by Polybius
[1] φῆς τὸν κατὰ μέρος ἀποδοῦναι λόγον: καθάπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν διαφερόντων πυκτῶν καὶ ταῖς γενναιότησι καὶ ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ὅταν εἰς τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στεφάνου συγκαταστάντες καιρὸν διαμάχωνται πληγὴν ἐπὶ πληγῇ τιθέντες ἀδιαπαύστως, λόγον μὲν ἢ πρόνοιαν ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ἑκάστης ἐπιβολῆς καὶ πληγῆς οὔτε τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις οὔτε τοῖς θεωμένοις ἐστὶ δυνατόν, [2] ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθόλου τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐνεργείας καὶ τῆς ἑκατέρου φιλοτιμίας ἔστι καὶ τῆς ἐμπειρίας αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τῆς εὐψυχίας, ἱκανὴν ἔννοιαν λαβεῖν, οὕτως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν νῦν λεγομένων στρατηγῶν. [3] τὰς μὲν γὰρ αἰτίας ἢ τοὺς τρόπους, δι᾽ ὧν ἀν᾽ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἐποιοῦντο κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἐνέδρας, ἀντενέδρας, ἐπιθέσεις, προσβολάς, οὔτ᾽ ἂν ὁ γράφων ἐξαριθμούμενος ἐφίκοιτο, τοῖς τ᾽ ἀκούουσιν ἀπέραντος ἅμα δ᾽ ἀνωφελὴς ἂν ἐκ τῆς ἀναγνώσεως γίνοιτο χρεία: [4] ἐκ δὲ τῆς καθολικῆς ἀποφάσεως περὶ αὐτῶν καὶ τοῦ τέλους τῆς φιλοτιμίας μᾶλλον ἄν τις εἰς ἔννοιαν ἔλθοι τῶν προειρημένων. [5] οὔτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἱστορίας στρατηγημάτων οὔτε τῶν ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ καὶ τῆς ὑποκειμένης περιστάσεως ἐπινοημάτων οὔτε τῶν εἰς παράβολον καὶ βίαιον ἀνηκόντων τόλμαν οὐδὲν παρελείφθη. [6] κρίσιν γε μὴν ὁλοσχερῆ γενέσθαι διὰ πλείους αἰτίας οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ ἦν: αἵ τε γὰρ δυνάμεις ἀμφοτέρων ἦσαν ἐφάμιλλοι, τά τε κατὰ τοὺς χάρακας ὁμοίως ἀπρόσιτα διὰ τὴν ὀχυρότητα, τό τε διάστημα τῶν στρατοπέδων βραχὺ παντελῶς. [7] ὅπερ αἴτιον ἦν μάλιστα τοῦ τὰς μὲν κατὰ μέρος συμπτώσεις ἀπαύστους γίνεσθαι καθ᾽ ἡμέραν, ὁλοσχερὲς δὲ συντελεῖσθαι μηδέν. [8] τούτους γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ συνέβαινε διαφθείρεσθαι κατὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς, τοὺς ἐν χειρῶν νόμῳ περιπεσόντας: οἱ δ᾽ ἅπαξ ἐγκλίναντες εὐθέως ἐκτὸς τοῦ δεινοῦ πάντες ἦσαν ὑπὸ ταῖς αὑτῶν ἀσφαλείαις καὶ πάλιν ἐκ μεταβολῆς ἐκινδύνευον.
