Delphi Complete Works of Polybius

by Polybius

  108. With earnest words of exhortation, therefore, to Aemilius, putting before him the gravity in every point of view of the result of the battle, they despatched him with instructions to seek a favourable opportunity to fight a decisive battle with a courage worthy of Rome. Having arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known the will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted them to do their duty in terms which evidently came from his heart. He addressed himself especially to explain and excuse the reverses which they had lately experienced; for it was on this point particularly that the soldiers were depressed and stood in need of encouragement. “The causes,” he argued, “of their defeats in former battles were many, and could not be reduced to one or two. But those causes were at an end; and no excuse existed now, if they only showed themselves to be men of courage, for not conquering their enemies. Up to that time both Consuls had never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly trained soldiers: the combatants on the contrary had been raw levies, entirely unexperienced in danger; and what was most important of all, they had been so entirely ignorant of their opponents, that they had been brought into the field, and engaged in a pitched battle with an enemy that they had never once set eyes on. Those who had been defeated on the Trebia were drawn up on the field at daybreak, on the very next morning after their arrival from Sicily; while those who had fought in Etruria, not only had never seen the enemy before, but did not do so even during the very battle itself, owing to the unfortunate state of the atmosphere.

  [1] πρῶτον γὰρ ἡμεῖς ἀμφότεροι πάρεσμεν, οὐ μόνον αὐτοὶ κοινωνήσοντες ὑμῖν τῶν κινδύνων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ πρότερον ἔτους ἄρχοντας ἑτοίμους παρεσκευάκαμεν πρὸς τὸ μένειν καὶ μετέχειν τῶν αὐτῶν ἀγώνων. [2] ὑμεῖς γε μὴν οὐ μόνον ἑωράκατε τοὺς καθοπλισμούς, τὰς τάξεις, τὰ πλήθη τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαχόμενοι μόνον οὐ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην ἡμέραν δεύτερον ἐνιαυτὸν ἤδη διατελεῖτε. [3] πάντων οὖν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐναντίως ἐχόντων ταῖς προγεγενημέναις μάχαις, εἰκὸς καὶ τὸ τέλος ἐναντίον ἐκβήσεσθαι τοῦ νῦν ἀγῶνος. [4] καὶ γὰρ ἄτοπον, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀδύνατον, ἐν μὲν τοῖς κατὰ μέρος ἀκροβολισμοῖς ἴσους πρὸς ἴσους συμπίπτοντας τὸ πλεῖον ἐπικρατεῖν, ὁμοῦ δὲ πάντας παραταξαμένους πλείους ὄντας ἢ διπλασίους τῶν ὑπεναντίων ἐλαττωθῆναι. [5] διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, πάντων ὑμῖν παρεσκευασμένων πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν, ἑνὸς προσδεῖται τὰ πράγματα, τῆς ὑμετέρας βουλήσεως καὶ προθυμίας, ὑπὲρ ἧς οὐδὲ παρακαλεῖσθαι πλείω πρέπειν ὑμῖν ὑπολαμβάνω. [6] τοῖς μέν γε μισθοῦ παρά τισι στρατευομένοις ἢ τοῖς κατὰ συμμαχίαν ὑπὲρ τῶν πέλας μέλλουσι κινδυνεύειν, οἷς κατ᾽ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀγῶνα καιρός ἐστι δεινότατος, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀποβαινόντων βραχεῖαν ἔχει διαφοράν, ἀναγκαῖος ὁ τῆς παρακλήσεως γίνεται τρόπος: [7] οἷς δέ, καθάπερ ὑμῖν νῦν, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἑτέρων ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὲρ σφῶν αὐτῶν καὶ πατρίδος καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ τέκνων ὁ κίνδυνος συνέστηκεν, καὶ πολλαπλασίαν τὰ μετὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα τὴν διαφορὰν ἔχει τῶν ἐνεστώτων ἀεὶ κινδύνων, ὑπομνήσεως μόνον, παρακλήσεως δ᾽ οὐ προσδεῖ. [8] τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν βούλοιτο μάλιστα μὲν νικᾶν ἀγωνιζόμενος, εἰ δὲ μὴ τοῦτ᾽ εἴη δυνατόν, τεθνάναι πρόσθεν μαχόμενος ἢ ζῶν ἐπιδεῖν τὴν τῶν προειρημένων ὕβριν καὶ καταφθοράν; [9] διόπερ, ὦ ἄνδρες, χωρὶς τῶν ὑπ᾽ ἐμοῦ λεγομένων, αὐτοὶ λαμβάνοντες πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λείπεσθαι καὶ τοῦ νικᾶν διαφορὰν καὶ τὰ συνεξακολουθοῦντα τούτοις, οὕτως ἑαυτοὺς παραστήσεσθε πρὸς τὴν μάχην ὡς τῆς πατρίδος οὐ κινδυνευούσης νῦν αὐτοῖς τοῖς στρατοπέδοις, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ὅλοις. [10] τί γὰρ ἔτι προσθεῖσα τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις, ἐὰν ἄλλως πως τὰ παρόντα κριθῇ, περιγενήσεται τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὐκ ἔχει. [11] πᾶσαν γὰρ τὴν αὑτῆς προθυμίαν καὶ δύναμιν εἰς ὑμᾶς ἀπήρεισται, καὶ πάσας τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχει τῆς σωτηρίας ἐν ὑμῖν. ὧν ὑμεῖς αὐτὴν μὴ διαψεύσητε νῦν, [12] ἀλλ᾽ ἀπόδοτε μὲν τῇ πατρίδι τὰς ἁρμοζούσας χάριτας, φανερὸν δὲ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ποιήσατε διότι καὶ τὰ πρότερον ἐλαττώματα γέγονεν οὐ διὰ τὸ Ῥωμαίους χείρους ἄνδρας εἶναι Καρχηδονίων, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἀπειρίαν τῶν τότε μαχομένων καὶ διὰ τὰς ἐκ τῶν καιρῶν περιστάσεις. [13] “2 τότε μὲν οὖν ταῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτα παρακαλέσας ὁ Λεύκιος διαφῆκε τοὺς πολλούς.

