactical Discussion 323-301B.C.
Dominant tactics applied by the Successor generals at the very dawn of the Hellenistic period varied according to their background. Therefore, we see Antipater, who had not partic ipated in the Persian conquest, approaching battle much as Philip II might have, with cavalry and infantry leading in tandem. In contrast, an Asian campaigner like Leonnatos fought with his horsemen in the lead more in the manner of Alexander. Yet with either approach, heavy footmen usually played a key role. This reflected that challenges facing these generals came from hoplite armies well enough equipped with horsemen and foot skirmishers so as to offset opposition light-armed forces and compel a decision by shock combat between phalanxes. Moreover, some actions in this interval saw the Macedonians relying just as much if not more on contingents of mercenary spearmen as they did on their own troops. Sometimes waged across restrictive Greek battlegrounds, these fights were, in fact, little different from those between polis armies in the mid-century's Third Sacred War.
Once combat began to take place between the Successors, there was an immediate shift toward more cavalry-oriented tactics by commanders that had fought under Alexander and were strongly influenced by his methods. This made "all mounted" decisions, which had earlier been anomalies, into common occurrences. In fact, it wasn't until Orcynii in 320 that phalanxes equipped with pikes on both sides actually came to blows. This was followed by another such action at Paraetacene (317). While both battles ended up with cavalry being decisive, there was some dueling between the heavy infantry arrays, especially in the later action. What we see in these engagements is that, despite lofty claims for Eumenes' elite, pike-armed hypaspists at Paraetacene, fighting between phalangites and spearmen was generally inconclusive. The hoplites couldn't usually get close enough to inflict any real harm nor could the pikemen normally deal out sufficient damage to take the battle ground for their side. This was the ancient equivalent of trench warfare, with defensive potential so much greater than offensive capability that a stalemate is virtually certain.
The solution to this gridlock came swiftly thereafter at Gabene (317/16). By placing phalangites opposite their own kind, Eumenes gave back to his phalanx its ability to carry a battle. With both armies' long weapons now able to reach and more effectively inflict wounds upon foes that lacked protection from large, closely arrayed shields, his superior hypaspist pikemen led the way to seize the field. And though these men would in the end yield to a cavalry maneuver (proving that Philip's combined-arms approach was just as valid as ever), their initial success pointed the way for a new phase of Hellenistic infantry tactics. (Gaza in 312 was an example of this evolving style. Both armies there initially sought to line their phalangites on the left per Eumenes' precedent, with Ptolemy then exchanging his wings to pit pike against pike.) Mounted forces might still rule the day, as they ultimately did at Gabene (and subsequently at Gaza and Ipsus), but a phalanx could be decisive. All it needed to do was secure its flanks in some way and thus negate mounted attacks while its pikemen thrust to victory against like-armed foes. For this, if nothing else, Eumenes deserves recognition as the most influential warlord of his era.
As the 4th century came to a close, the death of Antigonus and his dream of ruling a reunited Macedonian Empire marked permanent fragmentation of the Hellenistic world into a scatter of separate realms. Macedonia, Babylonia and Egypt would go on to spawn their own separate dynasties. These proved vibrant, continuing to wage war and spread Greek culture over the next 170 years. Yet never again was a Grecian monarch destined to approach Alexander's vision of world conquest. Future struggles were to start out with a focus on much more petty territorial interests and then descend into a desperate fight for survival as, one by one, the Successor kingdoms fell prey to Rome, a growing new power that had ambitions to match even those of Alexander.
"All military laws and military theories which are in the nature of principles are the experience of past wars.... We should seriously study these lessons.... We should put these conclusions to the test of our own experience, assimilating what is useful, rejecting what is useless, and adding what is specifically our own."
