El Alamein
Page 15
Despite the efforts of British aircraft, submarines and surface vessels, the losses to Axis shipping came in peaks and troughs. On average, almost eighty-six per cent of all supplies dispatched, arrived – including eighty per cent of oil and eighty-eight per cent of munitions.4 However, the quantities of supplies being dispatched to the Axis forces fighting in North Africa were insufficient before they left port. The Axis powers were already stretched beyond their resources. Furthermore, sufficient quantities could be neither loaded nor unloaded quickly enough because of problems with port facilities in Italy and North Africa. Once a cargo was unloaded, the Panzerarmee’s transport infrastructure was inadequate.
Both the Regia Marina and the Regia Aeronautica did what they could to ensure that Italian ships with supplies arrived in North Africa, but the ships sent were frequently not full. The same problems with the Axis, and especially the Italian, war economy that prevented the Regia Marina putting to sea with its largest capital ships against the Pedestal convoy, also ensured that Rommel would never receive adequate supplies for his forces. According to the Afrika Korps Chief of Staff, Oberst Fritz Bayerlein, ‘To build a stock pile for the decisive battle of the future was impossible’ because they were receiving only one-fifth of their normal requirements.5
It was ironic that the senior German commanders in North Africa not only blamed their allies for the inability to supply their forces but, taking their lead from Rommel, also cited this as a reason for their subsequent flawed decisions. Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin wrote that:
Benghazi and even Tobruk were very far from the front and the long haul between the supply ports and Alamein imposed an unbearable strain on our road transport. All these factors, combined with the incompetence or ill-will of the Italian transport and shipping authorities, made it obvious that we could not stay indefinitely at Alamein. The general staff of the Panzerarmee studied the whole problem carefully and prepared detailed appreciations. A possible solution was to withdraw all non-mobile formations to Libya and to leave only armoured and motorized divisions in the forward area.6
But this was not really an option, as Mellenthin made clear:
Hitler would never have accepted a solution which involved giving up ground, and so the only alternative was to try and go forward to the Nile, while we still had the strength to make the attempt.7
Agreement for withdrawal from Egypt might have been almost impossible to secure, but it would undoubtedly have reduced the Axis supply problems. The practicalities were not even examined closely. The other alternative – establishment of strong defensive positions against which Eighth Army might be encouraged to smash itself – was not fully endorsed either. The means to do this were available, as minefields were already being laid to protect key positions, but not to a definite plan. Concentration on this, combined with time spent addressing his supply situation (a senior staff officer with a better understanding of logistics and more tact than Rommel would have been able to achieve this), would have represented a better option in the circumstances than the one chosen. Nevertheless, to keep the initiative, but with inadequate supplies and forces that he acknowledged were weak in terms of equipment and numbers, Rommel recklessly gambled on all he knew – attack.
On 15 August, in a bullish memorandum that described well-fed troops with adequate supplies of ammunition and growing tank strength, Rommel advanced the case for going on the offensive before Eighth Army’s supplies of equipment and reinforcements swung the advantage to his opponent.8 Clearly, the real state of his forces was considerably better, by the Panzerarmee’s own reports, than Rommel was subsequently prepared to admit. Good quality infantry reinforcements, including 164. leichte-Afrika-Division, Fallschirmjäger-Brigade Ramcke and the Italian Divisione Paracadutisti ‘Folgore’, had arrived during July and August. The ‘Folgore’ were particularly good, although the harsh desert conditions still surprised them, as Tenente Emilio Pulini recalled:
