El Alamein

by Bryn Hammond

  Regarding the question of the conduct of military operations under the two Eighth Army commanders and the supposedly clear differentiation between Auchinleck’s command and Montgomery’s, researching this account has revealed that, on the contrary, there was considerable continuity in terms of tactical, technological and organizational changes and innovations that straddled the periods of command of both men. Indeed, these are so extensive as to suggest that, rather than Eighth Army being continually shaped and transformed by the two senior commanders to be weapons of their will, the army was actually an organic entity that was constantly revising and reinventing itself in small or more significant ways in response to the changing situation in the war. To take one example, artillery techniques that were appropriate to the concentration of artillery effect only assumed greater importance and received new impetus in the situation at Alamein in June–July 1942, even though Brigadier ‘Steve’ Weir may have been practising some of these techniques in exercises before that date. The means to perform these tasks more effectively arrived in the form of new weaponry which could actively contribute to this work or free up 25-pounders for the role by reducing the burden of their anti-tank role. All this, in turn, was helped by opportunities to give infantry the necessary training required to operate effectively behind a creeping barrage, etc.

  Similarly, the rapid British response in developing means to deal with deep minefield defences was catalysed by the introduction of extensive Axis minefields as a key element of their defensive positions in early July 1942. The means to clear mines already existed. The imperative to do this quickly and efficiently developed from the necessity of employing armour to break down the Panzerarmee defences in such positions.

  Similar continuities existed in the failure of both commanders to address with any success the operational problems encountered. A specific example was obviously infantry co-operation with armour concerning which Auchinleck began to grope towards a solution in a clumsily managed process soon after he assumed army command and which Montgomery equally did not completely resolve. The ‘accidental’ necessity of twinning New Zealand infantry with 9th Armoured Brigade indicated where the solution might lie. Credit should go to the commanders of both these units for the work they did in creating a climate in which effective liaison and co-operation could flourish, based on prior discussions, training and broader activities designed to create a bond between the infantry and the men inside the tanks (as opposed to the impossible i.e. bonding with the tank itself).

  The contribution of men at the level of brigadier and below in tactical and technological innovation has also been recognized in this account. Too much attention is given to the senior commanders and too much credit/criticism is attributed to them for the successes and failures in battle. Men like Colonel ‘Toc’ Elton, Major Henri Le Grand and Major Peter Moore were the tactical and technological innovators whose contribution to ultimate victory is immeasurable but ‘personalities’ or senior commanders are frequently credited with the success their subordinates accomplished. Brigadiers Kirkman, Weir and Kisch in particular are the names associated with the innovations introduced, when more appropriately they might be seen as sponsors of the innovators.

  Other continuities existed in the continual problems with wireless communication and security that plagued British operations at Alamein and, indeed, which had done so for most of the Desert War. It remained all too often the case that at critical junctures in the battle, British commanders could not communicate or be contacted. An example from Montgomery’s Alamein battle was Brigadier Gilbert McMeekan, Commander Royal Engineers of 10th Armoured Division. In July, Lieutenant-General William Gott was regularly ‘missing’ and uncontactable by radio. This did not facilitate clear and timely operational decision-making. Meanwhile, in the same month, the destruction of Nachrichten Fernaufklärungs Kompanie 621 was an important intelligence coup but it did not stop the problems associated with British units continuing to communicate using inadequate wireless security procedures. Furthermore, there was another radio intercept company attached to 15. Panzer-Division and NFAK 621 was subsequently reconstituted – although it did not achieve the successes its predecessor had enjoyed.

  The issues regarding the employment of Commonwealth, Empire and Dominion troops plagued both army commanders. Montgomery’s chief blessing was that he had more infantry options to turn to, somewhat diminishing (although not by much) the power of the Australian, New Zealand and South African divisional commanders. Montgomery did not have the stand-up row that Auchinleck experienced with Morshead over the deployment of Australian troops, chiefly because these issues were now dealt with at a lower level of the command structure and because Montgomery, after initially upsetting Freyberg, Morshead and Pienaar over the appointment of Leese as his XXX Corps commander, recognized the need in a coalition force like Eighth Army, to maintain good relations with the commanders and troops of all the nations represented. He and Leese worked hard in this respect in the weeks before the battle.