  109. But now the conditions were quite different. For in the first place both Consuls were with the army: and were not only prepared to share the danger themselves, but had also induced the Consuls of the previous year to remain and take part in the struggle. While the men had not only seen the arms, order, and numbers of the enemy, but had been engaged in almost daily fights with them for the last two years. The conditions therefore under which the two former battles were fought being quite different, it was but natural that the result of the coming struggle should be different too. For it would be strange or rather impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where the numbers of either side were equal, had for the most part come off victorious, should, when drawn up all together, and nearly double of the enemy in number, be defeated.”

  “Wherefore, men of the army,” he continued, “seeing that we have every advantage on our side for securing a victory, there is only one thing necessary — your determination, your zeal! And I do not think I need say more to you on that point. To men serving others for pay, or to those who fight as allies on behalf of others, who have no greater danger to expect than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake are of little importance, — such men may need words of exhortation. But men who, like you, are fighting not for others, but themselves, — for country, wives, and children; and for whom the issue is of far more momentous consequence than the mere danger of the hour, need only to be reminded: require no exhortation. For who is there among you who would not wish if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not be, to die with arms in his hands, rather than to live and see the outrage and death of those dear objects which I have named? Wherefore, men of the army, apart from any words of mine, place before your eyes the momentous difference to you between victory and defeat, and all their consequences. Enter upon this battle with the full conviction, that in it your country is not risking a certain number of legions, but her bare existence. For she has nothing to add to such an army as this, to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she has of confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of safety are in your hands. Do not frustrate those hopes: but pay back to your country
the gratitude you owe her; and make it clear to all the world that the former reverses occurred, not because the Romans are worse men than the Carthaginians, but from the lack of experience on the part of those who were then fighting, and through a combination of adverse circumstances.” With such words Aemilius dismissed the troops.