We arrived in northern Africa in very good condition. We had had very tough training in southern Italy before. For a couple of months we had been training in difficult ground and in a very hot climate too. When arrived we were very fit. Unfortunately in the desert the conditions were not the same as we had in Italy. The climate was very hot at that time because we arrived in the middle of July. We were taken immediately to the battle front and that too was a rather sudden change. There were a few things which we did not like very much and these things were flies, mainly, and very hot sun which was above us all day long. Being on the front line we had no means of being in the shade.9
They soon adapted, however, and their quality drew admiration from their opponents, who referred to them as ‘the cream of the Italian Army’.10
The Italians had also embarked Divisione ‘Pistoia’ in order to guard the extended lines of communication through Cyrenaica. Much to Rommel’s disgust, this division (unlike the other units) was well-equipped with vehicles, and Italian units generally were re-equipping with new motor transport, whilst the German units struggled on with worn equipment. Rommel’s vague criticism of perceived Italian prioritization of cargoes towards their own forces seems to amount to little more than jealousy on his part. Previously, he had always seemed to understand Kitchener’s adage regarding the need to ‘make war as we must and not as we should like’.11
As Rommel made his proposal for a further attack, the Panzerarmee was reporting that it had seventy-five per cent of its nominal strength in personnel, fifty per cent of its tanks, eighty-five per cent of its artillery, sixty per cent of its Pak anti-tank guns and seventy per cent of its heavy Flak artillery (chiefly 88mm guns).12 Its strength continued to rise. In tanks, for example, the Afrika Korps reported at the end of August having 203 tanks.13 With about 250 M13/41 Italian tanks as well, the tank forces of the opposing forces (in numerical terms at least), seemed roughly comparable. In an intelligence summary of 22 August, Major Ernst Zolling of the Panzerarmee staff estimated British tank numbers as between 350 and 400.14 In fact, they were closer to 700.15 Based on his estimate, Zolling argued ‘It can therefore be assumed that the enemy will remain on the defensive in his Alamein position for the time being’.16
With this flawed intelligence and promises from Oberbefehlshaber Süd (Luftwaffe Commander-in-Chief South), Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring, and Maresciallo d’Italia Conte Ugo Cavallero, and despite his own increasing ill health, Rommel decided to proceed. Mellenthin recorded:
In the end he accepted Kesselring’s assurance that he could fly in 90,000 gallons of gasoline a day, and we relied on a large tanker due in Tobruk at the end of August. Kesselring did in fact fulfil his promise but most of the gasoline was consumed on the long journey to the front… We were compelled to launch our attack on the night of 30/31 August to take advantage of the full moon. Any further delay would have meant a postponement of three weeks, which in the circumstances was out of the question.17
As the planned start date approached, Rommel heard what he wanted to hear. In his own words:
Cavallero informed me that tankers had been despatched to get to us in time for the offensive. If these were sunk, other ships, which were being assembled, would sail at once under appropriate escort. Kesselring promised the Panzer Army that in an emergency his transport squadrons would fly across 500 tons of petrol a day. Cavallero said he would use submarines and warships for the carriage of the most urgent material.18
Fritz Bayerlein heard much the same:
Marshals Kesselring and Cavallero guaranteed him that he would receive 6,000 tons of gasoline, of which 1,000 would come by air. Rommel stated, ‘The battle is dependent upon the prompt delivery of this gasoline.’ Cavallero answered, ‘You can begin the battle now, Herr Feldmarschall, the gasoline is already under way’.19
Kesselring, on the other hand, was more equivocal:
The precarious plight of our communication system made it impossible to give a positive assurance that all supply requirements would be met. I promised to do all I could and t
o use my influence with the Comando Supremo to keep the stream flowing.20
Despite his doubts and the unreliable promises given, the lure of the possible prize proved too much of a temptation for Rommel to ignore.
