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Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

Page 405

by Polybius


  76. While these events were happening in Italy, Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the fleet, setting sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to land with his whole squadron at a place in Iberia called Emporium. Starting from this town, he made descents upon the coast, landing and besieging those who refused to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the Iber; and treating with every mark of kindness those who acceded to his demands, and taking all the precautions he could for their safety. When he had garrisoned those towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole army inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of march, some by negotiation and some by force of arms. The Carthaginian troops which Hannibal had left in that district under the command of Hanno, lay entrenched to resist him under the walls of a town called Cissa.

  Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only got possession of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the army invading Italy had been left under its charge, but secured the friendly alliance of all the Iberian tribes north of the Iber, and took both Hanno, the general of the Carthaginians, and Andobales, the general of the Iberians, prisoners. The latter was despot of central Iberia, and had always been especially inclined to the side of Carthage.

  Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal crossed the Iber to bring aid. There he ascertained that the Roman troops left in charge of the fleet had abandoned all precautions, and were trading on the success of the land forces to pass their time in ease. He therefore took with him eight thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his own army, and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country, he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for refuge to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again, and employed himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts south of the river, taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his fleet, he punished the authors of the disaster according to the Roman custom; and then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco, and there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with affection towards himself and eagerness for future service. Such was the course of the Iberian campaign.

  [1] καὶ τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν ἐν τούτοις ἦν. ἐνισταμένης δὲ τῆς ἐαρινῆς ὥρας, Γάιος μὲν Φλαμίνιος ἀναλαβὼν τὰς αὑτοῦ δυνάμεις προῆγε διὰ Τυρρηνίας καὶ κατεστρατοπέδευσε πρὸ τῆς τῶν Ἀρρητίνων πόλεως, [2] Γνάιος δὲ Σερουίλιος τοὔμπαλιν ὡς ἐπ᾽ Ἀριμίνου, ταύτῃ παρατηρήσων τὴν εἰσβολὴν τῶν ὑπεναντίων. [3] Ἀννίβας δὲ παραχειμάζων ἐν τῇ Κελτικῇ τοὺς μὲν Ῥωμαίους τῶν ἐκ τῆς μάχης αἰχμαλώτων ἐν φυλακῇ συνεῖχεν, τὰ μέτρια τῶν ἐπιτηδείων διδούς, [4] τοὺς δὲ συμμάχους αὐτῶν τὸ μὲν πρῶτον ἐν τῇ πάσῃ φιλανθρωπίᾳ διεξῆγεν, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα συναγαγὼν παρεκάλει, φάσκων οὐκ ἐκείνοις ἥκειν πολεμήσων, ἀλλὰ Ῥωμαίοις ὑπὲρ ἐκείνων. διόπερ ἔφη δεῖν αὐτούς, [5] ἐὰν ὀρθῶς φρονῶσιν, ἀντέχεσθαι τῆς πρὸς αὑτὸν φιλίας. [6] παρεῖναι γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν ἀνακτησόμενος Ἰταλιώταις, ὁμοίως δὲ τὰς πόλεις καὶ τὴν χώραν, ἣν ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων ἀπολωλεκότες ἕκαστοι τυγχάνουσι, συνανασώσων. [7] ταῦτα δ᾽ εἰπὼν ἀφῆκε πάντας χωρὶς λύτρων εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν, βουλόμενος ἅμα μὲν προκαλεῖσθαι διὰ τοιούτου τρόπου πρὸς αὑτὸν τοὺς κατοικοῦντας τὴν Ἰταλίαν, ἅμα δ᾽ ἀπαλλοτριοῦν τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους εὐνοίας, ἐρεθίζειν δὲ τοὺς δοκοῦντας πόλεσιν ἢ λιμέσιν ἠλαττῶσθαί τι διὰ τῆς Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῆς.

  77. At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius marched his army through Etruria, and pitched his camp at Arretium; while his colleague Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum, to await the advance of the enemy in that direction.

  Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept his Roman prisoners in close confinement, supplying them very sparingly with food; while he treated their allies with great kindness from the first, and finally called them together and addressed them, alleging, “that he had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf; and that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves to him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians, and to assist them to recover their cities and territory which they had severally lost to Rome.” With these words he dismissed them without ransom to their own homes: wishing by this policy to attract the inhabitants of Italy to his cause, and to alienate their affections from Rome, and to awaken the resentment of all those who considered themselves to have suffered by the loss of harbours or cities under the Roman rule.