  [1] τῇ δ᾽ ἐπαύριον ἀναζεύξαντες ἦγον τὴν δύναμιν οὗ τοὺς πολεμίους ἤκουον στρατοπεδεύειν. δευτεραῖοι δ᾽ ἐπιβαλόντες παρενέβαλον, περὶ πεντήκοντα σταδίους ἀποσχόντες τῶν πολεμίων. [2] ὁ μὲν οὖν Λεύκιος συνθεασάμενος ἐπιπέδους καὶ ψιλοὺς ὄντας τοὺς πέριξ τόπους οὐκ ἔφη δεῖν συμβάλλειν ἱπποκρατούντων τῶν πολεμίων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπισπᾶσθαι καὶ προάγειν μᾶλλον εἰς τόπους τοιούτους ἐν οἷς τὸ πλέον ἔσται διὰ τῶν πεζικῶν στρατοπέδων ἡ μάχη. [3] τοῦ δὲ Γαΐου διὰ τὴν ἀπειρίαν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐναντίας ὑπάρχοντος γνώμης, ἦν ἀμφισβήτησις καὶ δυσχρηστία περὶ τοὺς ἡγεμόνας, ὃ πάντων ἐστὶ σφαλερώτατον. [4] τῆς δ᾽ ἡγεμονίας τῷ Γαΐῳ καθηκούσης εἰς τὴν ἐπιοῦσαν ἡμέραν διὰ τὸ παρὰ μίαν ἐκ τῶν ἐθισμῶν μεταλαμβάνειν τὴν ἀρχὴν τοὺς ὑπάτους, ἀναστρατοπεδεύσας προῆγε, βουλόμενος ἐγγίσαι τοῖς πολεμίοις, πολλὰ διαμαρτυρομένου καὶ κωλύοντος τοῦ Λευκίου. [5] ὁ δ᾽ Ἀννίβας ἀναλαβὼν τοὺς εὐζώνους καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἀπήντα καὶ προσπεσὼν ἔτι κατὰ πορείαν οὖσι παραδόξως συνεπλέκετο καὶ πολὺν ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐποιεῖτο θόρυβον. [6] οἱ δὲ Ῥωμαῖοι τὴν μὲν πρώτην ἐπιφορὰν ἐδέξαντο, προθέμενοί τινας τῶν ἐν τοῖς βαρέσι καθοπλισμοῖς: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς ἀκοντιστὰς καὶ τοὺς ἱππεῖς ἐπαφέντες ἐπροτέρουν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην συμπλοκὴν διὰ τὸ τοῖς μὲν Καρχηδονίοις μηδὲν ἐφεδρεύειν ἀξιόλογον, τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις ἀναμεμιγμένας τοῖς εὐζώνοις ὁμόσε κινδυνεύειν τινὰς σπείρας. [7] τότε μὲν οὖν ἐπιγενομένης νυκτὸς ἐχωρίσθησαν ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἐκβάσης τῆς ἐπιθέσεως: [8] εἰς δὲ τὴν ἐπαύριον ὁ Λεύκιος οὔτε μάχεσθαι κρίνων οὔτε μὴν ἀπάγειν ἀσφαλῶς τὴν στρατιὰν ἔτι δυνάμενος τοῖς μὲν δυσὶ μέρεσι κατεστρατοπέδευσε παρὰ τὸν Αὔφιδον καλούμενον ποταμόν, ὃς μόνος διαρρεῖ τὸν Ἀπεννῖνον — [9] τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστιν ὄρος συνεχές, ὃ διείργει πάσας τὰς κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ῥύσεις, τὰς μὲν εἰς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος, τὰς δ᾽ εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν: δι᾽ οὗ ῥέοντα συμβαίνει τὸν Αὔφιδον τὰς μὲν πηγὰς ἔχειν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ Τυρρηνικὸν κλίμασι τῆς Ἰταλίας, ποιεῖσθαι δὲ τὴν ἐκβολὴν εἰς τὸν Ἀδρίαν — τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ πέραν, [10] ἀπὸ διαβάσεως πρὸς τὰς ἀνατολάς, ἐβάλετο χάρακα, τῆς μὲν ἰδίας παρεμβολῆς περὶ δέκα σταδίους ἀποσχών, τῆς δὲ τῶν ὑπεναντίων μικρῷ πλεῖον, [11] βουλόμενος διὰ τούτων προκαθῆσθαι μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῆς πέραν παρεμβολῆς προνομευόντων, ἐπικεῖσθαι δὲ τοῖς παρὰ τῶν Καρχηδονίων.

  110. Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp, and advanced to where they heard that the enemy were entrenched. On the second day they arrived within sight of them, and pitched their camp at about fifty stades’ distance. But when Aemilius observed that the ground was flat and bare for some distance round, he said that they must not engage there with an enemy superior to them in cavalry; but that they must rather try to draw him off, and lead him to ground on which the battle would be more in the hands of the infantry. But Gaius Terentius being, from inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute and misunderstanding between the leaders, which of all things is the most dangerous. It is the custom, when the two Consuls are present, that they should take the chief command on alternate days; and the next day happening to be the turn of Terentius, he ordered an advance with a view of approaching the enemy, in spite of the protests and active opposition of his colleague. Hannibal set his light-armed troops and cavalry in motion to meet him, and charging the Romans while they were still marching, took them by surprise and caused a great confusion in their ranks. The Romans repulsed the first charge by putting some of their heavy-armed in front; and then sending forward their light-armed and cavalry, began to get the best of the fight all along the line: the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance, while certain companies of the legionaries were mixed with the Roman light-armed, and helped to sustain the battle. Nightfall for the present put an end to a struggle which had not at all answered to the hopes of the Carthaginians. But next day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage, and yet being unable any longer to lead off his army, encamped with two-thirds of it on the banks of the Aufidus, the only river which flows right through the Apennines, — that chain of mountains which forms the watershed of all the Italian rivers, which flow either west to the Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This chain is, I say, pierced by the Aufidus, which rises on the side of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea, and is discharged into the Hadriatic. For the other third of his army he caused a camp to be made across the river, to the east of the ford, about ten stades from his own lines, and a little more from those of the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river, might protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of the enemy.