Rommel had issued his orders for the attack on 22 August. It was scheduled to begin on the night of 30 August. His plans were as outlined by his operations chief, Friedrich Wilhelm von Mellenthin:
Since we could not pierce the Eighth Army front, we had to seek a way round the flank, and Rommel adopted a plan broadly similar to that of Gazala. The Italian infantry, stiffened by the 164th Infantry Division and other German units, were to hold the front from the sea to a point ten miles south of Ruweisat Ridge; the striking force, consisting of 90. leichte-Afrika-Division (on the inner arc of the circle), the Italian armoured corps, and the Afrika Korps, was to swing round the British left flank and advance on the Alam Halfa Ridge. This was a key position, well in rear of Eighth Army, and its capture would decide the fate of the battle. In case of success, 21. Panzer-Division was to advance on Alexandria, and 15. Panzer-Division and 90. leichte-Afrika-Division towards Cairo.21
The plan was simple and bold. It was also expected. Almost immediately upon taking command of Eighth Army, Montgomery had warning via Ultra of the likelihood of a new Axis offensive. The exact date was unknown but night operations in the desert without the benefits of moonlight were fraught with additional risks, suggesting it would coincide with a time when the moon was full. Ultra subsequently confirmed this. What was definitely known by the more traditional means of aerial reconnaissance was the approximate strength and location of the planned Axis thrust. This confirmed Eighth Army’s expectation in August that any attempt by Rommel would be made in the south, as a consequence of which XIII Corps (first under Gott, and then Horrocks) had been working to fortify the Alam Halfa Ridge. In the desert campaign both sides were aware of the problems in maintaining supplies to any force making a deep thrust through the desert away from the coastal plain and escarpment. Ultimately, any such advance would have to turn northwards to regain the coastal road, either to cut off its opponent’s retreat or to establish sustainable lines of communication. The Alam Halfa Ridge running east–west, therefore, offered protection to the southern flank of the Alamein position and observation over the open and difficult desert to the south. Its advantages to the defenders were clear, as John Harding recorded:
The position was that the front at Alamein was held by the infantry. In the north it was the Australians and the New Zealanders and so on. It was held by infantry divisions with the armour in support and with most of the armour on the left flank. There was a feature that runs back from Alamein almost at right angles to it which overlooks the line of advance that the German armour would have to take in order to break through into the Delta.22
Harding ascribed responsibility for the plan to meet the attack to Montgomery and three other men newly appointed to positions in Eighth Army – Brigadier Freddie de Guingand, Lieutenant-General Brian Horrocks (Gott’s replacement as XIII Corps commander) and Brigadier Roberts of 22nd Armoured Brigade. In fact, the plan was already being developed, first by Dorman-Smith and then by Gott. In Harding’s view:
What really matters is the execution of a plan. Monty and de Guingand with ‘Jorrocks’ and ‘Pip’ Roberts organized a defence on that high ground which overlooked the open area where Rommel would have troops. They put the armour in position and Rommel had to attack and defeat that before he could safely continue his advance on the Delta. And that was the battle of Alam Halfa. It was rarely that you had your right hand holding the front … with your left hand held back in mid-air, overlooking the line in which the German advance would have to take place.23
The existence of a plan on which schemes were already being developed gave Montgomery the framework he needed not only to continue the Alam Halfa preparations, but also to ditch those elements he disliked – such as any plan for a withdrawal to, and subsequent defence of, the Nile Delta. This allowed him to promulgate his ‘no retreat’ policy that was an immediate boost to the morale of most ordinary soldiers. Crucially, the refrain was taken up by his corps and divisional commanders in outlining the plan to their officers. Lieutenant-General Sir Bernard Freyberg of 2nd New Zealand Division made things plain in his address to the New Zealand Divisional Headquarters Conference on 16 August:
I want you to make the Army Commander’s views clear to everybody. This looking over your shoulder and cranking up to get back to the position in the rear is to cease. Here we are going to stay and here we are going to fight. There is no question of going to any back position from here. We are to make this position as complete as we can.24
There was, consequently, a great deal of sensitivity regarding the shape and terminology of the defensive positions. The 44th (Home Counties) Division had only recently arrived in Egypt but had been rushed up to the Ridge on Montgomery’s orders, despite being inadequately trained. One of its officers, Lieutenant-Colonel John Anderson Smith of the 57th Anti-Tank Regiment (RA) recalled:
