Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

by Polybius

  A considerable number of privates as well as officers were killed in this manner in the various émeutes which took place; and from the constant repetition of this act of violence the whole army learnt the meaning of the word “throw,” although there was not another word which was intelligible to them all in common. The most usual occasion for this to happen was when they collected in crowds flushed with wine after their midday meal. On such occasions, if only some one started the cry “throw,” such volleys were poured in from every side, and with such rapidity, that it was impossible for any one to escape who once ventured to stand forward to address them. The result was that soon no one had the courage to offer them any counsel at all; and they accordingly appointed Mathos and Spendius as their commanders.

  [1] στρατηγοὺς Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον. ὁ δὲ Γέσκων ἑώρα μὲν τὴν ὅλην ἀκαταστασίαν καὶ ταραχήν, περὶ πλείστου δὲ ποιούμενος τὸ τῇ πατρίδι συμφέρον καὶ θεωρῶν ὅτι τούτων ἀποθηριωθέντων κινδυνεύουσι προφανῶς οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τοῖς ὅλοις πράγμασι, [2] παρεβάλλετο καὶ προσεκαρτέρει, ποτὲ μὲν τοὺς προεστῶτας αὐτῶν εἰς τὰς χεῖρας λαμβάνων, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ γένη συναθροίζων καὶ παρακαλῶν. [3] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῶν Λιβύων οὐδέπω κεκομισμένων τὰς σιταρχίας, οἰομένων δὲ δεῖν ἀποδεδόσθαι σφίσι καὶ προσιόντων θρασέως, βουλόμενος ὁ Γέσκων ἐπιπλῆξαι τὴν προπέτειαν αὐτῶν, Μάθω τὸν στρατηγὸν ἀπαιτεῖν ἐκέλευεν. [4] οἱ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον διωργίσθησαν ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸν τυχόντα χρόνον ἀναστροφὴν δόντες ὥρμησαν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐπὶ τὸ διαρπάζειν τὰ πρόχειρα τῶν χρημάτων, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συλλαμβάνειν τόν τε Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς μετ᾽ αὐτοῦ Καρχηδονίους. [5] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ τὸν Σπένδιον ὑπολαμβάνοντες τάχιστ᾽ ἂν οὕτως ἐκκαυθῆναι τὸν πόλεμον, εἰ παράνομόν τι πράξειαν καὶ παράσπονδον, συνήργουν ταῖς τῶν ὄχλων ἀπονοίαις καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀποσκευὴν τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἅμα τοῖς χρήμασι διήρπαζον, τὸν δὲ Γέσκωνα καὶ τοὺς σὺν αὐτῷ δήσαντες ὑβριστικῶς εἰς φυλακὴν παρεδίδοσαν. [6] καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν ἐπολέμουν ἤδη φανερῶς πρὸς τοὺς Καρχηδονίους, συνωμοσίας ἀσεβεῖς καὶ παρὰ τὰ κοινὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔθη ποιησάμενοι. [7] ὁ μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς ξένους καὶ Λιβυκὸς ἐπικληθεὶς πόλεμος διὰ ταῦτα καὶ τοιαύτην ἔλαβε τὴν ἀρχήν. [8] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω συντελεσάμενοι τὰ προειρημένα παραυτίκα μὲν ἐξαπέστελλον πρέσβεις ἐπὶ τὰς κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην πόλεις, παρακαλοῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἐλευθερίαν καὶ δεόμενοι σφίσι βοηθεῖν καὶ συνεπιλαμβάνεσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων. [9] μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πάντων σχεδὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην ἑτοίμως συνυπακουσάντων αὐτοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τῶν Καρχηδονίων ἀπόστασιν καὶ τάς τε χορηγίας καὶ τὰς βοηθείας προθύμως ἐξαποστελλόντων, διελόντες σφᾶς πολιορκεῖν ἐνεχείρησαν οἱ μὲν τὴν Ἰτύκην, οἱ δὲ τοὺς Ἱππακρίτας, διὰ τὸ ταύτας τὰς πόλεις μὴ βού