  Another area of continuity was in senior commanders and Eighth Army staff. Guingand, whilst always depicted as a ‘Montgomery man’, was an Auchinleck appointment brought in as BGS to replace Whiteley. Guingand was previously on the GHQ staff at Middle East Command as Director of Military Intelligence, from where he ‘head hunted’ Captain ‘Bill’ Williams, who subsequently became Montgomery’s intelligence ‘guru’. Brigadier Frederick Kisch was already on Eighth Army staff, as was Brigadier Brian Robertson. John Harding, Montgomery’s protégé, may not have chosen to acknowledge his debt to Auchinleck for his time as Director of Military Training and in other posts on Middle East GHQ staff, but he certainly owed one. There was definitely a period of ‘Monty purges’ after Alamein (in which men like Lumsden, Gatehouse, Fisher and others were removed from command), but these men from his headquarters staff were not amongst those ‘degummed’ and all had served the ‘Auk’ – by subsequent reputation a ‘bad picker’.

  The chief criticism of Auchinleck from amongst those in close proximity to him as a military commander appears to be that, at a critical time in the First Alamein battle, he brought in Eric Dorman-Smith as his Chief of Staff. The role was unfamiliar at this stage to the men already at Eighth Army HQ. They grew to understand it when Guingand took the post and it was correctly framed by Montgomery, but much of the criticism of the admittedly ‘awkward’ Dorman-Smith can be sourced to those who did not like this sudden imposition of a fine mind with the army commander’s ear in their midst. Dorman-Smith, like John Frederick Charles Fuller, partly through his own personality, remained an unrealized talent whose climb in the army was abruptly halted and his career never recovered.

  Auchinleck’s other key ‘appointment’ was to empower his deputy, Tom Corbett, to act in his stead on all matters relating to Middle East Command, a role in which he was competent but massively over-worked. It was Corbett’s misfortune to be the target of General Sir Alan Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. From that point forward, he was doomed. Brooke’s judgement was demonstrably good in most matters relating to his single-minded pursuit of his plans for victory. His assessment may have been fair regarding Corbett; it was less so in connection with Auchinleck, who was ultimately dismissed from Middle East Command because he was unlikely to work well with Montgomery, for whom Brooke was determined to secure command of Eighth Army. Churchill’s caprice and misunderstanding of the command structure in the Middle East only confused the issue.

  One aspect of the Desert War this book has addressed is the myth of the Krieg Ohne Hass or ‘War Without Hate’. This concept was introduced by Rommel in his written memoirs at a time when Germany’s victory in the war was, at best, by no means certain and her defeat much more likely. Rommel’s personal disenchantment with Hitler’s leadership was growing. It seems a convenient device to position his own military conduct away from that of others in operations on the Eastern Front, for example. In drawing attention to the fact that there were no significant numerica
l losses amongst the sparse civilian populations of Egypt and Cyrenaica and that both the Panzerarmee forces and Eighth Army had behaved largely with dignity and respect for their opponents in victory or defeat, Rommel was suggesting that he was in some way a more decent commander than his fellow German commanders – something that might form the basis of a post-war negotiating position perhaps.

  Rommel undoubtedly did behave personally with correctness towards prisoners and non-combatants. This was acknowledged by high-ranking officers who encountered him as prisoners of war. In doing so, he was not exceptional in the desert or in the war in general. Nor was this type of good conduct limited to one side or the other in the desert fighting. But it was not the universal experience either. Men did kill, wound, rob and wantonly destroy at any opportunity in the desert fighting, as elsewhere. Unarmed prisoners in the act of surrendering were shot or otherwise executed without a moment’s hesitation; tank crews trapped in their armour were easy targets for ‘revenge’ attacks by infantry at close quarters where a few grenades or some small arms fire might be directed into the tank interior. Dugouts would be routinely bombed when known to contain occupants perhaps prepared to surrender. Very real atrocities were committed that participants attributed to ‘blood lust’, ‘battle fury’ or simply the heat of battle.