  [1] ἐχρήσατο δέ τινι καὶ Φοινικικῷ στρατηγήματι τοιούτῳ κατὰ τὴν παραχειμασίαν. [2] ἀγωνιῶν γὰρ τὴν ἀθεσίαν τῶν Κελτῶν καὶ τὰς ἐπιβουλὰς τὰς περὶ τὸ σῶμα διὰ τὸ πρόσφατον τῆς πρὸς αὐτοὺς συστάσεως κατεσκευάσατο περιθετὰς τρίχας, ἁρμοζούσας ταῖς κατὰ τὰς ὁλοσχερεῖς διαφορὰς τῶν ἡλικιῶν ἐπιπρεπείαις, [3] καὶ ταύταις ἐχρῆτο συνεχῶς μετατιθέμενος: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐσθῆτας μετελάμβανε τὰς καθηκούσας ἀεὶ ταῖς περιθεταῖς. [4] δι᾽ ὧν οὐ μόνον τοῖς αἰφνιδίως ἰδοῦσι δύσγνωστος ἦν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐν συνηθείᾳ γεγονόσιν. [5] θεωρῶν δὲ τοὺς Κελτοὺς δυσχεραίνοντας ἐπὶ τῷ τὸν πόλεμον ἐν τῇ παρ᾽ αὑτῶν χώρᾳ λαμβάνειν τὴν τριβήν, σπεύδοντας δὲ καὶ μετεώρους ὄντας εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν, προφάσει μὲν διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους ὀργήν, τὸ δὲ πλεῖον διὰ τὰς ὠφελείας, ἔκρινε τὴν ταχίστην ἀναζευγνύειν καὶ συνεκπληροῦν τὰς τῶν δυνάμεων ὁρμάς. [6] διόπερ ἅμα τῷ τὴν ὥραν μεταβάλλειν πυνθανόμενος τῶν μάλιστα τῆς χώρας δοκούντων ἐμπειρεῖν τὰς μὲν ἄλλας ἐμβολὰς τὰς εἰς τὴν πολεμίαν μακρὰς εὕρισκε καὶ προδήλους τοῖς ὑπεναντίοις, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑλῶν εἰς Τυρρηνίαν φέρουσαν δυσχερῆ μὲν σύντομον δὲ καὶ παράδοξον φανησομένην τοῖς περὶ τὸν Φλαμίνιον. [7] ἀεὶ δέ πως οἰκεῖος ὢν τῇ φύσει τούτου τοῦ μέρους ταύτῃ προέθετο ποιεῖσθαι τὴν πορείαν. [8] διαδοθείσης δὲ τῆς φήμης ἐν τῷ στρατοπέδῳ διότι μέλλει διά τινων ἑλῶν ἄγειν αὐτοὺς ὁ στρατηγός, πᾶς τις εὐλαβῶς εἶχε πρὸς τὴν πορείαν, ὑφορώμενος βάραθρα καὶ

  78. While he was in these winter quarters also he practised a ruse truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness of their character, and the newness of the tie between himself and them, the Celts might lay plots against his life, he caused a number of wigs to be made for
him, suited in appearance to men of various ages; and these he constantly varied, changing at the same time his clothes also to harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus made it hard to recognise him, not only for those who met him suddenly, but even for his intimates. But seeing that the Celts were discontented at the lengthened continuance of the war within their borders, and were in a state of restless hurry to invade the enemy’s territory, — on the pretence of hatred for Rome, but in reality from love of booty, — he determined to break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the desires of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the country best, he ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and well known to the enemy, but that the one which led through the marshes was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius as a surprise. This was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take this route. But when the report was spread in his army that the general was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier felt alarmed at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs which they would find on this march.