  70. This complete disorganisation and disorder did not escape the observation of Gesco. But his chief anxiety was to secure the safety of his country; and seeing clearly that, if these men were driven to exasperation, the Carthaginians would be in danger of total destruction, he exerted himself with desperate courage and persistence: sometimes summoning their officers, sometimes calling a meeting of the men according to their nationalities and remonstrating with them. But on one occasion the Libyans, not having received their wages as soon as they considered that they ought to have been paid to them, approached Gesco himself with some insolence. With the idea of rebuking their precipitancy he refused to produce the pay, and bade them “go and ask their general Mathos for it.” This so enraged them, that without a moment’s delay they first made a raid upon the money that was kept in readiness, and then arrested Gesco and the Carthaginians with him. Mathos and Spendius thought that the speediest way to secure an outbreak of war was for the men to commit some outrage upon the sanctity of law and in violation of their engagements. They therefore co-operated with the mass of the men in their reckless outrages; plundered the baggage of the Carthaginians along with their money; manacled Gesco and his staff with every mark of insolent violence, and committed them into custody. Thenceforth they were at open war with Carthage, having bound themselves together by oaths which were at once impious and contrary to the principles universally received among mankind.

  This was the origin and beginning of the mercenary, or, as it is also called, the Libyan war. Mathos lost no time after this outrage in sending emissaries to the various cities in Libya, urging them to assert their freedom, and begging them to come to their aid and join them in their undertaking. The appeal was successful: nearly all the cities in Libya readily listened to the proposal that they should revolt against Carthage, and were soon zealously engaged in sending them supplies and reinforcements. They therefore divided themselves into two parties; one of which laid siege to Utica, the other to Hippo Zarytus, because these two cities refused to participate in the revolt.

  [1] λεσθαι μετασχεῖν αὐτοῖς τῆς ἀποστάσεως. Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τοὺς μὲν κατ᾽ ἰδίαν βίους ἀεὶ διεξαγαγόντες ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκ τῆς χώρας γεννημάτων, τὰς δὲ κοινὰς παρασκευὰς καὶ χορηγίας ἁθροίζοντες ἐκ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην προσόδων, ἔτι δὲ πολεμεῖν εἰθισμένοι ξενικαῖς δυνάμεσι, [2] τότε πάντων ἅμα τούτων οὐ μόνον ἐστερημένοι παραλόγως, ἀλλὰ καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτῶν ὁρῶντες ἕκαστα τῶν προειρημένων ἐπιστρέφοντα, τελέως ἐν μεγάλῃ δυσθυμίᾳ καὶ δυσελπιστίᾳ καθέστασαν, ἅτε παρὰ τὴν προσδοκίαν αὐτοῖς τῶν πραγμάτων ἀποβεβηκότων. [3] τετρυμένοι γὰρ ἐν τῷ περὶ Σικελίας πολέμῳ συνεχῶς ἤλπιζον ἐπιτελεσθεισῶν τῶν διαλύσεων ἀναπνοῆς τινος τεύξεσθαι καὶ καταστάσεως εὐδοκουμένης. [4] συνέβαινε δ᾽ αὐτοῖς τἀναντία: μείζονος γὰρ ἐνίστατο πολέμου καταρχὴ καὶ φοβερωτέρου. [5] πρόσθεν μὲν γὰρ ὑπὲρ Σικελίας ἠμφισβήτουν Ῥωμαίοις, τότε δὲ περὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος ἔμελλον κινδυνεύσειν, πόλεμον ἀναλαμβάνοντες ἐμφύλιον. [6] πρὸς δὲ τούτοις οὐχ ὅπλων πλῆθος, οὐ ναυτικὴ δύναμις, οὐ πλοίων κατασκευὴ παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς ἦν, ὡς ἂν τοσαύταις ναυμαχίαις περιπεπτωκότων: καὶ μὴν οὐδὲ χορηγιῶν διάθεσις οὐδὲ φίλων οὐδὲ συμμάχων τῶν βοηθησόντων ἔξωθεν ἐλπὶς οὐδ᾽ ἡτισοῦν ὑ
πῆρχεν. [7] διὸ καὶ τότε σαφῶς ἔγνωσαν ἡλίκην ἔχει διαφορὰν ξενικὸς καὶ διαπόντιος πόλεμος ἐμφυλίου στάσεως καὶ ταραχῆς. [8] οὐχ ἥκιστα δ᾽ αὐτοὶ σφίσι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τηλι

