by Polybius
[1] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, παρὰ τὴν ὑπόνοιαν προσπεσόντος αὐτοῖς τοῦ πεπλευκέναι στόλῳ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους καὶ πάλιν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῆς θαλάττης, παραυτίκα κατήρτιζον τὰς ναῦς, [2] καὶ πληρώσαντες σίτου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιτηδείων ἐξέπεμπον τὸν στόλον, βουλόμενοι μηδὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰ περὶ τὸν Ἔρυκα στρατόπεδα τῶν ἀναγκαίων. [3] κατέστησαν δὲ καὶ στρατηγὸν ἐπὶ τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως Ἄννωνα: ὃς ἀναχθεὶς καὶ κατάρας ἐπὶ τὴν Ἱερὰν καλουμένην νῆσον ἔσπευδε τοὺς πολεμίους λαθὼν διακομισθῆναι πρὸς τὸν Ἔρυκα καὶ τὰς μὲν ἀγορὰς ἀποθέσθαι καὶ κουφίσαι τὰς ναῦς, προσλαβὼν δ᾽ ἐπιβάτας ἐκ τῶν μισθοφόρων τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους καὶ Βάρκαν μετ᾽ αὐτῶν, οὕτως συμμίσγειν τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. [4] ὁ δὲ Λυτάτιος συνεὶς τὴν παρουσίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν Ἄννωνα καὶ συλλογισάμενος τὴν ἐπίνοιαν αὐτῶν, ἀναλαβὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατεύματος τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας ἔπλευσε πρὸς τὴν Αἰγοῦσσαν νῆσον τὴν πρὸ τοῦ Λιλυβαίου κειμένην. [5] κἀνταῦθα παρακαλέσας τὰ πρέποντα τῷ καιρῷ τὰς δυνάμεις διεσάφει τοῖς κυβερνήταις ὡς ἐσομένης εἰς τὴν αὔριον ναυμαχίας. [6] ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἑωθινήν, ἤδη τῆς ἡμέρας ὑποφαινούσης, ὁρῶν τοῖς μὲν ἐναντίοις φορὸν ἄνεμον καταρρέοντα καὶ λαμπρόν, σφίσι δὲ δυσχερῆ γινόμενον τὸν ἀνάπλουν πρὸς ἀντίον τὸ πνεῦμα, κοίλης καὶ τραχείας οὔσης τῆς θαλάττης, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον διηπόρει τί δεῖ χρῆσθαι τοῖς παροῦσι. [7] συλλογιζόμενος δ᾽ ὡς ἐὰν μὲν παραβάλληται χειμῶνος ὄντος, πρὸς Ἄννωνα ποιήσεται τὸν ἀγῶνα καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὰς ναυτικὰς δυνάμεις καὶ πρὸς ἔτι γέμοντα τὰ σκάφη, [8] ἐὰν δὲ τηρῶν εὐδίαν καὶ καταμέλλων ἐάσῃ διᾶραι καὶ συμμῖξαι τοῖς στρατοπέδοις τοὺς πολεμίους, πρός τε τὰς ναῦς εὐκινήτους καὶ κεκουφισμένας ἀγωνιεῖται πρός τε τοὺς ἀρίστους ἄνδρας τῶν ἐκ τοῦ πεζοῦ στρατευμάτων, τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, πρὸς τὴν Ἀμίλκου τόλμαν, ἧς οὐδὲν ἦν τότε φοβερώτερον: [9] διόπερ ἔκρινε μὴ παρεῖναι τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρόν: συνιδὼν δὲ τὰς τῶν πολεμίων ναῦς ἱστιοδρομούσας ἀνήγετο μετὰ σπουδῆς. [10] τῶν δὲ πληρωμάτων εὐχερῶς ἀναφερόντων τὸν κλύδωνα ταῖς εὐεξίαις, ταχέως ἐπὶ μίαν ἐκτείνας ναῦν ἀντίπρωρ
60. That the Romans should have a fleet afloat once more, and be again bidding for the mastery at sea, was a contingency wholly unexpected by the Carthaginians. They at once set about fitting out their ships, loaded them with corn and other provisions, and despatched their fleet: determined that their troops round Eryx should not run short of necessary provisions. Hanno, who was appointed to command the fleet, put to sea and arrived at the island called Holy Isle. He was eager as soon as possible, if he could escape the observation of the enemy, to get across to Eryx; disembark his stores; and having thus lightened his ships, take on board as marines those of the mercenary troops who were suitable to the service, and Barcas with them; and not to engage the enemy until he had thus reinforced himself. But Lutatius was informed of the arrival of Hanno’s squadron, and correctly interpreted their design. He at once took on board the best soldiers of his army, and crossed to the Island of Aegusa, which lies directly opposite Lilybaeum. There he addressed his forces some words suitable to the occasion, and gave full instructions to the pilots, with the understanding that a battle was to be fought on the morrow. At daybreak the next morning Lutatius found that a strong breeze had sprung up on the stern of the enemy, and that an advance towards them in the teeth of it would be difficult for his ships. The sea too was rough and boisterous: and for a while he could not make up his mind what he had better do in the circumstances. Finally, however, he was decided by the following considerations. If he boarded the enemy’s fleet during the continuance of the storm, he would only have to contend with Hanno, and the levies of sailors which he had on board, before they could be reinforced by the troops, and with ships which were still heavily laden with stores: but if he waited for calm weather, and allowed the enemy to get across and unite with their land forces, he would then have to contend with ships lightened of their burden, and therefore in a more navigable condition, and against the picked men of the land forces; and what was more formidable than anything else, against the determined bravery of Hamilcar. He made up his mind, therefore, not to let the present opportunity slip; and when he saw the enemy’s ships crowding sail, he put to sea with all speed. The rowers, from their excellent physical condition, found no difficulty in overcoming the heavy sea, and Lutatius soon got his fleet into single line with prows directed to the foe.