Mao Tse-tung
There is a general evolutionary sequence that carries through Greek and Macedonian land battles of the 4th century B.c. This starts with dominance of the Doric phalanx as executed by the Spartan army. Refined over a period of two centuries, Sparta's approach depended on its best hoplites stationed on the right (offensive) wing to either overlap and envelop or otherwise fight their way through and break the opposing left as a preliminary to turning that flank and defeating the entire enemy array. Sometimes final victory might then require a second, reformed attack should the opposition have had similar success on its own right. Grand examples of this routine at its height can be seen at Nemea River and Coronea II in 394. Supplementary components of the technique were the left wing of the phalanx and light-armed troops (mounted and afoot) on post off either flank. The role of the spearmen on the left (defensive) wing was to engage and hold their facing foes long enough for the attack wing to carry the battle on the right. As for the light-armed men, they occasionally took direct part in envelopment, but most often played a more defensive role. This called for neutralizing their opposite numbers to keep them out of the hoplite fight.
Primary advancement of the foregoing tactics through the period 400-387 involved better use of cavalry along the edges of the phalanx. This was a trend that continued to develop 386-360. Horsemen began playing an even larger part at that time, especially for Theban armies under Pelopidas and Epaminondas. Their riders were very active and sometimes came off the flanks to fight out front between the heavy arrays as documented at Tegyra (375) and Leuctra (371). Yet they still weren't meant to be decisive. Instead, they strove to give greater aid to their hoplites by hiding deployments crafted to counter traditional Spartan tactics. Such arrangements called for very deep files on an attack wing to the left. This tack saw action at Leuctra and Mantinea II (362), maybe having debuted at Tegyra or even earlier. The other new element in the Thebans' tool chest was to hold back (refuse) their defensive wing, which now stood on the right. This was designed to deny the enemy a chance for victory there that might then necessitate reforming for a second attack. While such approaches worked well at Leuctra, they showed serious weaknesses at Mantinea II. Pammenes and other Thebans perhaps used overloaded files on a few occasions afterward, but this otherwise became an evolutionary dead end.
The period 359-336 saw Macedonia's Philip II move things forward by drawing upon prototypes developed by Iphicrates of Athens to put pikemen (phalangites) on the left and center of his phalanx. This produced a superior technique to Theban refusal of the defensive wing. He then combined highly trained hoplites with Macedonia's unique, shock-capable cavalry to create an attack wing of exceptional prowess on his right. There seems to have been some adjustment after a pair of defeats against Onomarchos in 353, perhaps lengthening pikes (sarissai) for greater defensive capability; all the same, this approach was highly effective and forever changed the trajectory of Grecian tactical evolution. Close partnership between horsemen and infantry was decisive in most of Philip's battles and furthered the trend of more active cavalry use,
Unlike Philip, Alexander III (336-323) rarely faced opponents who intended to carry the day with heavy infantry. He thus often had to adapt the Macedonian formation, which was derived from and at its best against Doric phalanxes, to combat lighter-armed foes unusually strong in cavalry. This led him to come up with unique infantry arrays for lesser actions as well as the concept of a second phalanx standing in reserve. Along with these innovations for his foot soldiers, he began to use horsemen in an extremely aggressive manner, leading them to open and turn the tide of battles before bringing his hoplites and pikemen up to finish the job. Granicus River (334) and Gaugemela (331) are prime demonstrations of this method. While Philip had operated in a somewhat similar mode against a few cavalry-rich barbarian armies in the
past, Alexander was clearly pioneering methods far beyond any routines inherited from his father. So successful was he in this approach that later Macedonian generals were heavily influenced to fight whenever possible in the same way.
The challenge facing those that followed Alexander in early Hellenistic times (323-301) was that, unlike foes of their late king and role model, most of their opponents had plenty of heavy infantry. These included not only Greek hoplites, but also fellow Macedonians once the Successor Wars got underway. The influence of Alexander and his methods was nevertheless powerful enough to prevent a complete reversion to Philip's techniques; rather, there remained a strong emphasis on cavalry action at the fore. To be sure, heavy footmen sometimes played significant parts in engagements during this era as per Paraetacene (317) and Gabene (317/16). Yet, to a large extent, the roles of predominant attack arm and defensive arm were reversed in these battles at century's wane from what they had been at its start. It was now heavy infantrymen that more often than not gave support by neutralizing their counterparts while horsemen served as the tools of decision.