  [1] τοὺς λιμνώδεις τῶν τόπων. Ἀννίβας δ᾽ ἐπιμελῶς ἐξητακὼς τεναγώδεις καὶ στερεοὺς ὑπάρχοντας τοὺς κατὰ τὴν δίοδον τόπους, ἀναζεύξας εἰς μὲν τὴν πρωτοπορείαν ἔθηκε τοὺς Λίβυας καὶ Ἴβηρας καὶ πᾶν τὸ χρησιμώτερον μέρος τῆς σφετέρας δυνάμεως, συγκαταμίξας αὐτοῖς τὴν ἀποσκευήν, ἵνα πρὸς τὸ παρὸν εὐπορῶσι τῶν ἐπιτηδείων: [2] πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μέλλον εἰς τέλος ἀφροντίστως εἶχε περὶ παντὸς τοῦ σκευοφόρου, λογιζόμενος ὡς ἐὰν ἅψηται τῆς πολεμίας, ἡττηθεὶς μὲν οὐ προσδεήσεται τῶν ἀναγκαίων, κρατῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπαίθρων οὐκ ἀπορήσει τῶν ἐπιτηδείων. [3] ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς προειρημένοις ἐπέβαλε τοὺς Κελτούς, ἐπὶ δὲ πᾶσι τοὺς ἱππεῖς. [4] ἐπιμελητὴν δὲ τῆς οὐραγίας τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἀπέλιπε Μάγωνα τῶν τε λοιπῶν χάριν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Κελτῶν μαλακίας καὶ φυγοπονίας, ἵν᾽ ἐὰν κακοπαθοῦντες τρέπωνται πάλιν εἰς τοὐπίσω, κωλύῃ διὰ τῶν ἱππέων καὶ προσφέρῃ τὰς χεῖρας αὐτοῖς. [5] οἱ μὲν οὖν Ἴβηρες καὶ Λίβυες δι᾽ ἀκεραίων τῶν ἑλῶν ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν μετρίως κακοπαθοῦντες ἤνυον, ἅτε καὶ φερέκακοι πάντες ὄντες καὶ συνήθεις ταῖς τοιαύταις ταλαιπωρίαις. [6] οἱ δὲ Κελτοὶ δυσχερῶς μὲν εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν προύβαινον, τεταραγμένων καὶ διαπεπατημένων εἰς βάθος τῶν ἑλῶν, ἐπιπόνως δὲ καὶ ταλαιπώρως ὑπέμενον τὴν κακοπάθειαν, ἄπειροι πάσης τῆς τοιαύτης ὄντες κακουχίας. [7] ἐκωλύοντο δὲ πάλιν ἀπονεύειν εἰς τοὐπίσω διὰ τοὺς ἐφεστῶτας αὐτοῖς ἱππεῖς. [8] πάντες μὲν οὖν ἐκακοπάθουν καὶ μάλιστα διὰ τὴν ἀγρυπνίαν, ὡς ἂν ἑξῆς ἡμέρας τέτταρας καὶ τρεῖς νύκτας συνεχῶς δι᾽ ὕδατος ποιούμενοι τὴν πορείαν: διαφερόντως γε μὴν ἐπόνουν καὶ κατεφθείρονθ᾽ ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ Κελτοί. [9] τῶν δ᾽ ὑποζυγίων αὐτοῦ τὰ πλεῖστα πίπτοντα διὰ τοὺς πηλοὺς ἀπώλλυντο, μίαν παρεχόμενα χρείαν ἐν τῷ πεσεῖν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις: [10] καθεζόμενοι γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν καὶ τῶν σκευῶν σωρηδὸν ὑπὲρ τὸ ὑγρὸν ὑπερεῖχον καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τρόπῳ βραχὺ μέρος τῆς νυκτὸς ἀπεκοιμῶντο. [11] οὐκ ὀλίγοι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἵππων τὰς ὁπλὰς ἀπέβαλον διὰ τὴν συνέχειαν τῆς διὰ τῶν πηλῶν πορείας. [12] Ἀννίβας δὲ μόλις ἐπὶ τοῦ περιλειφθέντος θηρίου διεσώθη μετὰ πολλῆς ταλαιπωρίας, ὑπεραλγὴς ὢν διὰ τὴν βαρύτητα τῆς ἐπενεχθείσης ὀφθαλμίας αὐτῷ, δι᾽ ἣν καὶ τέλος ἐστερήθη τῆς μιᾶς ὄψεως, οὐκ ἐπιδεχομένου τοῦ καιροῦ καταμονὴν οὐδὲ θεραπείαν διὰ τὸ τῆς περιστάσεως ἀδύνατον.

  79. But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road was firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp and marched out. He placed the Libyans and Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van, and the baggage within their lines, that there might be plenty of provisions for their immediate needs. Provisions for the future he entirely neglected. Because he calculated that on reaching the enemy’s territory, if he were beaten he should not require them, and if he were victorious he would find abundance in the open country. Behind this vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the cavalry. He entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his brother Mago, that he might see to the security of all, and especially to guard against the cowardice and impatience of hard labour which characterised the Celts; in order that, if the difficulty of the route should induce them to turn back, he might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force them to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans, having great powers of endurance and being habituated to such fatigues, and also because when they marched through them the marshes were fresh and untrodden, accomplished their march with a moderate amount of distress: but the Celts advanced with great difficulty, because the marshes were now disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being quite unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning back by the cavalry in their rear. All however suffered grievously, especially from the impossibility of getting sleep on a continuous march of four days and three nights through a route which was under water: but none suffered so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished, and could then only do the men one service: they sat upon their dead bodies, and piling up baggage upon them so as to stand out above the water, they managed to get a snatch of sleep for a short portion of the night. Another misfortune was that a considerable number of the horses lost their hoofs by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself was with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack of ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one eye, because the time and the difficulties of the situation did not admit of his waiting or applying any treatment to it.

 

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