[1] ρον κατέστησε τοῖς πολεμίοις τὸν στόλον. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι κατιδόντες τὸν διάπλουν αὐτῶν προκατέχοντας τοὺς Ῥωμαίους, καθελόμενοι τοὺς ἱστοὺς καὶ παρακαλέσαντες κατὰ ναῦν σφᾶς αὐτοὺς συνέβαλλον τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις. [2] τῆς δ᾽ ἑκατέρων παρασκευῆς τὴν ἐναντίαν ἐχούσης διάθεσιν τῇ περὶ τὰ Δρέπανα γενομένῃ ναυμαχίᾳ, καὶ τὸ τέλος ἑκατέροις τῆς μάχης εἰκότως ἐναντίον ἀπέβη. [3] Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν γὰρ τήν τε ναυπηγίαν μετειλήφεσαν καὶ τὰ βάρη πάντα χωρὶς τῶν πρὸς τὴν ναυμαχίαν ἐπιτηδείων ἐξετέθειντο: τά τε πληρώματα συγκεκροτημένα διαφέρουσαν αὐτοῖς τὴν χρείαν παρείχετο, τούς τ᾽ ἐπιβάτας κατ᾽ ἐκλογὴν ἄνδρας ἀπαραχωρήτους ἐκ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων εἶχον. [4] περὶ δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους τἀναντία τούτοις ὑπῆρχεν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ νῆες γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, τὰ δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ἦν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καιρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιβατικὰ νεοσύλλογα καὶ πρωτόπειρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ παντὸς δεινοῦ. [5] διὰ γὰρ τὸ μηδέποτ᾽ ἂν ἔτι τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ἐλπίσαι τῆς θαλάττης ἀντιποιήσασθαι καταφρονήσαντες ὠλιγώρουν τῶν ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων. [6] τοιγαροῦν ἅμα τῷ συμβαλεῖν κατὰ πολλὰ μέρη τῆς μάχης ἐλαττούμενοι ταχέως ἐλείφθησαν, καὶ πεντήκοντα μὲν αὐτῶν ναῦς κατέδυσαν, ἑβδομήκοντα δ᾽ ἑάλωσαν αὔτανδροι: [7] τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν πλῆθος ἐπαράμενον τοὺς ἱστοὺς καὶ κατουρῶσαν αὖθις ἀπεχώρει πρὸς τὴν Ἱερὰν νῆσον, εὐτυχῶς καὶ παραδόξως ἐκ μετ
αβολῆς αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὸν δέοντα καιρὸν τοῦ πνεύματος συνεργήσαντος. [8] ὁ μὲν οὖν τῶν Ῥωμαίων στρατηγὸς ἀποπλεύσας πρὸς τὸ Λιλύβαιον καὶ τὰ στρατόπεδα περὶ τὴν τῶν αἰχμαλώτων πλοίων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων οἰκονομίαν ἐγίνετο, μεγάλην οὖσαν: οὐ γὰρ πολὺ τῶν μυρίων ἔλειπε σωμάτων τὰ ληφθέντα ζωγρίᾳ κατὰ τὸν κίνδυνον.