  More importantly still, and with Rommel’s definite knowledge (although not necessarily his support), there were lurking behind the Axis forces in this supposed ‘War without Hate’ the same instruments and forces of repression and hatred that had already been employed throughout areas occupied by the German forces in Europe. Arab nationalism had been recognized as a possible avenue of support for Germany in the Middle East and Hitler had communicated his plans for the destruction of Jewish communities in Arab countries to the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem in November 1941. Eighth Army stood as a bulwark against this threat and against definite plans made in this regard. The Krieg Ohne Hass would very quickly have been unmasked as the sham it was, had the Panzerarmee triumphed in early July 1942.

  So the Americans have landed in Algiers and Tunis. Good luck to them. I expect they will claim that they have won the war for us in North Africa – but who cares who gets the credit so long as we get the damned thing over. We may get sent home soon. We are hoping so – Or we may be kept for further fighting in the Mediterranean area.6

  Sometimes after struggling to find adequate words to describe a complex aspect of this superficially simple, but complex in detail, sequence of battles, it has proved better to let the words of the participants themselves do all that is necessary. Charles Potts, known as ‘The Fighting Parson’ was one of many in Eighth Army with a fascinating and remarkable background. When war began he was helping to run a settlement for dockland boys in Canning Town. He had been a chaplain to the forces until April 1942 when he had resigned to serve as an infantry officer. He received the Military Cross at the end of the Second Battle of El Alamein for silencing snipers who were using derelict tanks in no man’s land as cover. He appears several times in this account because of his unique and insightful views on the war. However, he also had the ability in some of his letters to capture the mood and feeling of an entire army. His remarks concerning Operation Torch, the Anglo-American landings in North Africa which took place on 8 November 1942, days after the victory at Alamein sum up the feelings of the Eighth Army soldier. There was almost an expectation that their victory would soon be marginalized as events elsewhere took over.

  Thankfully this did not occur. In fact, the opposite has sometimes happened. The importance of overall victory at Alamein has been exaggerated and, in particular, this has happened in connection with the victory of Montgomery’s Eighth Army which, in turn, has produced depreciation in the perception of the battle’s conduct under Auchinleck. Alamein was in fact a victory achieved over several months by many of the same men under two very different army commanders. It marked a turning point in Britain’s fortunes in the war. It was not the point at which the war was won or even a victory in the most important theatre of that global conflict. But it was a definite victory and one achieved by a force that was, in the main, composed of men from Britain, the Commonwealth and Dominions and the Empire. From the moment American troops in significant numbers landed in North Africa, the nature of Britain’s role in the conflict changed and it became a minority partner in an American-led coalition in the West, whilst the forces of the Soviet Union dominated the war in the East where the sacrifice of the Red Army’s soldiers ultimately achieved victory over Fascism.

  Charles Potts’ words, with the hope of home but the expectation of further fighting, say so much for the ordinary Eighth Army soldier. But Potts was not alone and this book ends with the words of others who experienced the critical events of five months in mid- to late-1942, beginning first with the observations of Potts once more from soon after the final battle at Alamein had been won:

  This experience that we have been through has changed us all a bit. We know each other better. Some of the most unlikely men have shown themselves to be heroes and some of the plausible ones have been discredited. We have found a greater comradeship. There is a more general geniality and friendliness everywhere.7

  Canon Gervase Markham’s birthday celebrations took place on 7 November 1942 amidst the aftermath of the battle:

  There was great excitement when we finally discovered that the battle had been won. I remember having a little sort of birthday party. In the afternoon, I buried a sapper who had been shot by a comrade playing with an Italian revolver. Side by side we buried an Italian prisoner of war. About 500 of them were standing half a mile away. They had no food or water. We had none to spare for so many, we had no transport to take them away in, they were too tired to walk. Another thousand were reported a few miles away and more to come in. They needed no capturing.8

  It would be invidious not to include the thoughts of Frank Devaney, a private soldier who experienced the barrage and battle on 23 October 1942:

