El Alamein

by Bryn Hammond

  Rommel’s force of 90,000 men, 561 tanks and 542 aircraft was opposed by 100,000 men, 849 tanks (including the first supplies of the American M3 ‘Grant’ tanks that had a 75mm gun, mounted in a side sponson, capable of outmatching the Panzer III’s 50mm gun) and 604 aircraft. A few 6-pounder anti-tank guns were also available. These were eventually intended to replace the by-nowinadequate 2-pounder gun with which most infantry units and Royal Artillery anti-tank regiments were equipped and which was the gun on all British-built tanks at this time.

  Important changes in the Desert Air Strategy also took place. The Commander-in-Chief of the RAF forces in the Middle East, Air Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder, and Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Coningham, commander of the Desert Air Force, now introduced a new strategy focusing during battle on ground support rather than destroying the Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica. Fighter-bombers were developed for this task. The contrast was noted by Squadron Leader Billy Drake of 112 Squadron, a pilot with experience in the Battle of Britain:

  It was a very interesting period for us who had just come out from England where we’d been a part of the ‘interceptor’ Fighter Command concept and to come out to the desert where most of the flying was involved in air support of a sort. So, twenty per cent of your time was involved in air-to-air, the rest – eighty per cent – on strafing and releasing bombs in a rather haphazard, but effective way.33

  The P-40 Curtiss Kittyhawks of 112 Squadron bore distinctive markings leading them to be called the ‘Shark Squadron’. Now, as Drake described, an aircraft outclassed in high-altitude air fighting gained a new lease of life in a more appropriate role:

  It was obvious when I first arrived that the powers-that-be had decided to use the fighter aeroplane in a form of ground-support aircraft in support of the Eighth Army. To do that we were equipped with bomb racks and carried 500lb bombs with what was called a ‘stick’ – which was a protuberance in the nose of these bombs so that they would detonate at about a foot above ground to be used as anti-personnel weapons and against soft vehicles. They were also very effective against tanks if you got a bomb close enough. So my life when I took over 112 Squadron was basically in the ground attack mode in support of the Eighth Army.34

  There was, however, as Drake made clear, a considerable gap between the knowledge of the task and an understanding of the manner in which to accomplish it.

  Quite frankly we hadn’t a clue what we had to do to carry out this role except it was a fait accompli I had a bomb underneath this thing and that it had to be delivered against the Afrika Korps. So, it was a new experience to me and caused me a degree of apprehension particularly as, for the first time, I was up against light ack-ack – which is probably the most frightening aspect of ground attack fighting. Without any warning, the closer you got to the enemy, the more and more light flak. You couldn’t see it until you heard a bang. Or they were using tracer. All you saw was tracer coming at you. It was a new experience and it took a few months for me to get used to the idea that this was probably my future in the air force.35

  Meanwhile, Coningham moved himself and his staff close to Ritchie’s headquarters to improve co-operation.

  Churchill had, once again, been pressing Auchinleck to make an attack before Rommel whilst, at the same time, General Sir Alan Brooke was telling the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East of the probable loss of units to cope with the Japanese threat. Once again, Churchill believed Auchinleck had substantial superiority in the air, in armour and in other forces over his enemy and reminded Auchinleck of Malta’s precarious position, all of which necessitated Auchinleck acting as soon as possible to seize airfields in Cyrenaica for aircraft to operate in the island’s defence. Auchinleck’s factual evidence backing a conclusion that an attack before 1 June was too laden with risk was unpalatable to the Prime Minister and the British High Command in the shape of the Chiefs of Staff. Although based on solid evidence, it did his standing as a commander a great deal of harm.36