  71. Three things must be noticed in regard to the Carthaginians. First, among them the means of life of private persons are supplied by the produce of the land; secondly, all public expenses for war material and stores are discharged from the tribute paid by the people of Libya; and thirdly, it is their regular custom to carry on war by means of mercenary troops. At this moment they not only found themselves unexpectedly deprived of all these resources at once, but saw each one of them actually employed against themselves. Such an unlooked-for event naturally reduced them to a state of great discouragement and despair. After the long agony of the Sicilian war they were in hopes, when the peace was ratified, that they might obtain some breathing space and some period of settled content. The very reverse was now befalling them. They were confronted by an outbreak of war still more difficult and formidable. In the former they were disputing with Rome for the possession of Sicily: but this was a domestic war, and the issue at stake was the bare existence of themselves and their country. Besides, the many battles in which they had been engaged at sea had naturally left them ill supplied with arms, sailors, and vessels. They had no store of provisions ready, and no expectation whatever of external assistance from friends or allies. They were indeed now thoroughly taught the difference between a foreign war, carried on beyond the seas, and a domestic insurrection and disturbance.

  [1] κούτων κακῶν ἐγεγόνεισαν αἴτιοι. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν προγεγονότα πόλεμον εὐλόγους ἀφορμὰς ἔχειν ὑπολαμβάνοντες πικρῶς ἐπεστάτησαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην ἀνθρώπων, [2] παραιρούμενοι μὲν τῶν ἄλλων πάντων τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεις, διπλασίους δὲ ταῖς πόλεσι τοὺς φόρους ἢ πρὶν ἐπιτάττοντες, συγγνώμην δὲ τοῖς ἀπόροις ἢ συμπεριφορὰν οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν ἐπ᾽ οὐδενὶ τῶν πραττομένων διδόντες, [3] θαυμάζοντες δὲ καὶ τιμῶντες τῶν ἀεὶ στρατηγῶν οὐ τοὺς πρᾴως καὶ φιλανθρώπως τῷ πλήθει χρωμένους, ἀλλὰ τοὺς αὐτοῖς μὲν ἑτοιμάζοντας πλείστας χορηγίας καὶ ἐπισκευάς, τοῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν χώραν πικρότατα χρωμένους, ὧν εἷς ἦν Ἄννων. [4] τοιγαροῦν οἱ μὲν ἄνδρες οὐχ οἷον παρακλήσεως πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀγγέλου μόνον ἐδεήθησαν: [5] αἱ δὲ γυναῖκες αἱ τὸν πρὸ τοῦ χρόνον ἀπαγομένους περιορῶσαι τοὺς σφετέρους ἄνδρας καὶ γονεῖς πρὸς τὰς εἰσφοράς, τότε συνομνύουσαι κατὰ πόλεις ἐφ᾽ ᾧ μηδὲν κρύψειν τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐταῖς, ἀφαιρούμεναι τὸν κόσμον εἰσέφερον ἀπροφασίστως εἰς τοὺς ὀψωνιασμούς. [6] καὶ τοιαύτην παρεσκεύασαν εὐπορίαν τοῖς περὶ τὸν Μάθω καὶ Σπένδιον ὥστε μὴ μόνον διαλῦσαι τὰ προσοφειλόμενα τῶν ὀψωνίων τοῖς μισθοφόροις κατὰ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας, ἃς ἐποιήσαντο πρὸς τὴν ἀπόστασιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὸ συνεχὲς εὐπορῆσαι χορηγίας. [7] οὕτως οὐδέποτε δεῖ πρὸς τὸ παρὸν μόνον, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἀποβλέπειν ἀεὶ τοὺς ὀρθῶς βουλευομένους.

  72. And for these overpowering miseries they had themselves to thank more than any one else. During the late war they had availed themselves of what they regarded as a reasonable pretext for exercising their supremacy over the inhabitants of Libya with excessive harshness. They had exacted half of all agricultural produce; had doubled the tribute of the towns; and, in levying these contributions, had refused to show any grace or indulgence whatever to those who were in embarrassed circumstances. Their admiration and rewards were reserved, not for those generals who treated the people with mildness and humanity, but exclusively for those who like Hanno secured them the most abundant supplies and war material, though at the cost of the harshest treatment of the provincials.