  People at home didn’t understand. They didn’t realize what it was about. They pictured that El Alamein was … the mere fact that there was a big barrage, they thought that everything was drenched out and finished. But that wasn’t the case at all. Although we’d a lot of guns, we’d a lot of opposition from the German guns too. We met a lot of their defensive fire, but we went through it. Generally the Germans were in sound positions. There was bayonet fighting and that sort of thing at El Alamein. Plenty of it. People that think there wasn’t, well, the whole point is this – they probably picture El Alamein and wrongly project it to people at home.9

  Devaney’s understanding of what motivated the Germans and their Italian allies was simple but incisive:

  The Jerries wouldn’t come out of their slit trenches unless they were forced to. That’s all there was in it. They were there to stay. To think that they had come all the way down to be sitting just on the edge of the delta for one attack that would’ve seen them open up the whole of Africa and then have all the necessary things in life. The German Army knew that. Was he going to forego all that and go way back up the desert where he’d come from without putting up a good fight? This was the psychological effect. When he was pushed out, he was pushed out because he was made to go.10

  Finally, on behalf of the men of Eighth Army, consider a heartfelt complaint by Gunner James Brooks of 211 Battery, 64th Medium Regiment (RA), in a letter home sent some months after the battle:

  That brings us to the Battle of Alamein and to the end of my story. I can’t tell you anymore, as we can only tell you about our experiences up to Oct 23rd. But I will tell you this as I’ve told lots of times before. I’m sick and tired of this bloody desert and the sooner I get out of it the better I shall like it. I think I’ve done more than my share in this war and it’s about time somebody took my place.11

  * My emphasis.

  ORDER OF BATTLE

  EIGHTH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, 23 OCTOBER 1942

  (excluding signals, medical, supply, poli
ce and workshop units)

  Lieutenant-General B.L. Montgomery

  (BGS: F.W. de Guingand)

  HQ EIGHTH ARMY

  Army Troops and Formations under command included:

  1st Army Tank Brigade (42 and 44 RTR) – Matilda ‘Scorpions’; 2nd and 12th AA Brigades

  X CORPS

  (Lieutenant-General Herbert Lumsden)

  (BGS: Ralph Cooney)

  1st ARMOURED DIVISION (Major-General Raymond Briggs)

  2nd Armoured Brigade (A.F. Fisher): The Queen’s Bays, 9th Lancers, 10th Hussars and Yorkshire Dragoons (motor battalion)

  7th Motor Brigade (T.J.B. Bosvile): 2nd and 7th Bns, the Rifle Brigade and 2nd KRRC (60th Rifles)

  Divisional Troops

  12th Lancers (armoured cars)

  RA: (CRA, B.J. Fowler): 2nd and 4th RHA, 11th RHA (HAC), 78th Field Regt (less Troops with other divisions), 76th Anti-Tank Regt and 42 Light AA Regt

  RE: 1st and 7th Field Sqns, 1st Field Park Sqn. Attached: 9th Field Sqn and 572 Field Park Coy

  Others: Two companies R. Northumberland Fusiliers

  10th ARMOURED DIVISION (Major-General A.H. Gatehouse)

  8th Armoured Brigade (E.C.N. Custance): 3rd RTR, Nottinghamshire Yeomanry (Sherwood Rangers), Staffordshire Yeomanry, 1st Buffs (motor battalion)

  24th Armoured Brigade (A.G. Kenchington): 41st, 45th and 47th RTR and 11th KRRC (motor battalion)

  133 Lorried Infantry Brigade (A.W. Lee), added from 44th Division: 2nd, 4th and 5th Royal Sussex Regt and one company R Northumberland Fusiliers.

  Divisional Troops:

  The Royal Dragoons (armoured cars)

  RA: (CRA, W.A. Ebbels): 1st, 5th and 104th RHA, 98th Field Regt, 84th Anti-Tank Regt, 53rd Light AA Regt

  RE: 2nd and 3rd Field Sqns, 141st Field Park Sqn; attached: 6th Field Sqn, 571st and 573rd Army Field Coys