  In the Gazala position in May 1942, Ritchie was preparing an attack by Eighth Army when he received intelligence via Ultra that Rommel intended to launch an offensive towards the end of the month. This valuable information did not, however, say what Rommel’s plan was, although it was known that the main effort would be made in the south. Eighth Army found itself having to prepare for defence against an attack in dispositions ready to launch an attack. Auchinleck had been tempted to take over command of Eighth Army from Ritchie after Crusader. Witnessing Ritchie’s preparations, which he realized were inadequate, he had become more and more deeply involved in Eighth Army affairs which were, after all, only one (albeit important) part of Middle East Command. Auchinleck knew what had to be done but did not wish to cramp Ritchie’s style by telling him how to do it. Instead, with respect for the chain of command, he offered suggestions and advice. This approach was extremely unsatisfactory but circumstances had not yet merited Auchinleck making any change.37 Ritchie also lacked the confidence of his corps commanders, Gott and Norrie. Both were notionally senior to him and definitely more experienced. Then, on 26 May, the threat against Eighth Army became a reality as the Panzerarmee pre-empted Eighth Army plans and attacked.

  Rommel initially feinted with an assault in the north which used various means of deception to suggest that this was the main thrust. Small numbers of Afrika Korps and ‘Ariete’ tanks accompanied the predominantly Italian infantry. Lorries carrying aircraft engines were used to stir up dust to suggest movement of large numbers of vehicles. However, this was all recognized for what it was and when the Panzerarmee advanced in force southwards towards Bir Hacheim late that evening Eighth Army HQ could have done more to interfere with its intentions, but did not.

  The fighting soon demonstrated the weakness of the ‘Jock Columns’ as the Afrika Korps, now commanded by General der Panzertruppen Walther Nehring, brushed aside these formations. The chief obstacle to initial Panzerarmee success was the presence of a defensive ‘box’ – a position surrounded by wire and minefields – at Bir Hacheim, occupied by Général Pierre Koenig’s 1ère Brigade Française Libre which continued to resist repeated Axis attacks from 27 May until the night of 10–11 June when the brigade was withdrawn largely intact.

  Rommel hoped first to destroy Eighth Army’s armour and appeared to be succeeding as brigade after brigade was committed piecemeal to the fighting. Yet it was the Panzerarmee which was soon in difficulties as its units were widely dispersed and running low on supplies. The British had suffered heavy losses in Grant tanks and 6-pounder anti-tank guns, but both had inflicted many casualties on the Axis tanks and jolted the Panzer units’ morale. Seemingly trapped by minefields in an area that became known as the ‘Cauldron’, the Afrika Korps shielded itself with an anti-tank gun screen whilst clearing gaps in the minefields. It then destroyed 150th Brigade from 50th Division which, supported by thirty tanks from 1st Army Tank Brigade, had attempted to bar its way. However, during this fighting, Rommel’s deputy Panzerarmee commander, General der Panzertruppe Ludwig Crüwell, was shot down and captured whilst flying in a Storch light aircraft over 150th Brigade’s positions. Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring happened to be at Crüwell’s former headquarters when news of this loss arrived. Oberstleutnant Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin, a staff officer in the Panzerarmee Afrika, recounted:

  He wanted to know how the battle was going – and I asked him to take command of the group until Rommel could make other arrangements. Kesselring was amused, and remarked that as a Generalfeldmarschall he could hardly take orders from Generaloberst Rommel. But I pointed out that it would not suit us to have an Italian general in command of Crüwell Gruppe at such a critical juncture, and Kesselring agreed to take command for a few days.38

  This ensured continued German control of this formation which was chiefly Italian in composition.

  Meanwhile, Ritchie delayed in making a concerted attack on the Cauldron and lost the initiative. When this attack was finally launched on 5 June as Operation Aberdeen, it was comprehen
sively defeated. Rommel secured his supply lines and set about overcoming the resistance at Bir Hacheim. Rommel’s ‘personal’ command style was once again in evidence, as Leutnant Klaus Michaelse of 90. leichte-Infanterie-Division described:

  Near Bir Hacheim, during a sandstorm (a gibli), a larger and larger vehicle came out of the dust. It was an eight-wheeled car. Rommel. ‘What troop?’ ‘90th Light’. ‘Who is commanding?’ ‘Behind.’ ‘Well, I’m rolling ahead in that direction. He has to follow. We meet at point so and so.’ The commanding officer, General Kleeman, had to follow. So, half an hour later we met both generals, C-in-C and General Kleeman, with about twenty-five English lorries who had to bring ammunition and so on to Bir Hacheim.39

  With resistance at Bir Hacheim ended, Rommel’s aggressive thrusts now produced disaster followed by disaster for Eighth Army. In a major clash of tank forces in an area termed ‘Knightsbridge’, British command, communication and control mechanisms broke down and Ritchie’s armoured reserve was largely destroyed. The shattered remnants of the armoured brigades involved had to retire, leaving behind many damaged tanks that they might otherwise have recovered and repaired.