  These people therefore needed no urging to revolt: a single messenger sufficed. The women, who up to this time had passively looked on while their husbands and fathers were being led off to prison for the non-payment of the taxes, now bound themselves by an oath in their several towns that they would conceal nothing that they possessed; and, stripping off their ornaments, unreservedly contributed them to furnish pay for the soldiers. They thus put such large means into the hands of Mathos and Spendius, that they not only discharged the arrears due to the mercenaries, which they had promised them as an inducement to mutiny, but remained well supplied for future needs. A striking illustration of the fact that true policy does not regard only the immediate necessities of the hour, but must ever look still more keenly to the future.

  [1] οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καίπερ ἐν τοιούτοις κακοῖς ὄντες οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι, προστησάμενοι τὸν Ἄννωνα στρατηγὸν διὰ τὸ δοκεῖν τοῦτον καὶ πρότερον αὐτοῖς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἑκατοντάπυλον τῆς Λιβύης καταστρέψασθαι, συνήθροιζον μὲν μισθοφόρους, καθώπλιζον δὲ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ἡλικίαις τῶν πολιτῶν: [2] ἐγύμναζον δὲ καὶ συνέταττον τοὺς πολιτικοὺς ἱππεῖς: παρεσκεύαζον δὲ καὶ τὰ περιλιπῆ τῶν πλοίων, τριήρεις καὶ πεντηκοντόρους καὶ τὰ μέγιστα τῶν ἀκατίων. [3] οἱ δὲ περὶ τὸν Μάθω, παραγενομένων αὐτοῖς εἰς ἑπτὰ μυριάδας Λιβύων, ἐπιδιελόντες τούτους, ἀσφαλῶς ἐπολιόρκουν τοὺς Ἰτυκαίους καὶ τοὺς Ἱππακρίτας, βεβαίως δὲ τὴν ἐν τῷ Τύνητι στρατοπεδείαν κατεῖχον, ἀποκεκλείκεσαν δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδονίους ἁπάσης τῆς ἐκτὸς Λιβύης. [4] ἡ γὰρ Καρχηδὼν αὐτὴ μὲν ἐν κόλπῳ κεῖται, προτείνουσα καὶ χερρονησίζουσα τῇ θέσει, τὸ μὲν τῇ θαλάττῃ τὸ δέ τι καὶ λίμνῃ περιεχομένη κατὰ τὸ πλεῖστον: [5] ὁ δὲ συνάπτων ἰσθμὸς αὐτὴν τῇ Λιβύῃ τὸ πλάτος ὡς εἴκοσι καὶ πέντε σταδίων ἐστιν. τούτου δ᾽ ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ πρὸς τὸ πέλαγος νεύοντος μέρους οὐ μακρὰν ἡ τῶν Ἰτυκαίων κεῖται πόλις, ἐπὶ δὲ θατέρου παρὰ τὴν λίμνην ὁ Τύνης. [6] ἐφ᾽ ὧν ἑκατέρων τότε στρατοπεδεύσαντες οἱ μισθοφόροι καὶ διακλείσαντες ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας τοὺς Καρχηδονίους λοιπὸν ἐπεβούλευον αὐτῇ τῇ πόλει, [7] καὶ ποτὲ μὲν ἡμέρας, ποτὲ δὲ καὶ νύκτωρ παραγινόμενοι πρὸς τὸ τεῖχος εἰς φόβους καὶ θορύβους ὁλοσχε

  73. No such considerations, however, prevented the Carthaginians in their hour of distress from appointing Hanno general; because he had the credit of having on a former occasion reduced the city called Hecatompylos, in Libya, to obedience. They also set about collecting mercenaries; arming their own citizens who were of military age; training and drilli
ng the city cavalry; and refitting what were left of their ships, triremes, penteconters, and the largest of the pinnaces. Meanwhile Mathos, being joined by as many as seventy thousand Libyans, distributed these fresh troops between the two forces which were besieging Utica and Hippo Zarytus, and carried on those sieges without let or hindrance. At the same time they kept firm possession of the encampment at Tunes, and had thus shut out the Carthaginians from the whole of outer Libya. For Carthage itself stands on a projecting peninsula in a gulf, nearly surrounded by the sea and in part also by a lake. The isthmus that connects it with Libya is three miles broad: upon one side of this isthmus, in the direction of the open sea and at no great distance, stands the city of Utica, and on the other stands Tunes, upon the shore of the lake. The mercenaries occupied both these points, and having thus cut off the Carthaginians from the open country, proceeded to take measures against Utica itself. They made frequent excursions up to the town wall, sometimes by day and sometimes by night, and were continually throwing the citizens into a state of alarm and absolute panic.