Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

by Polybius

  23. Having got his main body into order, Flamininus gave his attention at the same time to relieving his advanced guard, and to going along the ranks to encourage his men. His exhortation was short, but clear and intelligible to the hearers: for, pointing to the enemy with his hand, he said to his soldiers: “Are not these the Macedonians, my men, whom, when occupying in their own country the pass to Eordaea, you routed in open battle, under the command of Sulpicius, and drove to take refuge on the hills with the loss of many of their comrades? Are not these the Macedonians whom, when defended by what seemed an impassable country in Epirus, you dislodged by sheer valour, and forced to throw away their shields and fly right into Macedonia? Why then should you feel any hesitation when you are to fight the same men on equal ground? Why look anxiously to the past, rather than let that past minister courage to you for the present? Therefore, my men, rouse each other by mutual exhortations, and hasten in your might to the struggle! For, with God’s will, I am persuaded that this battle will quickly have the same issue as the contests in the past.” With these words he ordered his right wing to remain where they were, and the elephants in front of them; while with his left, supported by the light infantry, he advanced in gallant style to attack the enemy. And the Roman troops already on the field, finding themselves thus reinforced by the legions on their rear, once more faced round and charged their opponents.

  24. Meanwhile, when he had seen the main part of his army in position outside the camp, Philip himself advanced with his peltasts and the right wing of his phalanx, commencing the ascent of the hills with great rapidity, and having left instructions with Nicanor, surnamed the Elephant, to see that the rest of the army followed at once. As soon as his first files reached the summit, he deployed his men into line by the left, and occupied the range of high ground: for the Macedonians who had been sent in advance had forced the Romans a considerable distance down the other side of the hills, and therefore he found the ridges unoccupied by the enemy. But while he was still engaged in getting the right wing of his army into line, his mercenaries came on the ground, having been decisively repulsed by the enemy. For when the Roman light infantry found themselves supported by the heavy, as I said just now, with their assistance, which they regarded as turning the scale in their favour, they made a furious charge on the enemy, and killed a large number of them. When the king first came on the ground, and saw that the fighting between the light armed was going on near the enemy’s camp, he was delighted: but when, on the other hand, he saw his own men giving ground and requiring support, he was compelled to give it, and allow the necessities of the moment to decide the fortunes of the whole day, in spite of the fact that the greater part of his phalanx was still on the march and engaged in mounting the hills. Receiving therefore the men who had been already engaged, he massed them all upon his right wing, both infantry and cavalry; while he ordered the peltasts and heavy armed to double their depth and close up to the right. By the time this was effected the enemy were close at hand; and, accordingly, the word was given to the phalanx to lower spears and charge; to the light infantry to cover their flank. At the same time Flamininus also, having received his advanced party into the intervals between his maniples, charged the enemy.

  25. The charge was made with great violence and loud shouting on both sides: for both advancing parties raised their war cry, while those who were not actually engaged shouted encouragement to those that were; and the result was a scene of the wildest excitement, terrible in the last degree. Philip’s right wing came off brilliantly in the encounter, for they were charging down hill and were superior in weight, and their arms were far more suited for the actual conditions of the struggle: but as for the rest of the army, that part of it which was in the rear of the actual fighters did not get into contact with the enemy; while the left wing, which had but just made the ascent, was only beginning to show on the ridge. Seeing that his men were unable to stand the charge of the phalanx, and that his left wing was losing ground, some having already fallen and the rest slowly retiring, but that hopes of saving himself still remained on the right, Flamininus hastily transferred himself to the latter wing; and when he perceived that the enemy’s force was not well together — part being in contact with the actual fighters, part just in the act of mounting the ridge, and part halting on it and not yet beginning to descend, — keeping the elephants in front he led the maniples of his right against the enemy. The Macedonians having no one to give them orders, and unable to form a proper phalanx, owing to the inequalities of the ground and to the fact that, being engaged in trying to come up with the actual combatants, they were still in column of march, did not even wait for the Romans to come to close quarters: but, thrown into confusion by the mere charge of the elephants, their ranks were disordered and they broke into flight.