  On 14 June, Auchinleck authorized Ritchie to withdraw from the Gazala line. The chaotic nature of the army’s situation now was such that 151st Brigade, which had become isolated and separated from 69th Brigade, the other surviving 50th Division formation, had to escape encirclement by a move westwards into the Axis positions before swinging south and then east. The escape was fraught with danger and packed with incident. Corporal Tom Russ of the 6th Durham Light Infantry (DLI) told the story:

  We were going to go out of the ‘box’ turn left, go along the line and down south and come back from the back – that’s what I was told. I had to make sure that everyone had got plenty of petrol, plenty of water and everything was roadworthy – which was quite a job to do to make sure everybody had jerry cans and they were all topped up, and their tanks were full and everything was functioning alright. That particular night, there was bloody shit flying all over. We just drove through the ‘box’, turned left and away we went. There were one or two little ‘knock-ups’ and what have you. First the autovac went dicky, so we were out with a four gallon drum de-siphoning the autovac. Then I heard a hell of a knocking noise – ‘Oh, my god, what’s…?’ Either the big end had worn or something. There was a chappie called Bill Nimmo. I said, ‘Bill, there’s a drum of oil in the back of there, get on this mudguard and when she knocks tip oil into the hole’. We’d got well and truly behind the column and I said, ‘Right, this is our final fling, we’ll fill her up and let go’. I put my foot down and caught up the last truck and we just dumped everything. We grabbed our rifles and water bottles and all jumped into the back of the truck. A Scottish chap called Dan Callow was driving. He stopped to pick us up and away we went.40

  Despite losing most of their vehicles, ninety per cent of 151st Brigade personnel managed to escape back to Mersa Matruh.

  Under pressure, the British continued to retreat and Tobruk was isolated on 17 June. The port city had previously withstood a nine-month siege before being relieved in December 1941, but this time the Royal Navy was too stretched to be sure of supplying a garrison which could, nevertheless, hold out for two months with its existing supplies. Auchinleck however had already decided Tobruk should not be held at all costs this time and informed Ritchie. Nevertheless, the loss of almost 35,000 men, including the entire 2nd South African Division, when Tobruk fell after little more than a day’s fighting, was a catalogue of disastrous elements that might have been avoided if each had been addressed. Churchill had insisted that Tobruk be held, but its defences had been allowed to decline since the first siege. Had it been abandoned, the South Africans might have been withdrawn in good order. Their commander, Major-General Hendrik Klopper, did not attempt a serious breakout. Ritchie and Auchinleck disagreed about the former’s decision to break contact between the defenders and the rest of Eighth Army, which he had ordered to regroup back at the Egyptian border.

  Tobruk’s fall was a shocking blow to British and Commonwealth morale. It was the latest in a succession of disasters which included the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse, the loss of Malaya and Burma, the fall of Singapore, the threat of a Japanese invasion of Australia and the heavy losses in shipping in the Battle of the Atlantic, as well as the losses amongst Mediterranean naval forces previously mentioned. Ironically, it prompted American action in offers of troops (which Churchill declined) and equipment and weapons, which he accepted gratefully. None of this help would arrive in time for Eighth Army’s immediate crisis. With Tobruk lost, Ultra intelligence was interpreted at Eighth Army Headquarters as indicating that Rommel would now stand and gather his forces before reorganizing for an attack on Egypt. But they had reckoned without their chief protagonist’s appetite for further glory and were soon to be disabused of this complacent analysis.