57. It is like the case of two boxers, eminent alike for their courage and their physical condition, engaged in a formal contest for the prize. As the match goes on, blow after blow is interchanged without intermission; but to anticipate, or keep account of every feint or every blow delivered is impossible for combatants and spectators alike. Still one may conceive a sufficiently distinct idea of the affair by taking into account the general activity of the men, the ambition actuating each side, and the amount of their experience, strength, and courage. The same may be said of these two generals. No writer could set down, and no reader would endure the wearisome and profitless task of reading, a detailed statement of the transactions of every day; why they were undertaken, and how they were carried out. For every day had its ambuscade on one side or the other, its attack, or assault. A general assertion in regard to the men, combined with the actual result of their mutual determination to conquer, will give a far better idea of the facts. It may be said then, generally, that nothing was left untried, — whether it be stratagems which could be learnt from history, or plans suggested by the necessities of the hour and the immediate circumstances of the case, or undertakings depending upon an adventurous spirit and a reckless daring. The matter, however, for several reasons, could not be brought to a decisive issue. In the first place, the forces on either side were evenly matched: and in the second place, while the camps were in the case of both equally impregnable, the space which separated the two was very small. The result of this was that skirmishes between detached parties on both sides were always going on during the day, and yet nothing decisive occurred. For though the men actually engaged in such skirmishes from time to time were cut to pieces, it did not affect the main body. They had only to wheel round to find themselves out of the reach of danger behind their own defences. Once there, they could face about and again engage the enemy.
[1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἀγαθὸς βραβευτὴς ἡ τύχη μεταβιβάσασα παραβόλως αὐτοὺς ἐκ τοῦ προειρημένου τόπου καὶ τοῦ προϋπάρχοντος ἀθλήματος εἰς παραβολώτερον ἀγώνισμα καὶ τόπον ἐλάττω συνέκλεισεν. [2] ὁ γὰρ Ἀμίλκας, τῶν Ῥωμαίων τὸν Ἔρυκα τηρούντων ἐπί τε τῆς κορυφῆς καὶ παρὰ τὴν ῥίζαν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατελάβετο τὴν πόλιν τῶν Ἐρυκίνων, ἥτις ἦν μεταξὺ τῆς τε κορυφῆς καὶ τῶν πρὸς τῇ ῥίζῃ στρατοπεδευσάντων. [3] ἐξ οὗ συνέβαινε παραβόλως μὲν ὑπομένειν καὶ διακινδυνεύειν πολιορκουμένους τοὺς τὴν κορυφὴν κατέχοντας τῶν Ῥωμαίων, ἀπίστως δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἀντέχειν, τῶν τε πολεμίων πανταχόθεν προσκειμένων καὶ τῶν χορηγιῶν οὐ ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῖς παρακομιζομένων, ὡς ἂν τῆς θαλάττης καθ᾽ ἕνα τόπον καὶ μίαν πρόσοδον ἀντεχομένοις. [4] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ πάλιν ἐνταῦθα πάσαις μὲν ἀμφότεροι ταῖς πολιορκητικαῖς ἐπινοίαις καὶ βίαις χρησάμενοι κατ᾽ ἀλλήλων, πᾶν δὲ γένος ἐνδείας ἀνασχόμενοι, πάσης δ᾽ ἐπιθέσεως καὶ μάχης πεῖραν λαβόντες, [5] τέλος οὐχ, ὡς Φάβιός φησιν, ἐξαδυνατοῦντες καὶ περικακοῦντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἂν ἀπαθεῖς καὶ ἀήττητοί τινες ἄνδρες ἱερὸν ἐποίησαν τὸν στέφανον. [6] πρότερον γὰρ ἢ ‘κείνους ἀλλήλων ἐπικρατῆσαι, καίπερ δύ᾽ ἔτη πάλιν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ τόπῳ διαγωνισαμένους, δι᾽ ἄλλου τρόπου συνέβη λαβεῖν τὸν πόλεμον τὴν κρίσιν. [7] τὰ μὲν οὖν περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα καὶ τὰς πεζικὰς δυνάμεις τοιαύτην ἔσχε διάθεσιν. τὰ δὲ πολιτεύματ᾽ ἦν ἀμφοτέρων παραπλήσια τοῖς ψυχομαχοῦσι τῶν εὐγενῶν ὀρνίθων. [8] ἐκεῖνοί τε γὰρ πολλάκις ἀπολωλεκότες τὰς πτέρυγας διὰ τὴν ἀδυναμίαν, αὐτῇ δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ μένοντες ἐκβάλλουσι τὰς πληγάς, ἕως ἂν αὐτομάτως ποτὲ περιπεσόντες αὑτοῖς καιρίως ἀλλήλων διαδράξωνται, κἄπειτα τούτου γενομένου συμβῇ τὸν ἕτερον αὐτῶν προπεσεῖν: [9] οἵ τε Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι κάμνοντες ἤδη τοῖς πόνοις διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῶν κινδύνων εἰς τέλος ἀπήλγουν τήν τε δύναμιν παρελέλυντο καὶ παρεῖντο