61. When the Carthaginians saw that the Romans were intercepting their passage across, they lowered their masts, and after some words of mutual exhortation had been uttered in the several ships, closed with their opponents. But the respective state of equipment of the two sides was exactly the converse of what it had been in the battle off Drepana; and the result of the battle was, therefore, naturally reversed also. The Romans had reformed their mode of shipbuilding, and had eased their vessels of all freight, except the provisions necessary for the battle: while their rowers having been thoroughly trained and got well together, performed their office in an altogether superior manner, and were backed up by marines who, being picked men from the legions, were all but invincible. The case with the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse. Their ships were heavily laden and therefore unmanageable in the engagement; while their rowers were entirely untrained, and merely put on board for the emergency; and such marines as they had were raw recruits, who had never had any previous experience of any difficult or dangerous service. The fact is that the Carthaginian government never expected that the Romans would again attempt to dispute the supremacy at sea: they had, therefore, in contempt for them, neglected their navy. The result was that, as soon as they closed, their manifold disadvantages quickly decided the battle against them. They had fifty ships sunk, and seventy taken with their crews. The rest set their sails, and running before the wind, which luckily for them suddenly veered round at the nick of time to help them, got away again to Holy Isle. The Roman Consul sailed back to Lilybaeum to join the army, and there occupied himself in making arrangements for the ships and men which he had captured; which was a business of considerable magnitude, for the prisoners made in the battle amounted to little short of ten thousand.
[1] οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι, προσπεσούσης αὐτοῖς ἀπροσδοκήτως τῆς ἥττης, ταῖς μὲν ὁρμαῖς καὶ ταῖς φιλοτιμίαις ἀκμὴν ἕτοιμοι πολεμεῖν ἦσαν, τοῖς δὲ λογισμοῖς ἐξηπόρουν. [2] οὔτε γὰρ χορηγεῖν ἔτι ταῖς ἐν τῇ Σικελίᾳ δυνάμεσιν οἷοί τ᾽ ἦσαν, κρατούντων τῆς θαλάττης τῶν ὑπεναντίων: ἀπογνόντες δὲ ταύτας καὶ προδόται τρόπον τινὰ γενόμενοι, ποίαις χερσὶν ἢ ποίοις ἡγεμόσιν πολεμήσειαν οὐκ εἶχον. [3] διόπερ ὀξέως διαπεμψάμενοι πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν ἐπέτρεψαν ἐκείνῳ περὶ τῶν ὅλων. ὁ δὲ καὶ λίαν ἐποίησεν ἔργον ἡγεμόνος ἀγαθοῦ καὶ φρονίμου. [4] μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν κατὰ λόγον ἦν τις ἐλπὶς ἐν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, οὐδὲν τῶν παραβόλων ἢ δεινῶν δοκούντων εἶναι παρέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ πάσας τὰς τοῦ νικᾶν ἐν τῷ πολεμεῖν ἐλπίδας, εἰ καί τις ἄλλος ἡγεμόνων, ἐξήλεγξεν. [5] ἐπειδὴ δὲ περιέστη τὰ πράγματα, καὶ τῶν κατὰ λόγον οὐδὲν ἔτι κατελείπετο πρὸς τὸ σῴζειν τοὺς ὑποταττομένους, πάνυ νουνεχῶς καὶ πραγματικῶς εἴξας τοῖς παροῦσιν ὑπὲρ σπονδῶν καὶ διαλύσεων ἐξαπέστελλε πρεσβευτάς. [6] τοῦ γὰρ αὐτοῦ νομιστέον ἡγεμόνος εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι βλέπειν τόν τε τοῦ νικᾶν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ λείπεσθαι καιρόν. [7] τοῦ δὲ Λυτατίου προθύμως δεξαμένου τὰ παρακαλούμενα διὰ τὸ συνειδέναι τοῖς σφετέροις πράγμασι τετρυμένοις καὶ κάμνουσιν ἤδη τῷ πολέμῳ, συνέβη τέλος ἐπιθεῖναι τῇ διαφορᾷ τοιούτων τινῶν συνθηκῶν διαγραφεισῶν: “ [8] 1ἐπὶ τοῖσδε φιλίαν εἶναι Καρ”1χηδονίοις καὶ Ῥωμαίοις, ἐὰν καὶ τῷ δήμῳ τῶν “1Ῥωμαίων συνδοκῇ. ἐκχωρεῖν Σικελίας ἁπάσης “1Καρχηδονίους καὶ μὴ πολεμεῖν Ἱέρωνι μηδ᾽ ἐπι”1φέρειν ὅπλα Συρακοσίοις μηδὲ τῶν Συρακοσίων “ [9] 1συμμάχοις. ἀποδοῦναι Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις “1χωρὶς λύτρων ἅπαντας τοὺς αἰχμαλώτους. ἀργυ”1ρίου κατενεγκεῖν Καρχηδονίους Ῥωμαίοις ἐν ἔτεσιν “1εἴκοσι δισχίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα Εὐβοϊκά.”2
62. As far as strength of feeling and desire for victory were concerned, this unexpected reverse did not diminish the readiness of the Carthaginians to carry on the war; but when they came to reckon up their resources they were at a complete standstill. On the one hand, they could not any longer send supplies to their forces in Sicily, because the enemy commanded the sea: on the other, to abandon and, as it were, to betray these, left them without men and without leaders to carry on the war. They therefore sent a despatch to Barcas with all speed, leaving the decision of the whole matter in his hands. Nor was their confidence misplaced. He acted the part of a gallant general and a sensible man. As long as there was any reasonable hope of success in the business he had in hand, nothing was too adventurous or too dangerous for him to attempt; and if any general ever did so, he put every chance of victory to the fullest proof. But when all his endeavours miscarried, and no reasonable expectation was left of saving his troops, he yielded to the inevitable, and sent ambassadors to treat of peace and terms of accommodation. And in this he showed great good sense and practical ability; for it is quite as much the duty of a leader to be able to see when it is time to give in, as when it is the time to win a victory. Lutatius was ready enough to listen to the proposal, because he was fully aware that the resources of Rome were at the lowest ebb from the strain of the war; and eventually it was his fortune to put an end to the contest by a treaty of which I here give the terms. “Friendship is established between the Carthaginians and Romans on the following terms, provided always that they are ratified by the Roman people. The Carthaginians shall evacuate the whole of Sicily: they shall not make war upon Hiero, nor bear arms against the Syracusans or their allies. The Carthaginians shall give up to the Romans all prisoners without ransom. The Carthaginians shall pay to the Romans in twenty years 2200 Euboic talents of silver.”