  [1] Ἀννίβας δὲ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καιρὸν θεωρῶν ὅτι καλεῖ τὰ πράγματα μάχεσθαι καὶ συμβάλλειν τοῖς πολεμίοις, εὐλαβούμενος δὲ μὴ διατέτραπται τὸ πλῆθος ἐκ τοῦ προγεγονότος ἐλαττώματος, κρίνας προσδεῖσθαι παρακλήσεως τὸν καιρὸν συνῆγε τοὺς πολλούς. [2] ἁθροισθέντων δέ, περιβλέψαι κελεύσας πάντας εἰς τοὺς πέριξ τόπους, ἤρετο τί μεῖζον εὔξασθαι τοῖς θεοῖς κατὰ τοὺς παρόντας ἐδύναντο καιρούς, δοθείσης αὐτοῖς ἐξουσίας, τοῦ παρὰ πολὺ τῶν πολεμίων ἱπποκρατοῦντας ἐν τοιούτοις τόποις διακριθῆναι περὶ τῶν ὅλων. [3] πάντων δὲ τὸ ῥηθὲν ἐπισημηναμένων διὰ τὴν ἐνάργειαν “1τούτου τοιγαροῦν”2 ἔφη “1πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς θεοῖς ἔχετε χάριν: ἐκεῖνοι γὰρ ἡμῖν συγκατασκευάζοντες τὴν νίκην εἰς τοιούτους τόπους ἤχασι τοὺς ἐχθρούς: [4] δεύτερον δ᾽ ἡμῖν, ὅτι καὶ μάχεσθαι τοὺς πολεμίους συνηναγκάσαμεν: οὐ γὰρ ἔτι δύνανται τοῦτο διαφυγεῖν: καὶ μάχεσθαι προφανῶς ἐν τοῖς ἡμετέροις προτερήμασι. [5] τὸ δὲ παρακαλεῖν ὑμᾶς νῦν διὰ πλειόνων εὐθαρσεῖς καὶ πρ
οθύμους εἶναι πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον οὐδαμῶς μοι δοκεῖ καθήκειν. [6] ὅτε μὲν γὰρ ἀπείρως διέκεισθε τῆς πρὸς Ῥωμαίους μάχης, ἔδει τοῦτο ποιεῖν, καὶ μεθ᾽ ὑποδειγμάτων ἐγὼ πρὸς ὑμᾶς πολλοὺς διεθέμην λόγους: [7] ὅτε δὲ κατὰ τὸ συνεχὲς τρισὶ μάχαις τηλικαύταις ἐξ ὁμολογουμένου νενικήκατε Ῥωμαίους, ποῖος ἂν ἔτι λόγος ὑμῖν ἰσχυρότερον παραστήσαι θάρσος αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων; [8] διὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν πρὸ τοῦ κινδύνων κεκρατήκατε τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν ἐκ ταύτης ἀγαθῶν κατὰ τὰς ἡμετέρας ἐπαγγελίας, ἀψευστούντων ἡμῶν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς πρὸς ὑμᾶς εἰρημένοις: ὁ δὲ νῦν ἀγὼν ἐνέστηκεν περὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ἀγαθῶν. [9] οὗ κρατήσαντες κύριοι μὲν ἔσεσθε παραχρῆμα πάσης Ἰταλίας, ἀπαλλαγέντες δὲ τῶν νῦν πόνων, γενόμενοι συμπάσης ἐγκρατεῖς τῆς Ῥωμαίων εὐδαιμονίας, ἡγεμόνες ἅμα καὶ δεσπόται πάντων γενήσεσθε διὰ ταύτης τῆς μάχης. [10] διόπερ οὐκέτι λόγων ἀλλ᾽ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἡ χρεία: θεῶν γὰρ βουλομένων ὅσον οὔπω βεβαιώσειν ὑμῖν πέπεισμαι τὰς ἐπαγγελίας. [11] “2 ταῦτα δὲ καὶ τούτοις παραπλήσια διαλεχθείς, προθύμως αὐτὸν ἐπισημαινομένου τοῦ πλήθους, ἐπαινέσας καὶ δεξάμενος αὐτῶν τὴν ὁρμὴν ἀφῆκε καὶ παραχρῆμα κατεστρατοπέδευσε, ποιούμενος τὸν χάρακα παρὰ τὴν αὐτὴν πλευρὰν τοῦ ποταμοῦ τῇ μείζονι στρατοπεδείᾳ τῶν ὑπεναντίων.