58. Presently however Fortune, acting like a good umpire in the games, transferred them by a bold stroke from the loca
lity just described, and the contest in which they were engaged, to a struggle of greater danger and a locality of narrower dimensions. The Romans, as we have said, were in occupation of the summit of Eryx, and had a guard stationed at its foot. But Hamilcar managed to seize the town which lay between these two spots. There ensued a siege of the Romans who were on the summit, supported by them with extraordinary hardihood and adventurous daring: while the Carthaginians, finding themselves between two hostile armies, and their supplies brought to them with difficulty, because they were in communication with the sea at only one point and by one road, yet held out with a determination that passes belief. Every contrivance which skill or force could sustain did they put in use against each other, as before; every imaginable privation was submitted to; surprises and pitched battles were alike tried: and finally they left the combat a drawn one, not, as Fabius says, from utter weakness and misery, but like men still unbroken and unconquered. The fact is that before either party had got completely the better of the other, though they had maintained the conflict for another two years, the war happened to be decided in quite a different manner.
Such was the state of affairs at Eryx and with the forces employed there. The two nations engaged were like well-bred game-cocks that fight to their last gasp. You may see them often, when too weak to use their wings, yet full of pluck to the end, and striking again and again. Finally, chance brings them the opportunity of once more grappling, and they hold on until one or other of them drops down dead.
[1] διὰ τὰς πολυχρονίους εἰσφορὰς καὶ δαπάνας. ὁμοίως δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι ψυχομαχοῦντες, καίπερ ἔτη σχεδὸν ἤδη πέντε τῶν κατὰ θάλατταν πραγμάτων ὁλοσχερῶς ἀφεστηκότες διά τε τὰς περιπετείας καὶ διὰ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι δι᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν πεζικῶν δυνάμεων κρινεῖν τὸν πόλεμον, [2] τότε συνορῶντες οὐ προχωροῦν αὑτοῖς τοὔργον κατὰ τοὺς ἐκλογισμοὺς καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν τόλμαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἡγεμόνος, ἔκριναν τὸ τρίτον ἀντιποιήσασθαι τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυτικαῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐλπίδων, [3] ὑπολαμβάνοντες διὰ τῆς ἐπινοίας ταύτης, εἰ καιρίως ἅψαιντο τῆς ἐπιβολῆς, μόνως ἂν οὕτως πέρας ἐπιθεῖναι τῷ πολέμῳ συμφέρον. ὃ καὶ τέλος ἐποίησαν. [4] τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐξεχώρησαν τῆς θαλάττης εἴξαντες τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τύχης συμπτώμασιν, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐλαττωθέντες τῇ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα ναυμαχίᾳ: [5] τότε δὲ τρίτην ἐποιοῦντο ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, δι᾽ ἧς νικήσαντες καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀποκλείσαντες τῆς κατὰ θάλατταν χορηγίας τέλος ἐπέθηκαν τοῖς ὅλοις. [6] ἦν δὲ τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τὸ πλεῖον ψυχομαχία. χορηγία μὲν γὰρ οὐχ ὑπῆρχε πρὸς τὴν πρόθεσιν ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν τῶν προεστώτων ἀνδρῶν εἰς τὰ κοινὰ φιλοτιμίαν καὶ γενναιότητα προσευρέθη πρὸς τὴν συντέλειαν. [7] κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῶν βίων εὐκαιρίας καθ᾽ ἕνα καὶ δύο καὶ τρεῖς ὑφίσταντο παρέξειν πεντήρη κατηρτισμένην, ἐφ᾽ ᾧ τὴν δαπάνην κομιοῦνται, κατὰ λόγον τῶν πραγμάτων προχωρησάντων. [8] τῷ δὲ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ ταχέως ἑτοιμασθέντων διακοσίων πλοίων πεντηρικῶν, ὧν ἐποιήσαντο τὴν ναυπηγίαν πρὸς [παράδειγμα] τὴν τοῦ Ῥοδίου