[1] τούτων δ᾽ ἐπανενεχθέντων εἰς τὴν Ῥώμην, οὐ προσεδέξατο τὰς συνθήκας ὁ δῆμος. ἀλλ᾽ ἐξαπέστειλεν ἄνδρας δέκα τοὺς ἐπισκεψομένους ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων. [2] οἳ καὶ παραγενόμενοι τῶν μὲν ὅλων οὐδὲν ἔτι μετέθηκαν, βραχέα δὲ προσεπέτειναν τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. [3] τόν τε γὰρ χρόνον τῶν φόρων ἐποίησαν ἥμισυν, χίλια τάλαντα προσθέντες, τῶν τε νήσων ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους προσεπέταξαν, ὅσαι μεταξὺ τῆς Ἰταλίας κεῖνται καὶ τῆς Σικελίας. [4] ὁ μὲν οὖν Ῥωμαίοις καὶ Καρχηδονίοις συστὰς περὶ Σικελίας πόλεμος ἐπὶ τοιούτοις καὶ τοιοῦτον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, ἔτη πολ�
�μηθεὶς εἴκοσι καὶ τέτταρα συνεχῶς, πόλεμος ὧν ἡμεῖς ἴσμεν ἀκοῇ μαθόντες πολυχρονιώτατος καὶ συνεχέστατος καὶ μέγιστος. [5] ἐν ᾧ χωρὶς τῶν λοιπῶν ἀγώνων καὶ παρασκευῶν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν ἀνώτερον, ἅπαξ μὲν οἱ συνάμφω πλείοσιν ἢ πεντακοσίοις, πάλιν δὲ μικρῷ λείπουσιν ἑπτακοσίοις σκάφεσι πεντηρικοῖς ἐναυμάχησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους. [6] ἀπέβαλόν γε μὴν Ῥωμαῖοι μὲν ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τούτῳ πεντήρεις μετὰ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ναυαγίαις διαφθαρεισῶν εἰς ἑπτακοσίας, Καρχηδόνιοι δ᾽ εἰς πεντακοσίας. [7] ὥστε τοὺς θαυμάζοντας τὰς Ἀντιγόνου καὶ Πτολεμαίου καὶ Δημητρίου ναυμαχίας καὶ τοὺς στόλους εἰκότως ἂν περὶ τούτων ἱστορήσαντας ἐκπεπλῆχθαι τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τῶν πράξεων. [8] εἰ δέ τις βουληθείη συλλογίσασθαι τὴν διαφορὰν τῶν πεντηρικῶν πλοίων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις, αἷς οἵ τε Πέρσαι πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας καὶ πάλιν Ἀθηναῖοι καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐναυμάχουν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν καθόλου δυνηθείη τηλικαύτας δυνάμεις εὑρεῖν ἐν θαλάττῃ διηγωνισμένας. [9] ἐξ ὧν δῆλον τὸ προτεθὲν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὡς οὐ τύχῃ Ῥωμαῖοι, καθάπερ ἔνιοι δοκοῦσι τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐδ᾽ αὐτομάτως, ἀλλὰ καὶ λίαν εἰκότως ἐν τοιούτοις καὶ τηλικούτοις πράγμασιν ἐνασκήσαντες οὐ μόνον ἐπεβάλοντο τῇ τῶν ὅλων ἡγεμονίᾳ καὶ δυναστείᾳ τολμηρῶς, ἀλλὰ καὶ