Each Brigade was in what we were forbidden to call a ‘box’– a defensive position entirely surrounded by wire and minefields – and usually there was wire and sometimes minefields between Brigade positions. Divisional HQ and my HQ were not in a box but were between 131 and 133 Brigades.25
This ban on certain terminology for defensive positions, which originated from Montgomery, had echoes of the controversies over the defensive arrangements of the British Army in March 1918 against the German Spring Offensive. Then ‘defence in depth’ was based around wired-in redoubts or strongpoints intended to delay the attackers’ advance and use up their ammunition and resources. The tactics were poorly understood and very unpopular, summed up in the observation of one anonymous non-commissioned officer (NCO): ‘It don’t suit us. The British Army fights in line and won’t do any good in these bird cages’.26 ‘Boxes’, like ‘bird cages’, suggested restrictions on freedom of movement and inevitable capture. Instead, ‘Every post was to have All-Round Defence, with its own stores, and supplied within itself.’27
The Alam Halfa position extended beyond the ridge itself, presenting problems for siting the 2-pounder guns and headquarters of Anderson Smith’s unit:
Owing to the extreme flatness of the area although one could get fairly good fields of fire for the guns it was extremely hard to conceal them. My HQ was a small area of desert, we had about five vehicles up scattered about. The second afternoon we were there we were dive bombed by four or five Stukas. At the time we were digging a bit of a hole to use as an office. It had a bank about a foot high against which I flung myself. One signaller was slightly wounded in the back. He had crawled under a lorry and a splinter had hit the chassis and ‘splashed’ him. He was back two days later. It had a very good effect ever after in that I never had much bother getting RHQ to dig in.28
Horrocks, new to the desert, made his preparations around a static defensive combination of tanks and anti-tank guns – especially the new 6-pounder guns of 1st Rifle Brigade and the Grant tanks of 22nd Armoured Brigade. Manoeuvre was not contemplated, except by 7th Motor Brigade and the armoured cars and Stuart tanks of 4th Armoured Brigade, both from 7th Armoured Division. Valentine tanks from 23rd Armoured Brigade had trained as a mobile corps reserve to support the infantry – especially 2nd New Zealand and 44th Divisions. Tom Witherby remembered getting to know the area with 46th RTR:
We had to know how to get to five places by day or night at top Valentine speed. In particular, I remember going to ‘Scotland’ and seeing the Grant tanks of the Royal Scots Greys. They were not in ‘dug-in’ positions but were on a steep hill at the back of the Alam Halfa Ridge. Nearby we examined the dug-in emplacement of a six-pounder anti-tank gun, with a very solid breastwork of sandbags, carefully camouflaged. This gun was half-way down a little ‘wadi’ or chine and was largely hidden from the ground in front and could only be attacked by tanks as they climbed up the wadi itself.29
Considerabl
e care was taken in siting the precious 6-pounders for their fire to achieve optimum effect. Douglas Waller recalled:
There were two of us in front and the other two were slightly on our flanks and further behind us. They put us out there and said ‘Mark out something 300 yards away’. Well, we put an empty petrol tin there and they said ‘That’s your maximum range. Don’t open fire above 300 yards’. Our tanks were not as heavily armoured and didn’t have as big guns as they [the Germans] did. Really they were outranged. That was the trouble. So where they were in a hull-down position, they didn’t want to be at extreme range because they weren’t going to inflict any damage. They didn’t want us to open fire until they were in the range of the tanks.30
The plan was simple and clear, the preparations to execute it obvious to all. Captain Tom Witherby spoke for many ordinary Eighth Army soldiers when expressing the view that ‘the days of complicated, obscure plans, of constant pointless movements and of the splitting up of formations were gone for ever.’31
The credit for the clear plans for battle at Alam Halfa should be assigned to Auchinleck, Dorman-Smith and Gott for the work they had already accomplished before Montgomery took over. However, when Churchill returned from his meeting with Stalin in mid-August, Montgomery told him of the measures being prepared against the expected attack – all of which were based on existing plans. This was a masterly exposition of the situation, according to Churchill, which left him delighted at the speed with which the new Army Commander had grasped the situation.32 This ascribed the credit to Montgomery, who without demurring, accepted it and perpetuated the lie ever after.