ναῦν, μετὰ ταῦτα στρατηγὸν καταστήσαντες Γάϊον Λυτάτιον ἐξέπεμψαν ἀρχομένης τῆς θερείας. [9] ὃς καὶ παραδόξως ἐπιφανεὶς τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Σικελίαν τόποις τόν τε περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα λιμένα κατέσχε καὶ τοὺς περὶ τὸ Λιλύβαιον ὅρμους, παντὸς ἀνακεχωρηκότος εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν τοῦ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ναυτικοῦ. [10] συστησάμενος δὲ περὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς Δρεπάνοις πόλιν ἔργα καὶ τἄλλα πρὸς τὴν πολιορκίαν παρασκευασάμενος, ἅμα μὲν ταύτῃ προσεκαρτέρει τὰ δυνατὰ ποιῶν, [11] ἅμα δὲ προορώμενος τὴν παρουσίαν τοῦ Καρχηδονίων στόλου καὶ μνημονεύων τῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς προθέσεως ὅτι μόνως δύναται διὰ τοῦ κατὰ θάλατταν κινδύνου κρίσεως τὰ ὅλα τυχεῖν, οὐκ ἀχρεῖον οὐδ᾽ ἀργὸν εἴα γίνεσθαι τὸν χρόνον, [12] ἀλλ᾽ ἀν᾽ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν ἀναπείρας καὶ μελέτας ποιῶν τοῖς πληρώμασιν οἰκείως τῆς ἐπιβολῆς τῇ τε λοιπῇ τῇ κατὰ τὴν δίαιταν ἐπιμελείᾳ προσκαρτερῶν ἀθλητὰς ἀπετέλεσεν πρὸς τὸ προκείμενον ἐν πάνυ βραχεῖ χρόνῳ τοὺς ναύτας.
59. So it was with the Romans and Carthaginians. They were worn out by the labours of the war; the perpetual succession of hard fought struggles was at last driving them to despair; their strength had become paralysed, and their resources reduced almost to extinction by war-taxes and expenses extending over so many years. And yet the Romans did not give in. For the last five years indeed they had entirely abandoned the sea, partly because of the disasters they had sustained there, and partly because they felt confident of deciding the war by means of their land forces; but they now determined for the third time to make trial of their fortune in naval warfare. They saw that their operations were not succeeding according to their calculations, mainly owing to the obstinate gallantry of the Carthaginian general. They therefore adopted this resolution from a conviction that by this means alone, if their design were but well directed, would they be able to bring the war to a successful conclusion. In their first attempt they had been compelled to abandon the sea by disasters arising from sheer bad luck; in their second by the loss of the naval battle off Drepana. This third attempt was successful: they shut off the Carthaginian forces at Eryx from getting their supplies by sea, and eventually put a period to the whole war. Nevertheless it was essentially an effort of despair. The treasury was empty, and would not supply the funds necessary for the undertaking, which were, however, obtained by the patriotism and generosity of the leading citizens. They undertook singly, or by two or three combining, according to their means, to supply a quinquereme fully fitted out, on the understanding that they were to be repaid if the expedition was successful. By these means a fleet of two hundred quinqueremes were quickly prepared, built on the model of the ship of the Rhodian. Gaius Lutatius was then appointed to the command, and despatched at the beginning of the summer. His appearance on the coasts of Sicily was a surprise: the whole of the Carthaginian fleet had gone home; and he took possession both of the harbour near Drepana, and the roadsteads near Lilybaeum. He then threw up works round the city on Drepana, and made other preparations for besieging it. And while he pushed on these operations with all his might, he did not at the same time lose sight of the approach of the Carthaginian fleet. He kept in mind the original idea of this expedition, that it was by a victory at sea alone that the result of the whole war could be decided. He did not, therefore, allow the time to be wasted or unemployed. He practised and drilled his crews every day in the manœuvres which they would be called upon to perform; a
nd by his attention to discipline generally brought his sailors in a very short time to the condition of trained athletes for the contest before them.