  26. The main body of the Roman right followed and slaughtered the flying Macedonians. But one of the tribunes, with about twenty maniples, having made up his mind on his own account what ought to be done next, contributed by his action very greatly to the general victory. He saw that the division which was personally commanded by Philip was much farther forward than the rest of the enemy, and was pressing hard upon the Roman left by its superior weight; he therefore left the right, which was by this time clearly victorious, and directing his march towards the part of the field where a struggle was still going on, he managed to get behind the Macedonians and charge them on the rear. The nature of the phalanx is such that the men cannot face round singly and defend themselves: this tribune, therefore, charged them and killed all he could get at; until, being unable to defend themselves, they were forced to throw down their shields and fly; whereupon the Romans in their front, who had begun to yield, faced round again and charged them too. At first, as I have said, Philip, judging from the success of his own division, felt certain of a complete victory; but when he saw his Macedonians all on a sudden throwing away their shields, and the enemy close upon their rear, he withdrew with a small body of foot and horse a short distance from the field and took a general survey of the whole battle: and when he observed that the Romans in their pursuit of his left wing were already approaching the tops of the hills, he rallied as many Thracians and Macedonians as he could at the moment, and fled. As Flamininus was pursuing the fugitives he came upon the lines of the Macedonian left, just as they were scaling the ridge in their attempt to cross the hills, and at first halted in some surprise because the enemy held their spears straight up, as is the custom of the Macedonians when surrendering themselves or intending to pass over to the enemy. Presently, having had the reason of this movement explained to him, he held his men back, thinking it best to spare the lives of those whom fear had induced to surrender. But whilst he was still reflecting on this matter, some of the advanced guard rushed upon these men from some higher ground and put most of them to the sword, while the few survivors threw away their shields and escaped by flight.

  27. The battle was now at an end in every part of the field; the Romans everywhere victorious; and Philip in full retreat towards Tempe. The first night he passed at what is called Alexander’s tower; the next day he got as far as Gonni, on the pass into Tempe, and there remained, with a view of collecting the survivors of the battle.

  But the Romans, after following the fugitives for a certain distance, returned; and some employed themselves in stripping the dead; others in collecting the captives; while the majority hurried to the plunder of the enemy’s camp. But there they found that the Aetolians had been beforehand with them; and thinking, therefore, that they were deprived of their fair share of the booty, they began grumbling at the Aetolians and protesting to their general that “he imposed the dangers upon them, but yielded the spoil to others.” For the present, however, they returned to their own camp, and passed the night in their old quarters: but next morning they employed themselves in collecting the prisoners and the remainder of the spoils, and then started on the march towards Larisa. In the battle the Romans lost seven hundred men; t
he Macedonians eight thousand killed, and not less than five thousand taken prisoners.

  Such was the result of the battle at Cynoscephalae in Thessaly between the Romans and Philip.

  28. In my sixth book I made a promise, still unfulfilled, of taking a fitting opportunity of drawing a comparison between the arms of the Romans and Macedonians, and their respective system of tactics, and pointing out how they differ for better or worse from each other. I will now endeavour by a reference to actual facts to fulfil that promise. For since in former times the Macedonian tactics proved themselves by experience capable of conquering those of Asia and Greece; while the Roman tactics sufficed to conquer the nations of Africa and all those of Western Europe; and since in our own day there have been numerous opportunities of comparing the men as well as their tactics, — it will be, I think, a useful and worthy task to investigate their differences, and discover why it is that the Romans conquer and carry off the palm from their enemies in the operations of war: that we may not put it all down to Fortune, and congratulate them on their good luck, as the thoughtless of mankind do; but, from a knowledge of the true causes, may give their leaders the tribute of praise and admiration which they deserve.

  Now as to the battles which the Romans fought with Hannibal, and the defeats which they sustained in them, I need say no more. It was not owing to their arms or their tactics, but to the skill and genius of Hannibal that they met with those defeats: and that I made quite clear in my account of the battles themselves. And my contention is supported by two facts. First, by the conclusion of the war: for as soon as the Romans got a general of ability comparable with that of Hannibal, victory was not long in following their banners. Secondly, Hannibal himself, being dissatisfied with the original arms of his men, and having immediately after his first victory furnished his troops with the arms of the Romans, continued to employ them thenceforth to the end. Pyrrhus, again, availed himself not only of the arms, but also of the troops of Italy, placing a maniple of Italians and a company of his own phalanx alternately, in his battles against the Romans. Yet even this did not enable him to win; the battles were somehow or another always indecisive.

  It was necessary to speak first on these points, to anticipate any instances which might seem to make against my theory. I will now return to my comparison.

  29. Many considerations may easily convince us that, if only the phalanx has its proper formation and strength, nothing can resist it face to face or withstand its charge. For as a man in close order of battle occupies a space of three feet; and as the length of the sarissae is sixteen cubits according to the original design, which has been reduced in practice to fourteen; and as of these fourteen four must be deducted, to allow for the distance between the two hands holding it, and to balance the weight in front; it follows clearly that each hoplite will have ten cubits of his sarissa projecting beyond his body, when he lowers it with both hands, as he advances against the enemy: hence, too, though the men of the second, third, and fourth rank will have their sarissae projecting farther beyond the front rank than the men of the fifth, yet even these last will have two cubits of their sarissae beyond the front rank; if only the phalanx is properly formed and the men close up properly both flank and rear, like the description in Homer —

  “So buckler pressed on buckler; helm on helm;

  And man on man: and waving horse-hair plumes

  In polished head-piece mingled, as they swayed

  In order: in such serried rank they stood.”

  And if my description is true and exact, it is clear that in front of each man of the front rank there will be five sarissae projecting to distances varying by a descending scale of two cubits.