  It had originally been agreed that after Tobruk was captured, the Panzerarmee would stand on the defensive on the Egyptian frontier, and that all available aircraft and shipping would be used to attack and conquer Malta. To that end, on 21 June Kesselring flew once more to Africa, and met Rommel in his Mammut command vehicle. According to Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin:

  Rommel insisted that he must follow up his victory without waiting for an attack on Malta, but Kesselring pointed out that an advance into Egypt could not succeed without full support from the Luftwaffe. If this were given, the Luftwaffe would not be available for operations against Malta, and should the island recover, Rommel’s communications would be in serious jeopardy. Kesselring maintained that the only sound course was to stick to the original plan, and postpone an invasion of Egypt until Malta had fallen.41

  Rommel argued that although the Panzerarmee had suffered in the Gazala battles, Eighth Army was in a far worse state and there was a unique opportunity to drive forwards to the Suez Canal. Even a short delay would allow the British commander time to regroup with reinforcements and dig in. Rommel had already issued an order of the day urging:

  Now for the complete destruction of the enemy. We will not rest until we have shattered the last remnants of the British Eighth Army. During the days to come, I shall call on you for one more great effort to bring us to this final goal.42

  But that evening he also sent a personal liaison officer to put his views before Hitler. The following day he signalled to Rome that ‘the state and morale of the troops, the present supply position owing to captured dumps, and the present weakness of the enemy, permit our pursuing him into the depths of the Egyptian area.’43 This contrasted strongly with the views of Maresciallo d’Italia Conte Ugo Cavallero, Badoglio’s successor at Comando Supremo, who announced that Comando Supremo intended to defend the Egyptian frontier whilst withdrawing aircraft and shipping for an attack on Malta.44 Rommel gained Hitler’s support, in spite of these strong objections. The decision was made to postpone Herkules until September, and throw everything behind Rommel’s invasion of Egypt. Hitler had never been keen on the prospect of invading Malta, probably fearing heavy losses like those suffered in capturing Crete, but Kesselring also blamed Rommel for misleading Hitler and OKW. Kesselring recorded:

  At that period Rommel exercised an almost hypnotic influence over Hitler, who was all but incapable of appreciating the situation objectively. This curious fact no doubt accounted for the … order I received when Hitler, impressed by Tobruk, and probably at the instigation of Rommel’s mouthpiece, Dr. Berndt, told me not to meddle with Rommel’s operational plan and to back him to the hilt.45

  The Panzerarmee began to move east on 22 June and Rommel’s Rubiconcrossing moment came the following day as he travelled into Egypt. In his own words, the whole enterprise was a ‘try-on’. He was counting on bluff and the superb morale of his men. He had also received notification that in reward for his victory at Gazala, he had been promoted to Generalfeldmarschall. The lure of Cairo, the Nile and the Pyramids and greater fame prove
d too great. Rommel had courted celebrity whilst a desert commander. Now he succumbed to the need to feed it with new victories.

  Rommel’s eagerness to continue the advance was owed in no small measure to intelligence received via the Gute Quelle (‘Good Source’). The ‘Good Source’ was unaware of his value to the Italians and Germans who eagerly read his every word for the information it might contain on their enemy’s strengths and weaknesses. This was because the Gute Quelle was Colonel Bonner Fellers, Military Attaché in the United States’ Embassy in Cairo. Fellers, had been sending back detailed encrypted reports on the combat performance, tactics, strength, location and morale of Eighth Army units to Washington since 1941. However, the diplomatic cipher he used had been compromised by the theft of the cipher keys by Italian agents from the US Embassy in the Vatican in September 1941. The quality of military information received by the Italian and German high commands for the North African theatre was at least as good as similar intelligence that the British received via Ultra.

  Fellers had provided a detailed summary of British tank strength and losses during the Gazala battle and Rommel had received a decrypted version of this report by 20 June. It undoubtedly convinced Rommel that his ‘try-on’ with the small number of surviving Afrika Korps tanks was definitely worthwhile against a force with virtually no serviceable tanks at all. Fellers also provided information that the 9th Australian Division was still in Palestine and Syria, which was true and of crucial importance, and that only one brigade of 50th Division was still in existence, which was inaccurate. Taken together, these factors must have suggested a very rosy picture to Rommel.