And just as the tactics of Grecian warfare evolved, so too did the dominant nature of the men who used them. There had been three Greek armies in the field at the dawn of the 4th century with the two that clashed at Cyrene being composed of amateur soldiers. Mostly small farmers, these men took up arms only by necessity to defend or regain their homes and local government. And their leaders were no different, having temporarily donned the mantel of command in anticipation of returning to a civilian trade when the current crisis was over. But the third army fighting at this time was very different. This was the band of mercenaries who had backed Cyrus at Cunaxa, now transformed into a roving instrument for hire. These men never lost their sense of nationality, always being proudly Greek, yet making war was their only profession and their allegiances were no longer intimately tied to native soil. Grecian hosts of the future were destined to more closely resemble this team of paid warriors than the people's militias that did battle at Cyrene. This was a trend that really took off with rise of the full-time Macedonian army and Phocis' dependence on pro fighters in the 350s, growing ever stronger until it became rare to see amateurs in the ranks by century's end. Moreover, what was true for the rankers was equally so for their leaders.
With the exception of Pelopidas and Epaminondas of Thebes, this century's preeminent commanders were no longer part-time soldiers, but truly men of battle, whether they led met cenary corps or were warlord rulers. And they came from many different Grecian states: Athens (Xenophon and Iphicrates), Sparta (Agesilaos), Phocis (Onomarchos), Macedonia (Philip and Alexander) and even Cardia in Thrace (Eumenes). Much as Mao advised, all of these fighting men drew on past practices for their tactics, yet often made clever and significant modifications to them as well, abandoning weak elements and sometimes adding entirely fresh ones borrowed from far afield or created in their own fervent minds. Taking advantage of the better-trained professional talent in their armies, these mortal gods of war produced an astounding cumulative effect over the course of the 4th century, evolving a highly potent military system that let them conquer much of the known world.
1: Combat Factors
Symbol Explanation
W Factor was an advantage to winner of the battle
L Factor was an advantage to loser of the battle
D Engagement was drawn with no clear winner
HI Superior performance by heavy infantry with small or no numerical advantage*
HS Significant advantage (a third up to two times greater) in heavy infantry manpower*
HO Overwhelming advantage (two times or more) in heavy infantry manpower*
CV Superior performance by cavalry with small or no numerical advantage
CS Significant advantage (a third up to two times greater) in cavalry manpower
CO Overwhelming advantage (two times or more) in cavalry manpower
LI Superior performance by light infantry with small or no numerical advantage
LS Significant advantage (a third up to two times greater) in light infantry manpower
LO Overwhelming advantage (two times or more) in light infantry manpower
SA Surprise attack (assault/ambush not anticipated by its target)
SM Surprise mobilization (force's arrival in area not anticipated by its opposition)
MV Maneuver on the battlefield (tactical movement of troops in the midst of combat)
FM Exceptional formation design (non-traditional ordering of troops prior to combat)
TR Use of terrain elements (natural or manmade) to advantage on the battlefield
HM Fighting on or near `home ground' (action in direct defense of one's homeland)
N Engagement took place on neutral ground
2: Decisive Factors*
Combatant Key
A: ABY=Abydos, ACA=Acarnia, ACH=Achaean, ACR=Acragas, AEN=Aenis, AEO=Aetolia, AIG=Aigina, AIT=Aitolia, ARC=Arcadia, ARG=Argos, ASN=Asian, ATH=Athens
B: BAR=barbarian, BEE=Boeotian exiles, BOE=Boeotia, BYZ=Byzantium