  30. With this point in our minds, it will not be difficult to imagine what the appearance and strength of the whole phalanx is likely to be, when, with lowered sarissae, it advances to the charge sixteen deep. Of these sixteen ranks, all above the fifth are unable to reach with their sarissae far enough to take actual part in the fighting. They, therefore, do not lower them, but hold them with the points inclined upwards over the shoulders of the ranks in front of them, to shield the heads of the whole phalanx; for the sarissae are so closely serried, that they repel missiles which have carried over the front ranks and might fall upon the heads of those in the rear. These rear ranks, however, during an advance, press forward those in front by the weight of their bodies; and thus make the charge very forcible, and at the same time render it impossible for the front ranks to face about.

  Such is the arrangement, general and detailed, of the phalanx. It remains now to compare with it the peculiarities and distinctive features of the Roman arms and tactics. Now, a Roman soldier in full armour also requires a space of three square feet. But as their method of fighting admits of individual motion for each man — because he defends his body with a shield, which he moves about to any point from which a blow is coming, and because he uses his sword both for cutting and stabbing, — it is evident that each man must have a clear space, and an interval of at least three feet both on flank and rear, if he is to do his duty with any effect. The result of this will be that each Roman soldier will face two of the front rank of a phalanx, so that he has to encounter and fight against ten spears, which one man cannot find time even to cut away, when once the two lines are engaged, nor force his way through easily — seeing that the Roman front ranks are not supported by the rear ranks, either by way of adding weight to their charge, or vigour to the use of their swords. Therefore it may readily be understood that, as I said before, it is impossible to confront a charge of the phalanx, so long as it retains its proper formation and strength.

  31. Why is it then that the Romans conquer? And what is it that brings disaster on those who employ the phalanx? Why, just because war is full of uncertainties both as to time and place; whereas there is but one time and one kind of ground in which a phalanx can fully work. If, then, there were anything to compel the enemy to accommodate himself to the time and place of the phalanx, when about to fight a general engagement, it would be but natural to expect that those who employed the phalanx would always carry off the victory. But if the enemy finds it possible, and even easy, to avoid its attack, what becomes of its formidable character? Again, no one denies that for its employment it is indispensable to have a country flat, bare, and without such impediments as ditches, cavities, depressions, steep banks, or beds of rivers: for all such obstacles are sufficient to hinder and dislocate this particular formation. And that it is, I may say, impossible, or at any rate exceedingly rare to find a piece of country of twenty stades, or sometimes of even greater extent, without any such obstacles, every one will also admit. However, let us suppose that such a district has been found. If the enemy decline to come down into it, but traverse the country sacking the towns and territories of the allies, what use will the phalanx be? For if it remains on the ground suited to itself, it will not only fail to benefit its friends, but will be incapable even of preserving itself; for the carriage of provisions will be easily stopped by the enemy, seeing that they are in undisputed possession of the country: while if it quits its proper ground, from the wish to strike a blow, it will be an easy prey to the enemy. Nay, if a general does descend into the plain, and yet does not risk his whole army upon one charge of the phalanx or upon one chance, but manœuvres for a time to avoid coming to close quarters in the engagement, it is easy to learn what will be the result from what the Romans are now actually doing.

  32. For no speculation is any longer required to test the accuracy of what I am now saying: that can be done by referring to accomplished facts.

  The Romans do not, then, attempt to extend their front to equal that of a phalanx, and then charge directly upon it with their whole force: but some of their divisions are kept in reserve, while others join battle with the enemy at close quarters. Now, whether the phalanx in its charge drives its opponents from their ground, or is itself driven back, in either case its peculiar order is dislocated; for whether in foll
owing the retiring, or flying from the advancing enemy, they quit the rest of their forces: and when this takes place, the enemy’s reserves can occupy the space thus left, and the ground which the phalanx had just before been holding, and so no longer charge them face to face, but fall upon them on their flank and rear. If, then, it is easy to take precautions against the opportunities and peculiar advantages of the phalanx, but impossible to do so in the case of its disadvantages, must it not follow that in practice the difference between these two systems is enormous? Of course those generals who employ the phalanx must march over ground of every description, must pitch camps, occupy points of advantage, besiege, and be besieged, and meet with unexpected appearances of the enemy: for all these are part and parcel of war, and have an important and sometimes decisive influence on the ultimate victory. And in all these cases the Macedonian phalanx is difficult, and sometimes impossible to handle, because the men cannot act either in squads or separately. The Roman order on the other hand is flexible: for every Roman, once armed and on the field, is equally well equipped for every place, time, or appearance of the enemy. He is, moreover, quite ready and needs to make no change, whether he is required to fight in the main body, or in a detachment, or in a single maniple, or even by himself. Therefore, as the individual members of the Roman force are so much more serviceable, their plans are also much more often attended by success than those of others.