C: CAP=Cappadocia, CAR=Carthage, CEL=Celts, CHA=Chalcidian, CHI=Chios, COE=Corinthian exiles, COL=Colchians, COR=Corinth, COY=Corcyra, CRE=Crenides, CRN=Carian, CYG=Greek Cypriot, CYP=Punic Cypriot, CYE=Cyrenean exiles, CYR=Cyrene
E: EGY=Egypt (undifferentiated), ELI=Elis, ELO=Elis oligarchs, ELP=Elis popular party, EPR=Epiris, ETR=Etruscan, EUB=Euboa
G: GRK=Greek
H: HRC=Heraclea
I: IBR=Iberians, ILY=Illyrians, IND=Indian, ION=Ionian, ITG=Italian Greeks
L: LEO=Leontini, LOZ=Ozolian Locris, LSE=Lesbos exiles, LUC=Lucanians
0: ORC=Orchomenos
M: MAN= Mantinea, MAC=Macedonia, MES=Messenians, MET=Methymna, MOS=Mossynoecians, MRC=mercenaries, MRG=mercenary Greeks, MSA=Messana, MYE=Mytilene exiles, MYT=Mytilene
P: PAO=Paeonians, PEL=Peloponnesian, PER=Persian, PHE=Phlius exiles, PHL=Phlius, PHO=Phocis, PHN=Phoenician, PHR=Pherae, PIS=Pisidians, PLA=Plataea, PRR=Persian rebels
R: RHG=Rhegion
S: SCG=Sicilian Greeks, SCL=Siculi, SCY=Sicyon, SPR=Sparta, SYH=Scythia, SYE=Syracusan exiles, SYR=Syracuse
T: TAN=Tanagra, TEE=Tegean exiles, TEG=Tegea, TEU=Tegea unionists, THB=Thebes, THR=Thrace, THS=Thespiae, THY=Thessaly, TSL=Thessalian League
3: Heavy Infantry Losses and Point/Cause of Formation Failure*
DR Drawn result
HL/HT Heavy infantry losses (deaths)/total heavy infantry manpower (includes light-armed men when in single, integrated formation as per Persian kardakes)
<50 Less than 50 killed (i.e. 0-49)
<100 Less than 100 killed (i.e. 50-99)
* Number includes at least some quantitative input from historical source(s)
** Losing side also carried out a turn/envelopment on one wing
Ancient Sources
Aelian.(c.A.D. 165-235): Eclectic Roman writer whose works include historical anecdotes relevant to 4th century B.C. Greek warfare. (Historical Miscellany [Varia Historia], Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).
Aeneas Tacticus. (early-mid 4th century B.C.): likely Aeneas of Stymphalus, a general of the Arcadian League in the Peloponnese. A writer of several military studies relevant to the 4th century B.C. his only surviving work deals with sieges. ("Aeneas on the Defense of Fortified Positions" in Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1928, p. 26-228).
Aeschines. (390-314 B.C.): Athenian orator, statesman and soldier whose surviving speeches shed light on 4th century events. (The Speeches ofAeschines, 1919, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press).
Anaximenes. (c. 380-320 B.C.): Historian from Lampsacus who composed works now lost on the history of Greece, Philip II and Alexander III.
Aristobulus. (late 4th-early 3rd century B.C.): Historian who served with Alexander and wrote of his reign, a major influence on Arrian.
Aristotle. (384-322 B.C.): Greek philosopher and tutor of Alexander the Great whose works provide details r
elevant to warfare in 4th century B.C. Greece. ("The Athenian Constitution" in Aristotle: Athenian Constitution, Eudemian Ethics, Virtues and Vices, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1952, p. 2-186; Politics, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
Arrian. (late 1st-early 2nd century A.D.): Lucius Flavius Arrianus, Greek-born Roman soldier and historian and author of an account of the career of Alexander the Great. (Arrian, The Campaigns ofAlexander, New York: Penguin Books, 1971 [A. Selincourt trans]; The Landmark Arrian, The Campaigns ofAlexander, New York: Pantheon Books, 2010 [P. Mensch trans]).
Ascleptiodotus. (late 2nd-late 1st century B.C.): Philosopher and writer of an academic work on military affairs relevant to the 4th century B.C. ("Tactics" in Aeneas Tacticus, Asclepiodotus, Onasander, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 1928, p. 244-341).
Callisthenes. (d. c. 327 B.C.): Greek historian whose works are now lost, but provided some information on 4th century B.C. events to surviving histories, including that of Diodorus.
Curtius. (early 1st century A.D.): Quintus Curtius Rufus, Roman soldier and historian and author of a history of Alexander the Great in Latin. (Quintus Curtius Rufus, The History ofAlexander, New York: Penguin Books, 1984).